Borders
and
Transborder Processes
in Eurasia

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Издание, подготовленное международным коллективом авторов, охватывает широкий спектр проблем исследований границ на пространстве самого крупного, культурно и политически разнородного континента планеты. Разделы книги посвящены теоретическим и сравнительным аспектам исследований границ в Евразии, вопросам формирования и исторического развития границ, а также современным трансграничным процессам и пограничной политике. Издание предназначено для специалистов в области исследований границ, практиков, преподавателей и студентов.

Ключевые слова: граница, исследования границ, трансграничные процессы, трансграничный регион, пограничная политика, Евразия, Северо-Восточная Азия.

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The editors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their comments on this volume.


The collective work prepared by an international team of authors covers a wide range of problems of border studies within the space of the largest, culturally and politically diverse continent of the planet. Sections of the book are devoted to theoretical and comparative aspects of study of boundaries in Eurasia, the formation and historical development of the boundaries, as well as contemporary transborder processes and border policies. The publication is intended for specialists in the field of border studies, practitioners, teachers and students.

Keywords: border, border studies, transborder processes, transborder region, border policy, Eurasia, Northeast Asia.

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The collective work of the border studies field, and particularly those produced by the Russian academic community, may be quite new to the general reader. Although border studies have developed into a comprehensive and multi-disciplinary field, led by a community of researchers in Europe and North America, its academic reach has only just begun to extend into Eurasia and Asia.

It is well known that political geography, which is closely related to border studies, has had a long and influential tradition in the Russian social science community. Moscow geographers, such as Vladimir Kolosov (current head of the International Geographic Union), and the likes of the renowned Far Eastern academic, Petr Baklanov, have influenced the work of the Northeast Asian research community. Nevertheless, these Russian researchers, with their outstanding geography-based scientific achievements, are less well-known in the field of border studies.

This volume represents some of the very first results to emerge from the new Russian border studies community in Vladivostok. Located at the edge of the Eurasian continent and open to the maritime zones leading to the Pacific, Vladivostok is a natural gateway to Japan, China, the Koreas and further afield, and is an ideal location from which to promote the field of border studies, within the region and beyond.

We welcome the appearance of this collection, which contains both empirical studies on specific regional borders and borderlands and attempts to advance the development of theory within border studies. The volume also features Northeast Asian border issues from the perspective of a younger generation of researchers, casting new light on a future global orientation towards “Eurasia.”

As a representative of Hokkaido University’s Global COE project on border studies and the editor-in-chief of the Eurasia Border Review, I am confident that this collective work will open new horizons for the advancement of Russian border studies and will make an impact on the Eurasian academic community. Despite the challenges related to border studies, it is ob-
vious from this collection that the regional integration of the border studies research community has a bright future.

I am particularly pleased to see that some of the works in this volume are closely related to the recent international conference: BRIT XII (Border Regions in Transition), which was held in Fukuoka and Busan in November 2012. This amazing conference featured some two hundred borderland researchers from forty countries, including more than ten Russian specialists from various parts of Russia, including St. Petersburg, Moscow, Novosibirsk, Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok and Sakhalin. If that conference encouraged Russian researchers to intensively interact with domestic and foreign research communities, then this volume can also be seen as a result of this convergence of border research communities from all over the world. This volume is therefore essential reading and inspiration for all those beyond any border.

Akihiro Iwashita
Coordinator of BRIT XII
Editor of Eurasia Border Review
Professor of the Eurasia Border Research Unit,
Slavic Research Center
With the intensification and spread of processes associated with globalization, regionalism, and regionalization over the last century, borders and transborder regions have arguably become more relevant and important than ever before. As a result of the unexpected demise of the USSR in 1991, there reemerged a Russian state alongside new sovereign states in the Baltic, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. These reconfigurations of political and economic space increased interest in border studies in Russia, though initially the focus was mostly on its western borders, where former socialist states started to implement market reforms and Russia's western borderlands became engaged in more active and intense processes of cross-border economic integration. This phenomenon triggered in Russia the formation of new multidisciplinary scientific research on borders and transborder processes. At the same time, the introduction of market reforms in communist China, the unresolved territorial dispute with Japan, and other processes and events in Asia, increasingly catalyzed an interest in border and transborder studies in the Russian Far East.

Professor Iwashita, in the introduction to this volume, has already mentioned that political geography is closely related to border studies and this sub-discipline has had an influential tradition in the Russian social science community. The relatively recent experience in Russia of globalization and its discontents inspired the renowned Russian Academician Petr Baklanov and his colleagues from the Pacific Institute of Geography in Vladivostok to promote multidisciplinary analysis (e.g. historical, economic, geopolitical, and geographical approaches) as the most relevant method for understanding the changing nature of borders.¹

This volume represents a unique international collaboration between experts from Vladivostok and their foreign colleagues to bring fresh perspectives onto Eurasian land borders

and Pacific maritime borders. The sixteen chapters of this volume are presented in three sections. The first section consists of four chapters devoted to theoretical aspects of border studies. This section begins with a chapter by Mikhail Alexseev, who advocates the utilization of evolutionary game theory for analysis and policymaking in border studies. Although his theoretical proposal may not take into account all factors that could arise from the opening of borders, it nevertheless draws our attention to the potential of this powerful theoretical tool.

In Chapter 2 Jussi Laine provides a historiography of border studies up to the present day. Laine attempts in this thoughtful piece to try to focus on “transnational border eroding relations”, however, he notes that these relations do not entirely overcome the state-centeredness of border studies. Despite the growing scale of globalization flows, state borders are far from fading away but rather changing their form and manifestations.

In Chapter 3 Anton Kireev makes an effort to create a typology of boundaries based on his interpretation of Russia’s history and geography. As a result of this analysis the author concludes that any border is undergoing certain development phases over time. Kireev raises contentious issues over whether the evolution of borders is linear, and whether this typology can account for the many different types of borders in a region, or even in the same country.

Andrei Volynchuk (Chapter 4) characterizes transborder cooperation processes in order to provide a theoretical explanation of how such transborder territories form and are capable of transcending the nation-state border. In contrast to prevailing views in recent scholarship postulating that borders exist mostly through society, this article considers the border as the state’s outer surface, through the notion of the “transborder strip” – a territorial region either side of the national border.

The second section of the book includes five chapters that describe different aspects of Eurasian border formation. These contributions are rich in historical facts and present new sources of scientific information to produce innovative conclusions. Chapter 5 by Gulmira Sultangalieva is helpful for understanding the historic evolution of the boundary line between Russia and Kazakhstan. The article follows a narrative, providing an account of the changing function and development of this border.
Chapters 6 and 7 (by Alexander Golikov and Marina Dmitrieva) provide readers with interesting insights on the history of imperial China and the formation of the Russian-Chinese border. The other two chapters in this section (by Naoki Amano and Jonathan Bull) are devoted to critical analysis of the settlement and contested history of Sakhalin/Karafuto.

The largest section of the book is the third and final section: “Modern Transborder Processes and Border Policies in Eurasia.” Chapters 10 and 11 (by Paul Richardson and Sergei Sevastianov) provide different visions of the current and future role of Vladivostok in the Asia-Pacific. These papers follow-up on the recent APEC summit held in the city and the changing dynamics of transborder cooperation. These chapters focus as much on core-periphery relations in Russia, and different models of international cooperation, as on borders.

Chapter 12 by Liu Yanping and chapter 13 by Sergei Ivanov investigate the impact of development policy in Northeast China (particularly Heilongjiang province) on economic integration and transborder processes in the Russian Far East. Jongseok Park in chapter 14 provides an interesting discussion and analysis of Special Economic Zones within North Korea, thus making a valuable contribution to this little-studied area.

The two final chapters of the book reflect different approaches to explaining borders and territorial disputes in East Asia. While Vasilii Allenov (chapter 15) attempts to connect mythical archetypes with national narratives regarding their border issues, Sergei Vradii (chapter 16) relies on classical historical methods to characterize the background and essence of the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands conflict.

It is hoped that an important aspect of this volume is its interdisciplinary character and contribution to theoretical research. Several authors try to put border development theory in a historical context, which can help better understand the formation and processes of borders today. It is also perhaps no coincidence that this surge of interest in border studies in Russia has occurred in Vladivostok, which has been promoted by the Russian government a city to bridge borders in Northeast Asia and to become one of the centers of international cooperation on par with neighbouring cities such as Dalian, Busan, and Niigata.
This book project owes its own origins to representatives of the Russian border studies community in Vladivostok taking part in the international conference “Border Regions in Transition XII”, which was held in Fukuoka and Busan in November 2012. Participation in this event inspired them to invite Russian and foreign scholars to prepare and publish a book devoted to border issues across Eurasia. Subsequently, this proposal has been fully supported by the Far Eastern Federal University (FEFU), which helped to finance some of the research projects discussed in these chapters and to publish the manuscript.

During the book preparation we received invaluable intellectual support from three outstanding scholars – Petr Baklanov, Academician, RAS; Vladimir Kolosov, Doctor of Geographical Sciences; Vladimir Karakin, Candidate of Geographical Sciences – who kindly agreed to review the book. The editors would also like to sincerely thank two anonymous referees for their useful and constructive comments on earlier versions of these chapters. Lastly, my personal thanks to the creative and efficient work of my co-editors: Anton Kireev, FEFU; and Paul Richardson, who started work on this project as a visiting scholar at FEFU, and helped to finalize it after he moved to the University of Manchester, UK.

We hope that this book is the first tentative step towards integrating the research of scholars working on borders in the Russian Far East with a worldwide border studies community.

Sergei Sevastianov
Since the 1960s, comparative border studies have advanced significantly. As the substantive focus of research expanded from territorial and geophysical to political, cultural and institutional boundaries between and within states, border studies expanded from a substantive subfield within geography to a major multidisciplinary academic field with sizeable niches in political science, economics, anthropology, sociology, and history. After surveying the history of the field, anthropologists Thomas Wilson and Hastings Donnan, in an authoritative 2012 edited volume comprising 32 studies by the leading border scholars from around the world, argued that border studies have become not only multi-, inter- or cross-disciplinary, but “post-disciplinary” – “a field of fields” focusing on distinctive discipline-transcending themes yet informed by “multiple styles, motifs, methods and theorizing.”

And yet, the same review indicates that major contributions to knowledge in this post-disciplinary “field of fields” remain largely restricted to descriptive inference – i.e., on what specific developments may be an instance rather than what may explain classes of events systematically across time and space, in a non-ad hoc fashion. According to Wilson and Donnan, the substantive focus of border studies continues to be driven

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by current events, the “interdisciplinary push” of the 1990s resulted in “an uncritical accumulation or juxtaposition of different perspectives which in itself did not advance the study of borders,” comparison is still used predominantly “to enhance description and facilitate analysis of a particular case rather than to generalize,” and most scholars in border studies are “interpretivists and constructivists who deny a priori categories.” Wilson and Donnan reach a conclusion suggesting that border studies have a long way to go before they offer significant contributions to knowledge that may have an impact on mainstream theoretical debates and theory-building in the disciplines that it purportedly transcends: “Much that is comparative in today’s scholarship [in border studies – M.A.] is far removed from the more controlled comparisons that supported model building and hypothesis testing of past generation of scholars. In its place we are often offered instead episodic story-byte comparisons.” An authoritative review of border research published in 2011 also demonstrates that individual non-cumulative and largely descriptive case studies remain central to border research. On the one hand scholars have recognized borders as the “primary institution” allowing for “the possibility of politics inside the state and the necessity of anarchy outside the state” – with anarchy being one of the cornerstone concepts of International Relations (IR) theory. On the other hand, the most advanced theoretical assessment of the role of borders in world politics has been limited to interpretive categorizations of the relative degree of border openness and border-regulating institutions. Most notably, these studies have stopped short of generating empirical and theoretical puzzles contributing to the development of IR theo-

3 Wilson and Donnan, Companion, 14, 15, 17.
4 Wilson and Donnan, Companion, 18.
ry itself and offering practical policy implications. The present study, in contrast, takes precisely this seldom-navigated route.

**Security and Economic Interests in the Borderlands: Illuminating Theoretical Puzzles**

Implicitly, most debates in comparative border studies about the functionality of borders echo the fundamental debate in IR: How do governments balance between security and non-security interests? Regarding border policy, this is one of the central questions states face in the international system, because most increases in border security entail increases in transaction costs, formal or informal, for business and trade – particularly in border regions. In a telling illustration of this dilemma, the mayor of San Diego, California, Bob Filner opened a satellite city office in 2013 across the international border with Mexico, in the neighboring city of Tijuana. The stated goal was to reverse economic losses after the U.S. Government built significant border fences and increased inspection times without widening transit area – which led to massive delays and bottle-necks at the world’s busiest border crossing. By 2013, these security enhancements – spurred particularly by the call to secure borders after the 9/11 terrorist attack in New York City – were costing San Diego County approximately US$2 billion a year in lost revenues because of the waits for border crossing, as estimated by a reputable and non-partisan San Diego Association of Governments. The San Diego mayor’s activities reflected the growing sense in the states bordering on Mexico that government security policies were punishing local residents with disproportionate economic burdens.8

The general question about the economic costs of gains in security confounds mainstream theoretical school in IR with serious conceptual puzzles. If states primarily maximize security and if the pursuit of wealth is subordinate to security – as the realists posit9 – what explains underinvestment in border secu-

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9 In the classical realist tradition this argument goes back to the assertion that defense is more important than opulence by Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. Edwin Cannan (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976), Vol. 1, 487 and the still influential work of
rity by major powers over long periods of time (including blatan
t lapses in security provisions on the U.S.-Canada after 9/11 or on Russia-Kazakhstan border for most of the post-Soviet peri-
od)? One may also cite the persistence of relatively inclusive im-
migration policies among major powers, particularly in Europe, despite the turn among governments toward “securitization” of border and immigration since the 1970s and promises to curtail immigration (known also as the “gap hypothesis” in comparative immigration studies)?

If states primarily maximize wealth and if economic in-
teractions boost interdependence and erode territorial borders – as neoliberal theories would predict – then how would one explain that stronger and richer countries are more likely than others to restrict economically beneficial cross-border interac-
tions with poorer, weaker states – as a 2008 quantitative analy-
sis of all geographically contingent countries has established?

If anarchy is what states make of it through “intersubjec-
tive reality” embedded in dominant public discourses – as the constructivists argue – then how would one explain rapid escalation of border disputes after long periods when these disputes were absent or marginalized in public discourses (e.g., China-
Japan island disputes) or rapid de-escalation and resolution of border disputes shortly following their framing in existential, security terms in dominant public discourses (e.g., Russia’s com-


Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence Re-

Sergio Pena, “The Determinants of Open and Closed International Bor-

Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Con-
pleting border demarcation with China in 2005 after protracted and intensive opposition to the process in the region’s key province, Primorskiy Krai, the 1990s)?

If governments maximize trade-offs between security and wealth and the benefits of borders serving simultaneously as walls and bridges between any dyad of states – as classic game theoretic models in IR would helpfully suggest by bringing into the picture the dynamic, interactive nature of decisionmaking – then how does one explain enduring stark asymmetries in border functionalities and their counter-intuitive shifts in response to changes in the international system? Consider, for example, the Soviet Union’s wholesale monitoring of the movement of people across its borders and within the country during the decades when it was practically closed to in-migration vs. post-Soviet Russia’s sporadic and feeble enforcement of the same institutions in the 1990s and early 2000s – when it became the world’s second migrant-receiving state. Moreover, consider that most migrants were arriving during the first two decades after the Soviet collapse from predominantly Islamic Central Asian states while the Russian government forces were fighting intense, violent battles with separatist and jihadist forces in the North Caucasus – forces challenging the integrity of Russia as a state. In the United States, one could argue that membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is at odds with the thrust of the immigration reform of the early 2010s in which the central element is the construction of the fence along the entire length of the U.S.-Mexico border. On a smaller scale, one may wonder what kind of equilibrium or security-wealth tradeoff is served by the Argentinean border service when it requires that rental cars entering the country from Chile have their factory vehicle identification numbers (VINs) etched on the passenger-door glass and go through long waits before they are checked? More importantly, classical game theoretic models from economics face the endogeneity problem when applied in

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the real world – arising from the difficulty of divorcing the assumed policy preferences from actual policy outcomes. The challenge is to ensure that the hypothesized policy outcome ratings supposedly informing states’ policy choices *ex ante* (before a policy is enacted) – the bedrock of the games’ payoff structures – are not assigned by an analyst *ex post-facto* (after the fact and with the knowledge of what actually took place)?

Granted, on a case-by-case basis, one may furnish plausible explanations of each puzzle above. Some of these *ad hoc* explanations could be consistent with a particular theory the puzzle challenges. Yet, it is hard to construct explanations that would address not only these individual puzzles from the perspective of individual theories – as advocates of any given theoretical perspective will undoubtedly be tempted to do – but also would rule out counter-arguments based on competing theories and explain their puzzles. The latter is precisely what needs to be done given that theories explaining a wider range of puzzles are in a better position to contribute to knowledge.

**Underlying Commonalities in Border Policy Puzzles**

The first common dimension across puzzles is the nature and, hence, operationalization of security vs. economic valuations. A theory that would conceptualize balancing between security and economic interests needs to transcend the inherently asymmetric nature of these valuations and tradeoffs. It is, indeed, hard to imagine any kind of an empirically-based scale measuring up qualitatively or quantitatively to the Guttman consistency criteria, which specific X amount of economic benefits would equal any specific Y amount of security benefits. Moreover, economic loss may easily be interpreted as a security loss, compounding the multidimensional scaling problem with a multicollinearity problem.

Second, all examples of the border policy puzzles imply that states accept suboptimal outcomes without systematically addressing the question on what basis and in what conditions

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16 One way around this conundrum is to conduct expert and/or focus group analysis of the government’s policy preferences – a time-consuming and expensive undertaking for most academics, with its own set of design, measurement and interpretation challenges that reduce the certainty of model predictions.
some suboptimal outcomes would be acceptable, but not others. A theoretical account of how states decide on security vs. economic tradeoffs therefore needs to factor in what makes some risks more acceptable than others.

Third and less explicitly, all the puzzles above have to do with a reciprocity problem. States typically interact with multiple other states, which, in turn, interact with each other and with others. Any number of these states may form alliances, blocs, trading unions, economic zones, bi- or multilateral commission and other transactional forums that would include some and exclude other states. Selective membership in these associations or clusters of states would establish in- and out-group boundaries affecting the allocation of trust and reciprocity by any given state setting its border regime.

Developing deeply specified accounts and solutions to each of these three problems appears to be a daunting task. But, luckily, such an approach would probably be not as productive as one might think. The bounded rationality theory – that brought insights from psychology to IR – argues that human beings lack the capacity to process all available information, work out sophisticated cost-benefit trade-off matrices, and unerringly pick most cost-effective solutions.\(^\text{17}\) This suggests that social theories would do better if their logic replicates standard real-world human decision shortcuts.

What about our three common themes behind the border policy puzzles? First, bounded rationality suggests how to resolve the asymmetry of valuations problem. Human decision makers are unlikely to work out complex Guttman-criteria scales for assessing security vs. economic benefits of any border policy. They are more likely to act on crude, rule-of-thumb sense of overall gains and losses whether they stem from security or economic issues. Formalization of gain-and-loss trade-offs, however, would be required.

As far as the trade-offs between gains and losses go – the second common theme across our puzzles – the basic element is risk assessment. It means that a good theory of border policy needs to factor in not only the value of gains and losses, but also the probability of either. Again, the assumption is that people

assess those probabilities on the basis of cognitive shortcuts (or rules of thumb), which makes them generalizable.

On the reciprocity issue, the fundamental point would be for a theory to factor in differences in behavior oriented toward in-groups vs. out-groups (“us” vs. “them”).

In sum, a theory to account for interstate border policies as part of multilateral interactions and the balancing of security and economic interests needs to factor in gain-loss valuation, risk and equilibrium assessment, and in-/out-group reciprocity. For these reasons we turn to evolutionary game theory. While sharing the same conceptual apparatus with the classic game theory regarding gain-loss and risk valuations, the evolutionary approach brings in the notion of interacting groups and populations that allow for more sophisticated yet intuitive modeling of policy processes, including experimental model-building. Given its distinguished pedigree and wide applications in social and natural sciences, it is surprising that evolutionary game theory has not been systematically applied at the time of this writing to explaining security and economic trade-offs in border studies. A review of the theoretic big picture that follows is nowhere near an exhaustive account of elaborate, sophisticated, and extensive work done over the last three decades in evolutionary game theory, but rather an illustration how this theory could be mined for understanding border regimes and an invitation for further exploration.

Evolutionary Game Theory: Insights and Implications

In their by now classic pioneering contributions in the 1970s and 1980s, John Maynard Smith, Robert Axelrod and those who followed them extended the conceptual reach of game theory in three important ways – all offering nontrivial insights into balancing between different policy priorities, of which security and economic interests could be a subset. All three contributions are derived from bringing in groups (populations, spe-

cies, cohorts, etc.) as actors into the game models, rather than modeling group interactions as if groups were individuals.

Their first contribution extended the concept of strategy – in game theory, a choice by a player of her first move and of subsequent moves, contingent on which move the other player makes.\(^{19}\) In classic game theory individuals (and, hence, governments, firms, social groups, etc. modeled as if they were individuals) have strategy sets. A player, for all intents and purposes, may pick strategies from this set at will. The set, in theory, may include an unlimited or random variety of strategies. In evolutionary game theory, it is species or societies or social groups that have strategy sets. Individual players may inherit this or that strategy from the set or a mutated strategy. The choice of strategy in this case is culturally or path-dependent. It means the assessment of a state’s priorities in choosing how to secure its borders while also maximizing benefits cross-border trade and exchanges will crucially depend on institutional or bureaucratic culture of risk assessment and on traditional patterns of economic interaction including extraction of rent for politically influential players. Thus, in Russia’s security and foreign policy establishment, the suspicion of China’s intent to extend its economic and possibly political control over the resource-rich regions of Siberia and the Russian Far East goes back at least as far back as Khrushchev’s rejection of Mao’s proposal to send 10 million Chinese volunteers to develop natural resources in Russia’s underpopulated areas.\(^{20}\) All else being equal, the shadow of these threat projections, based predominantly on demographic trends and enhanced by armed border conflicts of the late 1960s, understandably makes it harder for any Russian government official or analyst to project that Chinese intentions are benign rather potentially hostile. This would explain, for example, why in setting up transborder trade and economic complexes in the early 2000s along the Russian-Chinese border in Russia’s Far East (e.g., Suifenhe – Pogranichnyi, known in China as the Sui-Po Trade Zone) the Russian government enforced restricted entry and movement in the 30-kilometer perimeter

\(^{19}\) For example, a player may decide to cheat on the opponent, but would only do so until the opponent cheats back. In this case, cheating will not be the complete and unconditional strategy.

\(^{20}\) The author’s conversation with Sergei N. Khrushchev, the son of premier Nikita Khrushchev, March 3, 2003, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
along its border with China, while the Chinese government did not reciprocate – even though the complexes were designed to decrease security risks and enhance economic benefits symmetrically for both countries. As a result, China was able to attract significantly higher domestic and foreign investment into these complexes than Russia – perhaps best illustrated by the construction of a palatial Grand Holiday Inn Hotel Suifenhe. Evolutionary game theory predicts Russia will find it hard to get out of this asymmetric and economically suboptimal equilibrium vis-à-vis China unless the Kremlin specifically orders wholesale revision of Chinese threat assessment in its foreign policy and national security establishment. But that would not be easy to do given the constraints of institutional inertia. The same logic would probably explain the persistence of complex border-crossing arrangements between Chile and Argentina – such as etching vehicle identification numbers in the glass of the cars and multi-hour inspections of buses – that do little or nothing to prevent tangible security threat like military invasion, illegal settlement with territorial claims, terrorism, or organized crime yet that also stifle profitable tourism, trade, and other economic synergies. Alleviating these transactions costs would mean changing institutional cultures and practices on both sides, possibly stemming from entrenched bureaucracies developed during the prolonged rule of the military in each country. With respect to the puzzles posited earlier, the path-dependent nature of evolutionary game logic also explains that the abandonment of border and migration rule enforcement regardless of large-scale migration into Russia and related social problems in the 1990s had to do with the rapid collapse of Leninist political institutions mandating the protection of the Leninist cannon of “socialism in one country.”

The second contribution of evolutionary game theory has to do with the concept of equilibrium or the state of play in which each player would opt for any strategy that would be the best response to any strategy chosen by the other player. This is known as the Nash equilibrium, after an American economist and mathematician, John Nash who pioneered mathematical
estimation of such strategies around 1950. Evolutionary game theorists instead introduced the notion of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). Again, the crucial difference is the extension of the equilibrium from a pair of players to populations or groups of players. If one population or group plays ESS among themselves, it means members of no other group can “invade” them or outplay them with a better strategy – i.e., no other group can offer a strategy that would give strong enough incentives to the first group’s members to abandon their collective strategy. The concept of ESS enables social scientists – or any analyst of international relations – to move beyond modeling strategies ascribed to individuals to strategies constituting preferred outcomes in a society or a political system. It also lays down conceptual foundations for interpreting the robustness or longevity of strategies in multiplayer game experiments.

Thus, the major insight from ESS is that border policies and, hence, security/economic tradeoffs need to be viewed not only and perhaps not so much in dyadic terms (i.e., a sum of bilateral interactions among bordering states), but as part of multilateral, bloc, or international institutional interactions. This could be particularly an issue for large states with long land borders, multiple neighboring states, and membership in multiple international organizations and/or transnational regimes. Therefore, security and economic tradeoffs on the border with any given country could originate from the history of interactions along borders with other states, or from interactions among states within the common international organization, or, in the most abstract case, from cross-border interactions among any states affecting the first state’s security and economic interests. One insightful illustration of transnational effects – specifically on balancing security and economic interests – was the inter-governmental agreement “On the Basic Principles of the Mechanism of Custom Administration and Monitoring of Trade in Goods” that Russia and Georgia signed in Geneva on Novem-

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21 For example, in a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma game – when two crime perpetrators are arrested and held separately and have a choice to confess or not to confess with a prospect of facing the longest possible sentence if one stays silent but the other person confesses – confessing is the best equilibrium strategy for both players, even though it lands them both in jail.

22 Gintis, *Game Theory Evolving*, 148. This means that while all ESS are also Nash equilibrium strategies, not all Nash equilibrium strategies are ESS.
ber 9, 2011 opening the path for Russia’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Official statements on this agreement showed that both sides framed its conclusion as a success on both security and economic grounds – and that the specific arrangements of the agreement could not be replicated outside the WTO process.23

Another, no less important insight, comes from the notion of resisting invasion by mutant strategies. It means when any configuration of states, formal or informal, works out a durable and satisfactory balance between economic and security interests other states may find it hard to join it. Consider, for example, that EU’s expansion into East/Central Europe has been, in general, slower concerning border and immigration policy than trade or investment. This would explain why free trade blocs could be harder to enlarge than a neoliberal institutional theory would predict. It also means that establishing new transborder trade or security alliances, unions, regimes, or associations is likely to be costlier and slower than straightforward estimation of costs and benefits for member states would suggest.

The third contribution of evolutionary game theory expanded the understanding of interaction among players. Whereas classic game theorists modeled interactions as one-shot or repeated games between two players, Maynard Smith introduced the notion of repeated, random pairing of agents. Moreover, these agents are assumed to play “genetically” programmed or coded strategies regardless of the history of moves in the game.24 Following these conceptual advances, political scientist Robert Axelrod organized iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) competitions in which all computer-programmed strategies played each other – leading to one of the most frequently quoted books in social sciences on how cooperation evolves among egotists and to the ongoing and robust research program in experimental game theory.25 One fundamental insight from IPD competitions is that security and economic benefits are not mutually exclusive as long as states pursue ESS strategies of

24 Gintis, Game Theory Evolving, 149.
a certain type. By consistently playing a TIT-FOR-TAT (TFT) strategy that initially prevailed in Axelrod’s tournaments and continued to dominate in various forms in subsequent experiments, states can simultaneously reduce security risks and enhance economic benefits of cross-border interactions.26

Applying the IPD logic with TFT to border interactions, the best strategy for a state would be to start with open borders or with easing border restrictions and immediately retaliate with new restrictions or sanctions – but only against those states or non-state actors that free-ride on (exploit) this openness.27 An exploitative actor may, for example, impose unilateral trade barriers, fail to share trade information, illegally harvest and export natural resources, organize armed insurgencies, export goods prohibited within the receiving states, illegally settle or work within the receiving state, etc. If, however, the offending actor stops such exploitative practices, the best response under TFT is to lift retaliatory sanctions and return to the open border regime immediately, no matter how tempting it may be to keep punishing the initial offender for past malpractices. IPD competitions suggest this would not dissuade every state from exploiting others or free-riding on border openness, but it would result in the emergence of “islands of niceness” among states consistently playing TFT with each other and benefiting from lower security costs and higher economic gains of open borders. Ultimately, in an extremely stylized hypothetical scenario, as long as all actors seek maximum payoffs from border interactions in the form of total security and maximum trade benefits, the worst offenders (free-riders) will die out (go bankrupt) and all other states would form free-trade blocs or zones. Yet, the world would not become free of border restrictions. Once division into multiple groups emerges, further clustering and expansion of free-border regimes across groups or blocs will be unlikely or

26 Playing TFT means that the player’s first move is always to cooperate and then do exactly what the other player does. This means the strategy is nice, simple, forgiving, and easily provicable (the switch from cooperation to defection and back happens always on the next move). Thus, other players don’t get away with cheating and players collectively don’t get stuck in long periods of unproductive mutual punishment (defection).

27 It is obvious that this is a hypothetical, ideal type situation. In the real world, we would need to correct for complexity. For example, instead of thinking of a state having open borders we may think of a state easing border-crossing rules.
too costly to proceed rapidly – even if one discounts the internal properties of states (such as differences in their political and economic systems). In his classic work, *Evolution of Cooperation*, Axelrod offered formal proof based entirely on differential interaction frequency among players within groups. Extrapolating from his estimation, groups of states that initially form open-border regimes and develop high-frequency exchanges would be less likely to expand the same form of cooperative interactions to states with which they interact less frequently. Differences in internal political and economic organization would have partial effect on transactions within group border regimes, but they will not override the logic of clustering at the global level.

This doesn’t mean groups of states with more preferential border regimes toward each other would stay fixed. Reshuffling and rearrangement as well as overlapping group associations would occur, according to the evolutionary IPD logic. But the group dynamic is likely to stay. In fact, recent, sophisticated computer simulations of IPD tournaments strongly suggest the same. A study of evolutionary IPD competitions published in 2011 found that TFT was outperformed by a hybrid between TFT and a strategy called “Clique” which cooperates only with in-group members and is hostile to non-group members. Thus, states playing TFT with other states that predominantly play TFT, but selectively playing more cautious or unforgiving strategies with non-TFT players would do better than states indiscriminately playing TFT. Extrapolating to border policies, states in a free-trade area or bloc would do best by maintaining borders as open as possible to bloc members and as restrictive as possible to bloc non-members. In the real world, however, one observes significant variation in transborder exchange rules across blocs of states seeking freer trade (from EU to APEC to Mercosur). The question then arises why do some blocs develop more open-border policies on the inside and/or more restrictive policies on the outside of the bloc?

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28 Jiawei Li, Philip Hingston, and Graham Kendall, “Engineering Design of Strategies for Winning Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Competitions,” *IEEE Transactions on Computational Intelligence and AI In Games* 3 (4) (December 2011): 348-360. IEEE is the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, an international professional association with a stated purpose of advancing technological innovation and excellence.
Evolutionary game theory offers an important insight into this question by formalizing the logic of information & signaling when individuals or groups bargain. In a sense, any transborder regime or balancing between security and economic priorities can be viewed as a bargaining process, international or domestic. The first key issue is information completeness. As Gintis summarized the lessons of game bargaining models, "Where all parties have complete knowledge, there are generally Pareto-efficient bargaining equilibria, in which there are no impasses, strikes, or wars, and all divorces are amicable."29 This means that in interstate blocs where political and economic systems are more transparent toward one another, the participating states are more likely to achieve optimal tradeoffs between security and economic gains. Overall, this implies that political system type per se will not be the crucial causal variable – i.e., democracies and non-democracies may form equally cohesive and transparent transborder regimes optimally balancing security and economic interests. Yet, the signaling theory of international conflict, suggests that democracies would be more likely to achieve the benefits of complete information sharing. This is not because they are more responsive to the needs of their populations as classic neoliberal theorists have argued, but because their institutions are better suited to overcoming significant credible commitment problems. A Stanford political scientist – and dedicated game theorist – James Fearon generated convincing formal proof. The crucial factor, he showed, is the presence within the political system of a genuine (credible) opposition to the ruling regime. When such an opposition (e.g., Republicans in the U.S. Congress under a Democratic administration in the United States) supports a government policy, it is clear to the outside actors that the regime has genuine support for the policy and is acting in earnest. Absent such opposition, government would find it hard, if not impossible to signal credible commitment to other states.30

The striking and significant insight from this logic is that in transnational economic blocs the freer the movement of peo-

29 Gintis, Game Theory Evolving, 345. A distribution of gains among players is Pareto-optimal if it cannot be bested by any other such distribution.
ple, capital and goods within the bloc, the more restrictive the bloc would be to including members from outside the bloc that have dissimilar – particularly if they are more closed – domestic political and socioeconomic institutions. This explains, for example, why EU imposes not only higher standards of joining for institutionally and culturally dissimilar states such as Turkey, but did not reciprocate with visa-free regimes to prospective associate members (Ukraine, Georgia) that lifted entry visa requirements for EU citizens, and is unlikely to institute visa-free travel with Belarus and Russia. This is despite significant economic imperatives to promote freer trade and visa-free travel between EU and its neighbors outside the bloc – a fact that has visibly puzzled Russia’s leadership. At the same time, the evolutionary game logic would explain why blocs with fewer requirements for domestic institutional homogeneity are more likely to extend its membership to larger outside states – hence, even though Russia’s capital, cultural traditions, and most of its population are in Europe, it has few (if any) prospects of achieving even the associate membership status with the EU, but it has long been a member of APEC and hosted an APEC summit in Vladivostok in September 2012 as testimony to its rising prominence and influence. It also explains why under NAFTA – which has no Schengen visa regime equivalent of the EU – the U.S. has not pushed Mexico to toughen the screening of visa applicants or restrict trade coming from its generally poorer southern neighbors – the same way that the EU raised barriers and screening requirements for the movement of people and goods between EU and non-EU states. With respect to Central Asia’s prospects of economic integration with Russia vs. China, the evolutionary game logic suggests that whichever of the two great powers succeeds in instituting a freer migration, trade and border-crossing regime with Central Asian states the harder it would be for the other great power to make inroads into the same bloc. Thus, if Russia succeeds in instituting free movement of goods, capital, and people with Kazakhstan and Belarus in the form of a Eurasian Union, it would be harder for either EU states or China to carve out exclusive niches for economic activities within that Union. This is not necessarily the vision of the Eurasian Union that Moscow entertains at present, but the theory predicts this outcome, with or without prior intent. The same logic would also entice Ukraine and Georgia to take sides
and move more decisively toward either the EU or the Eurasian Union and would likely discredit or bankrupt the strategies of economic and political balancing between Russia and the EU that Ukraine and Georgia (after the 2012 parliamentary election) appear to pursue.

**Conclusion: General Lessons for Optimal Balancing**

The analysis above shows that game theoretic models are worth careful consideration and can shed light on puzzling variations in border policy and offer non-*ad hoc* recommendations on balancing between security and economic interests. Of the latter, three insights are probably the most significant and policy-relevant:

**Differentiate border policies.** The typical bind in which any state finds itself is that borders are a primary marker of state identity and its very existence. Hence, pursuing a unified national border policy and favoring security is a natural imperative. Yet, in most cases, this is likely to be a trap, precluding governments from exploring productive opportunities and innovative solutions to balancing security and economic interests. A more secure and economically beneficial border regime is likely for the whole state if it is differentiated on two dimensions. Internally, province and local governments need more say in developing border policies (and a central government could credibly commit to such policies by imposing harsh penalties on top officials if they intervene in these local decisions and by delegating significant resources to border provinces – strategies that most likely would have resulted in more transit capacity to be built along the U.S.-Mexico border at the same time as the fences were erected and security screening was tightened). Externally, central governments would do better by differentiating border policies by state and bloc and by signaling more rapidly than it is generally done that their policies are flexible to changing conditions and strategies of the neighboring states through selective incentives and retaliation.

**Reciprocate early and fast.** The underlying insight from evolutionary game theory is that players learn to cooperate not because they understand and value the benefits of coop-
eration, but because they understand and value the losses from non-cooperation. States would do better by applying penalties for border transgression selectively – and the deterring demonstration effects are likely to be more effective if harsher retaliation is meted out for smaller infractions originating in more powerful neighboring states. This is not as easy as it sounds. The logic of bureaucratic decisionmaking is to leave the problem alone until it becomes so large that it cannot be ignored. But failure to respond to initial, small breaches of security leads to path-dependent perceptions that a government is ineffective in dealing with the problem and, in turn, to stronger demands for oversized security measures that are likely to impeded economic benefits of cross-border interactions. The obvious case in point is the failure of the U.S. government to react fast to massive illegal migration of Mexicans into California in the 1980s and of the Russian government to respond to cross-border Chinese migration in the first half of the 1990s. Subsequent oversized responses to both lapses have cost both U.S. and Russia billions of dollars in unrealized trade benefits. A more productive strategy would have been to respond fast and restrict entry immediately, but then quickly relax restrictions once the other side restrained its behavior in response to initial retaliation.

**Engage multiple groups of states.** The fact that players in evolutionary IPD tournaments benefit from restricting cooperation to kin groups doesn’t mean a state should restrict cooperation on security and economic interests to members of its closest alliance or free-trade bloc. In fact, a hidden implication of these tournaments is that actors having more kin-groups are likely to outperform actors with fewer kin-groups. This is particularly the case for larger states, such as Russia, Canada, the United States, China, or Brazil. And this would also apply to groups of states with different political and economic systems. Since these differences would restrict member-states capacity to signal credible commitment to fair trade and border security, the intensity of interaction is unlikely to be as high as within groups of relatively closed polities compared to groups of states with relatively open polities. But less open-polity states may compensate by joining more groups. Thus, the more actively a state uses its membership in multiple transborder organizations or institutions simultaneously – such as WTO, APEC and
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – the more effectively would a state balance the security and economic interests across all of its borders. Additionally, the same logic suggests it would help a state like Russia to engage more deeply but on limited issues with more open-polity blocs such as the EU – for example, by joining more Euroregion initiatives and participating more actively in them, on the federal and province level.

Finally, evolutionary game theory prompts policymakers to pay attention not only to immediate substantive issues, but also to methods and procedures for designing policy. It is doubtful politicians or their advisors in most states systematically run formal computerized game analysis of their bargaining options, not to mention computer simulations of evolutionary IPD games. The latter could show plausible outcomes when most likely strategies used by participants in a border regime are played against each other. While no single evolutionary game analysis offers universal silver bullets to effectively balance security and economic interests, its specified applications are likely to generate micro-level solutions in specific cases. This is a non-trivial recommendation. In the rapidly globalizing economy, the capacity of states to simultaneously maximize security and economic benefits over their external borders (rather than to view security and economic interests as a tradeoff) may well become the principal determinant of global economic leadership, akin to the role maritime trade played in the previous 500 years or so. To paraphrase one of the world’s pre-eminent global maritime tradesmen, Sir Walter Raleigh – whosoever thus balances border functions would command the trade of the world, and “whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.”

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Understanding Borders: Potentials and Challenges of Evolving Border Concepts

Jussi P. Laine

Borders have long been one of the most central topics in political geography. However, much has changed since the pioneering framework of early border studies. The focus of border studies has developed in relation to predominant geopolitical models and visions. This has resulted in clear discursive shifts in understanding and framing borders. Despite optimistic notions of globalization and a new post-Cold War world order, the impact of borders, their functions and changing significance, continues to looms large.

Geographical borders continue to function as physical manifestations of state power, but they also serve as symbolic representations of statehood to citizen and non-citizen alike. While the nation-state has endured the pressures of globalization, the exclusively state-oriented approach with a focus on the international (i.e. interstate) serves only to confirm already existing political borders. As Anderson once stated, nation-states appear drawn on the political map of the world in such a permanent manner that, at times, they may seem even as “natural” formations.

The simplest way to understand the emergence and existence of borders is to examine them by their function – borders serve a purpose. Even though borders limit our lives they also

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have an effect on how we behave in different circumstances, how we perceive different places⁴ and how we perceive and interpret our own actions. Borders also help us to create and perceive differences, which are indispensable for us in order to construct contexts and meanings and to make sense in otherwise such a complex society in which we live in.⁵ Borders are thus an intrinsic element of human life and are a constituent of the relations between individuals and society.

More recently, the study of borders has moved away from an exclusive concern with borders between states in the international system to the study of borders at diverse socio-spatial and geographical scales from local to the global. The growing interdisciplinarity of border studies has moved the discussion away from an exclusive concern with geographical, physical and tangible borders to those which are cultural, social, economic, religious and, in many cases, invisible, but with major impacts on the way in which human society is bordered, ordered and compartmentalized.⁶ Today, the concept of bordering is commonly used to bring these diverse types of borders within a single frame of analysis.

In this brief introductory overview, I wish to step back in time and seek to explain how borders have been conceptualized in the past and how the concept of a border has evolved vis-à-vis broader changes in the social sciences. The description presented here is far from being all-inclusive. It rather provides some examples of each period. As O’Dowd has aptly argued, in privileging spatial analysis – space over time, that is – much contemporary border studies lack an adequate historical analysis.⁷ A failure to acknowledge this historical development leads eas-


ily to a disfigured perspective on the present. Over-emphasizing the novelty of contemporary forms of globalization and border change, propped up by poorly substantiated cases from the past, fails to recognize the “past in the present”, and brings with it an inability to recognize the distinctiveness of contemporary state borders and to deceptively discount the “extent to which we continue to live in a “world of diverse states””. To understand borders today, we must first understand how we arrived at them.

**Development of Border Studies**

*Natural borders as good borders*

The pioneering framework for early border studies focused, either implicitly or explicitly, on questions of justifiable state borders. Much of the credit has been given to the German geographer and ethnographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844 – 1904), who drew from the theories of both Malthus and Darwin to create an anthropo- and politico-geographical corpus. In his 1897 *Politische Geographie*, Ratzel rejected the static conception of borders and put forth the notorious idea of “lebensraum,” or living space, and the state as a living organism, with internal organs, external protective borders and an inherent drive towards expansion.

Ratzel’s Swedish student, Rudolf Kjellén (1869 – 1922), developed the organic state theory further. He coined the term “geopolitics”, defining it as: “the theory of the state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in space”. Kjellén maintained that a state was a geographical unit limited by natural borders and territory. The organic state theory was later adopted by Karl Haushofer (1869 – 1946), who regarded borders as delimiters of territorial control and ideology. He further argued that the state’s will to expand is part of its natural survival

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8 Ibid. 1032-1034.
9 This chapter is based on the background research for the EUBORDER-SCAPES project and author’s collaboration with Prof. James W. Scott throughout the project.
strategy, work that influenced the development of expansionist strategies in Nazi Germany. Ellen Semple (1863 – 1932), in turn, successfully promoted the German school of <i>anthropogeographie</i> in the United States and introduced some of Ratzel’s ideas to the Anglophone community.

However, it was Otto Maull (1887 – 1957), who actually systematized Ratzel’s principles in practice. For Maull, natural determination was the central element influencing the Society-Environment-System, but he also emphasized the importance of the “willful political act” in establishing states and borders. He made a distinction between “good” and “bad” borders based on their morphological features and their relations to political conditions of nation-states. Good borders dovetailed with natural and/or socio-ethnic borders, whereas anti-structural bad borders neither corresponded to physical features of the landscape, nor followed the borders of socio-cultural areas. In addition, bad borders did not have an actual border zone, within which the actual border could function as a connecting factor or, on the other hand, as a filtering feature allowing trade and cooperation to flourish, while simultaneously protecting the state from external threats. These kind of bad borders are, according to Maull, places where conflicts between two states are most likely to happen. The characterization was also adopted by S. W. Boggs, who elaborated the notion, arguing that good borders serve the purposes for which they have been designed, with a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of friction, while interstate conflict is due to bad borders that did not respect organic territorial limits.

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From Determinism to Possibilism

In contrast to the systematic approach of the German school, French geographers focused more on regional differentiation. This was manifested in particular in the works of Paul Vidal de la Blache (1845 – 1918), the founder of the French School of Geopolitics. While Vidal de la Blache was influenced by the German thought on geopolitics, from which he adopted the close linkage between human societies and their natural milieus, he also underlined the notion of “possibilism” in opposition of the more traditional environmental determinism put forth by Ratzel and his followers. Vidal de la Blache maintained that while people were not entirely free to determine their own directions, the natural environment offered possible avenues for human development and it was very much a human decision to choose which one was preferred.16 This, according to Vidal de la Blache, resulted in a “human world full of different genres de vie [lifestyles], distinctive to particular people living in particular places”.17

Vidal de la Blache’s work combined the disciplines of geography and history and attracted many followers in inter-war France. Among them were Lucien Febvre (1878 – 1956) and Marc Bloch (1886 – 1944), who were at the forefront of the intellectual developments of the influential and innovative Annales School. Febvre elaborated the concept of possibilism further and depicted man “as a master of the possibilities” provided by the environment and “the judge of their use”.18 Bloch, in turn, depicted individual actors as a social force that could change events and steer human development.

Borders willfully created by society

Élisée Reclus (1830 – 1905) was the first employ the term “social geography” (or rather géographie sociale), whereby he distanced himself from the Vidalian notion of landscape and suggested instead that space be viewed as a social product and

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17 Ibid, 64.
18 Lucian Febvre, La terre et l'évolution humaine. Introduction géographique à l'histoire (Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1922), 439
thus as inseparable from the functioning of society.\textsuperscript{19} Whereas for de la Blache, geography was “a science of places and not a science of men”.\textsuperscript{20} Reclus maintained that geography was “nothing but history in space”. For him, it was not “an immutable thing”, but it was rather made and remade every day by men’s actions.\textsuperscript{21}

It was, however, the French Marxist sociologist Henri Lefebvre (1901 – 1991), who really expounded the concept of the (social) production of space. Like the Annales Schools, Lefebvre underlined that change is never restricted to economy and ideology but involves everyday life. Thus, social transformation had to be conceived in terms of possibilities rather than determinations. In his famous \textit{La Production de L’Espace} (1974), Lefebvre argues that space is a social product, or a complex social construction (based on values, and the social production of meanings), which affects spatial practices and perceptions. The argument can be seen as a major catalyst in shifting the research perspective from space, and its borders, to processes of their production.

Brenner and Elden have brought Lefebvre’s distinction between the perceived, conceived, and lived dimensions of social space to bear on the question of territory – giving rise, respectively, to: territorial practices, representations of territory, and territories of representation.\textsuperscript{22} According to Brenner and Elden, territorial practices would be the physical, material spaces of state territory (borders, fences, and walls marking its external limits, but also infrastructure enabling various kinds of flows).\textsuperscript{23} Representations of territory would include a range of imagined


\textsuperscript{21} Élisée Reclus, \textit{L’Homme et la terre}, reissued with an introduction and choice of texts by Beatrice Giblin (Paris: Maspero, 1982); from the original, volume V, 335.


\textsuperscript{23} Brenner & Elden, \textit{Henri Lefebvre on State, Space, Territory}, 365-366.
senses of the body of a nation translated into political practice (maps and charts; abstract ways of representing territory through cartography, and otherwise diagrammatically). Territoriality of representation are, in turn, created at the intersection of the previous two categories, but are not limited to these narrow definitions. Just as Lefebvre insists with his notion of lived space, territory takes on meaning through the everyday practices and lived experiences, which occur within and beyond it.24

**Borders as elements of the physics and geometry**

Back on the German side, Walter Christaller (1893 – 1969), amongst others, took a more scientific approach by focusing on locational analysis and the spatial organization of functional regions. He saw borders as elements of the physics and geometry of social relations. According to his central-place theory certain settlements functioned as “central places” providing services to surrounding areas, and as nodal centers through such movements of people, goods, and alike were organized.25

August Lösch (1906 – 1945), who is commonly regarded as the founder of Regional Science, also introduced a hierarchically structured spatial pattern of his own. He built on Christaller’s work though turned its main logic upside down by beginning with a system of “lowest-order” in contrast to Christaller’s “highest-order.” As an economist, Lösch described borders as artificial obstacles for trade.26 In his opinion, state borders truncate regular market networks, resulting in economic losses. “Tariffs are like rivers”, he argued, “which separate their banks economically more than would correspond to their actual width”.27

Border scientism was also advanced by Torsten Hägerstrand (1916 – 2004), who stressed the temporal factor in spatial human activities. Relying on theoretical and methodological developments in science, he attacked the Durkheimian idea that

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24 Ibid.
space and time were social categories. In his attempt to explain how and why individuals link to each other and move between places, Hägerstrand developed a multidimensional time-geographical approach which went beyond social constructionism by emphasizing the physical constraints on human action and the wider networks of competing opportunities that they set up which act to steer situations.28

Although, the wider institutionalization of academic disciplines accelerated, borders remained relegated to sub-disciplines such as regional politics, regional economics and regional sociology, political anthropology, political geography and geopolitics.29 The latter two sub-disciplines had a long tradition of empirical research on borders, but in the 1960s and 1970s they almost ceased to exist.30 Political geography in particular remained fragmented, and instead, functionalism, positivism, and a focus on “Kantian” space prevailed.31

**Functionalist approaches to borders**

Within the afore mentioned parent disciplines, studies of borders focused towards description, classification and morphologies of state borders, but became also concerned with the emergence of core areas of nation-state formation and the “centrifugal” (i.e. fragmenting) and “centripetal” (i.e. integrating) forces that influenced the growth and development of states.32 The

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31 Henk van Houtum and James W. Scott, Boundaries and the Europeanisation of Space: The EU, Integration and Evolving Theoretical Perspectives on Border. EXLINEA State of the Art Report (Berlin and Nijmegen, 2005), 7-10.

32 Henk van Houtum and James W. Scott, Boundaries and the Europeanisation of Space: The EU, Integration and Evolving Theoretical Perspectives on Border. EXLINEA State of the Art Report (Berlin and Nijmegen, 2005), 7-8
widely used, but “fundamentally illogical” division of “natural” and “artificial” borders came to an end, when political geographers began to emphasize that all political borders are consequences of conscious choices and, thus, artificial.34

For Richard Hartshorne, geography was a study of areal differentiation.35 Accordingly, his research on borders was grounded in the study of border landscapes; he suggested that the interaction between political borders and cultural landscapes were an important source of spatial differentiation. Hartshorne elicited a genetic border classification, according to which borders could be classified as pioneer, antecedent, subsequent, consequent, superimposed or relic. These were typologies based on the stage of development of the cultural landscape in the border area at the time the border is laid down.36 He understood that the geodeterministic mindset of the German tradition of Anthropographie had served to discredit Political Geography and proposed that the analysis of the functioning of the state would provide a meaningful context for scientific rigor.37

Ladis Kristof, Julian Minghi, and Victor Prescott, all prominent scholars of the functionalist school, focused research attention on the emergence of borders based on forms of social-political organization and processes of nation-building. Kristof, followed Hartshorne’s ideas on political geography, and similarly devoted himself to the systematic study of borders as aspects of “Realpolitik” and as organizing elements of the state.38 Kristof considered borders first of all as legal institutions: “...in order to have some stability in the political structure, both on the national and international level, a clear distinction between

36 Hartshorne, “Suggestions as to the Terminology of Political Boundaries.”
38 Kristoff, “The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries.”
the spheres of foreign and domestic politics is necessary. The boundary helps maintain this distinction.”

Kristof also made a distinction between frontiers and boundaries by suggesting that “while the former are the result of rather spontaneous or, at least, ad hoc solutions and movements, the latter are fixed and enforced through a more rational and centrally coordinated effort after a conscious choice is made among the several preferences and opportunities at hand.” He specifies that etymologically, the word “frontier” refers to what is in front, the foreland, of the hinterland, the motherland, the core of the state, kingdom or empire: “Thus the frontier was not the end... but rather the beginning... of the state; it was the spearhead of light and knowledge expanding into the realm of darkness and of the unknown”. Whereas boundaries are inner-oriented, frontiers are outer-oriented, with their attention directed to those areas of friendship and danger, which exists beyond the state. Accordingly, boundaries, in Kristof’s conceptualization, are centripetal in their function; they divide and separate, strengthening the territorial integrity of the state, while frontiers, in contrast, are centrifugal in character; they are outwardly oriented, integrate different ecumenes and challenge the control functions of the state.

Minghi urged political geographers to acknowledge that “boundaries, as political dividers, separate peoples of different nationalities and, therefore, presumably of different iconographic makeup.” He suggested, that political geographers should work towards a more interdisciplinary approach and undertake investigations in the sociological, cultural, and economic areas “for the spatial patterns of social behavior can be even more important than other patterns in determining the impact of a boundary and its viability as a national separator”. Prescott, in turn, was mainly concerned with identifying spatial relationships between politics and geography. He saw the exercise of political sovereignty, of which borders are the formal delimiters,
as an important source of morphological and functional variation of space.\textsuperscript{45}

**Post-Cold War Borders**

While the dynamic role of borders had been overlooked and borders as a research topic neglected during the preceding decades, the prevailing “geopolitical” atmosphere during the Cold War led to a resurgence of research interest in borders in the late 1970s, early 1980s. The increased velocity and volatility of globalization and, later, the post Cold War “disorder” and the associated tearing down of the East-West division subsequently revealed that the empiricism, description and categorization of borders had their deficiencies. With the end of the Cold War, the previously stable border concept began to change and border studies began to be acknowledged as a discipline in its own right. What is especially noteworthy is that, influenced by the broader critical turn in the social sciences, border studies became more sensitive towards the ethics of borders.\textsuperscript{46}

With the end of the Cold War, state borders have increasingly been understood as multifaceted social institutions rather than solely as formal political markers of sovereignty. Whereas the field had earlier pre-dominantly focused on the study of the demarcation of boundaries (i.e. borderlines), the focus arguably shifted to borders as broader constructions. They became understood as socio-cultural constructs, and as such, they could be also be deconstructed.\textsuperscript{47} Dissatisfaction with the apolitical and “objective” assumptions of empiricism fuelled the application of various critical approaches. Some of them became associated with postmodern and poststructuralist perspectives, which analyze the social construction of borders in terms of discourses, agency, and practices.\textsuperscript{48} Border scholars became interested

\textsuperscript{45} See Houtum & Scott, *Boundaries and the Europeanisation of Space*, 10.


\textsuperscript{47} Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness*.

\textsuperscript{48} Houtum & Scott, *Boundaries and the Europeanisation of Space*, 1.
in the social production of borders: sites at, and through, which socio-spatial differences are communicated. Borders, as a consequence, became viewed as relational, not given.

The changing significance of borders has been partly interpreted as a reflection of global “de-bordering”, and of optimistic scenarios of globalization and international cooperation. However, such notions of “de-bordering” have been challenged by, or even succumbed to, the reality of ethnic and cultural tensions and increasing complexity and instability in the world system. While processes of globalization certainly threaten the particularity of borders – the “disappearance of history” – it perhaps instead leads to rather more complicated ways of grasping the past.\(^{49}\) The unprecedented expansion and transformation of the global economy and the concurrent fluidity of people and goods within a context of increased securitization, signifies fundamental societal challenges that directly relate to borders. In this view, borders help condition how societies and individuals shape their strategies and identities. At the same time, borders themselves can be seen as products of a social and political negotiation of space; they frame social and political action and are constructed through institutional and discursive practices at different levels and by different actors.

Paasi’s work can be taken as an illuminating example of this.\(^{50}\) Building on Shields work on social spatialization,\(^{51}\) Paasi argues that more attention should be paid towards how specific spatial ideas about a territory and its boundaries have been constructed and how they shape the images held by the society concerned.\(^{52}\) By reinstating Georg Simmel’s 1903 dictum that “[t]he boundary is not a spatial fact with sociological consequences, but a sociological fact that forms itself spatially”,\(^{53}\) Paasi returns to his earlier concept of spatial socialization,\(^{54}\) i.e. “the process through which individual actors and collectivities are

\(^{52}\) Paasi, “Bounded Spaces in a “Borderless World”,” 226  
\(^{54}\) Paasi, \textit{Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness}. 
socialized as members of specific territorially bounded spatial entities, participate in their reproduction and “learn” collective territorial identities, narratives of shared traditions and inherent spatial images (e.g. visions regarding boundaries, regional divisions, regional identities, etc.), which may be, and often are, contested”\textsuperscript{55}. Spatial socialization is part of the process of “symbolic violence”,\textsuperscript{56} through which territoriality is practiced – in other words, how the state territory is produced and reproduced among citizens through national education – especially in history and geography – and the media.\textsuperscript{57}

Henk van Houtum has sought to understand the complex construction of borders from a political, economic, socio-cultural and psychological standpoint. He asserts that the notion of border only really takes on meaning when understood as a product of “bordering,” i.e. the everyday construction of borders through ideology, discourses, political institutions, attitudes and agency.\textsuperscript{58} Within this context, borders can be read in terms of a politics of identity (feelings of belonging; us versus them; who is “in,” who is “out”), in terms of a regionalization of difference (defining who is a neighbor, a partner, a friend or rival), or in terms of politics of “interests,” in which issues of economic self-interest, political stability and security play a prominent role.\textsuperscript{59} Borders have an effect on how we behave and what we perceive. Van Houtum further argues that borders exert both an ideological power, which helps individuals and societies form identities, and also a sense of security and comfort. This is expressed even within “borderless” Europe, where national borders have remained central to the organization of economic activities and

\textsuperscript{55} Paasi, “Bounded Spaces in a “Borderless World”,” 226.
\textsuperscript{57} Paasi, “Bounded Spaces in a “Borderless World”,” 226.
the protection of economic interests. Furthermore, borders continue to influence socio-spatial behaviors and attitude; they help us recognize differences and construct meanings in order to make sense of the complex society in which we live in.

Concluding thoughts

In order to interpret the broad socio-political transformations that manifest themselves at borders, a multifaceted understanding of borders is needed. Certainly, borders are still about power relations, but they are also more than that. The brief discussion above aimed to show that the understanding of border has not only evolved during the last hundred years, but there are also various conceptualizations of it that exist concurrently. This is largely because all borders are unique, and each of them is related in different ways to local, regional, state-bound and supranational processes. Even if a border may appear as an absolute fact, perceptions of it are always relative – and, therefore, open to various interpretations.

To follow Lösch’s thinking, borders can be seen as rivers, which separate their banks more than would correspond to their actual width. However, unlike rivers, borders are not located only at the very border (line), but have spread, if not everywhere, at least broadly in society. As Paasi maintains, borders are therefore one part of the “discursive landscape” of social power that exists in social practices and relations. This is also why borders do not self-evidently disappear when some practices change.

State borders are in flux, yet simultaneously stable. The global era has certainly altered the understanding of power and agency, yet the state has not, disappeared. Its sovereignty and authority has become shared amongst governments at several territorial tiers, but also between various sectors of society. Indeed, today’s world politics involves many non-state actors who

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61 Lösch, The Economics of Location, 196-200.
interact with each other, with states, and with international organizations, at times skipping a level or two in between. This has fuelled a transition from international (border confirming) to transnational (border eroding) relations, though the change has not been linear.

Despite the broadened understandings of the border, border studies has struggled to break away from its state-centeredness. While the dynamics of globalization have certainly complicated the picture, the continuous (re)construction of borders based on forms of social-political organization and processes of nation-building remains a central issue in border studies.\textsuperscript{63} Despite the acknowledged complexity of borders, understanding borders is inherently an issue of understanding how states function.\textsuperscript{64} Borders are not only about borders but they can be exploited to both mobilize and fix territory, security, identities, emotions and memories, and various forms of national socialization. As Paasi states, this conceptualization suggests that “while it is continually vital to examine how borders and bordering practices come about, it is also critical to reflect on the political rationalities and state-based ideologies embedded in these practices.”\textsuperscript{65} This is to say that borders are not only broad, but also deep, the \textit{raison d'être} of which is inherently linked to the formation and continued use of nation-states as the principal way to divide the earth’s surface. However, as a nation is inevitably a social construction so too must be its borders. Just as they can be constructed, they can also be erased. Changing the focus from seeing like a state to seeing like a border, as Rumford has advised,\textsuperscript{66} would allow us to disaggregate the state and the border, and move beyond viewing borders only in national terms so as to allow more bottom-up expressions of transnational mobility and genuine political actorhood.

\textsuperscript{63} Kolossov et al., \textit{EUBORDERSCAPES State of the Debate Report I}.


\textsuperscript{66} Chris Rumford, \textit{Citizens and Borderwork in Contemporary Europe} (London: Routledge, 2008)
The Historical Typology of Boundaries and Some Peculiarities of Russian Limogenesis

Anton A. Kireev

Over the last 30 years, the development of border studies as an academic field has accelerated rapidly. However, while agreeing in general with the validity of this thesis, I would like to draw attention towards the need to clarify its meaning. What is commonly referred to as the development of border studies should perhaps be called a process of expanding its empirical base, mainly due to researching new regions of the world.1 This has occurred alongside the development of different approaches in the socio-humanitarian disciplines, which led to the revealing of new aspects of the objects under study.2 Yet if development refers to improving the organization and unity of our knowledge about borders, and constructing a generalizable and explanatory theory, then in this regard the success of border studies can hardly be considered significant.3 Theoretical work in this area is still not so much generalizing as instrumental and methodological in nature. Even within the methodological field of border studies, the last significant upgrade was in the 1970s – early 1980s.4

There are three important factors that complicate the theoretical study of boundaries. The first of these stems from the fact that despite the rapid growth in the number of empirical studies on boundaries over the last decades, a large part of the globe – including in particular regions such as Africa, South America, Oceania, the Arctic and Antarctica – is still very poorly studied by limologists. Thus, a vast multitude of boundaries

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1 Today, the region where study of boundaries is expanding the most actively is Asia.
4 It was during these years border studies finally accepted the constructivist approach, the spread of which in this area is particularly promoted by Benedict Anderson’s “Imagined Communities” published in 1983.
and transboundary processes await simple description and logical ordering, and consequently any in-depth theoretical analysis would be premature.

The second factor is the financial and institutional status of border studies. The existence and development of this area of scholarship today is supported primarily by grants from various government agencies and international governmental and non-governmental organizations. Such an influence from political actors can result in a narrowly targeted, practical orientation and prevents rather than promotes the studying of general theoretical issues.

Finally, the third factor is the outlook of most modern scholars towards boundaries, their scientific values, and their accompanying methodological attitudes. These values were formed under the strong influence of the philosophy of post-structuralism and post-modernist style and rhetoric. Such post-structuralist ideals – skepticism about any kind of “grand narratives”; a focus on the existence of individuals and groups, and their characteristics and desires; the trend towards the overcoming of the defined and because of this repressive present in the name of the Other, belonging to an uncertain future – are closely related to the fact that most scholars of borders today prefer the empirical approach over theoretical ones; case studies over broad generalizations; and futuristic analysis of the dynamics of the border over a historical study of its structural limitations.

These factors, of course, did not stop the development of theoretical studies of boundaries completely but significantly impeded it. Until now, the vast majority of works in this area focus on the descriptive study of individual cases – specific national borders or local sections on these borders.5 Much less often, researchers are turning to comparisons of two or more cases. The results of such comparisons are often in terms of different classifications, based on features of the morphology, formation and functioning of the studied boundaries.6 The classifications of state and other boundaries, created from the beginning of the

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twentieth century, still constitute the largest part of the generalized knowledge about them. However, the heuristic potential of such classifications, which are not so much of theoretical as of pretheoretical level of scientific knowledge, is rather limited.

More recently, especially since the 1990s, the development of comparative aspects of border studies has led to the gradual emergence of more complex knowledge in this field in the form of typologies. Unlike classifications, typologies combine boundaries in groups based on whether they have not one, but several similar features connected by certain causal or functional relations. As typologies of boundaries can have some explanatory and even predictive capabilities, they may be considered the simplest kind of theoretical knowledge. This is especially true for the social sciences and humanities, where theoretical knowledge is in general subjected to less stringent requirements.

However, one should take into account that typologies in current border studies are created as a rule by induction. Many of these typologies are improvements or innovations of previously established empirical classifications of boundaries, by means of their application to new cases, which supplement their content with new parameters. However, this way of building typologies can lead to inconsistency or ambiguity of relations between typological features and, as a result, the unjustified inclusion in one typological group of profoundly different boundaries. Examples of the risks associated with the inductive typologization are typological categories such as “frontier” and “linear border”. Originating as a result of specific descriptions of local phenomena, the concepts of “frontier” and “linear border” have been extrapolated to many cases belonging to different eras and regions of the world and at the same time absorbed their inherent features and nuances. As a result, now these typological categories are so vague that, without special refinements by the scholars applying them, they look more like metaphors or symbols. Simi-

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8 Entsiklopediia Epistemologii i Filosofii Nauki [Encyclopedia of Epistemology and Philosophy of Science] (Moskva: Kanon, 2009), 983-984.
lar substantial erosion has occurred with perhaps the most fa-
mous of modern typologies in border studies – Oscar Martinez’s
typology of alienated, coexistent, interdependent and integrat-
ed. This typology, which was built on the basis of studies con-
ducted along the US-Mexico border, is seen by many researchers
as universal, and applicable to the characterization of any bor-
ders, regardless of the place and time of their existence. At the
same time, various scholars often put in the Martinez’s typologi-
cal categories new meaning, actually creating their own typolo-
gy related to the original only nominally, in terminology.11

In my view, the further successful development of theo-
retical knowledge about boundaries, adequate to rapid growth
of empirical research in this field, within the framework of the
inductive approach is impossible. Inductive theorizing must
be complemented and reinforced by the construction of deduc-
tive typologies of boundaries and theories based on them. The
deductive approach to theorizing in border studies implies:
1) the direct application of principles and conceptual apparatus-
es of macroscopic theories of society and state in the construc-
tion of theories of boundaries, – above all the common concep-
tions of their historical development, such as positivist, Marxist
and neoevolutionist;12 2) identifying sustainable relationships
between empirically observable characteristics of each type of
boundary, and between them and exogenous factors that make
them unlike other types; 3) a significant expansion of space and,
especially, time frames for selection, and of the number of com-
pared boundaries. As such, comparisons should be conducted
not only at the preliminary stage, for the formation and extrapo-
lation of typologies and theories of boundaries, but also for their verification, refutation or spatio-temporal limitation.

Based on the methodological suggestions presented above, in this article I would like to propose a typology of boundaries, which could contribute to the development of their theoretical study. At the base of this typology is the assumption of the systemic organization of any human society. From this standpoint, the boundary should be treated as a component, a subsystem of a social system, the specific structure and functions of which may be only a variant of the overall structure and function of the system. Therefore, the definition and the explanation of the type of specific boundary cannot be well founded without identifying the structural features of the social system which it belongs to. In turn, the structural features, the structural type of any society as a system is formed in the course of its adaptive interaction with the environment, including the natural and social surroundings. Thus, the parameters of the natural and social environment of any social system should also be considered as an important factor that indirectly determines the type of its boundaries.

The correlation that exists between the environment, social system and boundary, is the main mechanism of limogenesis, i.e. the most sustainable long-term trends in the formation and development of the boundary, and the changing between its historical types. The historical interaction between the environment, society and its subsystems today is most profoundly and completely studied in neoevolutionist anthropology and sociology. After the book of Julian Steward, within this interaction, neoevolutionists distinguish two levels – general and specific evolution. Differentiation of general and specific evolution allow us to detect in history, as a process of the adaptation of societies to their environment, on the one hand, the universal stages and patterns inherent in all humanity and, on the other hand, the trends that are typical only for certain regions, states, and ethnic groups. This division is of great importance for the study of boundaries, since it provides a clear model of a hier-

13 Julian P. Steward, Theory of Culture Change. The Methodology of Multilinear Evolution (Urbana, 1955)
archival, multi-level organization of scientific knowledge, which could serve for combining the theory and typology of general limogenesis with conceptions and typologies of specific (regional, national, local) limogeneses. The next section will discuss some of the theoretical questions of the general historical evolution of boundaries (general limogenesis) and then move on to describe the specific evolution in the case of Russia.

Reconstruction of the general evolution of boundaries involves two tasks – to identify the main historical sequence of types of boundaries and to establish their legitimate (structural and functional) relation to the historical (stadial) typology of societies. If the problem of a historical typology of societies has been repeatedly analyzed by anthropologists and sociologists, the question of the construction of a universal historical typology of boundaries of societies has, as far as I know, still not been deeply considered. However, in the empirical studies of specific boundaries, limologists have formulated and tested two typological categories, which can be used as the foundation for a necessary typology. These are the above-mentioned categories of “frontier” and “linear border”. The value of these typological categories is that, provided they are more accurate and mutually correlated, they can not only serve as the building blocks of a historical typology of boundaries, but also demonstrate its leading trend, i.e.: the gradual increase in the structural complexity of the phenomenon. Out of the categories of frontier and linear border, and complementing them by conclusions drawn from of my own theoretical and comparative historical studies of Russian boundaries, I have compiled a more detailed typology of the phenomenon. This typology includes six main types of boundaries in historical order of their appearance: 1) intermittent, 2) frontier, 3) forepost, 4) limes, 5) linear and 6) transnational.


16 Previously, to indicate the border of this type I have used the term “broad”.

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The named types of boundaries can be described and arranged in three interrelated parameters: the spatial shape of the boundary; the subject and method of control; and stability. The spatial form of the boundary is defined as the objective geometric characteristics of this geographical object as continuity / discontinuity, and area. The parameter “subject and method of control” includes groups and institutions that control the functioning of the border, and methods used by them for this purpose. Finally, stability in this typology is called the degree of permanence of the geographical coordinates of the boundary, or, in other words, a measure of its spatial mobility.

Using the above three parameters, change of the basic types of boundary (in their ideal sequence) can be described as follows. The most structurally simple and, apparently, the earliest type of boundary for a human society is the “intermittent”. A boundary of this type is characterized by its “minimal” spatial form – the form of a dotted line, which consists of some of the most remote points of presence (residence) of members of a particular group, which mark the edge of the territory using by it. The subject of control over the intermittent boundary is society itself, and the main way to control it is economic activity carried out at remote points on the edge of the territory of society. Since control of the intermittent boundary is inseparable from everyday economic practices, the actual spatial organization and configuration of which change frequently, the geographical coordinates of such a boundary are characterized by high volatility, and constant fluctuations.

The transition from intermittent boundary to frontier is related primarily to changes in the spatial form of the boundary. As a result of increasing the number of points of presence provided by members of society in the course of mastering a particular area and the occurrence of new communications between them, the boundary-intermittent line becomes a frontier-zone having greater continuity and a certain spatial depth. This transformation is usually due to the emergence and development of a settled agricultural economy, which changes the way of the interaction of society with the natural and social environment. The subject regulating the functioning of the boundary remains society itself in the form of individual communities.

17 The most telling example in this case is the spatial mobility of hunting.
engaged in non-specialized local control over their parts of the frontier in the course of economic activity. In connection with the regular conversion to agricultural use of new land,\textsuperscript{18} this type of boundary retains instability, but its dynamic has not so much the character of multidirectional vibrations as of unidirectional, geographically quite clearly oriented expansion. A kind of historical standard of frontier is believed to be the zonal moving social boundary of colonization in North America in the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{19} But much earlier examples of its formation can be found in the history of Russian (East Slavic) agricultural colonization of some regions of Eurasia, which began at the end of the First Millennium AD.

The most important difference between the frontier and the boundary of the forepost type is that there is a new subject with new methods of control over it. The subject becomes the state, which regulates the functioning of the forepost border by methods of military and political coercion. The weakness of state institutions at an early stage of their development means the forepost border takes a simpler form, compared to frontier, a dotted one. At the same time, it maintains the expansionary dynamics, the engine of which is military-political rather than socio-economic interests. One of the embodiments of the boundary of the forepost type were the borders of Russia in Northern Siberia and the Far East in the seventeenth to the first half of the nineteenth century.

The limes type is similar to the forepost border, both in terms of subject and control methods and the degree of stability. It is a state managed military-political boundary, which is in the process of a progressively widening, wavelike expansion. However, the main peculiarity of this type of boundary is its spatial form: due to the greater density and mutual connectivity of border military-administrative points, the limes border (unlike the forepost and frontier type) has the form of a zone (or band). An example of this type is the fortified border-lines of the Russian state, which expanded in the northern Black Sea region, the

\textsuperscript{18} This is due to the extensiveness of the pre-industrial forms of agriculture.

\textsuperscript{19} Frederick J. Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History”, \textit{Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the year 1893} (Washington: Government printing office, 1894), 197-227.
Volga region, the Northern Caucasus, Central Asia, and South Siberia between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries.

The qualitative change in general limogenesis is the emergence of the boundary of linear type. Key typological features of the linear border should be considered as the increasing of control over it by the state, and the beginning of not only military-political, but also economic, social and cultural regulation of cross-border processes. With increased and more effective state control of the border comes the closely related clarifying of its geographic coordinates, transforming it into a line, established by international legal documents and fixed by border signs. Another consequence of the solution of the task of strengthening and expanding state control over the linear border is the stabilization of its spatial position, deceleration, and, finally, a more or less complete cessation of its geographical dynamics. The concept of a linear border originally developed on the basis of observations of the borders of the European states from the seventeenth to the first half of the twentieth centuries. The formation of borders of this kind outside of Europe began not earlier than the eighteenth century, and in different regions of the world they remain to varying degrees incomplete until now.

Typological features of the latest type of boundary – transnational – are so far difficult to describe with sufficient certainty. The process of formation of transnational boundaries, even in the most developed regions of the world – Europe and North America – started only about half a century ago. The boundaries of Russia (mainly its western ones), began to be affected only over the last twenty years. However, it is clear that transition to boundaries of the transnational type is related to the gradual weakening of state regulation of cross-border flows and the redistribution of the control powers of the central government (especially in the spheres of economic, social and cultural relations) in favor of other subjects, and above all, new transnational organizations and communities. Existing thanks, first of all, modern information and transport communications, transnational communities (or networks) are characterized by extraterritoriality and dispersion, which leads to a discrete, dotted form of their boundaries. These communities and their boundaries exist simultaneously in the physical and the virtual space.
ality of transnational communities, in addition, makes them dependent on situational changes in the identity of their members, which contributes to considerable instability, frequent fluctuations in the composition of these communities and, accordingly, their outer contours.\textsuperscript{21}

The above description of the historical typology of boundaries is presented in a more compressed form in Table 1.

If the presented historical typology of boundaries reflects some universal tendencies of their development, then it must consistently and regularly meet the historical typology of human societies. In the social sciences and humanities today there are many typologies of societies. However, perhaps the most common and developed of these is the conception of the historical evolution of society, for the first time systematically grounded in the work of the sociologist Daniel Bell. This conception divides social evolution into three stages, which correspond to the pre-industrial society (agrarian, traditional), industrial and post-industrial.\textsuperscript{22} However, many anthropologists, whose research has focused on the earliest period of human history, reveal before the pre-industrial stage another one, represented by societies of a primitive (egalitarian) type.\textsuperscript{23} In general, these four typological categories, the main criteria of selection for which are the technical and technological features of production, make it possible to record the most important milestones in human history. Their value to border studies lies mainly in the fact that they cover the general evolution of the economic subsystem of society, changes in which are one of the main factors of limogenesis.

However, the four-part technical and economic typology of societies does not differentiate some milestones in the development of their political organization, which have a great influence on the general limogenesis. These are the stages of political history associated with the origin and early evolution of the state.


\textsuperscript{22} Daniel Bell, Griadushchee Postindustrial'noe Obshchestvo (The Coming of Post-Industrial Society) (Moskva: Akademiia, 1999).

\textsuperscript{23} Kradin, Politicheskaia Antropologiia, 149-151.
The problem of stadial mismatch, – the time differences of economic and political evolution, – has long been known in anthropology. In particular, political anthropologists have revealed the diverse political nature of pre-industrial societies, which in various stages of development could have an organization such as the chiefdom, nome or early imperial state.24 Over-laying these typological categories on the techno-economic typology of societies can improve the accuracy and heuristic value of the latter and clarify their relationship with the historical typology of boundaries outlined above. Refined for the purposes of this study, the typology of societies can be represented as follows: 1) primitive society, 2) pre-industrial pre-state (chiefdom).

Table 1. Historical typology of boundaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of boundary</th>
<th>Spatial shape</th>
<th>The subject and the method of control</th>
<th>The degree of stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intermittent</td>
<td>dotted line</td>
<td>public non-specialized control</td>
<td>fluctuating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontier</td>
<td>zone</td>
<td>public non-specialized control</td>
<td>expanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forepost</td>
<td>dotted line</td>
<td>state specialized military-political control</td>
<td>expanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limes</td>
<td>zone</td>
<td>state specialized military-political control</td>
<td>expanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear</td>
<td>full line</td>
<td>state specialized comprehensive control</td>
<td>stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td>dotted line</td>
<td>public non-specialized control</td>
<td>fluctuating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the author

The problem of stadial mismatch, – the time differences of economic and political evolution, – has long been known in anthropology. In particular, political anthropologists have revealed the diverse political nature of pre-industrial societies, which in various stages of development could have an organization such as the chiefdom, nome or early imperial state.24 Over-laying these typological categories on the techno-economic typology of societies can improve the accuracy and heuristic value of the latter and clarify their relationship with the historical typology of boundaries outlined above. Refined for the purposes of this study, the typology of societies can be represented as follows: 1) primitive society, 2) pre-industrial pre-state (chiefdom).

24 In modern anthropology, there are a large number of different typologies of pre-industrial (early) states. In this paper, I rely primarily on the typology by Igor M. D’iakonov (and somewhat similar to it the typology by Iurii V. Pavlenko), which by the scale and the degree of centralization divides the states of this period to “nome” and “imperial” (I.M. D’iakonov, Puti Istorii. Ot Drevnesheg Cheloveka do Nashikh Dnei [The Paths of History. From Early Man to the Present Day] (Moskva: Vostochnaia literatura, 1994), 45-53; Kradin, Politicheskaia Antropologiia, 163-167, 181-186).
society, 3) pre-industrial state (nome) society, 4) pre-industrial state (imperial) society, 5) industrial society, 6) post-industrial society. The main criteria for the separation of these types are the degree of structural differentiation in the social system and the order of relations of its subsystems.

Since the change of type of boundary has always been under this or that economic or political basis, a direct and quite definite relationship can be revealed between the typology of societies and typology of boundaries. However, such a direct connection of types of society and types of boundaries greatly simplifies the problem of their relationship and can be allowed for descriptive purposes only. If we consider these typologies as a basis for building a theory and searching for scientific explanations, it is necessary to take into account the complex nature of the relationship of the social system as a whole and the boundary as one component of that system, and the presence in their relationship of important intervening variables.

Despite the fact that the economic and political subsystems of the social system are more closely related to its boundary than social and cultural subsystems, their impact on it may not be straightforward. Key elements of the social system – the economic and political means, technologies, institutions, norms, and ideas – are artifacts and products of the human mind, and as such largely autonomous of the organization of geographical space and can be created, distributed and connected by various ties independent of it. At the same time, the boundary of society is always a spatial phenomenon that arises and develops under the strictly defined conditions and limitations of the outer, natural and social, environment. Therefore, essential economic and political relations may have an impact on the historical evolution of the border primarily through the process of their localization, i.e. the formation of a particular spatial structure of economic, political, and, social life. Thus, the physical spatial (territorial) structure of society is the main intermediate variable in the relationship between its definite essential (or, in the terminology of Pierre Bourdieu, symbolic) structure and the type of its boundaries.

The problems of the territorial structure of society have for more than half a century been studied in socio-economic geography. Despite the fact that these studies focused primarily on the present and rarely deal with issues of the historical
evolution of society, some of them developed typologies of territorial structure which allow us to trace the development of these structures over the long term. In addition, the authors of a number of geographical works in recent years have drawn attention to the existence of a correlation between changes in territorial structure, the allocation of economy and population, and change of the type of boundary. Of particular relevance to this study are three types of territorial structures, proposed by Russian geographers, which essentially reflect the successive stages of not only the socio-economic but also the overall social mastering of a certain physical space: 1) route-nodal (linear-nodal), 2) enclave (focal), and 3) areal (square). The criteria for distinguishing between these types of territorial structures are the density and pattern of their constituent productive and inhabited points and their communicative links.

If we consider the relationship between the types of society, their territorial structures and boundaries in historical dynamics, their co-evolution can be described as follows. Historically the first, “primitive”, type of human society is characterized by a high degree of structural simplicity and unity, a lack of differentiation of social subsystems, and the inseparability of social, cultural and political ties from the basic productive (proto-economic) relations of its members. In these circumstances, the territorial organization of the primitive society evolved, particularly in the course of economic activities and their spatial features. An appropriating (gathering, hunting and fishing) economy of societies of the primitive type is characterized by the mobility of economic entities, the high dispersion of these entities and the decentralized form of their interaction. Similar traits (dispersion, decentralization, mobility) were also inherent in the territorial relations of members of primitive societies, which together form the structure of a route-nodal type that reflects the shallowness of the social mastering of the envi-


26 These features were associated with the need for permanent search for resources of flora and fauna, usual low density of such resources and impossibility of a monocentric regulation of exploitation them.
environment and the high degree of its subordination to the natural landscape structure. In turn, the peculiarities of the route-nodal territorial structure of primitive society are the basis for the formation of its intermittent boundary, with such features as dotted form, public (decentralized) and non-specialized control and fluctuating dynamics.

The transition from the primitive to the pre-industrial, pre-state society (the political organization of which was chiefdom) was accompanied by the increasing complexity and internal differentiation of its composition and structure, and the gradual separation of its social, cultural and political subsystems from the economy. Nevertheless, in societies of this type, the economic subsystem has retained its fundamental and leading position, and its essential structure has continued to play the role of a supporting framework in relation to the structures of other subsystems. The territorial structure of pre-industrial, pre-state societies was formed in the process of imposing on a territory, in the first order, the essential structure of an economy, and then the structures of social, cultural and political spheres, which were on the whole isomorphic and could only slightly adjust the former’s pattern. In contrast to the primitive, the pre-industrial, pre-state society was based on a productive agrarian economy, which also consisted of decentralized, but much more dense localized economic actors (communities and family farms), which have a more stable (settled) position in space and develop mainly due to extensive mastering of it. The relatively high density, decentralization and extensive stationary of activities and relations of subjects of this type of society in the economic sphere (and like it – in other spheres) contribute to the forming of its territorial enclave-type structure. This structure consists of the built-in in natural and social constraints of the environment and gradually moving them local and regional anthropogenic landscapes connected by a net of communications. The outer frame of such an enclave territorial structure of society was a broad, publicly-controlled and ever-expanding zone, i.e. the frontier.

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27 Fundamental position of subsystem in this paper refers to its ability to create the basic livelihood of the whole system, subsystem leading position – to its ability to determine the direction of development of the system as a whole.
The emergence of the social system of the following – the pre-industrial state (nome) – type was the result of the development of the political subsystem, which changed its internal structure and relations with other subsystems. With the advent of state organization, the political subsystem set itself against the rest of the subsystems in society, assuming not only the leading (regulating) role, but also a coercive role in relation to them. It became a major force in shaping the territorial structure of society and its boundaries. This process took place in several stages with the growth of the political subsystem, the assimilation of space already mastered by other subsystems, and the vertical integration of the latter. The first stage of this process has been associated with the existence of nome (small, point) states. During the initial political mastering of physical space, the nome state created – on top of the already functioning public territorial structures (route-node and enclave) – its own route-nodal structure with a tenuous, but centralized and expanding fixed network of administrative settlements and roads. The emergence of this new territorial superstructure was the prerequisite for the formation of the first state border of the forepost type, the features of which were dotted form, military and political control and an expanding dynamic. The state forepost border co-existed with the public dotted and frontier boundaries, settling mainly within their contours.

The specificity of the pre-industrial state (imperial) society was also due to changes in the structure and function of its political subsystem. The imperial state was the second phase of the mastering of physical space by the political subsystem, in which it fully integrated the geographical limits of the other subsystems of society and overcame them, spreading to other societies. In order to make full and effective military control of various public territorial substructures, the territorial structure of the political subsystem (the imperial state), maintaining features of centralization and extensiveness, shifted to a denser, enclave character. This enclave territorial structure was the basis for the rise of state borders of the limes type, with such features as zonal form, military-political control, and expanding dynamics. In the process of expanding this border, the public intermittent and frontier boundaries are left behind.

The formation of the industrial type of society was due to the restructuring of the internal structure and interrelation-
ships of all its subsystems. However, the most important changes concerned the economic (fundamental) and political (leading) subsystems of society. The agrarian economy gave way to an industrial one that, from the spatial point of view, meant a further densification of the network of economic entities, the higher centralization of the management of these entities, as well as the intensification of their territorial development. The processes of densification, centralization and intensification led to the formation in the economic and subsequently, under its influence, in the social and cultural subsystems of society a new territorial structure of an areal (square) type. An areal territorial structure is a set of relationships that ensure the existence of an integrated anthropogenic landscape, characterized by a high degree of internal coherence, uniformity, and significant independence from differentiating factors in the environment. The limits of this landscape are determined not so much by objective (natural) environmental constraints, as by the influence of the political subsystem of society, the nation-state. In industrial society, the state has not only external military (violent) control of the other subsystems, it also begins to strategically manage their development, their internal structure and spatial configuration. The political subsystem not only gains an areal territorial structure, but reaches its maximum performance, density, centrality and intensity, and thus, it becomes a model for the social system as a whole. Through deliberate state-policy, this standard is projected vertically to the lower social subsystems and structures by authoritative methods. The most clear territorial-structural impact of the nation-state is expressed on the spatial outskirts of the social system. Here, the state establishes precisely demarcated, comprehensively regulated and stable linear borders. The state linear border subordinates all types of social structures and boundaries, either bringing them closer to its configuration, or rendering them apart.

Post-industrial society is characterized by destruction due to processes of differentiation of the spatial coincidence of eco-

\[\text{28 The densification of the network of industrial enterprises, the creation of clusters associated with the decreasing dependence of their localization from the environmental conditions, the centralization of management – with the processes of concentration and monopolization of production, intensification of territorial development, the turning it “inside” – with the introduction of more advanced processing technologies of exploitation of natural factors of production.}\]
nomic, social, cultural and political subsystems, i.e. their vertical disintegration. Non-political subsystems in society are increasingly beyond the geographical limits of the nation-state. This process began in the economic sphere, where the transition from an industrial economy to a knowledge economy led to the layering atop the areal productive-territorial structures a dynamic network of information and financial structures, which transcend national borders. These new networks manifest the main typological features of territorial structures of the routenodal type, including low density, decentralization and mobility. The political subsystem, however, is the least susceptible to structural change. Despite the erosion of the limits of state sovereignty, and even the appearance of the first forms of network policies, the areal type territorial structure of the nation-state remains dominant in this sphere. Therefore, new dotted, public controlled and fluctuating transnational boundaries of economic, social and cultural background continue to co-exist and overlap in various ways with the old, more permeable, but still significant linear political borders. The above discussion of the co-evolution of types of society and types of boundary is summarized in Table 2.

Given the typological description – it remains a very abstract conception, which in studies of specific boundaries should take into account a range of associated methodological assumptions. First, the proposed scheme of the genetic sequence of types of society, its territorial structure and borders, admits the asynchronous development of various social subsystems and their individual components, and hence the possibility of the simultaneous coexistence in one society of boundaries of different historical types, layering them on top of each other within the space it occupies. Second, this historical typology is based on the ideal conditions for the development of a single society. It abstracts the parameters of the natural and social environment, considering their value as constant in time and space. Such an abstraction allows the reconstruction of the universal historical evolution of boundaries, creating a particular conception of the general limogenesis though it also significantly simplifies and impoverishes this reconstruction.

The study of specific limogeneses demands returning the environment to the explanation of the development of boundaries. The spatial differentiation of the planet’s surface, the fea-
The environmental conditions that determine the specificity of regional limogeneses can be divided primarily into stimulating and hindering. Stimulating factors subjectively motivate and objectively facilitate the mastering of regional space and the development of the colonizing society and its territorial structure. These factors ultimately, contribute to increasing the structural complexity of its boundaries. Hindering factors are the subjective and objective impediment of the mastering of a regional area, and the development of colonizing society and its territorial structures and boundaries. Each of these two groups of factors can be internally divided into natural and social conditions. These four categories are: 1) natural incentives (nature...
ral resources, such as flora and fauna, soil quality, and minerals); 2) social incentives (especially less developed or weaker neighbors as objects of peaceful or military expansion, as well as transport routes); 3) natural constraints (unfavorable climate, landscape and relief); 4) social constraints (the counter-mastering of the region by other societies of similar or a more advanced type, military threats and communicative isolation).

Based on the groups of factors of specific limogenesis, I suggest possible explanations for some of the features of limogenetic processes across Russia as a whole (in its historical borders of 1991) and across three major regions. The description of these features is summarised in Figure 1 and is based on the comparative historical studies of Russian borders, conducted by the author.29 During these studies it was concluded that it is necessary differentiate Russian space into three macro-regions – European Russia, the southern part of Asiatic Russia, and the northern part of Asiatic Russia. The criterion for differentiation of these macro-regions is landscape-climatic conditions. Among all the factors of regionalization, landscape-climatic conditions are the most fundamental. They have the most comprehensive and lasting impact on all aspects of society, including the evolution of its boundaries.

On the basis of this criterion in the European Russia I include the East European Plain, within the areas of tundra, taiga and deciduous forests. Featuring the most favorable natural conditions of social development the region is the site of the formation of the western sector of Russian boundaries. The southern part of the Asiatic Russia covers zones of forest-steppe, steppe, desert and semi-desert from the Japan Sea to the Caspian Sea, as well as close to them in the natural, historical and cultural aspects forest-steppe and steppe zones of the south of the East European Plain. This much more continental and more severe due to natural conditions region is the site of the development of the southern sector of the Russian boundaries. The least favorable is the northern part of the Asiatic Russia, which includes stretching from the Pacific Ocean to the Urals zones of arctic desert, tundra, taiga and deciduous forests. Within the

29 Kireev, “K Voprosu o Tipologii Aziatskikh Granits Rossii (chast’ I)”; Kireev, “K Voprosu o Tipologii Aziatskikh Granits Rossii (chast’ II)".
region was formed the largest part of the modern perimeter of Russia’s boundaries, including its northern and eastern borders.

As Figure 1 illustrates, limogenetic processes in the three selected Russian macro-regions are characterized by pronounced asynchrony. It manifests itself most clearly in the difference between the start dates of formation in these regions of the border of the linear type (European Russia – the beginning of the eighteenth century; South Asiatic Russia – the beginning of the twentieth century; North Asiatic Russia – the middle of the twentieth century). In my opinion, the main reason for these differences, determined by the heterochrony (delay) of the social development of Russia from west to north-east, was a group of factors of specific limogenesis designated above as “natural constraints.” The most critical of which was landscape-climatic conditions. Even lasting unifying policy of rigidly centralized state was not able to overcome, or mitigate, the differentiating effect of these conditions of limogenesis.

Taking into account the chronology of the development of boundaries in Europe, historical (typological) delay can be considered a common and most important peculiarity of Russian limogenesis as a whole. If in European Russia, the delay of the development of boundaries in comparison with Europe (or at least Western Europe) was relatively small (about half of the century), then in the northern part of Asiatic Russia, there is a huge time gap (about 300 years).30

Landscape and climatic conditions, as well as the complex mountainous relief of the northern part of Asiatic Russia became the main cause of the very late (fifteenth century) beginning of Russian colonization of the region and significant delay of regional limogenesis. However, a characteristic feature of limogenesis in this part of Asiatic Russia is its relatively high intensity: in less than 600 years, the five types of boundaries appeared in this region.31 The explanation for this feature seems to be a combination of factors such as low levels of social con-

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30 It is noteworthy that the lag in development of the Russian border has been particularly noticeable since the 17th century, when the territory of the country was rapidly increased due primarily Asian regions.

31 However, different types of boundaries often did not replace each other completely, but continued to co-exist simultaneously in different parts of the region.
straints on the colonization of the region, and a steadily increasing level of natural incentives for its mastering.

The most notable feature of limogenesis in the southern part of Asiatic Russia was the long (for a total of more than 600 years) endurance here of the boundaries of the limes type. A key factor of this is a consistently high level of social constraints on Russian colonization (military threat, first of all, from nomadic societies), but exceptional stability and strength of this factor, however, was rooted in deeper, natural, restrictions in the landscape and climate of the steppe and forest-steppe region. The same social (military) restrictions underlie such phenomenon of limogenetic process in the South Asiatic Russia as the regression of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries – the returning from a limes border to the borders of a more simple, forepost type, the reverse of the course of general limogenesis. This reverse movement was due to the temporary success of the nomads in their struggle against Russian society and the inclusion of most of the Russian principalities as special ulus of the Golden Horde in the Mongol Empire.

The features of limogenetic processes in European Russia were their relatively high consistency and outrunning character. The appearance of these features was facilitated by the high level of social (military-political, communicative) incentives for mastering space and developing the western border regions of Russia and the relative moderation of natural and social obstacles to this. However, it should be noted that for over 600 years the boundaries of the forepost type prevailed in European Russia. Apparently, the main reason for the length of the forepost stage (and the shift of the following stages) of limogenesis in the region was an indirect effect of colonization and limogenetic processes in the southern and northern parts of Asiatic Russia, which from the fifteenth century attracted increasing demographic, economic, and military-political resources.

This historical typology of boundaries and the description and explanation of the features of Russian limogenesis are merely preliminary and do not provide sufficient accuracy. Developing these ideas requires further theoretical as well as empirical work, including comparative historical and geographical studies of other countries and regions of the world. It is likely that the results of such studies will lead to an adjustment or even revisions of some of the typological principles and catego-
ries proposed by the author. However, the main point of this article is to demonstrate that the future prospects of border studies depend on the extent to which the empirical research in this area will get the support, the rationale and organization from macro-level theory of society based on the conceptual achievements in various social sciences. The necessary integration of inductive and deductive directions in the study of borders should be realized through comparative studies of regional and cross-regional levels.
Figure 1. Comparative chronology of types of boundary in three macro-regions of Russia

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The Historical Typology of Boundaries...
Theoretical Aspects of Transborder Territory Formation

Andrei B. Volynchuk and Semyon A. Korotich

For the past few decades the interest of scientific society in studying globalization and regionalization processes has significantly grown. Debates about the reasons of the emergence of those processes and about the character of their development have reanimated issues of borders, regions and transborder territories, which had previously seemed stable.

Issues of boundary delimitation, disintegration and integration became very acute in Post-Soviet space, Eastern Europe and the Balkan regions. This led to the creation of a new research direction – the study of transborder territories, formed by close linkage between two or more bordering territories of neighboring states. This kind of study appeared to be an interdisciplinary one, where comprehensive geographic, economic and political researches play key roles. The terms of transborder territory, region, border territory and area are used increasingly often. But frequently various scholars put a different emphasis on these terms. This is due to the indistinct definition of the aforementioned categories, their qualities, functions and types. This study has not only scientific, but also great practical meaning, since it is connected with particular economic and geopolitical effects, and it backed by governmental decisions and regional authorities.¹

While examining transborder issues, one should take into account their multidimensional essence. “Transboundarism” – is either a special quality, or a special condition of processes and objects. It reflects the nature of transborder region unified and partitioned at the same time. Partitioning is determined by the presence of the special element in structure of object – states border. There are two types of borders could be defined: natural and man-made. Borders as special elements of territorial systems always simultaneously play role of a barrier, as well as a

connecting element with neighboring territories.\textsuperscript{2} It is notable that the barrier function of a boundary (a state border in our case) can be surmounted only in several functional levels.

The first, transborder processes are the movements of natural objects and processes such as various geosystems (ecosystems), river basins, natural air and water circulation systems, and animal migration (particularly bird and insect), which are all unhindered by political borders.

The second level is based on the contiguous ethno-cultural peculiarities of local society across borders. The characteristics of society under the circumstances of transborder processes are defined by, either belonging to the same ethnic group, kinship, religious values etc. However, transborder interaction can be severely complicated by the barrier function of a state border running through such a community.

The third level refers to the economy. It suggests the functioning of border areas is determined by economic expediency, minimization of expenditures, and maximization of profit. It could result in the merging of territorial economic structures, located astride the border, into a single economic complex. The features of labour organization in such a territory could be: specialization, cooperation, concentration and combination. These forms coexist and develop simultaneously, exerting combined influence on the character of cooperation between border territories.

The fourth level could be defined as geocological transborder processes, which is often related to pollution of soil, surface and underground water, as well as atmospheric pollution, and even a decrease of biodiversity provoked by economic activity. The level emerges under the anthropogenic influence of local societies on different sectors of border territory.

And finally, the fifth type of transborder processes is the political level. This level incorporates an ability to manage transborder processes, through legislative means, mechanisms of monitoring and control of transborder activities. Toughening or liberalization of the border regime policy determines the degree of its permeability, therefore the degree of intensiveness of transborder processes.

\textsuperscript{2} Petr Ia. Baklanov and Sergei S. Ganzei, Transgranichnye territorii: problemy ustoichivogo prirodopol`zovaniia (Vladivostok: Dal’nauka, 2008), 10.
Cooperation between different governmental agencies, functioning across the border, is capable of determining the intensiveness of transborder processes, and resolving critical situations in the sphere of economic development, ecology and disaster management. There is a wide set of mechanisms for influencing the situation: limitation or stimulation of cross-border mobility (tourism/labor migration), regulation of customs checkpoints quantity, changing of customs duties and sanitary-epidemiologic standards, introduction or cancellation of visa requirements. In turn, the character of international or border regulations is under the influence of political interests and peculiarities of the regime in neighboring states and regions. These political regimes exert direct influence on transborder conditions, and depend on the correlation of interests of regional elites and the local population, the power of local authorities, as well as regional leaders’ interest in attracting investment, labor resources and influence for the stimulation of transborder cooperation.

The most important feature of each level is a capacity of their spatial localization, i.e. correlation with particular plot of land, which has exact geographical coordinates. For example, it is pretty simple to define the place filled with mineral deposits, draw on the map industrial and agricultural areas, system of human settlements and communication infrastructure, recreation areas and territories of environmental emergency, administrative and political centers. All the processes outlined above, one way or another will be mutually overlaid and together they make a region a transborder one.

In Russian science, the term “region” is not new. It infiltrated into the Russian language in the 19th century and was defined as “country, territory, space”. Most frequently this term was used by geographic sciences, as a synonym to the word “rayon” (area, district). In the modern scientific literature the term “region”, being more flexible, is replacing the term “rayon” (district). And the term “region” occupies one of the key theoretic positions. “In each branch of science, as science of history shows, the most difficult task is to define initial points and terms. In

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3 Ėnrid B. Alaev, *Sotsial'no-ėkonomicheskaia geografiia: poniatiino-terminologicheskii slovar’* (Moskva: Mysl’, 1983), 69
mathematics such term is number, in physics it is substance and energy, in biology – cell, in geography – district (region)

Despite the fact that geographers did much for the development of regional ideas and methods, the term itself, was never under geography’s monopoly. With the passage of time the term has been integrated into a wide range of different branches of science such as: ecology, pedology, social and political sciences. The regional approach was used or independently developed in various disciplines studying geographically dispersed phenomena. Most actively these processes were studied from political, geopolitical and economic perspectives.

In spite of the fact that the concept of “region” appeared a long time ago, it lacks a generally accepted definition. As a result, the definition of this term and the ideas of regionalization have varied from time to time.

In 1968 Nikolai N. Kolosovskii formulated a definition of region as theory. He defined region as a distinct territory, divergent from its environment by having specific feature, which at the same time has an internal unity. This definition could be used as a starting point for this study.

Currently, studying of the various types of territories remains one of the leading matters of modern science. Particularly, studying of the issues, correlated with transborder regions, becomes more and more topical. Its attractiveness is stipulated by the fact that transboundarism is inherent in the most of objectively existing territorial units. This circumstance makes the factor analysis very important, which in turn favors the preservation of transborder region integrity. Let us review the factors that seem to be more apparent in this regard.

Among them the priority should be given to physicogeographical factor, which introduces natural basis for the transborder region formation – e.g. river basin, plateau, seaside, etc.). Other factors are also connected to the features of local society functioning across borders. They are the main forces of regional organization and restoration. On the one hand, that kind of activity serves as the main reason for the division of region-forming natural objects among states. On the other hand, it contains

4 Nikolai N. Kolosovskii, Teoria ekonomicheskogo raionirovaniia (Moskva, 1969), 15.
5 Ibid
the forces, which help to maintain the constructive unity of the territory. Thus they contribute to its development as a transborder region. Among them, top priority should be given to:

- nature management factor refers to the formation on a particular territory of an economic complex determined by a local combination of natural conditions and resources. Even if later it could get successively transformed and superstructured, those transformations rarely go beyond naturally allowed conditions;
- demographic factor is the flow of population across interstate borders from places of labor excess to places of shortage. There are only two obstacles to this process. The first one is objective and it is connected to demographic deficit across the transborder region. The second one is connected to the level of interstate relations;
- ethnocultural factor refers to the exchange of cultural traditions elements and linguistic adoptions between heterogeneous or homogenous social groups separated by the state border. The mutual infiltration is a priori more intensive on the part of territory, where neighboring social groups appeared to be connected by the necessity of adaptation to environmental conditions and by resolving similar problems of land development and ecology;
- factor of regional politics and the political aim of a collective strategy of transborder regional development, which would be able to significantly defuse differences and problems, and eventually favor the comprehensive development of an entire cross-border region.

These above factors do not cover all of the historic-geographic approach. The further deepening of research of border problems could increase the number of its components.

Spatial unevenness, taking place in the process of interaction between initial region-forming factors, should be considered as an objective condition for transborder region-forming. Various natural-economic zones are forming because of it.

Concerning the main principles of transborder regions creation, which outline the division of space into parts of territory, they should meet following criteria:
Separation of transborder region should be held on objective principles, i.e. on detection of really existing territorial system;

Each region should possess consistency of its distinctive features, spatial and time characteristics;

Determination of transborder regions should match other kinds of geographic zoning, but it should have its own features;

This kind of zoning should be based on theory of system approach and system analysis. Former serves as a basis for consideration of separated regions as the systems of special kind. Latter refers to “individually” detailed level of the research.

Transborder regions also have features of core, periphery, communication network, belt of transboundarism and a contact zone.

The core in this case is the center, or concentration of intraregional processes. Center, using surrounding resources, manages the rest of the territory. This is intrinsic to the core of all territorial taxons.

A special feature of a transborder region is its multi-core structure. As opposed to “usual”- economic region, which could successfully function having single core – transborder region exists only when it has two or more cores in its structure. Also the number of the main region-forming centers is determined by the quantity of transborder sectors, which in turn is determined by the peculiarities of interstate delimitation.

Cores of transborder region, as well as the cores of other taxons have the “hearth” (center of diffusion) characteristics. In other words, core diffuses flows of matter, energy, information on local environment and through them it reproduces its territorial features.

The main function of the core is its region-forming feature. Forming on the basis of some resource (agricultural, climatic, mineral and etc.), core consolidates segments of the territory and creates a hierarchical and functional order of all the elements of the region. As opposed to other territory, in hearth region-forming factors acquire maximum power. As a rule, it is reflected in a higher level of the population, manufacture and capital concentration.

At the initial stages of economic development, the role of the core belongs to large and medium size settlements with administrative functions. At later stages these settlements develop
into cities that are characterized by territorial unity, high density, interconnection and interaction among enterprises and establishments of manufacturing and non-manufacturing spheres.

Subsistence of a regional core also implies the existence of a regional periphery. Spatial differentiation appears not only among separate regions, but also within them. According to the Ozhegov Dictionary of the Russian language, periphery is defined as an area remote from the center. And as opposed to the core, it does not possess the high density of region-forming factors, it has a lower level of infrastructural development. Moreover, the manageability of transborder processes decreases with the enlargement of the distance between a peripheral zone and the regional center.

A periphery, in turn, is a zone of a simple, fragmentary and not solid space. It is oriented on various intraregional centers. It is not capable of self-development. This type of zone is dependent and not self-reliable.

The next attribute of the region is the Communication Scheme (CS) or the interaction between cores and periphery. From this perspective, we should consider the CS as a display of existing functional connections between elements of a transborder region. The significance of the Communication Scheme goes beyond simple transferring of goods, energy and information. It helps to form the spatial unity of the region. Territory begins to acquire a special feature – manageability.

Natural, ethnic-cultural, social and industrial connections among people across borders serve as examples of the transborder interaction process. Developed CS strengthens those connections, makes them stable and enlarges the sphere of their functioning.

Border appears to be one the most complex and ambiguous elements of a transborder region. According to the opinion of Boris B. Rodoman (1999) a border in general could rightfully claim the status of a general scientific notion or even a philosophical category. Border is often perceived as a line lying be-

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tween two objects and dividing them, or lying around one object and detaching it from everything else.\textsuperscript{7}

Such kind of notion seems correct for all types of borders, including territorial. Geographical borders rarely represent some sort of line. More often they represent a special transition zone, where region-forming processes gradually fade away. It has the characteristic of a strip or a belt. This assertion could be summarized as the following: “if two dots on the territory have essential distinctions according to the number of geographic characteristics, the geographic border between areas with different characteristics would lie through particular segment, not the dot”.\textsuperscript{8}

In terms of the transborder region we can define two types of borders: external and internal. External border determines the spatial limit for the spreading of the cores” organizing influence on the territory of the entire region. It implements not a barrier, but rather localizing function. In other words, it defines the place of the transborder territorial system. It outlines the space of the region and separates it from other territories.

Comparing to the external border, internal one divides the region into separate sectors, not critically disturbing integrity of space and unity of intraregional processes and connections.

External borders could be represented by various geographical objects (rivers, mountain chains, etc.) or borders of territorial-administrative formations within the states. Internal border in this case is represented by interstate borders.

In transborder regions, the state border plays a central regulating and connecting role in forming and functioning of the specific attributes of a transborder region – the zone of contact. The zone of contact is defined as a part of the region with the highest intensity of contacts among different sectors of the transborder region. This component of the territorial structure is located within the scope of a transborder strip and takes the form of security check-points, practically state border check-points. Elements of border and customs inspection, such as international terminals of airports and seaports located within the

\textsuperscript{7} Boris B. Rodoman, \textit{Territorialnye arealy i seti. Ocherki teoriticheskoi geografii} (Smolensk: Oikumenia, 1999), 256.

region, should be considered as zones of contacts. The presence of these attributes forms the prerequisites for the development of favorable conditions for the creation of transborder forms of socio-economic interaction in the immediate proximity to the state border.

The outline of the transborder strip is necessary for understanding the most important elements of the transborder region formation. This element “resting upon” the state’s border line is an integral part of any transborder taxon. The transborder strip includes the characteristics of a population settlement, the presence of small and large settlements, the legal status of municipal and economic subjects, the level of the autonomy in decision-making process, the nature of the border regime, etc.

Totality of main elements of the transborder region forms transborder frame, consisting of major settlements, the communication scheme connecting them and the aggregate of all contact zones. The peculiarities of a transborder territory are determined by state borders and the features of peripheral sectors.

The unity of all the elements of a transborder region can be identified as the territorial structure (TS). The territorial structure of a transborder region should be seen through the prism of the term “organization”, representing the complex of sustainable relations and connections among its parts. Not all the connections among objects on this or that part of a territory may be qualified as system-forming. Consequently, a transborder region should also represent the complex of territorial objects, which are meeting the organization criteria and united by common administration. In other words, the transborder cooperation should also be reflected in forms of the institutionalization of interstate relations between countries. A transborder region, existing within its borders should be substantiated by the system of interstate agreements and normative legal documents.

Regional systems are dynamic, they change pretty fast. Old enterprises, centers, nodes and checkpoints develop or disappear. Numerous new territorial formations emerge. The strengthening of the region-forming function of the cores, undoubtedly, affects the expansion of their spatial influence, which results in the territorial growth of a region. And on the contrary, weakening of a region-forming impulse coming from the center materializes in a decrease of the “physical mass” of a region.
In the course of the territory development the main elements of transborder frame undergo changes as well. With time a double-core region can turn into a poly-core region and inversely. This transformation is closely linked to the serious reconstruction of the whole territorial structure. The structure of the transborder region is initially composed of two or more cores (for instance, each part of the transborder region of North-East Asia – China, Japan and Korea – has its own core). Another reason for its forming is conditioned by the fact that the radius of one core influence frequently spreads unevenly. The inner hierarchy of cores is determined by the amount of services provided by centers of respective peripheries. Their quantity and function in different cores cannot be equal. However, with the changing of some region-forming factors, usually on political and economic levels, change in hierarchy could occur, i.e. the shift of the main “transborder hearth” functions from one core to another.

The possibility of such region structure transformation is explained by special heterogeneity of social-economic processes, running in frames of the territory. Moreover, this fact determines the presence of lower level systems – sub-regions (sectors) within the transborder organization. The aggregate of these sub-regions in turn makes up the entire transborder region.

Internal structure of subregions resembles territorial organization of the higher rank taxon. In other words, the territorial structure of subregions consists of the core – the center of economic development; and the periphery – the local network, connecting objects of different types and specializations; and borders, determining the core influence range.

In summary, the transborder region – is a territorial formation sustainable in time, differing from other formations by a distinctive type of economic development and the set of interacting natural, social-economic and socio-cultural factors, which also invariably has a state border within its structure.
Novoileksk Line as the Boundary Between Asia and Europe in a Historical Context

Gulmira S. Sultangalieva

The appearance of new state boundaries in the post-Soviet era profoundly altered what was once an economically and culturally united space. This new situation has revived research into transborder or transboundary zones that were once centers of conflict as well as peaceful, cross-cultural interactions.

In this respect, the Novoileksk frontier line, which Russian authorities created in the 1810s near the confluence of the Ural and Ilek rivers as a means for protecting the Ileksk salt-works from incursions by Kazakh and Bashkir nomads, has become a topic of significant interest. The frontier line moved the borders of the Bashkir and Kazakh populations in the South Ural steppes to the Ilek, Berdianka, and Kurailiy rivers. This, in turn, disturbed the nomads’ traditional migratory routes, in particular, the movement of Bashkirs to the trans-Ileksk steppe and the movement of Tabyn and Tama Kazakh tribes to the pasture between the Ilek and Ural rivers. Today, the former “Novoileksk frontier line” serves as a state border between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan. It is one of Eurasia’s many transborder, multi-ethnic regions, where the state border does not correspond with the location of different

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1 The Ilek River is a left tributary of the Ural River and flows in the Orenburg region of Russia and Republic of Kazakhstan.
2 The Berdianka River is left tributary of Ural River and flows in Orenburg region. It is 65km long.
3 The Kurailiy River is a left tributary of the Ilek River and flows in the territory of Kazakhstan’s Aktobe region.
ethnic groups. Russians, Kazakhs, Tatars, Bashkirs, Ukrainians and others live on both sides of the line, creating a unified and unique space.

Historians of Russia and Kazakhstan have examined the construction of reinforced frontier lines in the Russian Empire’s southeast as a support zone for expanding deeper into the steppe and launching attacks on the territory of Southern Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Historian Anatolii Remnev, for instance, considered the creation of buffer zones as crucial moments of the strengthening of the empire in newly conquered territories. The boundaries served the specific purpose of consolidating and mastering imperial zones. In this case, Remnev’s concept of the frontier as a “transition zone” corresponds to how the topic has been studied in the United States, where there is a long history of studying the frontier. In these studies, the frontier has traditionally been associated with the idea of expansion toward an “empty” territory.

In the case of the Russian empire, the idea of the frontier reflects the process of the interactions (vzaimodeistviia) between the local population and the colonial authorities and the use of the natural landscape in the region (in this particular case, the Ural and Ilek rivers) to advance deep into a territory and develop it. Another interesting aspect in this case is the “social frontier,” or how Kazakhs in the steppe perceived imperial power and how the Russian government understood the traditional behavior of the local population. The concept of the “social frontier” between different ways of life opens an understanding into how Kazakhs were understood as representative of nomadic culture, while the Russian administration was understood to represent the sedentary-agricultural population. This is reflected in

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the administration’s use of such terms as “development,” “use,” and “possession” (osvoenie, pol’zovanie, sobstvennost’).

This understanding of Russian authority can be found in a report by Orenburg Governor Vasilii Perovskii (1833 – 1842; 1851 – 1857) from the 1830s. Arguing that the frontier line needed to be moved further into the steppe, he highlighted how the “Kazakhs did not grant any value to the places in the steppe that have irreplaceable benefits for us [the settled population]”. For the Kazakhs who are “herding cattle” and leading a “nomadic life,” the “arable lands were completely useless” and “rivers flowed without purpose, waiting for dams, windmills, and other establishments (zavedenie).” Furthermore, Perovskii claimed that Kazakhs “did not consider the traders and manufactures who came to the steppe everyday as violators (narushitel’i) of their property (sobstvennost’).” In fact, they “did not even think to demand some kind of retribution (vozmezdie) for the forests, salt, and fish that Russians (Russkii) extracted from the steppe.” Based on this view, the governor concluded that Kazakh as nomad couldn’t be called as owner of land because pasture belonged nomadic tribe”.

At the same time, the governor realized that shifting the boundary in the steppe could disturb Kazakhs. He stressed that “we [the Russian authorities] should not think that Kazakhs who had pastured on that territory will be indifferent.” Yet, he added that “their distress” would only be limited by “leaving [them] traditional nomadic places.” He also claimed that the establishment of a new frontier line deeper in the steppe should not be considered a “conquest or acquisition,” but should instead be understood as a form of “conventional economical regulation.” In particular, he stressed that the migration of Russians to the steppe should be understood as resettlement from provinces with land shortages to sparsely-populated territories. Perovskii also explained that the frontier lines were needed by Kazakhs as well. In his opinion, the Kazakhs along the new frontier lines would be able “to exchange their cattle for our bread and get protection from inter-tribal cattle-rustling (baramty).”

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This raises a question about whether Kazakh nomads considered the construction of frontier lines as borders (granitsy) or as barriers to traditional winter pastures. And, more generally, this requires us to examine what the frontier line symbolized for Kazakhs in the first third of the 19th century.

Here it is important to note how the term “border” has evolved in recent historiography. Breaking from its original, narrow meaning – that is, as a political division between states – scholars have more recently examined “borders as socio-territorial constructs.”

In the historiography of Kazakhstan, the construction of fortified frontier lines has been studied as the initial stage of the process of Kazakhstan’s annexation (prisoedinenie) to the Russian empire. The construction of the Orenburg, Yaik, Uisk, and Irtysh frontier lines has been considered a logical step for maintaining security in the southeastern borders of the Russian Empire. According to the Bashkir researcher, R. Rakhimov, the frontier lines in the 18th century served as Russia’s de facto borders in the southeast and provided security from nomadic raids on Russian possessions. Rakhimov has also argued that the formal, military discourse on the frontier line had a powerful influence on how Kazakhs perceived Russia as a strong military state.

In the past decade, Kazakhstani historians have focused in particular on the construction of the frontier lines in Syr-Darya and at Ishimsk as part of the larger context of the political, socio-cultural, and economic changes in the Kazakh steppe.

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in the 19th century. This approach contributes to the development of the concept of the frontier and aids the study of methods and forms of regulation deployed in the steppe as well as the interaction of Kazakhs and Cossacks.

Scholars have in general focused more on the construction of the New Frontier Line on the territory between Orsk and Troitsk in 1835 under the Orenburg Governor-General, Pervoskii, than the Novoileksk frontier line. The reason for constructing the New Frontier Line can be found in the shift in Russian political strategy, which began to emphasize active incursions in the steppe in the 1830s, rather than simple “border control.” Pervoskii’s personality also played a decisive factor; as Governor-General of Orenburg, he was more interested in employing military tactics in the region (e.g., campaigning in Central Asia in 1839 and 1853) than studying the local population. However, the establishment of the Novoileksk line was one of the first major instances of Russian confiscation of Kazakh lands in the first quarter of the 19th century and the creation of Cossack villages deep inside the steppe.

This paper is based on the theory that a particular culture of interaction between Slavic and Turkic peoples formed in a particular frontier region caught up in the political influence of the empire. In spite of the regulatory power of the Russian authorities, the frontier’s local communities were not simply objects of influence but also active participants in the historical process. In this paper, I will therefore attempt to explain the logic behind the construction of the Novoileksk line, the regional administration’s perspective of Cossack-Kazakh interactions, and the specifics of trading and cultural interaction across the line.

12 Alim Baikhozaev, Syrdar’inskaia voenno-politicheskaia liniiia v sisteme kolonizatsionnoi politike tsarisma v Severnom Priaral’e i Yuzhnogo Kazakhstana (40-60-h XIX v.). Avtoreferat dissertatsii kandidata ist. nauk (Almaty, 1999); Erzhan Toraigyrov, Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe I kulturnoe rasvitie raiona Irtyshskoi desyverstnoi polosy (vtoraya polovina XVIII – nachalo XX vv.) Avtoreferat dissertatsii kandidata ist. nauk. (Karaganda:Kargu, 2010)

The construction of the fortified frontier line and Russian state policy

In the early 1800s, the Military Governor of Orenburg, Grigorii S. Volkonskii (1803 – 1817), noted that controlling the mining and trade of Ileksk salt was vital for increasing the Orenburg treasury’s revenue. According to his directive from April 18, 1805, a new salt mine was to be established at Ileksk, and four months later an expedition for managing the salt-works was created. The new directive also permitted the “unrestricted sale” (vol’naia prodazha) of “up to 1.5 million poods” of salt. (This was in contrast to the 500,000 poods that had been allowed previously.) The number of exiled workers at the salt-mine nearly doubled (from 173 to 300) and the salary provided for those “breaking and transporting” salt increased.14 Furthermore, the directive introduced new measures for the development of the Ileksk salt mine. These included new, protected tracts for the transportation of salt (solevoznye trakty). As a result of the increased production of salt in the region, on August 28, 1810, the Russian State Council approved colonel Grigorii N. Strukov15 proposal on the “Organization of the salt-transporting tract” from the Iletsk Zashchita16 to Samara.

The essence of the proposal was to change the route for delivering salt; it would be transported straight through the Ilek River rather than through Orenburg.17 It was therefore necessary to build a new border-line on the right bank of the Ilek River from the Iletsck Zashchita to the Iletsck Cossack town.18

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14 Vladimir Semenov, Vera Semenova, eds, Gubernatory Orenburgskogo kraia (Orenburg: Orenburgskoe knizhnoe isdatelstvo, 1999)
16 A settlement of salt miners was established in 1744 and the Iletsck Zashchita was built in 1754.
18 In February 1737, on the order of the head of the Orenburg expedition (Ivan K. Kirillov), the Iletsck town settlement was established on the left shore of the Yaik River near the mouth of the Ilek. The first inhabitants were Cossacks who later served in the Yaik Cossack army. E.V. Danilevskii, K.V. Rudnickii, Uralo-Kaspiskii region (Ural province and former – the land of Ural Cossack army and Ural region) (Uralsk: Edition GuBONO, 1927), 166-167.
The proposed route passed through the territories of the “Little Horde” (Kishi Juz) Kazakh tribes such as the Tama and the Tabyn. This inconvenience to them did not stop the Russian authorities.

In 1811, 600,000 desiatins of land between the Ural, Kuraily, and Berdianka rivers, which included the winter pastures of the Tama and Tabyn tribes, was demarcated for the protection of the Iletsk Zashchita. At the same time, authorities began constructing outposts at Izobilnyi, Novoiletskii, Ozernyi, and Zatonnyi; these outposts extended across 131 versts and comprised the first chain of the Novoileksk line. To create the fortifications, ditches were dug along the embankment, barns were built inside outposts, and holes were dug to make temporary garrisons in the winter. With a decree from Tsar Alexander I, this land between the Ilek and Ural rivers became a part of the Ileksk salt-mine.

It took nearly 15 years to construct the Novoileksk frontier line. Construction was delayed by the Patriotic War of 1812, in which Cossacks and Bashkirs participated, and the complicated economic situation in the Steppe. Orenburg Military Governor Volkonskii noted that, in the first decade of the 19th century, “the disorder and widespread disarray in the steppe” of the Little Horde (Kishi Juz) Kazakhs had reached new levels of confusion: “Kazakhs are engaging in theft – if not external, than internal, between themselves.” The Orenburg Governor reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Karl Nessel’rode, that armed detachments of Kazakhs were scattered in the steppe and “mutually harassing each other” by stealing cattle. The extent of the economic crisis is also reflected in the fact that a number of Kazakhs began to appear at the frontier line. Some were recorded as members of Bashkir cantons, others were employed as workers in Cossack villages, and still others were recorded selling their children into slavery.

19 Aleksandr Kriukov described the service of summer guards on the line. See Aleksandr Kriukov, “Kirgizskii nabeg (drus’iam moin),” Severnye tsvety (1829): 117-119.
From 1817, construction on the Novoileksk frontier line was carried out under the authority of the Orenburg Military Governor Petr Essen. Through 1824, new Cossack outposts were established at Suchorechensk, Linevsk, Vetliansk, Bunan-nyi, Boguslavsk villages, and at Berdianka fortress. The line began at the mouth of the Ilek and followed it along the Berdianka and Kurail rivers, where it was called the Berdiano – Kurailinsk line. Near Blagoslovnennii station it crossed the Ural River and merged with the Orenburg frontier line. This line essentially moved the borders of Orenburg south of the Iletsk post and promoted the development of salt mining and the salt transport tract.23

The question of settling the outposts arose during the process of constructing the line. The outposts had few inhabitants and settling Cossacks at the new frontier line was not proceeding as smoothly as had been expected. Many Cossack families refused to leave their old homes and property and settle in an unfamiliar territory or, as they would say, “into the wild steppe, to see death.” The reluctance to set up a new household in a new territory was exacerbated by the fact that Cossacks did not want to live near Kazakhs, who they viewed as “predators” and “barbarians.” Distressed by the confiscation of their winter pastures, Kazakhs had been known to attack frontier lines, capture horses, and abduct people. Thus, settling Cossacks at the outposts had to proceed through administrative decree.

In 1817, Governor Essen entrusted Ural Cossacks to settle at Zaton and Ozernyi. The new settlers were granted fishing privileges, the use of forest resources, and even a three-year service exemption for developing their household (khoziaistvo).

According to a document preserved in the Orenburg regional archive, Tsar Alexander I sought to settle the Novoileksk line to the southeast from Iletsk Zashchita, starting from the top of the Ilek River down along its right bank. To fulfill this aim, military outposts were also constructed at Prokhladnyi, Grigorievskii, and Ugolnyi toward the eastern side of the Iletsk Zashchita. Additional sites for outposts on the borders of the Ural region were identified at Mertvesk, Velianovsk, Izobilnyi, Burannyi, Novoiletsk, and Linevsk. Cossacks from the Oren-

23 Leonid Futoryanskii, ed., Istoria Orenburzh’ia (Orenburg: Orenburgskoe knizhnoe isdatelstvo, 1996)
burg Cossack army served at these outposts, and intensive resettlement of Cossacks to the area began in 1823 with 289 settlers.24

In the 1820s, the Cossacks of the abolished Krasnoufimsk village were administratively transferred to the Novoileksk line.25 Between 1823 and 1829, 749 people were moved to the Novoileksk and Orenburg lines. This included 519 Cossacks, or 200 families. Thirty-five families were located at the Linevsk outpost, 65 at Novoiletsk, 15 at Burannyi, 25 at Izobilnyi, 30 at Vetyansk, and 30 at Mertvetsovsk. Each family was granted 159 rubles to construct a shelter and develop farms.26

In 1832, some Cossacks from the Orenburg village, living on the outskirts of Forshtadt, were invited by the Military Governor Pavel P. Sukhtelen to settle in the area near the 1st Berdiansk outpost and found the new village, Blagoslovensk.27 The Novoileksk line was primarily managed from the Burannyi village (a former outpost). The Cossack captain Stepan Arzhanukhin served as the head of the line from 1820 to 1830.28

The construction of the Novoileksk line was completed in the 1820s and new projects were developed to promote the spread of the Orenburg and Siberian frontier lines into the Kazakh steppe.29

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25 Fedor Starikov, Istoriko-statisticheskii ocherk Orenburgskogo kazach'ego voiska (Orenburg:Tipographiia B.Breslina, 1891) In 1820 Krasnoufimskia stanitsa (Perm region) was abolished, Cossacks had to move to Novoileksk line. However they denied to move and appealed to tsar and began to rebel. In 1826 year Cossacks were forced to move by regional authority.
Patterns of Kazakh and Cossack actions on the Novoileksk line

From the 1750s until the construction of the Novoileksk line, the Iletsk Zashchita on the lower portion of the Ilek River was the only fortress that bordered the nomadic camps of the Jeturyu tribe of the Kazakh Little Horde (Kishi Juz). An early historian of the Orenburg region, Petr Rychkov, noted that the Iletsk Zashchita was situated “right in the Kirgiz-Kaisak steppe ... near the place where Kazakhs used to settle.” From the 18th century to the first quarter of the 19th century, Kazakhs also bordered the land of the Bashkir nomadic tribes that pastured along the lower half of the Ilek River to the middle of the Yaik River. This continued proximity aided the development of a long-term relationship. Following the construction of the Novoileksk line, it is possible to delineate two periods based on different forms of political and ethno-cultural interactions.

The first period, from 1811 to 1828, was characterized by open confrontation as Kazakhs fought for the right to pasture on the fertile steppe lands located on the right bank of the Ilek River. In August 1819, the Orenburg Frontier Commission sent orders to Shergazy, the khan of the Little Horde (Kishi Juz), and sultan Arungazy, requesting that they inform Kazakhs that pasturing within the boundaries of the Novoileksk line was forbidden. This directive led Jolaman Tlenshi, a foreman (starshina) from the Tabyn tribe, to lead an insurrection against the regional administration.

The years between 1821 and 1824 were also characterized by Kazakh attacks on the fortresses and outposts along the Novoileksk line. During these attacks, horses were stolen. Additionally, Russian inhabitants and Cossack salt-mine workers were abducted. On August 19, 1821, the Kazakhs captured the Cossacks Vasilii Ivanov, Grigorii Alekseev, and Petr Melnikov from the Rassypnaia settlement. Additionally, canton leader Filipov’s house serfs were robbed of property that totaled 578...
rubles and 50 kopeks. On September 5, 1822, about 100 Kazakhs attacked the Suhorechensk fortress on the Novoileksk line, capturing three Iletsk Cossacks, six Bashkirs, and 73 horses. On September 4, 1822, another group of 50 Kazakhs from the Tabyn and Akkete tribes attacked the Iletsk settlement and captured three Cossacks, two girls, and two Bashkirs; and, on May 8, 1823, Kazakhs captured 12 horses along with some people from the Sakmarsk settlement.

The scale of these attacks was so enormous that the prerevolutionary scholar Iogann Blaramberg wrote that “the Cossacks had to pay the price of their own blood to own the fertile coast of the Ilek River. Under the leadership of their batyrs [Kazakh warriors], the former owners would gather in huge crowds and fight to the death, preferring to die than to lose the lands of their nomadic ancestors. All kinds of damage were done to the new settlers. To this day, Jolaman’s raids are remembered by the Novoileksk Cossacks.”

At this point it is important to investigate how Russian authorities attempted to prevent these attacks and rescued captured Cossacks. First, S. Arzhanukhin, the head of the Novoileksk line, tried to attract Kazakh sultans and foremans (star-shiny) who were “committed to Russia,” such as sultan Algazy Aishuakov, the assessor (zasedatel’) of the Khan’s Council; Gabdulmuklin Agymov; Tyauki and Baimukhamet Aishuakov; and the foremen Kurbaba Yantuov and Igibulay Duysin. These sultans and foremen were enlisted to help find guilty Kazakhs. They uncovered the locations and the names of the Kazakhs responsible for capturing Cossacks; the guilty parties were from the Aydar sub-division of the Tabyn tribe. The sultans collaborating with the head of the Novoileksk line requested military assistance from the Russian authorities in order to catch the Kazakhs responsible for the disturbances. Without military as-

37 Iogann Blaramberg, Voennno-statisticheskoe obosrenie semel” Kirgiz-kaisakov Vnutrennei (Bukeevskoi) I Zaurl’skoi (Maloii) Ordy Orenburgskogo vedomstva po rekognostsirovkam I materialam, sobrannym na meste (Sankt-Petersburg., 1848), 95.
sistance, the sultans were too “frightened to act.” Furthermore, without this form of help, the Kazakhs would not cease their attacks on the Novoileksk line.38

However, according to an 1816 decree of the Council of Ministers on “not sending military commands into the Kazakh steppe,” the regional administration had no authority to send military troops to the steppe. As stated in the document, “the main source of abuse in the region is barymta (cattle rustling), [which is] no pretext for sending a military command abroad in order to return stolen property.” This decision was based on the fact that the use of military commands often lead to the abuse, murder, and plundering of innocent Kazakhs in addition to the guilty ones. This was one of the reasons behind the “revenge (mshchenie) from their [the Kazakh] side.”39

After this decision was confirmed, Vasilii F. Timkovskii was sent to Orenburg in 1820 to investigate the current situation among the Kazakhs of the Little Horde (Kishi Juz). In his report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he wrote that “the devastating barymtas, or, in fact the incredible pillage, which occurred in the Little Horde under the leadership of General-Major Bakmetev resulted in a disastrous state...In this respect, many of the most audacious and harmful attacks carried out by Kazakh riders should be considered retributive search-es for their lost autonomy by using revenge as repayment for suffering.”40 As a result, in 1820 the Asian Department (of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) recognized that the “mutual territorial claims [pritiasaniia] arising between Russian frontier residents and Kazakhs” are the “main cause,” leading to “willful retribution quests,” of barymta.41

In these situations, the regional authorities sent R. Chanyshev,42 an interpreter (tolmach) from the Orenburg Frontier Commission, to chief S. Arzhanukhin. Chanyshev was

39 Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR, 253-254.
41 19 February, 1820, Zhurnal Asiatskogo komiteta o netselesoobrasnosti rasdela Ordy na dva khanstva s predpisaniem mer dlia ukrepleniia v Orde blasti khana Shiergasy in Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR, 351 (document 116)
42 Mikhail Havrin, a Cossack from the Novoiletsk line, accompanied Chanyshev. The sultans and foremen who accompanied the interpreter were obliged to be responsible for “Chanyshev’s security.”
tasked with insisting on the “execution of law, the return of the captured Cossacks,” and the use of a non-military detachment to catch the perpetrators. When a sultan from the Khan’s Council and the interpreter Chanyshev reached the camp of Sultan Karatai Nuraliev, where the Kazakh suspects lived, it became evident that the suspects had no connection with the abduction of the Cossacks. As Sultan Karatai stated, the Kazakhs from the Aydar sub-division had been on islands in the Caspian Sea on the day of the abduction.43

In his report, Chanyshev wrote that, based on his discussions with different foremen, he believed that the Cossack prisoners had already been sent to Khiva to be sold into slavery. There was no way to have them returned; the only recourse left was to arrest the six people from the Akkete tribe, “because they have always had encampments near those who participate in the abduction of Cossacks and their leader is the known thief Suiunkara.”44

The Orenburg Frontier Commission informed Khan Shergazy that the Jetyru Kazakhs kept invading the territory of the Novoileksk line and capturing its residents. The Commission requested that Khan Shergazy take strict measures to prevent “impudent Kazakhs from preying on manufacturers and to reduce their power with the authority” he had been granted by the Russian administration. The Orenburg Frontier Commission also requested that the bailiff (pristav) Aleksandr Gorikhvostov,45 who served with Khan Shergazy, conduct a “secret” investigation. He was also supposed to aid Khan Shergazy in tracking down the Kazakhs that attacked frontier inhabitants. None of the bailiff’s attempts were successful.46

Evidence that the goal behind this was to strengthen the boundaries of the Novoileksk line can be found in the fact that cordon guards sent proposals about preventing Kazakh invasions of the line. Colonel G. Okunev,47 the head of the summer

45 Materialy po istorii Kazhskoi SSR, 349-351 (document 116)
47 Commander of 1-st Teptyarskogo Cossack guards. Aleksandr Podmaso Shefy i kommandiry regulyarnyk polkov russkoi armii (1796 – 1825) (1997), ac-
guard, emphasized the need to place outposts and strong pickets across the Ilek River, as they had done on the Ural line. This would allow the guards to observe the Kazakh’s actions from as far away as 15 *versts*. He also argued that the Orenburg and Il-etsk Cossacks should serve at these posts. From his perspective, they were “more agile than the Bashkirs.” The Bashkirs were best to keep “on this side” of the line, “in reserve,” so that they could be used for Kazakh detachments across the Ilek when they were needed. At the same time, he noted that Bashkirs needed to be supervised, so that they “would not depart from abuse, [since] it would otherwise be hard to maintain stability on the line.”

Okunev’s perspective on the service of Bashkirs and Kalmyks on the frontier line reflects a larger trend in Kazakh-Bashkir and Kazakh-Kalmyk relations in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. It also underscores how the Orenburg administration incorporated existing “turbmoil and strife between nomads” in their regional policy.

On September 28, 1828 the sultan of the western division of the Little Horde Kazaks, Karatai Nuraliev, informed the military governor P. K. Essen that Jolaman Tlenshi (who belonged to the Abyn tribe and Jaimbet subtribe) had asked for Karatai’s forgiveness and expressed his desire to be under the authority of sultan Karatai.

After the 1820s, the situation on the frontier line changed, marking a second stage in the relationship between Kazakhs and Cossacks. A number of factors contributed to this change. The fertile lands along the Ilek River had been so important for the Kazakh nomads that they continued to try to pasture their herds along the Ilek in spite of the bans introduced by Russian authorities. The Russian state and the Orenburg authorities decided to grant some concessions and allow those tribes who had “retained the goodwill of Russia” to pasture their herds along the river. Evidence of this decision can be found in the reports...
the head of the Novoiletsk line sent to the Orenburg Frontier Commission between 1828 and 1835 regarding Kazakh sultans and biys.

On November 30, 1828, S. Arzhanukhin, the head of Novoileksk line, reported that 46 Kazakh sultans, foremen, and biys, and Kazakhs under their authority, had approached the line and given their guarantee that they would winter on the left bank of the Ilek River and that “they would not do any harm to the officials and salt workers on the line, not take their herds to the right bank of the Ilek, and not destroy forests.” They would live “quietly and in harmony” with the new line. Additionally, if Kazakhs from either side of the Ilek River “spoiled the forests, wasted bread (grains), or stole anything,” the sultans, foremen, and biys would be committed to “investigating” the case and, in accordance with a general decision, would have the accused “repay the residents of the Novoileksk line.” This commitment was guaranteed by requesting a hostage, or amanat. The regional administration required one amanat for every 50 nomadic tents and one for each outpost at Novoileksk, Linevsk, Ozersk, Suhorechensk, and Zaton.51 On November 8, 1828, Iusup Nuraliev, the ruler of the Tama tribe, requested that the regional administration not take any amanats from the Kazakhs under his jurisdiction. Highlighting his loyalty and his “good service to his superiors,” he vowed to be responsible for all of the “illegal actions undertaken by the Kazakhs under his authority.”52

For the most part, however, Arzhanukhin noted that fewer Kazakhs were coming to the line than in years past. This can be explained in part by the fact that more Kazakhs had migrated to the “other side, having [been granted] permissions (bilety) to serve as workers for newly settled peoples.” Still other Kazakhs pastured with Sultan Kydrali Aishuakov about 30 versts away from the line, on the Jirenkop and Kaymas tracts and at the mouth of the Kuraily and Utva rivers.53

Two years later, in 1830, the outpost chiefs informed the Orenburg Frontier Commission that the sultans Abdulmukmin

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Agimov and Baimukahmet and Tauke Aychuakov had pastured their herds on the border of the Ilek River in the winter and returned in the summer to sow grass and harvest crops. They committed to behaving “in a friendly manner and living in agreement with their neighbors, and would use for fuel and small shelter repairs only the deadwood and plants that were useless for building.” They agreed to pasture 15 *versts* away from the Ilek River and to provide the required one *amanat* for every 50 tents.\(^{54}\) The sultans emphasized that they and the “Kazakhs under their authority” had “always wintered along the Novoileksk line and prepared hay” for their cattle.\(^{55}\) Another sultan, Asfan-diarov Sugalin, noted that his grandparents and great-grandparents had lived a nomadic life between the stations at Zaton-nyi and Suhorechensk, and that he pastured his herds in the exact same place, that is, on the steppe side of the Ilek River.\(^{56}\)

These sultans did not perceive the Novoileksk line as a frontier but rather as the site of the winter pastures that their tribes had kept and passed down through generations. As these sultans” requests underscore, they saw the Novoileksk line as dividing traditional pastures rather than defining a border. In the 19th century, the Novoileksk line essentially became a moving boundary of Cossack settlements or an aggregate of divisions between Kazakh winter camps and Cossack settlements that were situated close to one another along the frontier line.

According to I. Blaramberg’s research from the 1840s, the Kazakhs of the Kadyrbek division of the Tabyn tribe (a total of 570 tents), had winter camps across from Iletsk town, Zaton outpost, Suhorechensk, and Ozersk; the Karamukan division (a total of 360 tents) had winter camps opposite the Novoileksk fortress; the Abyz division (145 tents) had winter camps opposite the Linevsk outpost, Iletsk town, and at the top of the Ilek River. All of these Kazakhs lived along the line peacefully and Russians could “move safely among them.”\(^{57}\)

\(^{57}\) Blaramberg, *Voenno-statisticheskoe obozrenie*,105.
Cross-cultural interactions on the frontier line

The organization of trading posts along the fortified lines and the creation of favorable conditions for exchange between nomads and visiting traders played an important role in the Russian state’s trade policy. The Novoileksk line was not an exception: it became an intensive zone of commercial cooperation. That said, only the kinds of goods that Kazakhs needed for daily life were traded along the line.

In 1830, the sultans Abdulmukmin Agimov, Tauke and Baimukhamed Aisuakov informed the regional authorities that an exchange yard, where Kazakhs arrived with their cattle, had been arranged behind the Ilek River and across from the Podgorn outpost.58

The largest trade turnover occurred at the bazaar on the Berdianka River near the Novoileksk border-line. Here nomads traded livestock that had passed through inspection at a veterinary post. Aleksei Dobrosmyslov, a veterinarian from the Tur-gai region, noted the rise in the number of goods purchased: in 1896, 8,117 livestock were sold while, in the following year, this had increased by 2,755.59

The trade of raw animal products, hides, and wool that had been brought to Tamar-Utkul from the Tuz-Tiubinsk, Iletsk, Khobdinsk, and Karatugaisk volosts of the Aktiubinsk district, as well as the Kalmytskii district and the Ural’sk region, was managed by Tatars from the Iletsk Zashchita.60 These traders would purchase skin in small batches and store it in a special location; after accumulating a significant amount, they would send the skins off to be sold in Orenburg. They traded wool in a similar fashion.

Kazakhs, Tatars, Bashkirs also worked together at the Il-etsk salt mines. P. Nebol’sin, who visited the salt mine, highlighted that most workers were Tatars, Bashkirs, and Kazakhs. Four hundred people would arrive in May, when the salt mining would begin.61 In 1846, 67 salt-workers and 718 civilians, most

60 Pamiatnaia knizka Turgaiskoi oblasti 1899 god (Orenburg: Turgaistatcomitet, 1900),120-121.
61 Pavel Nebolsin, “Iletskie solianye kopi,” Geograficheskie izvestiiia Imp. RGO 1 (1854); 409.
of them Tatars from the Orenburg region, mined salt at the Il-
etsk Zashchita. In 1847, Kazakhs were granted employment
permissions (bilety) to work at the Iletsk Zashchita: 161 were is-
sued for one month, 110 for two months, 42 for four months, and
one for six months. In the first half of the 19th century, ap-
proximately 3,000 Kazakhs worked at the Iletsk salt mines. Kaz-
akhs and Bashkirs would often use camels to transport salt from
the Iletsk Zashchita to Orenburg, Troitsk, and Samara.

Around the area of the Novoileksk frontier line, a single
cultural space of Turkic peoples began to form. This is evidenced
by the construction of mosques, the use of mekteps and madra-
sas, and the mutual assistance offered in difficult economic situ-
atations.

Most mosques were built in the first half of the 19th cen-
tury along the frontier lines. These construction projects were
usually initiated by Tatars. No mosques were built in the Ka-
azakh steppe until the beginning of the 1830s. However, archi-
val records indicate that the sultan Orman Nuraliev petitioned
the local authorities in 1809, requesting that a mosque be con-
structed near the Sarachikovsk fortress. A similar request was
submitted by the sultans A. Ashimov and T. and B. Aishuakov
in 1825. According to these figures, a mosque would help Ka-
azaks “abandon their [bad] inclinations, pranks, and misdeeds.”
Nonetheless, the tsarist government rejected their request; the
construction of a mosque required expenses that “would not be
understood by the steppe population.” Additionally, since Kaza-
kh did not own stationary homes, they were not “able to pre-
serve wooden constructions.”

After these earlier failures, Kazakhs and Tatars worked
together in 1832 to raise funds for the construction of a mosque
at Iletsk since it was “a place where they focused on trade.” The
sultan Tauke Aishuakov “volunteered to be in charge of collect-
ing offers from Kazakhs,” who emphasized that the “mosque
would include a school that would teach their children Tatar

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62 Voenno-statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiskoi imperii. Orenburgskaya gu-
berninya, vol.14, p.2, (Sankt-Petersburg: Departament General’nogo shtaba,1848), 83
65 Orenburgskii krai, 7 (1892)
and Muslim law (magometanskii zakon).” Baimukhamed Aishuakov, a sultan from the western division of the Little Horde (Kishi Juz), donated 20 gold coins (400 rubles) to construct the mosque. Kazakhs pastured near the territory of the salt mines provided 9 lambs.\(^67\) The mosque was built in 1833 and Gainulla Gadilshin, a Tatar from Kazan province, was appointed mullah.\(^68\)

Evidence of the support that the Turkic-speaking populations in the region provided for one another can be found in their responses to the natural disasters which seriously affected Kazakh nomadic society. One specific example was the devastating jute that occurred during the winter of 1879-1880. As the veterinarian, A. Dobrosmyslov, noted Kazakh livestock was reduced by 42 percent due to the disaster.\(^69\) At the same time, a large group of Kazakhs arrived at the Iletsk Zashchita, requesting to be hired out to different craftsmen.\(^70\) The administration in Orenburg noted that impoverished Kazakhs were often supported by Tatar merchants who provided food until all of the impoverished Kazakhs were hired.\(^71\)

A strong tradition of inter-cultural interaction continued in the following years, especially as Tatar merchants began to open new madrasas and Muslim charity organizations as part of the larger jadid movement.

**Conclusion**

The historical conditions that led to the establishment of the Novoileksk line are connected with the larger processes of colonizing and developing Kazakhstan’s western and southern Ural regions in the first third of the 19th century. The frontier line reflects the complex situation that Russian authorities and Kazakhs faced in the process of constructing a single mechanism for governing and promoting coexistence between these different groups, which included the various layers of Kazakh society, the

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\(^69\) Aleksei Dobrosmyslov, *Turgaiskaia oblast’. Istoricheskii ocherk*, vol.1-3 (Tver’, 1902), 254.

\(^70\) RGIA. F.1291. Op.82. D.10. L.12ob.

Russian administration, the Cossacks, and the Tatar and Bashkir subjects of the Russian state.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the Novoileksk line was not a zone of long-term, open confrontation between different ethnic groups. According to Governor-General V. A. Pervovskii’s note about the results of constructing the line, “in the first few years there [were several] cases of Kazakh border raids and cattle-rustling, which still sometimes happens,” but, in the end, the “possession of land is determined by politics, government perks, and personal benefits.”

If from 1811 to 1826 the Ileksk frontier line served as a social frontier between settled and nomadic populations that led to open confrontations, then, in the following period, the line could be described as a transitional or contact zone of intensive cultural exchange that continued for centuries. It could also be described as a territory of cross-cultural communication and complementary economic interaction.

By the end of the 1820s, the Novoileksk line started to lose its significance as a boundary line. New frontier line projects began to emerge: the Embensk was built along the east bank of the Emba River to the Caspian Sea in 1826, and the Novotroitsk line was constructed along the borders of Orsk and Troitsk between 1835 and 1837. As a result, Kazakh tribes were allowed to cross the Novoileksk frontier line, though they had to pay with a hostage, or amanat, at each outpost.

Today, the Novoileksk line serves mostly as a mental construction with a symbolic character that has emerged from the long history of Kazakh-Russian, Kazakh-Tatar, and Kazakh-Bashkir cross-cultural encounters and exchanges. This symbolism and the historical and cultural specificities of the Ilekisk and Sol-Iletsk regions are today reflected in their flags, which include frontier symbols. The Ileksk region’s flag represents the merger of the Ural and Ilek rivers with a forked dark blue cross; these reflect two parts of the world: the left coast of the Ural in Asia and the right coast in Europe. The walls of the fortress serve as a symbol of the reliable protection of these borders for centuries. The flag of the Sol-Iletsk region portrays Cossack

pikes, symbolizing the first inhabitants of the region along with the trans-boundary position of the land between Russia and Kazakhstan. Additionally, the crimson and white colors (introduced for the Orenburg Cossack army in 1803) indicate that the Sol-Iletsk Cossacks were a part of the Orenburg Cossack troops.
The contemporary Sino-Russian border in mainland Northeast Asia emerged in 1858 – 1860, when the Russian Empire’s agents in the region, the Governor-General (Graf Murav’ev) and Plenipotentiary at Peking (Graf Ignat’ev) took advantage of the “window of opportunity” opened up by the Qing Empire’s defeat in the Second Opium War.

From the Russian perspective, the treaties of Aigun, Tianjin and Beijing were the culmination of more than 100 years of strategic planning. Beginning with Peter the Great, Russia endorsed a mercantilism-inspired expansionist doctrine focused on gaining access to the sea, which was perceived as an initial step in the developing of industry and trade with overseas countries. The wars of the 1700s against Sweden and Turkey also had this motive. Similar ideas had been first proposed by the academic Gerhardt Müller and an earlier Governor-General, Ivan Iacobi. They believed that the acquisition of the Amur1 Basin should be followed by the construction of a sea port on the Pacific coast and the development of trade with Canton, Japan, and Korea.2

In the beginning of the 21st century, an independent observer may notice similar Leitmotifs in the Asia-Pacific political rhetoric of the contemporary Kremlin. Regardless of the possible outcomes stemming from these various declarations, he (the observer) would likely discover a remarkable continuity (in political vocabulary at least) between the Tsar’s Empire and modern Russia.

While the Russian motivations to claim the Amur Basin and establish a foothold on the Pacific Coast are quite obvious, the Chinese aspects of the aforementioned development are less so.

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1 Amur is known as Heilongjiang in Chinese and as Sahaliyan Ula in Manchu.
What did the Qing dynasty think about the vast areas of territory that lay to the west of the Sea of Japan? How did these ideas influence actual institutions and practices? What lessons may contemporary observers draw from a story which reached its denouement more than 150 years ago?

The objective of this paper is to analyze the Qing dynasty’s perception of its Northeast Asian borderlands, the specifics of her centrally – and regionally – based political institutions, and the evolution of these approaches and practices. Some comparisons will also be drawn to emphasize the specificity of the Qing case.

Geographically the area under review would consist of the Great Xing’an Mountains to the west, the Sea of Japan to the east, the Stanovoy (or Outer Xing’an Mts.) to the north, and the Great Wall to the south. Chronologically the paper will cover the period from the late 17th century conflicts between the Russians and Manchus to the “New Deal” reforms of 1901 – 1911, which established a regular Chinese administration in the area left under Qing control after 1858 – 1860.

The primary sources of this research are found in the “Veritable records of the Great Qing”, the “Collected Institutes of the Qing dynasty”, the “Draft History of Qing”, and the “Illustrated Tributaries of the Qing”.

Contemporary Chinese historiography on this issue includes works on the border history of China (Li Zhiting), administrative evolution (Zhao Zhongfu), and ethnic policy (Zhang Danben, Diao Shuren). While valuable and informative, the Chinese approach suffers from a two-fold bias. Firstly, it often “ethicizes” the problem through presenting it as a specifically Manchu one. On the other hand, it often exaggerates the level of bureaucratic centralization in Qing political practice, which automatically diminishes the importance of intra-regional and local actors.

Non-Chinese work that contributed significantly includes that of Mark Elliott, Richard Edmonds, and Yoshiki Enatsu. A comparative perspective is drawn from the works of James Lewis and Takakura Hiroki.

The Qing dynasty was established in the hilly areas east of the Liao River valley in the early 17th century. The rapidly expanding state had become a rival of the eastern Mongols and Ming China by 1620, when the backbone of Qing imperial rule,
the Eight Banner\textsuperscript{3} system, was established. In 1644 the Manchus passed through the Great Wall and began the conquest of China. The relocation of the Qing Court to the Ming capital of Beijing was followed by the massive relocation of the Manchu population (c. 900,000) to Intramural China.

By the time China was secured for the Qing, Russian fur-traders and Cossacks had advanced through Siberia to reach the Amur Basin. The small fortress (Ru. \textit{ostrog}\textsuperscript{4}) of Albazin became in 1685-1687 an arena for one of the first military conflicts between a European country and China. As a result, the treaty of Nerchinsk secured Qing control over the whole of the Amur Basin. It also lead to the relocation of the Daur people from the areas fallen under Russian rule.

**Administrative evolution of Chinese Northeast Asia**

*(Manchuria)*

As of 1687, the Qing administrative system in Manchuria was built along essentially military lines, with a hierarchy of Eight Banner garrison commanders (General, Ch. \textit{jiangjun} – Lt.-General, Ch. \textit{fudutong} – Fortress Commandant, Ch. \textit{chengshouwei}, etc.) who also performed as the regional/local administration. Manchuria afterwards came to be known as the “Three eastern provinces” with the \textit{jiangjun} as the supreme military and civilian administrator.\textsuperscript{5}

**South Manchuria: garrisons vs. regional government.** But the actual situation was more complex, reflecting both the already diverse population and logistical difficulties.

The south had been re-populated (until the ban in 1668) by Han settlers, partially integrated into the Eight Banner system. To govern them, a special Capital District of Fengtian (Ch.

\textsuperscript{3} An administrative-military system which permanently allocated each bannerman’s household (including adult warrior, family members and household slaves) to the specific company (Ma \textit{niuru} or Ch. \textit{zuoling}), which formed battalions (Ma \textit{jailing}, Ch \textit{candling}), which were put under one of the banners (Ma \textit{gas}, Ch \textit{quid}).

\textsuperscript{4} Hereinafter the allophone words are given in parenthesis. Languages are abbreviated as follows. Ch stands for Chinese (\textit{Pinyin} transliteration), Ma for Manchu (Möllendorf), Mg for Mongol (Mostaert), Ru for Russian, Ja for Japanese (Rōmaji).

\textsuperscript{5} Regular provinces were headed by the governor (Ch. \textit{xunfu}). The Banner General’s rank was equal to the governor-general (Ch. \textit{zongdu}).
fengtian fu) was established, subordinated to the Mukden Eight Banner General. District prefects (Ch. fuyin) had a rank roughly corresponding to that of a civil governor (Ch. buzhenqshi) of a regular province. His deputy (Ch. fucheng) was equal in rank to a provincial judge (Ch. anchashi). Below this were a network of prefectures (Ch zhou), counties (Ch xian) and districts (Ch fu) administered identically to China south of the Great Wall. The Han settlement zone was confined within the so-called Willow Palisade (Ch. liutiaobian), a system of earthy fortifications with specially guarded passages. Migration outside the palisade, as well as from Inner China to South Manchuria was prohibited, though not effectively enforced.

Additionally, Five Boards (or Ministries) were established in Mukden to collect taxes, maintain local infrastructure (imperial tombs), defend the area from banditry, receive and escort the embassies from Joseon (Korea), and so forth. Each ministry was headed by an official of the vice-ministerial rank of shilang. Another bureaucratic structure which had its parallel in Beijing was the Imperial Household department. In general, the southern part of Manchuria had its own separate government (staffed mostly with the personnel from the Eight Banners), with responsibility over the civilian population.

North Manchuria: garrisons vs. tribal polities. The northeast and northwest parts of Manchuria also had its administrative specificities. The area was governed by two Eight Banner Generals in Girin and Qiqihar who commanded a network of garrisons at strategic locations, mostly at river junctions along the Sungari, Nonni, Hurha, etc. The outer perimeter of the area under garrison control was roughly corresponding to a

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9 Beijing had Six Boards: Personnel, Revenues, Army, Rites, Public Works and Punishments. Each was headed by two directors (Ch. shangshu; a Han and a Manchu) and four vice-directors (Ch. shilang, two Manchus and two Hans). Mukden had no Board of Personnel.
line between Sahaliyan Hoton (Ma, modern Heihe and Russian Blagoveschensk) and Mergen (modern Nehe). Further to the west the Qalq-a Mongol Khanates had been vassals of the Qing Emperors since the 1690s. The regions to the east remained largely outside the political order of the Qing Empire.

The garrisons were surrounded by tribal polities, mostly of Tungus linguistic affiliation. These tribes were incorporated into a system of tributary trade with the Manchus, who perceived this as a form of political domination.11 Interestingly the Amur basin was simultaneously involved in the early modern trade network known as the Santan trade (Ja. santan köeki) centered on the Japanese fief of Matsumae.12 Tribal peoples of Manchuria were subjected to a system of conscription which integrated them into the Eight Banners.13

To the west of Manchuria, the nomadic polities of the eastern Mongol ulus (Mg. “polities”, e.g. Qaračin, Jalayid, Ölöd, etc.) were ruled by a hereditary aristocracy (Mg. törö) which owed feudal ties (Mg. jasay) to the Qing Emperors.14 Administratively they were controlled by the Eight Banner generals of Qiqihar and Mukden.

Reforms: 1700 – 1860. During the period between 1715 and 1745, the network of Eight Banner garrisons was expanded eastward to reach the Joseon (Korea) borderlands at Hunchun and the Sungari/Hurha junction at Ilan Hala Hoton (Ch. Sanxing). Thus the outer perimeter of the Manchu control shifted significantly eastward, largely reaching the contemporary Sino-Russian border. More garrisons (Alčuga, Itun, Hulan) were established within the perimeter, partially due to the imperial policy of resettling destitute Bannermen.15

13 Some former tribesmen grew to prominence. The last Qing titular empress Wanrong was an example.
14 Johan Elverskog, Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism and the State in Late Imperial China (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2006), 42-45.
15 Wei Ying, Qingdai jingqi huitun wenti yanjiu (Haerbin: Heilongjiang daxue chubanshe, 2009), 39, 65, 80.
This eastern expansion of the garrison line led to the establishment of two special bureaucratic structures – the Hunters” Directorates (Ch. dasheng zongguan yamen), both in charge of collecting tribute and recruiting soldiers from the tribal polities of the Amur Basin.

The establishment of Han settlement prefectures (Ch. ting) was the most significant reform of this period. Yongji (within the modern city of Jilin) and Ning’an (south of Mudanjiang) were established to incorporate the increasingly agricultural population. During the first quarter of the 19th century, the Qing government gradually established new prefectures in Changchun (1800), Changtu (1807), Fuyu (1810), Xinmin (1814).16

Reforms: 1860 – 1911. The Russian advance to the Amur Basin in 1858 – 1860 was not the only factor contributing to the administrative reforms in Manchuria in the second half of the 19th century. The other, no less important, was the growing Han presence in the region which became a challenge for both the fiscal and security apparatus of the Empire.

New reforms included: lifting the ban on the Han migration (1876), establishing the inspectorate (Ch dao) of Fengtian-Jinzhou-Shanhaiguan (1866) and the Eastern Frontier District (Ch dongbiandao), founding (1862 – 1881) new local administrations in south Manchuria and the Sungari valley (Hulan, Fenghuang, Xinjing, Wuchangbao, etc.). The status of the Fengtian prefect was raised; he became the provincial governor (Ch xun-fu).

Interestingly the outer perimeter of the Eight Banner garrison system was expanded or enforced. Several new garrisons were established along the new Russian border: Fujejin (on Sungari), Buteha (on Nonni). Others were promoted to the higher rank of Lt. General (Ch fudutong), e.g. in Hunchu (1881).17

Eventually, the sub-regional and local bureaucracy of the three eastern provinces became identical to the rest of China. Only the upper-level bureaucracy remained belonging to the

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Eight Banners until the last wave of the Qing reforms in 1901–1911. The efforts of Xiliang, Xu Shichang, Zhao Erxun and other Manchu and Han officials finally led to the administrative unification of Manchuria and China Proper in 1906. The roles of the Banner Generals at Girin and Qiqihar were merged with those of the provincial governor, while the governor of Mukden was promoted to the position of Governor-General of the three eastern provinces (a position initially reserved for the Eight Banners).  

Ideas behind the Qing Administrative Policy in Manchuria

The Qing political system in Manchuria displayed considerable diversity, especially in the beginning. It combined the Eight Banner garrisons network, regular civilian administration for the Han and rural Bannermen, the vassaldom of the Mongol nomadic aristocracy, and tributary trade with tribal peoples of the Amur basin. While a gradual process of administrative unification from the local level upward is clearly visible, the Qing dynasty obviously favored a policy of “rule according to local habits” (Ch hu-han fenzhi).

Diversification. This practice may be viewed as a manifestation of the essentially dual character of the dynasty. The Qing simultaneously belonged to the Sinitic and Inner Asian (Manchu-Mongol) cultural areas and were very sensitive to cultural diversity. Until the reforms of 1901–1911, the empire preserved segregation between the major ethnic/political groups: Manchus and Han (Ch Man-Han zhenyu), Mongols and Han, and so on. The groups were housed separately, intermarriages and other social interactions were banned, and special quotas (Ch guanque) were assigned to the majority of government institutions. In this respect, the diversity of administrative system seems to be quite natural.

Another explanation may be found in the functional distinction between military (or militarized) and civilian groups of the population (as perceived by the dynasty). There are spatial

manifestations of this difference. The walled cities and outer perimeters of the Qing Empire were “guarded” by the Eight Banner garrisons, or by the Mongol nomadic polities, as well as by the warlike tribal peoples of the Amur Basin. The inner space was “reserved” for the agricultural Han Chinese people. The gradual establishment of the civil administration in Manchuria, therefore, was the logical consequence of Han settlement.

The diverse approach to administration may have a cultural explanation: the regions north of the Great Wall were perceived by the culturally Chinese bureaucracy (even if of Manchu or Mongol ethnic origin) as “borderlands” (Ch biandi), as opposed to the “inner lands” (Ch neidi or fudi). The Chinese empires historically used to treat such territories and peoples separately.

But the reverse is also correct. The ethnically Manchu Qing dynasty clearly differentiated between “inner” (Ma dorgi) and “outer” (Ma tulergi) spheres relative to the Emperor. The Eight Banners, according to this scale, were considered “the root of the state” (Ch guojia genben). In Manchuria they formed the nucleus, the core of imperial rule; as often expressed in Mongolian political vocabulary, they were the “bones” which carried the “flesh” (i.e. the Han Chinese).

The diverse approach to the administration was justified in terms of both Chinese and Manchu political philosophies.

Decentralization. The Chinese imperial states were pre-modern phenomena, their ability to govern limited by transport and communication technologies. Considerable autonomy for regional and local officialdom was quite natural, making the hand-picking of loyal administrators essential for sustainable rule.

The emperors stopped regular inspection of Manchurian garrisons in the 1820’s due to political and fiscal troubles. The trend towards regionalization became common for all Qing domains. The governors, governor-generals and Banner generals became extremely independent in fiscal, military and diplomatic affairs. The Aigun treaty with the Russians was concluded by General Yishan, while the development of modern region-

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20 Dai Yinghua, Qingmo Minchu qimin shengcun zhuangtai yanjiu (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2010), 56-57. When recruited to the Eight Banners, they proved to be good soldiers during the mid 19th century wars against rebellions.
al armed forces was with the contribution of Manchu generals Yiketangga and Ming’an (though usually overshadowed by Wu Dachen, who was a Han official).21

The behavior of Banner Generals during the famous Boxer rebellion also displays significant autonomy: only Shoushan followed the official policy of fighting against the Russian forces. The others (e.g. Zengqi) preferred making deals with the invaders.22

The situation on a local level was similar. As the riverine system was the principal traffic route, the distant garrisons or posts may often have been inaccessible for several months annually. A Japanese traveller, Mamiya Rinzo (1800s), noticed that an officer of the Eight Banners (rank “cavalry captain” Ch xi-aqiuwei) stayed in the villages along the Amur during the summer season, and then retreated back to his home garrison for the winter, leaving the villages outside the sphere of effective government control.23

A decentralized administration, as pointed by contemporary researchers, encourages a less rigid local attitude towards Han migration. The landowners and Eight Banner officials were economically interested in the presence of growing number of tenants and taxed farmers and usually turned a blind eye to the fact that officially Han settlement was prohibited.24

The relatively decentralized administrative system of Qing Manchuria led to the formation of locally-based cliques (e.g. in Fushun, Liaoyang) which gained prominence during the last years of the Empire and first decades of the Republic.25

“Oriental physiocrats”. While western (including Russian) colonization was largely based on mercantilist political econo-

21 Qian Shifu, Qingji xinshe zhiguan nianbiao (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977), 29, 58.
22 Li Yanguang & Guan Jie, Manzu tongshi (Shenyang: Liaoning manzu chubanshe, 2001), 633-635. The governors of South China (e.g. Li Hongzhang, Liu Kunyi, Zhang Zhidong) went even further and withdrawn from the war against the anti-Boxer coalition by forming an association of provinces and concluding peace accord with foreigners.
23 Mamiya Rinzo, Dongda jixing (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1974), 12-17.
my, the Qing attitude was more physiocratic – they favoured agriculture over commerce and industry. Applying this concept to the administration of Manchuria, one may find that the whole logic of Qing rule in the region was based on the presumption that agriculture was the backbone of both the economy and politics.

The changes in the administrative system reflected the role of agriculture. When the populace of northern Manchuria was engaged in hunting and fishing, the simplistic approach of ruling via the Eight Banners dominated. They were the political substructure, upon which the economic basis of colonization was built. When the farming population became dominant, the administrative system was re-constructed along Chinese lines.

Thus the borderlands were internalized (Ch neidi) through peasant colonization, with the bureaucratic infrastructure as the superstructure. The cost of such a philosophy was high. Han peasant migration was too slow to Sinicize the region, which opened a “window of opportunity” to the Russian fur traders, Cossacks and merchants. Their network of trading posts became the infrastructure of colonial advance.

East Asian Borders in Comparative Perspective

Qing China was not the only state displaying diversified (functionally and/or culturally based), decentralized and agriculturally-focused development of its border areas.

As early as the 14th century, Joseon Korea imposed elements of military rule onto the recently acquired areas of modern Hamgyeong and Pyong’an provinces. A chain of fortified settlements was built along the Tuman River and Yalu River.26 In the 17-18th centuries the Koreans dealt, with varying degrees of success, with the culturally distinct group of Ya’ìn (“savages”, a.k.a. Jurchen).27

The relations between the Japanese Tokugawa Shōgun and the northern tribal peoples (known nowadays as the Ainu)

26 Li Gi Baek, Istoria Korei: novaia traktovka (Moskva: Pervoe marta, 2000), 208-209.
present another example of the decentralized approach – contacts were handled via the Matsumae fief (a vassal of the Tokugawa) through a tributary trade system. Interestingly, the delegation of foreign relations to autonomous local agents was common practice in pre-Modern Japan: Tokugawa contacts with Korea were handled by the Tsushima daimyō (prince) and relations with China through the Satsuma daimyō and the Ryūkyūs.28

The comparison with Japan and Korea is valuable since it places the north-eastern frontier of China into the broader context of East Asian culture. It shows that such distinct features of border management as a culturally-diverse approach to administrative practices, a decentralized structure of authority and agriculturally-focused colonization practices are not accidental but reflect a different historical and cultural background from European empires.

FORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN-CHINESE BORDER
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Marina O. Dmitrieva

Today experts agree that the Russian-Chinese relationship has a definite impact on the development of global politics. However, this influence on the world system is certainly less significant than Sino-American relations.

In this article an attempt is made to look at the history of the border between Russia and China through the prism of foreign affairs and bilateral Russian-Chinese relations.

President Vladimir Putin, at a press-conference on 20 December, 2012, said that the relationship between Russia and China was at “an unprecedentedly high level of trust and cooperation”.¹

The two countries have made efforts to conduct a concerted policy on the world stage. Their views coincide on such issues as strengthening security in Asia, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and multipolarity. Russia and China take a common stand on such problems as the fight against religious extremism, national separatism and international terrorism. Both states vote concertedly on a majority of issues at the UN Security Council, General Assembly and in various international organizations. One of the most recent examples of such coordinated actions was the veto of Russia and China to a UN draft resolution providing for sanctions against Syria. Previously, the two countries had taken a common stand against such measures being applied to Iran.

According to the Professor of MGIMO-University, Sergei Luzianin, the main objective in regional cooperation for both Russia and China is “a struggle for stability, development and prosperity of all states and nations and creating a foundation for world harmonisation”.²

¹ “Vladimir Putin’s press-conference on 20 September, 2012”. President of Russia Website, accessed December 19, 2012, http://президент.рф/%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8/17173.

² Sergei G. Luzianin, “Rossiia i Kitai v Evrazii. Mezdunarodno-Regionalnye Izmerenia Rossiisko-Kitaiskogo Partnerstva”, in Russia and China in Eura-
Bilateral interactions include trade, economic and investment ties, cooperation in the energy, science, technology and military fields, as well as cultural exchanges. Russia and China are also developing their cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), BRIC (the group of Brazil, Russia, India and China), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Six-Party Talks and other international bodies.

An important element of the Russian-Chinese partnership is transborder exchanges. For a number of Russian eastern regions (Primorye and Khabarovsk Territories and the Amur Region) China is the major trade partner, an important factor in the local population’s wellbeing, and a channel of globalization and regional integration.

Events on this extensive Russia-China border line provide a laboratory for examining shifts in the economic, military and political power of both countries and the resolution of border issues is indicative of improvements in Russian-Chinese interactions occurring within the context of the global political system.

The issue of border legitimacy is quite complex. Despite a host of signed treaties that delimited the border, territorial conflicts recurred. However, armed clashes between locals didn’t play a decisive role and border issues were mainly settled through negotiations and the signing of treaties and agreements. The first of them, the Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689, set the first Russian-Chinese border and determined diplomatic and trade relations between the states. According to the Treaty of Aigun of 1858, the left bank of the Amur River from the Argun River up to the estuary was recognized as belonging to Russia, while Ussuriiskii krai from the Ussuri River confluence with the Amur up to the sea was left under joint occupation until the border was defined.

The Treaty of Beijing of 1860 delimited this region and marked the western border between Russia and China. The right bank of the Ussuri River was recognized as belonging to Russia, while the left was granted to China. The border was also
settled along the Sungacha River, Khanka Lake, Belenhe and Tunmenjiang Rivers up to the border with Korea.

The Treaty of St. Petersburg of 1881 granted control over the western part of the Ili region (in the Ili River valley) to Russia. The remaining territory of the region was ceded to China. The treaty reaffirmed all rights and privileges Russia held in western China and Mongolia. In 1911, the Treaty of Qiqihar fixed the border after technical adjustments near Argun.

In 1991, the USSR and PRC signed an agreement on border delimitation in the east, which was finally completed in 2004. Obvious difficulties in border delimitation had emerged in the 1950s after the creation of the PRC, when its leadership advanced a number of territorial demands. Sergei Golunov points out that “the offensive policy of the PRC regarding border issues throughout 1960s-1970s was determined by a worldwide struggle against the USSR”. At the same time China made territorial claims to Vietnam and Japan and reclaimed Hong Kong.

The armed conflict over Damanskii Island in March 1969 can be considered the peak of confrontation between the USSR and PRC. In September of that year, at a meeting initiated by the Soviet side, Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and Zhou Enlai, Prime Minister of the State Council of the PRC, reached an agreement on resuming Soviet-Chinese negotiations on border issues. However, the parties couldn’t reach a compromise and the negotiations were halted.

A significant role in the normalization of the Russian-Chinese relationship was played by Mikhail S. Gorbachev who, in his speech in Vladivostok in 1986, proclaimed the new principles of the USSR’s foreign policy. The head of state conveyed his willingness to meet representatives of the PRC at any level that positively impacted on the Soviet-Chinese relationship.

In May 1989, M. Gorbachev made an official visit to Beijing. The outcome of the state leaders meeting was a formula comprised of eight characters translated as: “To close the past – to open the future”. As a result, in May 1991, the Sino-Rus-
sian Agreement on Border Delimitation along its Eastern Section was signed.

After the break-up of the USSR, a new stage in the relationship with the PRC began. The need to define the border between the RF and PRC on the basis of new priorities brought the two states to the negotiating table. In February 1992, the Sino-Russian Border Line Agreement on its Eastern Section was ratified. For the sake of a quick resolution to negotiations, the parties decided to remove disputed issues from the agenda and postpone discussion of them for an indefinite time.

In December 1992, the Russian President Boris El’tsin made his first official visit to China. The Beijing Declaration signed during this visit reaffirmed the principles of friendship between the two countries that had been agreed during Gorbachev’s visit to the PRC in May 1989.

However, the development of the relationship between the two states slowed due to the initial pro-Western foreign policy of B. El’tsin and increased anti-Chinese attitudes among the regional authorities. Nevertheless, in 1994, continued negotiations led to the Agreement on the Russia-Chinese State Border along its Western Section.

The next step was a conclusion of two agreements between the PRC, on one side, and Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, on the other. In 1996 they signed an agreement of mutual trust and one agreeing to the reduction of armed forces stationed in areas along the border in 1997.

In June 2001, on the basis of these agreements they founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Established initially as a political alliance of five states that aimed to settle outstanding border issues along the former Soviet-Chinese frontier, the SCO today has become a fully-fledged multilateral institution.

The emergence of this new integrating structure in the international arena was possible thanks to Russian-Chinese political rapprochement as a result of the settlement of border disputes between the two countries.

In July of that year, Russia and China signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation. Aleksei D. Bogaturov notes that their mutual obligations are “typical for

Ves’ Mir , 2010), 881.
treaties between allies, though the word “ally” wasn’t used in the context of the Sino-Russian treaty”.  

The rapprochement of Russia and China was facilitated by the appointment of Evgenii M. Primakov as the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The pro-Western vector in Russian foreign policy was changed to one which emphasized multipolarity. China as a result became one of Russia’s key partners. The idea of a strategic triangle – Moscow-Delhi-Beijing – was also floated, although in practice it wasn’t realized.

This transformation of Russian foreign policy was taking place during a period of worsening relations between both Moscow and Beijing with Washington. The former emerged as a result of growing mistrust following on from events in Yugoslavia, NATO’s expansion to Russia’s borders and disappointments caused by the unrealized expectations engendered through partnership with the West. Tensions between Beijing and Washington were stoked by the crisis over Taiwan, when on the eve of the presidential election in Taiwan the PRC conducted military exercises in the area. Washington condemned Beijing’s actions and sent its warships to the Taiwanese Strait. The situation was exacerbated by the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999.

The Treaty of 2001 between Russia and China facilitated a resolution of border issues, but, at the same time, caused discontent among the public and regional authorities in Russia, who considered the treaty inimical to national interests and a potential threat. Nevertheless, on 14 October, 2004, the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov and Li Zhaoxing, signed an additional agreement in Beijing that settled the border line along its eastern sector.

In the Joint Declaration that the Russian Federation and Peoples’ Republic of China signed in 2004, it is emphasized that “the agreement on the state border as well as other agreements in relation to the state border have opened additional opportunities for interaction between the two countries” border regions ...

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that will facilitate an enrichment of Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation and partnership”.6

The concession of islands to China had opponents in the Russian Far East. In 2004, members of the Khabarovsk Regional Duma pleaded with the State Duma and the Federation Council to not ratify the agreements under any circumstances. Those opposed pointed out the importance of keeping hold of the fortifications on Bol’shoy Ussuriisky Island. According to some Far-Eastern economists, as a result of the island’s concession Russia has lost US$3 billion.7

Nevertheless, on 21 July 2008, a descriptive protocol that marked the border line along the Amur River was signed, and the border problem between Russia and China was finally resolved.

This analysis of the history of the settlement of the border between Russia and China gives grounds for the conclusion that this process depended heavily upon the state of foreign affairs between the two countries and the positions of both states in the geopolitical system. Negotiations over a border settlement dragged due to the uncoordinated foreign policy of the Russian central and regional authorities in the early 1990s and the desire of the regional authorities to conduct their own independent course. The discontent of the populations of both countries, who believed that the border delimitation was unjust, was another hurdle on the way to the border settlement.

It is remarkable that during the last twenty years Russian-Chinese relations have continued to deepen and strengthen in a context where the power balance between the two states has significantly shifted.

Rapid changes in the Russian-Chinese relationship are probably explained by the fact that Russian foreign policy is still reactive. Russia hasn’t yet found its place in a formative world order, whether it is a global or regional power. Pavel B. Salin, notes that “for Moscow, which has learnt the ways of reacting to

current challenges from the West (particularly the US), there is inexperience in China’s case, and Moscow has no clear-cut strategy towards it, not even a reactive version”.

Despite the proclaimed strategic partnership, there remains a good deal of disagreement between Moscow and Beijing. Prominent among these are such economic issues as the trade imbalance, oil supply problems, and the unbalanced nature of political, trade and economic ties. Political issues include different approaches to the SCO’s development and competition for influence in post-Soviet space, and the lack of trust and mutual understanding between the peoples of the two countries, with a perception of a “Chinese threat” in the minds of some Russians and of “territories annexed by Russia” in the minds of some Chinese still alive.

Bobo Lo points out that “a combination of factors like global recession, the strengthening of China, and a “reset” of the Russia-US relationship makes earlier hidden frictions between Moscow and Beijing more evident”. This suggests that the settlement of border issues with the PRC was a timely decision by the Russian leadership. In a situation where the power balance between the two states was shifting in favor of China, the fastest resolution was arguably the most advantageous one.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the strategic partnership between Russia and China was established mainly as a challenge to global US hegemony. This was to some extent an imposed rapprochement of two weaker states to counter a stronger one. However, the ever-accelerating development of the PRC is a concern for everyone, including the RF. It raises the question of whether China’s strengthening will lead to a new reconsideration of its borders with Russia.

These concerns are driven by claims in the works of a number of Chinese authors to China’s “historical lands”. Iurii M. Galenovich, after studying a book “China is disappointed” released in 2009, has come to the conclusion that “such perceptions currently are quite popular in China, especially among

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some youths and military servicemen”. Though one should be cautious at such categorical estimates, such conclusions are made on the basis of a large opinion poll.

There is another viewpoint as well. For example, Chang Bin”, points out that “an implementation of a policy of peace can lead to mutual benefits, while a policy of confrontation – to bilateral failure”. Moreover, he is confident that “an international balance of power requires Russia and China to unite for mutual support”. In such a situation, the question of reconsidering the border settlement isn’t raised.

Also, no one should forget China’s domestic problems, the resolution of which is the main focus of Beijing. Taiwan is also a potential source of conflict in the Asia-Pacific Region, as are the territorial claims of the PRC to some East-Asian countries. The factor of the US plays a significant role as well.

According to Fedor Luk’ianov, the editor-in-chief of the journal Russia in Global Affairs “China isn’t ready for confrontation – neither militarily or politically, nor, and this is more important, mentally”. Researchers agree that Beijing’s leaders are most likely to continue to pursue the current course. However, in the long-term, the situation is not as clear.

The state of Russian-Chinese bilateral interactions, therefore, will as before apparently depend on the wider state of global affairs and the role that Russia and China will play in these affairs.

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12 Ibid.15.
Therefore, the formation of the border between Russia and China was occurring in the context of the development of Russian-Chinese relations. A swift shift in the balance of power in favor of China has forced Russia to make a decision that, if not totally beneficial for her, favors further development of cooperation between these two countries.
In 2008, I took part in an international symposium entitled “Sakhalin: historical experiences of opening up / colonization”, which was held at Sakhalin State University. This was my first visit to the island of Sakhalin. The program I had originally received from the organizers had rendered the subtitle of the symposium as “historical experiences of colonization”, without the term “opening up (osvoenie)”. I realized then that the word “opening up” had been subsequently added to the subtitle. This is because controversy had erupted over the term “colonization” and the question of whether Sakhalin was a colony or not.

When Japanese scholars refer to Karafuto, it is common to define Karafuto as a “colony”. The formal colonies of the Empire of Japan include Taiwan, Karafuto, Korea, the Kwantung Leased Territory and the South Sea Islands. They became Japanese territories after 1899, when the Constitution of the Empire of Japan was in force. However, if you call Karafuto a “colony” in front of repatriates from Karafuto, you will face strong objections: for them, Sakhalin was an integral part of Japan, not a “colony.”

This problem results from the polysemy of and negativity associated with the term “colony.” There are two major types of colonies: “exploitation colonies” and “settlement colonies.” The former involve the conquest and exploitation of a native population and the number of settlers from the mother country is relatively low. Exemplars of this type of colony within the Empire of Japan include Taiwan and Korea. These sorts of colonies correspond to the generally-held negative image of a “colony.” On the other hand, in “settlement colonies” the settlers form a majority of the population, as a result of the dispossession of the original inhabitants. “Settlement colonies” can themselves be classified into two types: colonies formed by settlers from the mother country and those formed by settlers from elsewhere. Typical

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1 In this paper, “Sakhalin” means the territory governed by the Russian Empire or the Russian Federation, while “Karafuto” means the southern part of the Sakhalin Island governed by the Empire of Japan in 1905-1945. Sakhalin Island is referred to as the geographical place name.
cases of the former are the British colonies of New England and Australia. The cases of Sakhalin in the Russian Empire and Karafuto in the Empire of Japan can be viewed as examples of this type. An example of the latter type is the Caribbean colonies primarily worked and populated by imported African slaves.¹

A characteristic of Sakhalin / Karafuto as a settlement colony is its geographical proximity to “home”. Sakhalin Island lies 42 km from northern Japan and only 7 km from continental Russia. So it is hard to comprehend a border between mother country and colony. In other words, the inhabitants of Sakhalin / Karafuto cannot imagine that they lived or live in a foreign colony. This explains why the term “colony” causes a strong reaction amongst people from Sakhalin / Karafuto.

This paper aims to consider the characteristics of Sakhalin and Karafuto as a colony, in the Russian Empire and Japanese Empire respectively. Recently in Japan, there has been a growth in research on the former colonies of the Japanese Empire, but the study of Karafuto has lagged behind. In 2012, Miki Masafumi published The Formation of the Japanese Settlement Colony of Karafuto,³ which is the first monograph on the history of Karafuto in Japan. However, for Sakhalin’s history during the Czarist era, much progress has been achieved through a collaborative project, The Russo-Japanese war and Sakhalin Island.⁴ In Russia, Sakhalin studies are undertaken only by Sakhalin historians, but they have made remarkable progress, especially on its history in the Czarist era. Particularly noteworthy are Marina I. Ishchenko’s Old Russian Inhabitants in Sakhalin, Natal’ia V. Potapova’s Creed Policy of the Russian Empire and religious life in the Far East from the first half of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century, and Mikhail S. Vysokov’s Commentary on A.P. Chekhov’s “Sakhalin Island”.⁵ In particular, Ishchenko’s important work is closely related to this paper.

⁵ Marina I. Ishchenko, Russkie starozhily Sakhalina: Vtoriaia polovina XIX – nachalo XX vv. (Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 2007); Natal’ia V. Potapova, Veroispravednaia politika Rossiskoi imperii i religioznaia zhizn’ Dal’nego Vostoka vo vtoroi
The specific question I am concerned with here is how and why the Russian settlement colony of Sakhalin became the Japanese settlement colony of Karafuto, and how the Japanese occupying forces treated the Russian citizens of Sakhalin. To put it briefly, these Japanese forces engineered the departure of the Russian inhabitants in a short space of time, and this enabled the formation of the Japanese settlement colony. But why were such actions necessary? To answer this question, it is necessary to study the conditions of colonization on Sakhalin. This piece will begin with a description of how Sakhalin Island was colonized by the Russian Empire. Then, in the second part, I would like to discuss how the Russo-Japanese war ended on Sakhalin and how the Russian inhabitants left the island.

Sakhalin as a penal colony

The Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875 between Japan and Russia incorporated Sakhalin Island unambiguously into the territory of the Russian Empire. Prior to this, though, Sakhalin under Czarism was already known as a penal colony. According to the Tentative Regulations Relative to the Island of Sakhalin in 1867, the island was designated as being under the joint occupation of Russia and Japan, and the Russian government officially made Sakhalin a place of exile in 1868, though the sending of exiles to this island had already begun in 1858. The purpose of the colonization of Sakhalin by exiles was to strengthen and secure the Russian presence on the island. By 1873, 1,162 Russian people lived on the island, together with a Japanese population only 660 strong. The British Minister to Japan acknowledged that Sakhalin was under Russian sway,
and suggested that the Japanese government should abandon the island. This led to the Treaty of 1875.

Within the Russian Empire, Russian America (Alaska) was the only official colony. Russian official documents seldom called Sakhalin a “colony”. On the other hand, you very often see the term in a variety of contemporary literature. One of the most famous examples is Aleksei A. Panov’s *Sakhalin as a colony*. Wider recognition of Sakhalin as a penal colony reflected its image within Russia and the reality of colonization on the island. In 1912, the Governor of Sakhalin oblast Dmitrii Grigor’ev argued that, “The period of exile has already passed, so the image of Sakhalin as a penal colony should be erased.

The Russian Empire’s “Regulations on exiles” categorized them into three classes: hard labor convicts, convict settlers and tramps. Hard labor convicts lived in prison, and were forced to work in coal mines, constructing roads and so on. After serving their sentences as hard labor convicts, they were reclassified as convict settlers and settled in colonies specified by the administration, where they had to support themselves through agriculture. Although they remained convicts in the eyes of the law, they lived freely within the boundaries of the colony as peasants. Tramps, mere itinerants, were treated as convict settlers.

Following ten years as convict settlers, or six if granted a pardon, they were again reclassified as peasants-formerly-exiles. Legally, they were no longer convicts, able to reside anywhere on Sakhalin Island and even, after 1888, to leave the island. However, the administrative treatment of them was different from this legal designation, and the administration treated these peasants-formerly-exiles as “exiles” as well.

Citizens of the Russian Empire generally imagined “exiles” as hard labor convicts and regarded Sakhalin as “a colony

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11 Aleksei A. Panov, *Sakhalin as a colony* (St. Petersburg, 1905).


13 Polnyi svod zakonov Rossiskoi Imperii, vol. 14 (St. Petersburg, 1904), 1.

14 Obzor ostrova Sakhalina za 1899 god. Prilozhenie k vsepoddanneishemu otchety (St. Petersburg, 1900), 9.
of hard labor convicts.” This image was created through works like Anton P. Chekhov’s *Sakhalin Island*. Chekhov’s discourse created the image that Sakhalin was a “hell island” at “the far end of the earth,” where the hard labor convicts lived terribly and hopelessly, all of them desperate to return to the “continent”, “Russia.”

Chekhov visited Sakhalin in 1890, when the colonization of Sakhalin was at a tipping point. The composition of the population showed that “the colony of hard labor convicts” was turning into a “colony of convict settlers and peasants-formerly-exiles,” i.e. “a colony of “peasants’.”

The number of hard labor convicts increased drastically after 1879, when the Russian Volunteer Fleet started carrying them to Sakhalin. Most convicts’ terms were less than 12 years, so many of these same individuals became the convict settlers of the 1890s and then the peasants-formerly-exiles of the end of

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that decade. In 1902 Sakhalin had a population of 36,595, 50.8 percent of which was made up of convict settlers and peasants-formerly-exiles.\textsuperscript{16} This means Sakhalin after Chekhov was, in effect, a “colony of peasants.” The first scholar to pay attention to this discrepancy was Marina I. Ishchenko.

Contrary to Chekhov’s expectations, these “peasants” settled on the island. The total number of the peasants-formerly-exiles who left Sakhalin was only about 650.\textsuperscript{17} The quantity of sowed seeds of grain in 1883 was 39 tons, and potato 65 tons. The quantity of grain in 1901 had increased to 609 tons and potato to 880 tons, and the Sakhalin peasants got a yield 3454 tons of grain and 6642 tons of potato.\textsuperscript{18} The number of Sakhalin-born increased from 310 in 1895 to 968 in 1901, 800 of whom became adults. The collective identity “Sakhalintsy”, those who love the island as their home, was built by the end of the 1890s.\textsuperscript{19}

However, the Sakhalin administration did not recognize this situation. According to a document summarizing the history of the penal colony on Sakhalin, because the official organizations depended on continental Russia for food, they concluded that colonization through exiles was a failure.\textsuperscript{20} However, this does not mean that the Sakhalin “peasants” failed in agricultural development, because they were able to support their own lives without any aid from the administration. From data in 1899, it was only 337 of the 17,240 “peasants” who received food aid\textsuperscript{21}. The administration said that the reason it did not buy food from the “peasants” was the low quality of their products\textsuperscript{22}. However, it can readily be imagined that this mainly derived from prejudice toward the “exiles.”

In March 1905, the Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamzdorf tried to sell Sakhalin to the U.S. Although the plan was not

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{16} Marina I. Ishchenko, \textit{Russkie starozhily Sakhalina}, 38.
\item\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Sakhalinskii kalendar}” (O. Sakhalin, 1897), 103; Ibid (1898), 76; Ibid (1899), 85; \textit{Obzor ostrova Sakhalina za 1899 god, Vedomost” 1; Obzor ostrova Sakhalina za 1900 i 1901 god, Vedomost” 1.}
\item\textsuperscript{18} Marina I. Ishchenko, \textit{Russkie starozhily Sakhalina}, 217-218; \textit{Obzor ostrova Sakhalina za 1900 i 1901 god, Vedomost” 24.}
\item\textsuperscript{19} Marina I. Ishchenko, \textit{Russkie starozhily Sakhalina}, 319-320.
\item\textsuperscript{20} “Otmena ssylki na o. Sakhalin,” \textit{Tiuremnyi vestnik}, 6 (1906), 319-320.
\item\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Obzor ostrova Sakhalina za 1899 god, 28-30.}
\item\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 26.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
realized, the Russian government clearly recognized that the Russo-Japanese border would inevitably be renegotiated. In other words, before the war reached as far as the island, Sakhalin had already been abandoned by Moscow.

The Russo-Japanese war on Sakhalin Island: repatriation and slaughter of the population

On July 7, 1905, Japanese 13th Infantry Division landed at Merei, a small hamlet 20km east of Korsakov in Aniwa Bay. The commander of the Southern Sakhalin Troops Artsyshevskii fired Korsakov and commenced guerrilla warfare while retreating northwards. However, the Japanese had swept through Vladimirovka (present day Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk) by July 11, on July 16 the main force of Southern Sakhalin had surrendered, and by July 24 the Japanese had occupied the northern part of the island. Northern Sakhalin Troops, under the command of Military Governor Mikhail Liapunov, surrendered on 31 July without fierce resistance, although some partisans of the Southern Sakhalin Troops continued their operations. Mopping-up operations by the Japanese continued until 1 September, five days before signing the Treaty of Portsmouth.

It is true that the battle for Sakhalin Island was not a large one. According to the official history of the war, edited by the Russian General Staff Office, 3 Russian officers and 85 soldiers died in the battle. However, this data is far from complete. It excludes that on volunteer soldiers (2,262 people) who accounted for 40 percent of the total number of Sakhalin Troops (5,934 people). For example, the report compiled by the Japanese General Office says that more than 100 Russians were dead in Vladimirovka. The Russian official history also says

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23 Iu. V. Basenko, V. I. Zhuravleva, eds., Rossiia i SShA: diplomaticheskie otnosheniiia. 1900-1917 (Moscow, 1999), 79-85.
that the 114 volunteer soldiers of the 4th Army of the Southern Sakhalin troops “were all killed after surrender.”

Who were these unrecorded dead people? How were they killed? Let us take the case of Vladimirovka.

The Japanese entered Vladimirovka on 10 July while the main force of the Southern Sakhalin Troops had retreated to Dal’nee, a small hamlet 10km north-west of Vladimirovka. The Japanese therefore easily occupied the town, and gathered 300 male inhabitants near their camp. On the morning of the 11th, half of the inhabitants were released. The other 150 people were brought into the forest. According to Aleksii Troitskii, priest of Vladimirovka church, all of them were shot in the forest.

The dead were not regular soldiers or volunteer soldiers, but the inhabitants of the town. In the Register of Births of Berzeniaki church, in which inhabitants of Vladimirovka were registered, you can find it recorded that on 11 July, 6 inhabitants were “killed by the Japanese.”

The Japanese did not distinguish the inhabitants from volunteer soldiers. A Japanese soldier wrote in his notes, “all of the Russian prisoners were shot to death.” Ariga Nagao, a contemporary scholar of international law, wrote a few years later that the Japanese could not distinguish the inhabitants from volunteer soldiers, as they were not in full dress. Even if they were volunteer soldiers, it was not necessary to apply international law to them, since they were “convicts” who didn’t know international law. Therefore, the Japanese “sentenced to death about 120 people after inquisitions.”

The Russian volunteer soldiers consisted of exiles drafted by the Military Governor’s command on 22 February, 1904. If exiles volunteered, they would shorten their sentences, and in-

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29 Harada Munehiro’s note in Maezawa Tetsuya’s possession.
ternational law should have been applied to the volunteer-prisoners. As for the nonmilitary inhabitants, international customary law of the period allowed them to be sentenced to death by military trials if they offered resistance. However, the slaughter in Vladimirovka continued after July 11. According to Troitskii’s memoirs, in all 300 nonmilitary inhabitants were killed by the Japanese.

It is often said that the Japanese treated Russian prisoners fairly during the Russo-Japanese war. But if you know about the incidents in Sakhalin, this evaluation is overturned. On August 30, the Japanese found the 4th Army of Southern Sakhalin along the river Naiba. After fighting for three hours, 180 Russians surrendered. A Japanese soldier wrote in his letter to his hometown that all the prisoners were shot to death on August 31. Arkhip Makeenkov, a volunteer soldier survivor, also testified that the Japanese speared the prisoners with bayonets and shot them.

Why did such incidents happen? Missionary Nikolai Iaponskii, hearing of the tragedies from Russian prisoners sent to Japan, recorded in his diary that “the Japanese revealed their true character,” because no foreign war correspondent served on Sakhalin Island. A Russian newspaper Russkoe Slovo said that the Sakhalin administration allowed the Japanese to treat the exiles without mercy.

I offer here another reason: these incidents of slaughter were part of the operation of occupying Sakhalin Island. The Japanese tried to make the island “uninhabited” by force in order to govern the occupied territory securely. Such battles for security were repeatedly fought in other occupied territories in Taiwan, Korea and China. But there were two ways of mak-

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33 Troitskii, “Iz vospominanii,” 19 (1908), 478.
34 Fukui prefectural archives: K0020-00901 (2-3/6).
38 Kasahara Tokushi, “Chiansen no shiso to gijutsu [Thoughts and Techniques during Security Operations],” ed. Kurasawa Aiko et al., Asia-Taiheiyo
ing the territory “uninhabited” on Sakhalin Island. One was this slaughter of the inhabitants, while the other was their repatriation.

There were essentially four routes by which Sakhalin inhabitants left the island. The families of administrators could leave the island on ships chartered by the administration. 500 families of exiles also left the island at their own expense before the battle. About 800 people returned to Odessa via Japan after the battle, mostly officials, their families and some children in orphanages, with a further 224 inhabitants who could pay their expenses. Some inhabitants escaped from the island by themselves. M. Diks, a correspondent for the Russian newspaper *Novoe Vremia*, said that some officials and inhabitants of Northern Sakhalin crossed the Tatar Straight to the continent on their own.

The fourth route was repatriation via de Castries Bay, the expenses of which were borne by the Japanese occupation authorities. Those repatriated were convict settlers, those peasants-formerly-exiles. Hard labor convicts, who were to be sent to Nerchinsk Prison, were transported on the same ships. From the end of August to the beginning of September, 3,962 exiles from Southern Sakhalin and 2,758 from Northern Sakhalin were shipped to de Castries. As a result, as of December 1905 5,487 people (excluding the indigenous population) lived on the northern part of the island, while only about 500 Russians remained in the southern part, more than half of whom left the island in 1906.
Recently there has been rapid progress made in Japanese research on the Sakhalin inhabitants’ repatriation. The key figure here, Itahashi Masaki, concludes that the evacuation to de Castries was actually a repatriation forced on the Japanese, who drove the inhabitants from Southern Sakhalin so as to avoid their starvation.

It is true that the Sakhalin administration did not have enough food at the time. After the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war, transportation between the island and the continent was halted, so the quantity of food in public warehouses decreased sharply (see Figure 2). The monthly food supply to the 9 warehouses in Southern Sakhalin was often less than that consumed. Some warehouses had exhausted their supply

**Figure 2. Flour supply and consumption of the public warehouses in Southern Sakhalin in 1904 (in units of pood)**

![Flour supply and consumption graph]


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44 The latest achievement is Hara Teruyuki, “Nichiro-senso ki no Sakhalin nammin to rosia-seifu no kyujyutsu seisaku [Refugees from Sakhalin and the relief policy of the Russian Empire during the Russo-Japanese War],” in Roshia-shi kenkyu [Studies of Russian History], 91 (2012), 3-22.

45 According to Itahashi, inhabitants of Northern Sakhalin left the island to evade the heavy taxes the Japanese tried to impose on them. Itahashi, “Repatriate or Remain,” 168-179.
of flour.\textsuperscript{46} and in May 1904, Governor Liapunov ordered restrictions on the warehouses.\textsuperscript{47} As of the end of May, the warehouses in Southern Sakhalin had stock for only two months.\textsuperscript{48} When food was supplied to Southern Sakhalin in August, the warehouses in Tymovsk okrug in Northern Sakhalin did not get any food.\textsuperscript{49} In October 1904, supplies were furnished to Southern Sakhalin, and this was the last supply before the battle on Sakhalin.\textsuperscript{50}

A Japanese document said that, when the Japanese occupied Southern Sakhalin, the inhabitants complained of a serious shortage of food.\textsuperscript{51} Officials truly felt the shortage, because they lived on the food supplied by the warehouses. The troops also did not get enough food.\textsuperscript{52} However, I do not believe that convict settlers, peasants-formerly-exiles and their families were on the verge of starvation, because, as stated above, they supported themselves without aid from the administration.

It is true that the inhabitants “selected” leaving the island themselves. The head of Aleksandrovsk okrug asked the occupation forces to change the destination for repatriation, as De Castries was much harder to live in.\textsuperscript{53} In fact, many repatriates came back to Northern Sakhalin after the war.\textsuperscript{54} Nevertheless, they “chose” to abandon their homeland. Why?

This was because Sakhalin had been abandoned. Mikhail Zviagin, the head of Korsakov okrug, and his staff had left the island with the prisoners in July. This means that the Sakhalin administration had already collapsed before the moment of choice. Moreover, the inhabitants witnessed the “uncivilized” operations of the occupying forces. The commander Takenouchi Seisaku of the Southern Karafuto Occupying Army reported the Russian inhabitants were nervous, because they were afraid

\textsuperscript{50} Russko-iaponskaia voina 1904-1905 gg, vol. 9, 98. 
\textsuperscript{51} JACAR: C03020412200 (12-13/22).
\textsuperscript{53} JACAR: C06041286600 (11-12/50).
the Japanese were not “civilized.” The inhabitants’ uncertainty, as mentioned above, came true. Priest Troitskii claimed in his memoirs, “Can you call such troops civilized? Readers themselves should judge.”

Under such conditions, the inhabitants had to “choose” to stay or repatriate. Moreover, they had to make their decision within 10 days, as on 6 August the occupying forces ordered that the inhabitants must give notification of their intentions by 16 August. You may easily imagine that they had no choice but to abandon their homeland.

Conclusion

Japanese immigrants flocked to the “uninhabited” island after the war. As of the end of 1911, 54,651 Japanese were settled in Karafuto, making up 96 percent of the population.

When building colonies, the Japanese empire tried to “empty” the land both in Taiwan and in Korea so that the empire could achieve security in foreign lands. One Japanese historian even refers to such activities as the traditional behavior of the empire. In Korea the activity was carried out by the same army division as in Sakhalin (it had moved to Korea soon after finishing the action in Sakhalin).

However, both in Korea and in Taiwan Japanese settlers did not form a majority of the population and the empire established exploitation colonies there. This was partly because the colonies had a much larger native population than Sakhalin. The great population density of the colonies was a significant feature of Japanese empire. Moreover, the disparity in material power made it possible for the fewer colonists to build the exploitation colonies. In other exploitation colonies of European

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55 JACAR: C03020412200 (11-12/22).
56 Troitskii, “Iz vospominanii,” 20 (1908), 507.
57 JAC: C06041286600 (13-14/50).
empires, the “civilized” few controlled the “uncivilized” native population in a foreign land. That could be applied to the cases in Taiwan and Korea.

A total change in the composition of the inhabitants of Sakhalin Island occurred again after World War II. Almost all the Japanese settlers were forced to repatriate between 1946 and 1949. Therefore, every time a battle ended on the island and the border changed, the occupying forces made the new territory “uninhabited.”

But Sakhalin / Karafuto was a colony between two empires. There was not a clear hierarchy between the empires. It was therefore impossible to establish an exploitation colony. The smaller native population and the Russian officials’ attitude as stated above also encouraged the Japanese empire to empty the land. In addition, the occupation of Sakhalin in the Russo-Japanese war meant the “recovery” of the Japanese land, which the Japanese had called “Kita Ezo (Northern Ezo) before the first demarcation of the border in 1875. So, the colonization of Karafuto could be regarded as the advancement of the frontier, or the opening up of a “colony without colonialism.” As a result, the settlement colony of Karafuto, in which it was hard to see the border between “the mother country” and “the colony,” was built up against the Russo-Japanese border.

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60 Ezo is a Japanese name historically referring to the islands north of Japan.

61 Osterhammel, Colonialism, 37.
In 1947 Ōhashi Kazuyoshi became one of the 6.9 million Japanese who repatriated after the fall of the empire. Unlike many others, Ōhashi was fortunate enough to have his reintegration into society smoothed by an acquaintance putting in a good word for him at a job interview. As Ōhashi’s wife told the story almost 50 years later, when her husband went for a post as a reporter at the Hokkai Taimusu he scored zero on the general knowledge exam. However, pointing to Ōhashi’s previous experience as a journalist for the Karafuto Shimbun, a way was found to take on the recent repatriate. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published. As Ōhashi explained, his account of life in Soviet-ruled Southern Sakhalin was perhaps only the second or third to be published.
into a source of potential readers, Karafuto repatriates living in Hokkaido were one such possibility. After the end of the empire and the “loss” of Karafuto to the Soviet Union, nearly 250,000 repatriates from Karafuto settled in Japan’s northern-most island as shown by statistics collected by the Hokkaido Prefectural Government in 1949.4

A few studies have touched on Japanese repatriates from Karafuto. Mariya Sevela provides a valuable account of some of the reasons why people’s experiences in Karafuto are largely missing from Japanese memories of the war vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. She argues that the memories of Japanese who were in Karafuto, which were often positive about life alongside the Russian population, could find little room for expression in a society dominated by negative images of a “Soviet enemy”.5 Interestingly, John Stephan, writing in the early 1970s, emphasised how private individuals and organizations made irredentist demands for the “return” of Karafuto to Japanese control. As Stephan pithily wrote, “former residents naturally phrase their arguments like men who have been driven from their homes.”6 Similarly, Tessa Morris-Suzuki maintained that many Karafuto repatriates’ views were closely entwined with the aims of the organisation set-up to represent them – Zenkoku Karafuto Renmei (hereafter “Kabaren”). Set-up in 1948 with the backing of the Japanese government, Kabaren continues to operate in 2013. According to Morris-Suzuki, this organization fostered a sense of “colonial nostalgia” primarily because of its involvement in Cold War politics.7 Sevela’s findings and the work of Stephan and Morris-Suzuki point to the danger of making assumptions about “Karafuto repatriates” as either a single group with com-

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4 Karafuto shūsenshi kankō kai, Karafuto shūsenshi (Tokyo: Zenkoku Karafuto Renmei, 1973), 596.
mon ideas or as sharing the same viewpoint as the main repatriate organisation.

Japanese language research also uses Kabaren as a lens through which to view the post-imperial history of Karafuto repatriates. Nakayama Taishō described how the organisation formed a “post-war Karafuto identity” that, in part, tapped into wider narratives in post-war society about Japanese victimhood. This is certainly an important part of memory making about Karafuto and the figure of the repatriate. However, we do not know the process by which this occurred. One crucial step would appear to have been the emergence of an “official history” researched and drafted largely by Kabaren officials in the mid to late 1960s. Known as Karafuto Shūsenshi (“Karafuto and the end of the War”; hereafter “Shūsenshi”) this has become the “go-to” text, not only for historians, but also for repatriates researching the history of Karafuto. Such activity often manifests itself in the writing of “self-histories” (jibunshi) of which hundreds have been produced since the 1980s onwards. Tamura Masato goes as far as dismissing these books and pamphlets as “basically all the same” meaning a formulaic narrative of Soviet takeover, Japanese expulsion and longing in later life for a lost homeland. Tamura’s criticism may be a touch strong; however, there can be less doubt about the importance many writers have placed on Shūsenshi as a reference to add historical credibility to a jibunshi-narrative.

Why then should we return to Ōhashi’s newspaper articles? An obvious reason is that Ōhashi had a somewhat unusual vantage point from which to view Southern Sakhalin. His work as a journalist provided him with numerous opportunities to compare and contrast life under Japanese and Soviet rule. However, there are limitations to using Ōhashi’s writings as a source in this way – not least the time that elapsed between when the events happened and when he wrote his account. The source is of greater interest for what it reveals about the kinds of views and opinions that were circulating amongst Karafuto repatriates at a moment in the mid-1950s. By examining some of the

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8 Nakayama Taishō, “Karafuto imin shakai no kaitai to henyō – sengo Saharin o meguru idō to undō kara,” Imin kenkyū nenpō 18(2012), 112.
problems raised by Ōhashi we gain a different perspective on how Karafuto, repatriation and the war were being talked about and the ways this discourse may have shifted over time. This is important because Ōhashi’s narrative has significant differences of interpretation and emphasis from the version of events later set out in the Shūsenshi (and the one that has become the benchmark historical text). Ōhashi’s account therefore enables us to step back from the standard portrayal of Karafuto at the war’s end and the unstated assumption that “this was what all Karafuto repatriates thought” to explore whether any alternative narratives might have existed and how these complicate our current understanding.

Karafuto and the collapse of the Japanese Empire

Between 1905 and 1945, the southern half of Sakhalin Island was part of the Japanese Empire. Known as Karafuto, and acquired during the negotiations that followed the Russo-Japanese War, by the 1930s approximately 400,000 Japanese were living and working there. In addition to the Japanese, local society was a mixture of Koreans, Chinese, Russians and indigenous peoples. The entrance of the USSR into the war against Japan led to two weeks of fierce fighting in Karafuto in August 1945. The Soviet Union established control by the end of the same month and shortly afterwards renamed Karafuto as Sakhalin.

During the fighting, the Japanese authorities in Karafuto organised an evacuation that lifted tens of thousands of people to Hokkaido. In addition, several thousands more left in small boats. Between 280,000 and 290,000 Japanese are thought to have spent anything from several months to up to four years living under Soviet authority. After 1946, repatriation began from Sakhalin and the Japanese population steadily decreased. In 1951, the Japanese government signed the San Francisco

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Peace Treaty and gave up its claim to the southern half of Sakhalin Island. However, the treaty did not state to which country those rights had been given up. Neither did the USSR ratify the treaty which meant that the Japanese government could continue to maintain that no settlement had been reached regarding Karafuto.  

Ōhashi Kazuyoshi repatriated in 1947. By the time the official repatriation began in December 1946, over 5 million repatriates had already returned to Japan from other parts of the former empire. As nearly all accounts written by repatriates and researchers rarely fail to show, on their arrival many experienced the so-called “cold winds of the homeland”. This expression encapsulates the discrimination that repatriates (both soldiers and civilians) encountered from fellow Japanese who had spent the war years in mainland Japan. In addition to the difficulties of feeding, sheltering and employing repatriates in a society ravaged by the war, research has also suggested that this discrimination was a way for people in the post-war Japanese nation-state to forget the pre-war and wartime imperial past. Throughout the Occupation period and well into the 1950s, going about everyday life was often enough to expose many repatriates to small slights and minor discriminations.

**Japanese-Soviet negotiations in the mid-1950s and Karafuto**

In 1955, negotiations for the normalization of relations between Japan and the USSR began. Hatoyama Ichirō, replacing Yoshida Shigeru as Prime Minister in December of the previous year, came to office with strong public backing for his proposal to improve relations with other countries. Negotiations lasted from June 1955 until October 1956. Ultimately, no peace treaty was concluded but a Joint Declaration was issued which officially ended the state of war and re-established diplomatic relations between Japan and the USSR. Of relevance here is that in 1955 Japanese diplomats included “Karafuto” as territory with an un-

### References

13 Stephan, Sakhalin – A history, 167-168.  
decided status and, therefore, as part of their bargaining position. This has subsequently been dismissed as little more than a tactic to strengthen the Japanese negotiating position.\(^{16}\) The Soviet negotiators ignored any attempts to raise the subject.

Discussion of Karafuto was closed down in diplomatic manoeuvrings but opened up within domestic politics in Japan. Kabaren held a meeting in Tokyo in March 1955 from which the Minami Karafuto Henkan Kisei Dōmei ("Alliance for the realization of the return of Southern Karafuto") was launched. The meeting was attended by several prominent politicians including Machimura Kingo who later become the Governor of Hokkaido. As well as issuing a statement calling for the return of Karafuto to Japanese control, a petition was started and 200,000 signatures were collected from across Japan.\(^{17}\) Separate from Kabaren, within regional politics in Hokkaido the negotiations were observed with great interest. In addition to questions about territory, reaching agreement on access to fishing grounds was an issue of consequence to local businesses and communities alike.

Although the mid-1950s marked a moment when the USSR was the focus of attention for much of the domestic media, public interest in Japan’s northern neighbour was nothing new. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa has argued for the importance of the “collective memory of the Soviet-Japanese War in the summer of 1945” in shaping perceptions.\(^{18}\) He suggests that for many Japanese, the image of the USSR was overwhelmingly a negative one based on numerous grievances from the war and early post-war years. Repatriates formed a key part of such images. In particular, the depiction of “pitiful” women and children from Manchuria and “brainwashed” men from Siberia was especially powerful.\(^{19}\) However, the hold of such collective memories on society is a problem that must be treated with caution. One young Fulbright scholar who went on to become a highly regarded expert on Japanese-Russian relations drew on his own experience of everyday life in Hokkaido to question assumptions about overwhelming public hostility towards the USSR. In 1954

\(^{16}\) Stephan, Sakhalin – A history, 168.

\(^{17}\) Karafuto shūsenshi kankō kai, Karafuto shūsenshi, 638-640.


\(^{19}\) Watt, When Empire Comes Home. Chapter 3.
George Lensen wrote, “There is relatively little admiration or support of Communism in Japan, but there is much sympathy for the Russian people” and, quoting as anecdotal evidence from a recent newspaper report, “the Russian skaters who ran away with the [...] 1954 world speed skating championship were [...] extremely popular in Sapporo”.20

Ōhashi Kazuyoshi and “The Karafuto that was lost”

Ōhashi’s articles were, therefore, partly a response to the interest generated by the Japanese-Soviet negotiations. In 1955, from February until May, the Hokkai Taimusu published Ushinawareta Karafuto as a series of 58 articles. Written entirely by Ōhashi, the period he covered lasted from 9th August 1945 when the USSR entered the war against Japan until December 1947 when he arrived in Japan on a repatriation boat. For most of this time, Ōhashi was working as a journalist. At first, this was for the Karafuto Shimbun which from 1942 became the main newspaper for Karafuto. In August 1945, Ōhashi was dispatched to the frontline in Karafuto to cover the start of the fighting. On 29th August, Soviet military orders meant the Karafuto Shimbun ceased publication. However, this was not the end of Ōhashi’s time as a journalist because he found himself writing for Shinseimei (“New Life”). This newspaper, controlled by the Soviet authorities but published in the Japanese language, was written for the Japanese who remained in Southern Sakhalin. Ōhashi’s press credentials enabled him to move around Southern Sakhalin relatively freely – something that was not possible for most other Japanese at the time.

Ōhashi wrote from memory and without the aid of notes or a diary about events that had happened almost 10 years ago. Because of this, he seems to have anticipated that some people might find this reason enough to doubt the veracity of his account. Ōhashi stated that he had only included those details of which he was most certain; any memories that were hazy he had left out.21 There is no way of knowing for certain how factually accurate Ōhashi’s account is. Unlike a diary, his articles

21 Ōhashi, Ushinawareta Karafuto, 207.
were written in the knowledge that they would be read. Therefore, it is likely that he modified the content of his account and his portrayal of events to meet the expectations of his audience. Rather than read Ōhashi’s words to find out “what happened” in Karafuto at the end of the war, of greater importance are the topics that he chose to raise for discussion. These are suggestive of what kinds of discourse were circulating amongst Karafuto repatriates in post-war society.

Possibly, because of his training and experience as a journalist, Ōhashi chose to structure his story primarily around the people he saw in Karafuto. Through his description of their everyday lives in the last weeks of fighting and then for a two year period following the Soviet takeover, Ōhashi commented on politics and “Karafuto” as a place. He focussed on people from the perspective of nationality – the Karafuto he saw contained “Japanese”, “Koreans” (Chōsen-jin), and “Russians” (Soren-jin). “Americans” also featured but as a faceless and unknown presence in post-war Japan.

*Ōhashi’s portrayal of Russian soldiers, settlers and “the Soviet system”*

In many accounts by Japanese who were in areas occupied by Soviet soldiers immediately after Japan’s surrender one of the main themes is the danger of violence, including rape, and robbery. Ōhashi’s description of Southern Sakhalin in the weeks and months after the Soviet takeover does not mention any specific incidents against Japanese civilians. Instead, he refers to “bad elements” amongst the soldiers who he alleges were responsible for most of the acts of violence and theft. In the same article, he appears to contradict himself by stating that such soldiers were untypical of “the general situation” but by concluding that, even still, there were “too many bad elements”.22 Ōhashi does state that once Soviet administrative control became established, laws were enforced and theft and violence towards Japa-

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22 Ōhashi, *Ushinawareta Karafuto*, 84.
nese civilians decreased.\(^{23}\) This point is supported by American intelligence reports from the late-1940s.\(^{24}\)

Ōhashi interpreted his encounters with the Russian civilian population in a more positive light. Beginning shortly after the end of hostilities, people began to move from the Russian mainland to settle in Southern Sakhalin. By the autumn of 1946 approximately 70,000 Soviet citizens had arrived. By 1949 this figure had reached 450,000.\(^{25}\) Because of the shortage of housing, many of the new settlers shared accommodation with Japanese families. Ōhashi wrote about how this provided opportunities for Japanese and Russians to get along with each other. He also explained that cohabitation was a tactic Japanese used to protect themselves from break-ins and to obtain extra supplies of food and daily essentials.\(^{26}\) Accounts other than Ōhashi’s also often comment warmly on time spent living alongside Russian families.\(^{27}\)

Ōhashi’s gaze over the Soviet society in Southern Sakhalin was not restricted to people but also included politics. He separated the Soviet organisation of society from what had existed before through his notion of “the workers’ country” (rōdōsha no kuni). Ōhashi never clearly expressed what he meant by this term but he used it to explain various “differences” that he noticed with his idea of Japan. As a journalist for Shinseimei his job required him to travel around various locations in Southern Sakhalin to write copy for the newspaper. The stories he was told to write were usually about the “efforts” of Japanese workers and the “munificence” of the Soviet labour system. However, as Ōhashi recalled in his articles, many of the supposedly most attractive features of the system often failed to be implemented. Japanese workers in coalmines frequently found themselves having to work longer than the mandated 8-hours to ensure that

\(^{23}\) Ōhashi, *Ushinawareta Karafuto*, 84.


\(^{25}\) Nakayama, “Futatsu no teikoku, yottsu no sokoku – Karafuto/Saharin to Chishima/Kuriru,” 208.

\(^{26}\) Ōhashi, *Ushinawareta Karafuto*, 131.

\(^{27}\) Sevela, “How Could You Fear or Respect Such an Enemy?” The End of WW II on Sakhalin Island,” 189.
Soviet supervisors met production targets. Free healthcare was good in theory but in practice there were seldom enough medical supplies for people to receive adequate treatment.

Where Ōhashi expressed his greatest admiration for the Soviet society he encountered was what he perceived as a lack of discrimination towards a defeated people. He wrote about his experience on a train when a fellow passenger spoke-up for him after an army officer demanded that Ōhashi, being Japanese, give up his seat. The passenger rebuked the officer with the words that “Japanese and Russians were free to work alongside each other in Southern Sakhalin” and that “the [Japanese] people should not be confused with the crimes of their leaders”. Ōhashi contrasted society in Southern Sakhalin with, not only what had existed prior to 1945, but also what he had found in Japan after repatriation. On several occasions he invoked an image of Occupied Japan and the “Americans” as the opposite of his experience in Southern Sakhalin. Commenting on a Russian man working to polish shoes he stated that he could not picture the same scene in Sapporo (the administrative capital of Hokkaido) where the “victors would shine the shoes of the losers”. Writing about shared housing Ōhashi sardonically exclaimed that he could not imagine “if it was Americans, [that they] would want to live in battered old Japanese houses”.

Thousands of Japanese detained in Southern Sakhalin tried to escape across the Soya Straits to Hokkaido rather wait for the start of official repatriation. There are no statistics for those who died trying to do so. Evidently, many felt there was enough hardship and uncertainty to risk attempting the perilous crossing. Therefore, Ōhashi’s positive comments about living under Soviet rule should be viewed within this context. In particular, there is evidence that discrimination towards Koreans, which was an everyday feature of Japanese rule in Karafuto, did not end with emergence of Soviet society. Ōhashi’s view of the Soviet system and “the workers’ country” was, in places,
a romanticised image. However, why did Ōhashi feel it was appropriate to describe the transition of Karafuto into Sakhalin in this way? There is no definite answer. Rather, important factors seem to have been the way he was trying to come to terms with the impact of the war and how he understood his own role as an individual in Karafuto’s history.

**Ōhashi’s “Karafuto” and the Japanese**

Ōhashi witnessed, what one scholar has aptly called, the moment “when Japan became Russia”.\(^{35}\) He saw Russian settlers arriving in their thousands. The towns and villages he had known since childhood were given Russian names. Former Japanese houses were modified to meet Russian standards for keeping out the cold. In areas badly damaged during the fighting Russian designed buildings were erected. Russian style markets, restaurants and entertainment venues all appeared during the two years Ōhashi lived in Southern Sakhalin. In his description of these changes and his portrayal of living alongside Russian settlers Ōhashi refrained from expressing outright anger and hostility towards those who were now living in what he referred to as his “home place” (kokyō). Despite this, other research emphasises widespread public antipathy towards the USSR and Karafuto repatriates” arguments as being based on an irredentist agenda and having been “expelled”.

One reason for Ōhashi’s restraint was possibly the political context at the time he was writing the articles. In 1955, as the Japanese government was preparing to open negotiations for a peace treaty with the USSR, highly critical accounts of the war would most likely have been unwelcome. In Hokkaido, a region where the stakes in securing good relations were higher, newspaper editors were probably aware (or made aware) of this point. Nevertheless, Ōhashi’s treatment of the behaviour of the Soviet military suggests that he was not afraid to make his more controversial opinions known.

However, another important reason, alluded to by Ōhashi himself, was the short duration of the hostilities between Japan and the USSR in August 1945. Ōhashi argued that because,

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\(^{35}\) Sevela, “How Could You Fear or Respect Such an Enemy?” The End of WW II on Sakhalin Island,” 174.
“there was not the horrific killing of the fighting between Russians and Germans” this explained, “the vast difference [in Russians] feelings towards Japanese [as compared] to Germans”.36 Such comments would have been of little comfort to those people who lost family and friends during the fighting or whilst awaiting repatriation. Ōhashi’s point, however, is important for comprehending the way he depicted the end of Karafuto. He could have processed the loss of his home place by focussing on a phrase that was to become almost ubiquitous in Japan in popular portrayals of USSR: as a “thief who robs you when your house is on fire” (kajidorobō). This term referred to the widespread sense of anger in Japanese public opinion that the Soviet leaders had taken advantage of Japan’s weakened position at the end of the Asia-Pacific War to make territorial gains. Ōhashi did use this language but qualified it by acknowledging in the following sentence “the Soviet side’s perspective” that Southern Sakhalin had already been returned as part of the secret clauses of the Yalta Agreement.37

Nevertheless, although the fighting in Karafuto was relatively brief compared to other theatres of the war, Ōhashi still struggled to come to terms with the violence he had witnessed. That the fighting between the Japanese and Soviet sides framed Ōhashi’s recollections of Karafuto is obvious from the date at which he started his account – the 9th August 1945 when the USSR declared war on Japan. Ten years later, many unanswered questions confronted Ōhashi as he tried to sum-up his wartime experience. This is shown by Ōhashi’s attempt to analyse one of the most traumatic moments in his life: the bombing of the train station in Toyohara. Ōhashi was in the town on the 22nd August, saw the bombs being dropped and witnessed the horrific aftermath. A decade later he was still grappling with the “reason” for the bombing. What made this a particularly vexing problem was Ōhashi’s belief that Toyohara was under “a white flag” at the time of the attack.38

An obvious target for Ōhashi to blame was the Soviet side. As he declared, “that the surrender had no meaning was hard

36 Ōhashi, Ushinawareta Karafuto, 199-200.
37 Ibid., 72.
38 Ibid., 65.
for the townspeople [of Toyohara] to accept”.\(^{39}\) However, as with his earlier moderating of the term “kajidorobō”, Ōhashi doubted whether blame could be fixed so unambiguously. According to Ōhashi, “The Japanese military’s resistance was still continuing”. He reported others as saying “that the USSR had issued orders to halt evacuation which the Japanese side had not adhered to”.\(^{40}\) Ōhashi widened his discussion to include another incident that became seared into collective memories about the war in Karafuto – the fighting that engulfed the town of Maoka. In this case, approximately 500 civilians are thought to have died after being caught-up in the crossfire between Japanese and Soviet soldiers.\(^{41}\) Although he was not a direct witness, Ōhashi methodically listed the better-known incidents when civilians were killed. Once again he intimated the difficulty of establishing blame.\(^{42}\)

Ōhashi tried to balance his answers regarding questions about blame. That he was making these arguments in the mid-1950s shows that no clear-cut narrative of Karafuto repatriates as “victims” of the USSR yet existed. The Hokkai Taimusu was not a newspaper known for taking an extreme stance. By running the articles, the editors indicated that they thought Ōhashi’s views would resonate with at least some of the newspaper’s readers. Why did Ōhashi pull back from holding the Soviet military as solely responsible for the fate that befell Karafuto?

Shortly after Japan’s surrender, the “betrayal” of the “ordinary Japanese” by the wartime “leaders” became one of main themes of public discourse. Historians have found ample scope in this phenomenon of Japan’s post-war history for interpretation. One of the main points is that by apportioning blame to a small coterie of wartime leaders (whilst excluding Emperor Hirohito) Japanese people have been able to overlook their own wartime responsibility. The separation of “guilty” leaders from “innocent” masses was, therefore, a useful device in the post-war for coming to terms with war and defeat. Ōhashi too told his story by using the dichotomy of leaders (shidōsha) and or-

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\(^{39}\) Ōhashi, *Ushinawareta Karafuto*, 65.
\(^{40}\) Ibid., 65.
\(^{41}\) Karafuto shūsenshi kankō kai, *Karafuto shūsenshi*, 303.
\(^{42}\) Ōhashi, *Ushinawareta Karafuto*, 65.
dinary people (*minkanjin/shomin*). As a newspaper journalist he would have been familiar with such rhetoric. However, to assume that Ōhashi was simply either using the cliché of the time or subtly trying to avoid personal responsibility is to overlook a different problem: how people in Karafuto regarded the local elites who ruled over them. Unsurprisingly, and as shown most effectively by Hiroyuki Shiode, local society in Karafuto was a rumbustious place. Tensions inevitably existed amongst migrant workers, settlers, local village and town notables, and the colonial government of Karafuto-chō. The afterlife of such tensions can be clearly seen in Ōhashi’s work.

If Ōhashi’s position on who to blame for civilian deaths was ambiguous, it was less so on another event that was to become crucial to later collective memories – the conduct of the emergency evacuation. Between the 13th to the 23rd August 1945 evacuation boats ferried approximately 88,000 people to Hokkaido. The evacuation, supposedly limited to women, children and the elderly, was planned by officials in Karafuto and Hokkaido in conjunction with the military. Ōhashi’s anger was directed towards Karafuto officials and the military leaders who he believed had ensured that their families were placed on the first evacuation boats to leave. Ōhashi wanted to know why they had been given priority over “ordinary people”. He questioned the feasibility of evacuating such a large number of people and offered the opinion that a way should have been found to bring a halt to the fighting rather than planning for an evacuation. He even suspected that the “self-interest of some of the leaders” in wanting to ensure that their families were safely evacuated had delayed the ceasefire. Ōhashi was adamant that “it could not be helped if the evacuation of women and children was interpreted as consolidation for a final battle”.

Ōhashi saw the handling of the evacuation as one of several examples of how the Japanese “leaders” of Karafuto had discredited themselves and, in doing so, badly let down the “ordinary people”. His greatest anger was directed towards the

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44 Kato, ‘*Dai Nippon Teikoku*’ hōkai, 212.


46 Ibid., 65.
former governor of Karafuto: Ōtsu Toshio. As well as prioritising the evacuation of his own family, Ōhashi alleged that Ōtsu had sent a subordinate official to meet Soviet military commanders rather than risk going himself. In another example of the ordinary people being deceived, Ōhashi recalled talking to a farmer who had been ordered to leave his home by the Japanese military. Soldiers then poured gasoline over the buildings and set them alight. For Ōhashi, this was a clear sign that “of course, Karafuto had been no more than a colony [after all]”.

Ōhashi used the term “colonial” as a derogatory phrase to criticise both the manner of the governor and the actions of the Japanese military towards Karafuto.

The last article in the series was published on 2nd May 1955. So far in his writing, Ōhashi had refrained from discussing the subject of how to understand the way Japan had acquired the southern half of Sakhalin Island in 1905. As he drew his thoughts together, he wrote a revealing sentence: “The Soviet Union retook territory seized by the Japanese imperialists – amongst progressive Japanese too those who believe this are [many].” Ōhashi did not explicitly state what his “politics” were. However, his strong criticism of the elites of Karafuto and the affinity he expressed towards many of the Russian people he encountered suggest that he might have called himself a “progressive Japanese”. How to understand contemporary history, therefore, placed him in a bind – he struggled to reconcile the tension between the view that Karafuto was a product of imperialism and the commonplace belief that a person should have a deep sense of affection for the place they were born and raised.

His idea of “the colonial” was useful for dissipating some of this tension. The colonial was what he now saw as negative about Karafuto’s history, namely the self-interested actions of the official elite and Japanese military. The positive aspects that he chose to remember were the opposite of the colonial – the efforts of “ordinary people” to settle and the “longing for home place” of

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48 Ibid., 78.
49 Ibid., 54-55.
50 Ibid., 208.
those born in Karafuto. “Colonial” was a word that helped him to avert his gaze from Karafuto’s problematic history and his own place within it.

**Conclusion**

Pre-war society in Karafuto was riven with conflict and competition amongst a variety of actors. The fact that unelected bureaucrats were the primary power-holders added to these tensions. The start of the war with the United States and Britain in 1941 led to a reconsolidation of wartime society in Karafuto. The slide towards “total war” required a ramping-up of the rhetoric about officials and civilians in Karafuto acting as one. In two weeks in August 1945 the Soviet military overturned 40 years of Japanese rule of Karafuto. In defeat and then during the following period when “Japan became Russia”, pre-war tensions reappeared and were reinterpreted. Repatriate newspapers written in the first years of the post-war reveal the antagonism some repatriates felt towards the official elite of Karafuto. Ōhashi, prompted to put his thoughts on paper by the onset of diplomatic negotiations and the ten-year anniversary of the end of the war, continued the narrative of repatriates and their sense of anger towards officialdom and the military.

Ōhashi wrote an account that pointed to the difficulty he was having coming to terms with his wartime experience. Comprehending the death of civilians in war, something that he had witnessed, was one of the hardest challenges he faced. Ōhashi sensed that someone should be held responsible but his writings showed that attributing blame was no simple task. His description also contained, what for Ōhashi was, an irresolvable conundrum. His political sympathies lay on the side of those who now revoked the history of Karafuto as one more chapter in the story of Japanese imperialism. Yet he also wanted to hold on to “Karafuto” as the place he called home.

Ōhashi Kazuyoshi died in 1974, less than two decades after *Ushinawareta Karafuto* was printed. The articles seem to

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have been Ōhashi’s only extended piece of writing on Karafuto. The year before he passed away, a book now regarded as the “official history” of the war in Karafuto – *Karafuto Shūsenshi* – was published. The book made use of Ōhashi’s articles in several sections including those about *Shinseimei* and, in particular, on the bombing of Toyohara.\(^{52}\) However, the extracts were used in such a way as to omit Ōhashi’s nuanced appraisal of life under Soviet rule and his excoriation of official and military actions. There is no way of knowing if Ōhashi was aware his work was being ransacked in this manner, or if with the passing of time he might have actually modified his views and come to agree with the later description. But neither is this the point. Ōhashi’s articles are evidence of a moment in the mid-1950s when memory making about repatriates and Karafuto was still complicated and in a state of flux. During the 1960s, as monuments about Karafuto and repatriates began to be erected and government-backed histories began to be written, memory-making about the Japanese empire took on a more “official” and less convoluted form. These later “texts” have been seized upon as evidence for how Karafuto repatriates came to terms with their past. Ōhashi’s writings help us to remember that the history of repatriates and Japanese society’s post-imperial transformation was perhaps more tortuous than we have until now considered to be the case.

\(^{52}\) *Karafuto shūsenshi kankō kai,* *Karafuto shūsenshi,* 377-378, 530-531.
This chapter explores how borders and borderlands are being reconfigured and reframed in the Russian Far East (RFE), with a particular focus on the city of Vladivostok. This region provides a fascinating case study through which to observe how “boundaries materialize, rematerialize, and dematerialize in different ways, in different contexts, at different scales, and at different times.” The paper attempts to demonstrate how borderlands serve simultaneously as locales of intense meaning and significance for politics, identity, society, and business; at the same time as existing in a state of constant flux, possessed with multiple meanings, which have the potential to undergo sudden and sometimes unpredictable discursive shifts.

Such an understanding of borders follows recent geographic narratives on territorial boundaries. A prevailing feature to come from this scholarship is an understanding that “individual state borders are deeply characterized by contextual features and societal power relations and their meanings change in the course of time along with broader, typically state-related

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This chapter explores state-society relations in the context of national development strategies promoted by Moscow in the Russian Far East. It discusses how this region is being reconfigured by processes of de-territorialisation – a broad conceptual term which captures the material and discursive disappearance of the border in a globalising world; and re-territorialisation – a counter-trend where new types of borders and borderland spaces are proliferating. As Anssi Paasi has noted, both de- and re-territorialisation “occur in various institutional practices and discourses and display economic, cultural and political power relations. Since both processes are taking place continually, they are overlapping and intermittent, and they inevitably result in differentiation of the already complex spatialities of borders.”

One of the tasks of this chapter is to highlight these complexities and to explore how the purported dematerialisation of one kind of border can occur at precisely the same time as the materialisation of another kind of border. It seeks to examine how borderlands are a nexus where the economic imperatives of state elites and their national development strategies intersect with local border-cultures. It acknowledges that borders and borderlands are represented in a myriad of different ways, in different places, at different scales. As Chris Rumford has noted, “[p]eople can construct the scale of the border for themselves; as a “local” phenomenon, a nation-state “edge,” or as a transnational staging post: the border can be reconfigured as a portal.” This chapter seeks to engage with different constructions and imaginings of Russia’s Far Eastern borderlands both in the “centre” and at the “periphery,” while highlighting precisely how “borders are open to contestation at the level of state and in everyday life.” It is argued here that examining various representations of borderlands can tell us much about strategies of national development and elite-led visions of national destiny,

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3 Paasi, “A Border Theory: an unattainable dream or a realistic aim for border scholars,” 27.
4 See: ibid., 18.
5 Ibid., 18.
7 Ibid., 61.
while at the same time demonstrating how they are contested and fragmented at every spatial scale. In such a context, borders are “no longer seen only as lines on a map but as spaces in their own right (as in the idea of “borderlands”) and as processes.”

Sites in these borderland spaces have the potential to serve as a kind of stage, “where identity is dramatised, broadcast, shared and reproduced...often mapping out identities which are situated in wider symbolic, imagined geographies of which the particular stage may be part.” Against the background of a renewed state-led interest and commitment of resources to developing Russia’s Far East, this chapter turns attention to how such border sites can become highly charged political stages on which national and regional elites perform their own specific narratives of identity and articulate competing ideas of national destiny. Focussing in particular on the 2012 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, held in Vladivostok last year, the chapter outlines how this event marked a performance of national identity where the state leadership – through their construction of this stage, and their rhetorical pronouncements and actions on it – sought to decisively declare that Russia is a renewed, economic, and geopolitical power in Asia. In this discourse the city was to become a portal to the dynamic Asia-Pacific region and a symbol of the de-materialisation of inter-state borders, as well as the infrastructural development of the region.

However, it is suggested that the discursive framing and material construction associated with APEC 2012 came at the cost of overlooking, denying, and misinterpreting the desires and aspirations within local border-cultures. Instead, on this very same stage, a local reaction to these state-led processes emerged through the demonstration of a regional sense of identity and distinctiveness, which rejects and resents the top-down appropriation of these borderlands. At the same time as the Russian state has sought to reconfigure its inter-state border

9 Emphasis in original: Tim Edensor, *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life* (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 69-70. Although Edensor is not talking specifically about borders they could certainly be defined as the symbolic sites that he regards as stages.
with neighbouring states in the Asia-Pacific region, the relationship between centre and periphery within Russia has been redefined and even subverted. As the rest of this chapter explores, the shaping of Vladivostok into a symbol of Russia’s presence and openness towards Asia has occurred alongside the emergence of new ideational borders between centre and periphery.

The changing nature of Vladivostok and Russia’s Far Eastern borderlands

Vladivostok is a port city located in the Russian Far East, a little over 50 km from the Chinese border and is also the closest Russian city\(^{10}\) to the markets, conurbations, and industrial centres of Japan and South Korea. Since Vladivostok’s foundation in 1860, the city has gone through alternating periods of relative freedom in cross-border trade and migration flows, in contrast with tightly restricted external links and rigorous state controls on border crossings. The former is perhaps best represented by the period from Vladivostok’s founding until the consolidation of Soviet power in the 1920s, and again from the late 1980s until today. The latter would be from the 1930s until the Soviet collapse, when Vladivostok was a closed city to foreigners.\(^{11}\)

However, even during the Soviet period, Vladivostok was briefly used as a stage for attempts to reform and re-orientate the state. In 1959, then Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, visited the city after his first official visit to the United States. Khrushchev, evidently impressed by his time on America’s West Coast, called for the residents of Vladivostok, to turn the city into “our own San Francisco.”\(^{12}\) His pronouncement, made at a local shipbuilding plant, was soon followed by a massive con-

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10 I.e. over 500,000 inhabitants.


struction effort aimed at transforming the city into a “Greater Vladivostok.”

A proliferation of low-quality apartments, as well as a funicular, were the major achievements of Khrushchev’s enthusiasm. However, as the base of the Pacific Fleet, the city remained a closed military port and it was not until the mid-1980s that Vladivostok again caught the attention of the Soviet leadership as a locale which could demonstrate a new orientation for the state. In July 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev, used the occasion of a visit to Vladivostok to proclaim in a famous speech a new era of Soviet engagement with the Asia-Pacific region. He stressed that the Cold War was ending and that the Soviet government would seek to open up the region and develop it as part of a broader Asia-Pacific economy. His intention was to transform Vladivostok from an outpost of Soviet military power into a city that symbolised his newly introduced processes of glasnost and perestroika.

However, the opening of Vladivostok was ultimately only realized with the dramatic and sudden implosion of Soviet power in 1991. The Soviet state’s collapse, and the associated withdrawal of central state authority and support, had the result of exacerbating acute social and economic problems in the RFE. Features of this period were the decline of state-backed industries and services; a reduced military capability; unemployment; the removal of barriers over the movement of goods and people; the weakening of state and law-enforcement institutions; uncontrolled exploitation of the region’s natural resources; worsening corruption; and the increasing influence of criminal elements on business and politics. It is therefore hardly surprising that between 1991 and 2012, the RFE lost about one fifth of its population as birth rates collapsed and out-migration increased as


\[15\] Ibid, 193.

\[16\] Ibid, 194.
people left the deteriorating economic conditions and dire employment prospects.\textsuperscript{17}

If, in the 1990s, the RFE was characterized by neglect and disconnection with Moscow, then the coming to power of Vladimir Putin in 2000 was to signal a renewed engagement with the region. From the start of the new millennium, the central government began to reassert its influence, most dramatically and immediately with the removal of the outspoken and controversial Primorskii Governor, Evgenii Nazdratenko, in early 2001.\textsuperscript{18} By the end of Putin’s first Presidency a massive federal development programme for the RFE and Siberia had also been announced with huge state funding allocated through to 2013.\textsuperscript{19} The culmination of this trend came with the announcement by Putin in September 2007, at the APEC leaders’ meeting in Sydney, that Vladivostok would host the 2012 APEC Summit.

Putin’s announcement committed Russia to hosting a major international summit in a city with basically non-existent infrastructure for such a purpose at the time. Justifying the decision to bring APEC to Vladivostok, Putin and other members of the leadership emphasised that it was aimed at giving impetus to the RFE and showcasing it to the international community.\textsuperscript{20} Among Russia’s declared priorities for the summit were further liberalisation of trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific; deeper economic integration into this region; efforts to encourage “innovative growth”; and the improvement of transport and logistics.\textsuperscript{21} The summit was therefore part of a wider trend towards the dematerialisation of the economic and political bor-

ders between Russia and its Far Eastern neighbours, as well as a chance for a symbolic demonstration to a domestic audience – especially to the residents of the RFE – that the Russian state had a renewed desire to develop the region and to provide the necessary services and infrastructure for its citizens. Perhaps most significantly, it also indicated that the state now had the resources to make good on its promises and in total US$21 billion of federal money was spent on making Vladivostok capable of hosting this summit.22

Projects included the construction of a large, state-of-the-art university campus (at a cost of 70 billion roubles [US$2.2 billion]),23 three massive bridges (one of which is the longest cable-stayed bridge in the world and alone cost 32.2 billion roubles [US$1 billion]), two luxury hotels (8.5 billion roubles [US$267 million] each, and neither opened in time for the summit), as well as 150 km of new roads, a new airport terminal, and a rail link to the airport.24 A theatre and opera house was also planned for the summit but it was still not open in September 2013, one year after the APEC delegates had left. This building was reported to have cost 2.5 billion roubles from the federal budget (almost US$80 million), an additional 800 million roubles (US$25 million) from the regional budget, and it comes with anticipated annual running costs of 180 million roubles.

Azizian and Artyom Lukin (Vladivostok: Far Eastern Federal University Press, 2012), 130


23 Located on the picturesque Russkii Island off Vladivostok, the campus of the Far Eastern Federal University took over the APEC 2012 site and is capable of accommodating up to 50,000 students. The university is designed as a leading education and research center that would be able to attract students and scholars not only from Russia, but from the Asia-Pacific, as well. (The Russian ruble / US dollar exchange rates here and elsewhere in the chapter were calculated in October 2013).

(US$5.7 million). Additional projects approved by the government, included a gas-pipeline to the city, an automobile assembly plant, and two big shipyards to be built in the south of Primorski Krai (Primorye).

In the run-up to the summit, the political leadership expended great efforts on highlighting not only how hosting APEC would enhance Russia’s prestige and change the country’s relationship with the Asia-Pacific but also the transformative impact it would have on the lives of Russian Far Easterners. While still President, Dmitrii Medvedev made a number of high-profile visits to the city in order to supervise construction and ensure timely progress was being made. In 2011, he outlined his belief that “what we are creating will stand, I hope, for decades and centuries to come.” In summer 2012, at the opening of one of the bridges, Medvedev was at pains to emphasise that: “Everything that we’ve done in the past few years is, of course, linked to the summit...But it’s not for the summit – it’s for you, for all who live here.” Similarly, Putin, President at the time of the summit, declared on the eve of its opening that: “When I invited our counterparts, five years ago, to meet for this forum...my rationale was to acknowledge the importance of this area for Russia.”

Through APEC 2012, Medvedev and Putin actively endorsed and promoted a strategy of reconfiguring relations and inter-state borders between Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region,

26 Ibid.
27 One of the main motives to launch the manufacturing of cars in Vladivostok was to compensate the region for the loss of access to relatively cheap cars from Japan, whose imports were drastically cut by prohibitive customs duties in 2009.
at the same time as a domestic development strategy, which tied their own political legacy to the success or failure of developing the RFE. Now that APEC is over this legacy is at stake, a fact that was reaffirmed at a meeting of the Presidium of the Russian State Council in November 2012, when Putin declared that “the development of such large territories [as Siberia and the RFE] requires long-term strategic and sustained activity. All of these approaches should be reflected in the state programme of socio-economic development of the Far East and the Baikal region, and it should be budgeted up to 2025.”

Perhaps unsurprisingly, many at the local level endorse such a scale of continued federal investment in the region. For example, in January 2013 the APEC conference site hosted the 21st session of the Asia-Pacific Parliamentary Forum (APPF), a gathering of the leaders of legislative bodies of the Asia-Pacific region. Explaining what this meant to the city and the region, Chairman of the Legislative Assembly of Primorski Krai, and member of the ruling Edinaia Rossiia party, Viktor Gorchakov, declared that:

This shows a consistent Eastern policy of our state...after the APEC summit, it is the second confident step of our country on the path of integration into the Asia Pacific region. And the fact that this is happening on our...territory, confirms the serious intentions of the Russian leadership to support and develop our Far East, our native Primorye

As such pronouncements suggest, Vladivostok has been transformed and modernised by hosting APEC 2012. The successful completion of the summit was a moment of huge significance for the city and the RFE in general. However, it also raised some critical questions about Russia’s development strategy in the region and a number of commentators have noted how the current approach almost entirely relies on vast state resources, which have bound the region to the fickle budgetary

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conditions of the Russian state. Questions remain over to what degree the region will be burdened with the long-term upkeep of these projects? What is the sustainability and prospects for future funding of such costly programmes, in Vladivostok or elsewhere? And, do such projects merely encourage corruption and dampen the competitiveness of Russian business in the region, in reality working against the integration of Russia in the Asia-Pacific Region?

These and other key questions have a serious potential to undermine the Putin / Medvedev legacy and their visions of national identity and national development trajectories. They highlight many of the contradictions and challenges facing the current Russian state-system, as well as revealing the inequalities in the relationship between centre and periphery. The announcement of the continuation of a massive state-led development programme for Siberia and the Far East until 2025 has tied the destiny of the leadership to the destiny of the borderlands of the RFE for the long-term. However, with so much at stake, there comes an associated risk that the Russian leadership will find itself as much connected to the failures of high-profile, state-led programmes, as with their successes.

What is APEC to Us?

The early achievements of APEC 2012 have as yet not matched the soaring rhetoric of certain members of the national and regional political elite. In 2012, the economic growth of Primorye was a mere 5.1 per cent, which, although higher than Russia’s average rate of 3.4 per cent, was hardly impressive given the US$21 billion of federal resources lavished on the territory over the preceding years. Demographic indicators are also not particularly encouraging as Primorye’s population continues to shrink, not only as a result of mortality exceeding birth rate, but also due to the continued outward migration of residents who are leaving the RFE for European Russia and other countries. In 2012, 25,000 people left Primorye, most of them be-

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35 Ibid.
ing highly educated and of working age.\textsuperscript{37} An article in the main business magazine of the Russian Far East, \textit{Dal’nevostochnyi Kapital} (and citing official figures from \textit{Primorskstat}) reported that in what should have been “the year of hope,” out-migration from the region in 2012 increased by as much as 22 per cent.\textsuperscript{38}

There has also been little evidence of significant increases in private investment in the RFE after APEC, either from Russian or foreign sources.\textsuperscript{39} While the current Governor of Primorski Krai, Vladimir Miklushevskii, noted that the volume of foreign investment into Primorye in 2012 had doubled compared with 2011, a recent article in \textit{Kommersant Vlast’} emphasised that this was entirely due to the doubling of investment (to US$400 million) by the leasing company Siemens Finance.\textsuperscript{40} This is only a fraction of the amount of federal investment in the region and an end of year editorial in Vladivostok’s leading newspaper, \textit{Zolotoi Rog}, gloomily reported that:

[T]here remain all the acute problems [for business], which existed before the summit. The region did not become one iota more attractive for investors...It is painfully difficult to start a business, to obtain land for construction...We don’t even talk anymore about bribes, kickbacks, and corporate raiders, as they are chronic and incurable problems\textsuperscript{41}

The same editorial lamented that: “[The majority of] questions in our country are as always to be resolved exclusively in the capital. It is difficult to find a similar country where the central government so totally interferes in the affairs of almost

\textsuperscript{37} Lukin, “The Russian Far East: developmental and geopolitical challenges.”


\textsuperscript{39} Lukin, “The Russian Far East: developmental and geopolitical challenges.”


\textsuperscript{41} Pushkarev, “Andrei Pushkarev: Mne malo slyshat’ frazy-lozungi: Dal’nii Vostok nam nuzhen! Ia eshche khochu uslyshat’ – zachem?.”
every village or even individual companies." There is a sense that, despite the successful completion of APEC, the most critical problems in the region have not been solved and Moscow may be part of the problem. Alexander Latkin, Director of Institute of International Business and Economics at the Vladivostok State University of Economics and Services, has noted that local concerns and interests have been largely disregarded in the remaking of Vladivostok:

Such massive spending is not justified, and the projects themselves are not entirely in agreement with public opinion...As a result, we have received unnecessary buildings, which cost the budget tens of billions of rubles...So with the facilities of the summit, there has been made a grand entrance, the gloss has been put on, but in essence everything remains the same. It is naive to suggest that the citizens do not understand this.

Therefore, away from the official discourses of national development, de-bordering, and integration in the Asia-Pacific, it appears that there is a prevailing cynicism at the regional level towards the leadership's disregard for local concerns, and the apparent lack of direction in government decision-making. Iurii Avdeev, Director of the Asia-Pacific Institute of Migration Processes, went as far in an interview with Zolotoi Rog to declare that:

We have no strategic line of development, our leaders have no idea what they want here...Look at the statements our leaders made at the summit, everyone is talking about various things, – it is chaos, where nothing is clear. Today Moscow says "let's do projects."...[But]... Which projects is the government going to support today, and which in the future, in 10 years?

The frustration over a lack of coordination has been compounded by anger at the reported scale of corruption surrounding the APEC projects. In November 2012, the regional business paper, Konkurent, reported that the Interior Ministry had announced the theft of 93 million rubles (US$3 million) of the budget allocated for the insurance of construction of the Far

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Eastern Federal University.\textsuperscript{45} Arrested under suspicion of involvement in the theft was Roman Panov, Prime Minister of Perm Territory (and the former Deputy Russian Regional Development Minister), while the Interior Ministry also stated that a number of other high-level officials were involved in the case, including Oleg Bukalov, Head of the Far Eastern Directorate of the Ministry of Regional Development.\textsuperscript{46} It was also reported that the Account Chamber of the Russian Federation could pursue further proceedings against the administration of the Regional Development Ministry and noted that the current claims are “mainly related to the poor quality of technical expertise, resulting in the collapse of two new sections of road, [and] flooding at the airport.”\textsuperscript{47}

Other allegations of corruption and embezzlement included the theft of 96 million roubles (US$3 million) worth of metal from the bridge projects,\textsuperscript{48} while \textit{RIA Novosti} reported that the final audit of the use of funds allocated to the APEC Forum, presented to the State Duma in January 2013, had identified 8.1 billion rubles (more than US$250 million) of “financial irregularities.”\textsuperscript{49} This is a staggering sum of unaccounted resources and has contributed to a widely held perception of mismanagement and misappropriation surrounding APEC 2012. This had a potentially devastating impact on the potential for foreign investment and Andrew Vernikov, Deputy Director General for Investment Analysis at \textit{Zurich Capital Management}, has highlighted how these factors have undermined the results of the summit:

The economic impact of the APEC summit will be small, because it took place at a very unfortunate time for the global economy. Scandals have

\textsuperscript{47} Ivanova, “Imidzh kraia isporchen okonchatel’no.”
also come to light: the road collapse, the failure to construct in time the Opera and Ballet Theatre, searches and arrests at the Directorate of Public Procurement facilities for the APEC summit. The image of the region has been spoiled completely.50

The legacy of APEC has also left a long-term financial burden on the city and regional administration of maintaining the projects and structures associated with it. According to Konkurent (citing “a well informed source in the regional administration”), the up-keep of these structures will cost in the order of about 600 million rubles [almost US$20 million] annually from the regional budget.51 In the run-up to the summit one report suggested that the bridges alone would likely “eat” an extraordinary 1.5 billion rubles (almost US$50 million) per year.52 It appears that there is still much uncertainty about what the annual bill will actually be to the regional authorities and according to Pavel Ashikhmin, a Deputy in the Legislative Assembly of Primorskii Krai:

The Regional Administration has, to date, not given us detailed calculations on what makes up this 600 million rubles... So we cannot say, if this amount is adequate or not. However, we believe that the cost of maintenance of the summit will be larger... We have a lot of social facilities, which would be far more useful to direct resources towards than spend each year 200 million rubles [more than US$6 million] for the maintenance of the [new] theatre.53

This has led to a situation where Primorye is facing a sharp budget deficit. At the end of 2012 it was reported that the Vladivostok Duma had adopted the 2013 budget, which anticipated the revenue of the city treasury would be reduced by 37 per cent.54 This decline resulted in part from the expected decrease in intergovernmental transfers and the ending of the federal programme for the “Development of Vladivostok as a Centre for International Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region,”

50 Ivanova, “Imidzh kraia isporchen okonchatel’no.”
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
through which the funding for the APEC summit was allocated.55

Therefore, in the aftermath of APEC, the region has found itself trapped in a state of what could be termed dual dependency. On the one hand it is dependent for its development on accelerating the processes of de-materialising the economic and political borders between Russia and the dynamic economies of the Asia-Pacific region; and on the other it is tethered to Moscow and a reliance on the largesse of its federal development programmes. As Vladimir Isakov, Chairman of the Committee for the Budget, Tax, and Finance of the Parliament of Vladivostok, has stated:

In my view, only through the principle of co-financing can be solved the mega-tasks [in the region] such as road-building and housing. The local budget cannot on its own bear these huge costs and amount of work... Municipalities which succeed in attracting an influx of supplementary revenues from higher [federal] budgets will find it many times easier to deal with local issues. Therefore it is necessary to negotiate, it is necessary to concede.56

This acknowledgment that the region must somehow “concede” to the centre demonstrates that one of the tacit agreements of the federal programmes is that Moscow brings with it control over how and where the money is spent. A corollary of this is that it exacerbates a sense of resentment at the local level that Moscow does not take into account or understand the region’s interests. These debates in Russia’s Far Eastern borderlands over APEC 2012 also suggest that Moscow’s state-led development of the RFE, and the associated dependency of the region on the centre, is in certain ways detrimental for creating appropriate conditions for attracting foreign investment and realising Russia’s integration in the Asia-Pacific region. As one administrator of a regional district summarised in an anonymous interview with Konkurent: “To beg for money out of [the regional and federal] budgets has become easier and more profitable than to stimulate the growth of the economy on the ground.”57

55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 The administrator was speaking under the condition of anonymity to: Ivanova, “Imidzh kraia isporchen okonchatel’no.”
Conclusion

Over the last few years, massive federal resources have been committed to a state-led reconfiguration of Russia’s Far Eastern borderlands. Through federal largesse, the RFE has been assigned a special role as a portal and platform for promoting Russia’s political engagement and integration with the economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region. This has led to a dematerialisation of inter-state borders as well as a re-imag-ination of the Far Eastern borderlands in a profoundly different way from both Soviet times, and the neglect and disinterest which characterised the early post-Soviet period. However, instead of enhancing the region’s competitiveness and connectivity within, and critically beyond Russian national space, there has emerged in these borderlands a counter-trend, where a dual dependency (a reliance on Moscow’s subsidies; together with the opportunities presented by the proximity of Asian markets and their advanced economies and technologies) has come to define state-societal relations. This chapter has suggested that this dual dependency, in certain ways, serves to emphasise the disconnection and dislocation of the centre from its Far Eastern periphery.

While state-funded development has had some undeniably positive effects on Vladivostok, and the wider RFE, it has at the same time highlighted the problems of centralised decision-making, ineffective bureaucracy, and corruption. Today the region finds its development potential dependent on the whims of Moscow’s politicians and the state’s uncertain budgetary condition, as much as on cross-border trade and investment with its neighbours in the Asia-Pacific. These two forms of development dependency are not always mutually compatible and while the current, state-led approach has provided infrastructural improvements, it has also burdened the region with a culture of reliance on federal hand-outs to the detriment of promoting conditions for competitive business and the creation of an attractive foreign-investment climate.

As the conceptual literature at the beginning of this chapter discussed, with the state-led reconfiguration of borders there are always complex, contradictory, and uncertain consequences. For the state-elite in Moscow, the city of Vladivostok was meant to be a symbol of Russia’s integration in the Asia-Pacific region,
as well as the achievements and capabilities of the Russian state under Putin’s leadership. Yet, as this chapter has demonstrated, the APEC stage has at the same time become associated with the failures of this state-led vision in the form of a local reaction against corruption and the inefficiencies and overbearing nature of hyper-centralised government. It is in Russia’s Far Eastern borderlands that Moscow’s ambitious desires for the region are reinterpreted, refracted, and distorted at the local level, turning their originally intended meanings and symbols into something entirely different. Just as the fog and swirling mists that regularly descend on Vladivostok can envelop the grand structures – the bridges, theatres, and hotels – of APEC, so too the vividness of this bold declaration of Russia’s presence in the Asia-Pacific, and the purported de-materialisation of inter-state borders, begins to be diminished, distorted, and incrementally effaced by the realities, challenges, and alternatives presented by life on the border.

In the era of globalization, borders became less important due to increased cross-border mobility of people, capital, goods, diseases, ideas, etc. However, despite the unprecedented opening up to globalization flows, borders are far from fading away. Moreover, some areas of the world are staying out of these globalization effects and integration into the global economy is not effectively addressed in national frameworks. Elsewhere, neighboring local and regional actors engage in multifaceted cooperation to find mutually beneficial solutions to common problems by transcending the barrier function of borders. These practices first appeared in Europe in the 1960s, and later became common in other parts of the world, such as North America and Southeast Asia.1

A similar phenomenon happened in the case of the “East Sea / Sea of Japan” region of Northeast Asia (NEA), where due to the weak interests of the states to interact in a multilateral format, the initiative towards the development of international cooperation in the 1990s was assumed by non-governmental transnational actors (TNAs). The most active role on the international scene was played by sub-regional state entities (provinces, prefectures, oblasts, krais, etc.) and megalopolises (“key” cities) where administrative, financial structures, research institutions, universities, etc. are all concentrated.

Considering the development of the East Sea integration process, it is interesting to note that the governors of Hokkaido and the prefecture of Niigata established a lead role in cultivating economic and political cooperation with the Russian Far East, and in particular with Primorskii Krai – the leader among the Far Eastern territories of the Russian Federation on the attained level of international cooperation.

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The cities of Sapporo and Niigata have claimed to be “key” or “global” cities in NEA. They took the first steps to institutionalize scientific cooperation by carrying out annual international conferences in the cities of Niigata (1990) and Sapporo (1989). The role of Sapporo in the light of the concept of the “key” cities is noteworthy. The population of the capital of Hokkaido has quickly grown, and is today 1.7 million people (more than, for example, the former capital of Japan – Kyoto – at 1.5 million people).

The advantageous geographical position of Niigata (its proximity to Russia and the Korean peninsula), and also its large population supported its bid for leadership in development of international cooperation among the prefectures on the western coast of Japan. Notable examples of those efforts include: the Niigata prefecture government financing of the Annual Economic Conference on cooperation in NEA, and the formation in 1993 of the Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia (ERINA). The Secretariat of Association of Mayors of the Cities of the Western Coast of Japan is also based in Niigata, and its members regularly meet with colleagues from the cities of Siberia and the Russian Far East.

It is appropriate to draw on the abovementioned facts to start describing the changing role of Vladivostok and its bid to become such a “key” or “global” city on par with Niigata, Sapporo, Dalian, etc. In this context the history of Vladivostok is of particular interest, because a little more than 20 years ago, Vladivostok – as the main naval base of the Russian Pacific Fleet – had an official status as a closed city that completely prevented visits by foreigners and even Russians who were not permanent citizens of the city.

However, the end of the Cold War totally changed the future fate and vision of Vladivostok. The idea to turn Vladivostok into an international center of the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) had been firstly expressed in the late eighties by the President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev. A more comprehensive concept to transform the capital of Primorskii Krai to the “key” city of NEA had been offered in 1993 by the Far Eastern scientist Valentin Mikhailov. He believed that: “Vladivostok on the Pacific Ocean should become the same international center as Geneva in Europe” where the European office of the United Nations is situated. In his opinion, there were all the necessary conditions
to turn the city into the political, cultural, educational, and scientific center of the entire Asia-Pacific.²

To start the realization of this concept, the Vladivostok city administration began to develop bilateral contacts with their counterparts in NEA based on “sistership” agreements. These activities included: exchange of youth delegations, sports teams, school students, performances of dancing and musical ensembles, the realization of trade fairs etc. Carrying out these actions promoted confidence-building and mutual understanding of the customs and cultures of the people of the neighboring states. However, analysis of the international contacts of Primorskii Krai and Vladivostok shows that actions from the Russian side, as a rule, had a reciprocal character as they responded to external initiatives. Overall, they did not lead to increasing the role of Vladivostok as one of the regional centers of international activity.

Unfortunately, in the 1990s, due to instability of the administrative control in Vladivostok, no real effort to improve the city’s political image and its old infrastructure had been undertaken. This backlog was especially noticeable in comparison with ground breaking achievements in Sapporo and Niigata, in the Korean city of Inchon, and northeastern cities of China, such as Dalian (sister-city of Vladivostok) and Tianjin. The latter is represented by China as the unofficial capital of NEA. This status, in their view, could be cemented by creating a NEA Economic Development Bank (NEADB) and by placing its head office in Tianjin. Interestingly Tianjin and Vladivostok are also large port cities in which two branches of the transcontinental railway end.

Recently Inchon and Dalian also started and institutionalized important international cooperation projects. Two years ago in Inchon the Secretariat of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) Subregional Office for East and Northeast Asia (SRO-ENEA) was established in the city on a permanent basis. Its zones of responsibility became East and Northeast Asia. While the city of Dalian from 2013 institutionalized an annual Track II international forum devoted to NEA maritime security issues.

The decision of the Russian leadership to carry out the APEC Summit 2012 in Vladivostok and to allocate considerable financial funds (about 200 bln. rubles) to develop its infrastructure became a clear signal that after years of hesitation Moscow had finally decided to make practical steps to realize a role for Vladivostok as a center of international cooperation in the Asia-Pacific providing critical services for logistics, tourism, recreation, culture, education, etc.

To improve the APEC summit host city’s infrastructure the “Greater Vladivostok” project was developed and mostly realized, significantly changing the shape and spirit of the city. During the last few years, new highways, a new airport, three new bridges, a new opera and drama theater, a new multifunctional sports and recreation center, a huge campus for the newly formed Far Eastern Federal University (FEFU) on the Russkii Island have been built, while two five star hotels are still under construction in Vladivostok. Even critics of governmental programs agreed that Vladivostok became qualitatively another city that is now much more open and ready for international cooperation.

In the Russian Far East the Russian Government is pursuing a policy of regionalism where national governmental, regional and local actors will mobilize resources to develop this part of Russia as a priority. The Vladivostok summit became a golden opportunity to draw the attention of the government officials and business circles of APEC countries to the more technologically advanced industrial and postindustrial projects in this part of Russia, and to invite them for cooperation. The Russian Government plans to make substantial investment in developing natural resource processing, thus increasing the share of value added product, and to reinvigorate in the Russian Far East (RFE) such high technology based industries as shipbuilding, civilian aircraft production, and LNG production. Foreign investments into those sectors are to be welcomed. Joint preservation and rehabilitation of marine bio-resources, complex exploration of the ocean and continental shelf are also very promising areas of cooperation.

At the same time Russia is interested to highlight the special role of Vladivostok in education, innovation, and cultural issues. The agenda of the “new regionalism” is emphasizing the significance of the so-called soft power of the city – such as the
improved social environment and growing education, science and cultural assets. That should help Vladivostok achieve competitive advantage over other “key” cities in a world of globalization and to transcend the borders of NEA by attracting more businessmen, scholars, students, tourists, etc.

In this sphere further development and internationalization of the Far Eastern Federal University became a clear priority for Russia. FEFU was officially formed in June 2011 (as a result of merger of four universities), and in September 2013 it started its first academic year in a brand new campus on Russkii Island, situated at the southern part of Vladivostok. The campus facilities already successfully served as a venue for the 2012 APEC Summit, and from that time numerous international forums and conferences have been arranged there with the active participation of foreign delegations and students.

The principal motto of using this federal university format is to rely on the enlarged financial, scientific and educational resources of FEFU (combined with the already existing resources of the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Science) to develop academic cooperation with APEC countries and particularly in the spheres of biotechnologies, nanotechnologies, regional studies, international relations.

The Russian leadership was actively advertising this envisioned role of FEFU during recent Summits in the Asia-Pacific. For example, at a press-conference arranged after the APEC 2013 Summit at Bali, Indonesia on October 8, Russian President Vladimir Putin mentioned that Moscow would promote international cooperation in the Asia-Pacific by further developing international exchanges between students, scholars and researchers, and recommended FEFU as the best partner university to make this happen. Three days later (on October 11) while speaking at the Plenary Session of the 8th East Asia’s Summit in Brunei the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, further promoted President’s call. He proposed forming an East Asia university network (such a university model is already working effectively in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization), and promised to use the potential of FEFU as Russian contribution to this future project.3

3 Sergei Lavrov, “Address at the 8th East Asia’s Summit, Brunei, 10 October, 2013,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed on
The Russian federal budget’s huge allocations have already started to work for the benefit of Vladivostok’s population. However, in order to increase the international role of Russia and to secure global city status for Vladivostok these funds must continue. To become a recognized center of international cooperation in NEA, Vladivostok should develop in several directions. Initially, the development plan for Vladivostok territory should be elaborated, updated and approved. The city urgently needs new districts for complex business, as well as for industrial and housing construction. It would seem sensible to join the districts of nearby Artem and Nadezhdinskii (with plenty of free land for new construction) into a larger “Greater Vladivostok” city entity. Such a development scenario should involve taking into account the best urban construction experience elsewhere, the preparation of a complex plan, including the allotment of designated space for construction of cottages, townhouses, as well as new technology projects and industrial/postindustrial clusters. The latter should include an oil refinery and petrochemical cluster; an agricultural, fishery, and aquaculture processing cluster; a modern medicine production cluster; machine building and logistics technology parks; new hotels and tourist attractions.

As other NEA “key” cities have discovered, improving their international profile requires a campaign to invite and host at least one meaningful institute of international cooperation on a permanent basis. Regional governance that takes place through institutions is capable of articulating regional networks of interests. They are often multi-scalar, can include local, national and supranational members, and would try to transform trans-border regions into more meaningful political and economic actors. “Nonetheless, their activities do not entirely bypass central governments, and often require the involvement of non-local actors... Accordingly, more elaborated cross-border cooperation models typically assume the form of multilevel governance.


4 It is well known in this professional sphere that the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS), Seoul, RK is already taking part in preparations of such a plan. Overall, the positive role of Russian-Korean cooperation in bridging borders in NEA will hopefully increase from January 1, 2014, when these two countries plan to implement a visa free regime for international trips up to several months.
networks involving local, regional, and national administrations, supranational institutions, universities, NGOS, private businesses...”.

In the 1990s it seemed obvious to experts that the integration of Russia into NEA could be achieved in the sphere of economics, and it would also be possible, but difficult, in the sphere of security, and practically impossible in the field of culture. Taking this thesis into account, we can consider two options for placing such multilateral cooperation institutions in Vladivostok. The first one is in the sphere of economic cooperation. In May 2013, Vladivostok hosted the Asia Pacific Energy Forum (APEF), arranged at the level of Ministers of Energy of the countries of this region. At this forum Russia had a chance to demonstrate its intention to host this forum in Vladivostok annually and to place here the Secretariat of Intergovernmental Organization. It could have helped to indicate that Russia was ready to become one of the regional leaders in formulating the APEF agenda. However, so far, this chance had been missed.

The second option, of creating an institution of multilateral cooperation in regional security, is even more difficult to realize. In the Six-party talks over North Korea, Russia heads the Working Group on discussion of NEA security problems, which are not connected directly with nuclear safety on the Korean peninsula. In the context of current conditions of amplified competition for regional leadership between the USA and China, and serious strains in relations between Japan and its neighbors, Russia can offer Vladivostok as a permanent venue for negotiation in a five-party format (not including North Korea) by positioning itself as a mediator in these difficult issues. Therefore, either as a valuable locale for the discussion of regional economic, or security issues, Russia could utilize Vladivostok as a venue for strengthening its role as an active international actor interested in bridging borders in NEA.

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RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE ASIA PACIFIC: A NEW WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR CHINA

Liu Yanping

At the beginning of the third millennium, the United States launched a "return to the Asia-Pacific" policy of interventions and aimed at domination over regional affairs. Russia, being a Eurasian country, followed this pattern and announced its own "eastern turn". Russia began actively seeking broader involvement in an integration process that centered on the Russia-China-US axis, with the two Koreas, Japan, and the Philippines in the vanguard. The Russian Far East, due to its geographic location in Asia, became the focal point of the attention of the Russian central government, primarily since the ascension of Vladimir Putin. This policy was defined and investment flooded into the region. But what would be the Russian Far East's role in the process of integration in the Asia-Pacific region? What challenges it? What would evolve? The following article will focus on and analyse these issues.

Russian Far East Regional Integration: Factors and Trends

The Asia Pacific accounts for 31 percent of the world's landmass, 40 percent of its population and 40 percent of world trade. Regional economic development provides the preconditions for political integration. Thus, in August 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (referred to as ASEAN)¹ was inaugurated and began to play an important role in promoting regional economic ties, aiding both growth and social progress. But developmental inequality and lack of a central political leadership slowed down ASEAN-led progress. Japan, despite

¹ The ASEAN was originally established by three states, i.e. Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand; later it developed to include ten nations: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Burma/Myanmar, and Cambodia. Additionally China, Japan, Republic of Korea, United States, Canada and Australia have entered the dialogue process. A principal objective for the ASEAN is stimulating the economic growth, social progress, and cultural development. Its constituent principle reflects the spirit of mutual cooperation. The ASEAN is one of the most vibrant regional inter-government institutions of the Asia-Pacific.
its influence and a highly developed economy and political system, failed to lead the process, partially due to painful memories of the WWII Japanese expansionism. Any role for her was consequently not welcomed by some of the regional nations. To ensure more effective development in the region, the establishment of a more pragmatic Asia-Pacific economic milieu was vital. In 1989 the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization was established, with the stipulated goals of “serving common interests of the people of the region, maintaining economic growth, promoting interdependence among the members, strengthening an open multilateral trading system and reducing trade barriers”. Currently APEC comprises 21 member-states, has a population of 2.6 billion (40 percent of the world’s), US$19 trillion regional GDP (56 percent of global value), and 56 percent of the world’s trade. Thus APEC became the key player in regional economic exchanges and development, the largest multilateral regional economic integration organization.

In November 1991, China joined APEC. The peaceful rise of China was to become central to the organization’s impressive economic progress and profound impact on international affairs and economic trends.

Russia is one of 21 APEC member-states, the latest to join. This fact reflects the change in Russia’s national strategic decision-making. As was noted above, Russia stretches across Eurasia. But the nation has not been able to integrate herself into either the European or Asia Pacific world-systems. As the Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev has noted, “Russia is an integral part of the world; she is both western and eastern culturally, predestined to struggle between two poles and eventually unify them”. In 1950 – 1980, due to its neglect of the Asia-Pacific, the former Soviet Union’s trade with the region decreased, with exports declining from 28.5 percent (1950) to 4.2 percent (1980) and imports falling from 18.8 percent (1950) to

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2 The Asia-Pacific Cooperation organization has 21 constituent members – Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, US, China, Chinese Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei, Mexico, Papua-New Guinea, Chile, Peru, Russia, and Vietnam.

3 Nikolai Berdiaev, Eluosi Sixiang [Russia’s Idea] (Beijing: Sanlian sudi-an, 1995)
5.4 percent (1980). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Boris Eltsin’s government undertook a “shock therapy” of privatization, liberalized prices, fiscal and monetary policy and embarked on a radical free market course. It had disastrous consequences: inflation and material deficit. During 1992 – 1998, the Russian economy contracted by 39.4 percent. Russia had chosen to integrate herself into the Euro-American “community of democracies” with unidirectional pro-Western policies, with painful results. As Vladimir Putin took office, foreign policy was adjusted and became multidimensional, excluding leaning towards either Eurasian pole. Since then, the Russian government has actively changed national policy, implemented a more comprehensive “eastern turn”, and actively engaged with ASEAN, the East Asian Summit, and the Asia-Pacific Parliamentary Forum.

The fact is that the Russian Far East has used its geographic advantage to develop trade and economic ties with its neighbors in Northeast Asia. The Russian Federation’s relations with the Asia-Pacific are built on mutual trade between the Russian Far East and Northeast Asian nations. The Russian Far East’s area of 6.2 million km² (1/3 of its national territory) is rich in fish, timber, gold, silver, tin, antimony, boron, diamonds, oil and natural gas, and other natural resources. The Northeast Asian economies are complementary. Table 1 shows the trade between Russia and the Northeast Asian countries in 1993 – 1995.

It is clear that China, Japan and South Korea were Russia’s main regional trading partners, with China having the largest share (5.1 percent of exports and 2.6 percent of imports in 1995). By 1995 bilateral trade had decreased significant-

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5 Rossiia v Tsyfrakh [Russia in figures] (Moskva: Roskomstat, 1998), 11; Rossiia v Tsyfrakh [Russia in figures]. (Moskva: Roskomstat, 2002), 32.
6 Fu Jingjun, “Eluosi yu Dongya hezuo – dongyun, zhiyue yinsu ji qianjing” [Russia and cooperation in East Asia – factors pro et contra and perspectives], Eluosi Zhongya Dong’ou yanjiu. 2 (2012): 49.
8 The statistical figures were provided by the FEFU School of Regional and International Studies Associate Professor Alexander P. Golikov.
### Table 1. Russian Trade with the Northeast Asian Nations

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<td>3068/6.9</td>
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<td>370/0.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>2005/4.5</td>
<td>2267/4.3</td>
<td>3173/4.8</td>
<td>1367/5.1</td>
<td>1114/3.9</td>
<td>763/2.3</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>5783/13.1</td>
<td>5667/10.7</td>
<td>7563/11.4</td>
<td>4143/15.1</td>
<td>2593/9.2</td>
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<td>429/1.5</td>
<td>502/1.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>4143/15.1</td>
<td>2593/9.2</td>
<td>2184/6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2. Russian Trade with Northeast Asia, 2007-2010 (in thousand US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>4 289 074</td>
<td>4 857 004</td>
<td>4 485 053</td>
<td>6 943 878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5 956 546</td>
<td>6 844 204</td>
<td>4 067 130</td>
<td>6 942 617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>5 355 254</td>
<td>5 828 707</td>
<td>4 143 541</td>
<td>6 237 634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Russia's Integration into the Asia Pacific...
ly, with imports having reduced approximately three-fold compared to 1993. Japan is Russia’s second-largest trading partner, with foreign trade amounting to US$3.96 billion by 1995. Russia’s exports to Japan rose from 4.5 percent (1993) to 4.8 percent (1995), while imports fell from 5.1 percent to 2.3 percent. As of 2011, China, Japan, and South Korea are still the Russian Far East’s major trading partners. The bilateral trade breakdown by country is basically the same. China is still the champion of cross-border trade but her considerable advantage over her competitors no longer exists (see *Table 2*)<sup>9</sup>.

Compared with the data from 1993 – 1995, Sino-Russian trade had increased, though only in value, with real growth a mere 0.6 percent. Trade with Japan and South Korea was growing faster than with China, with a real increase of 4.2 percent in Korea’s case. Obviously China’s economic and trade relations with the Russian Far East have to be further developed.

**Factors and Prospects of Russian Far East integration into the Asia-Pacific Economy**

Regional cooperation is the cumulative result of political objectives and economic interests. The goal of making the Russian Far East a cornerstone of Russian policy in the Asia-Pacific is shared by society, but the actual process is slowed down by a lack of funds and a traditionally militaristic concept of power. As a result political fervour is followed with an economic freeze (*zheng-re, jing-leng*). Or as it was put by one Russian academic, “Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific is weak, hampered by its economic situation, social problems, and a lack of central government coordination.”<sup>10</sup> Is this what prevents the Russian Far East’s integration into the Asia-Pacific?

First, the lack of investment and backward economy constrains the Russian Far East from entering the regional market and Asia-Pacific economic integration. During the USSR, the Far East relied on central government funding and subsidies, foreign trade was the responsibility of the center, which limit-

<sup>9</sup> The statistical figures were provided by the FEFU School of Regional and International Studies Associate Professor Alexander P. Golikov.

ed the scope of its activities as the whole rationale of the system was reaching centrally planned indicators of development and standards of living. During the 1990s, Russia’s severe fiscal deficit reduced the prospects of development, especially in the Far East; due to the accompanying overtaxation, poor communications, corruption and other social evils, along with a collapsing legal system and shortage of foreign investment. The funds required for development were unavailable, being unable to even maintain normal operations. The collapse of state subsidies for transportation made integration into the Asia-Pacific markets unfeasible.

Second, a primitive economic structure with over-reliance on exports of energy and raw materials and a lack of international competitiveness in innovative products are the underlying causes of Russian Far Eastern backwardness. The legacy of overdependence on natural resources (oil, gas, fish, timber, coal and other raw materials) resulted in shortages in the production of foodstuffs, textiles, chemicals and other daily necessities, resulting in their large-scale import from abroad. As the central government’s financial role decreased, the development of the regional economy became evermore dependent on the export of timber, fishery products, metals and energy to the Asia-Pacific countries. In general, the region’s economy faced a Russified “Dutch disease”.¹¹ On the other hand, as a lot of the traditional local industry was military-related, this overdependence on the export of raw materials and energy undoubtedly curtailed any recovery of its industrial potential, as high-tech development became difficult and the ability to develop innovative and competitive products was lost. This led to economic asymmetry and the dominance of primitive forms of cooperation. As things stand, armaments and energy trade partners are limited to East Asia, which makes it difficult to develop ties with ASEAN, as the region’s energy imports are dominated by the Middle East (with relatively lower transportation costs). The Russian government has realized this problem and, as Vladimir Putin has repeated-

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¹¹ The term “Dutch decease” is applied to the phenomenon of the economies relying extensively on natural resources and thus slowing down its development. See Wang Jinliang, Zhuangui shiqi Eruosi duiwai maoyi yu jingji zengzhang guanxi yanjiu [Russian foreign trade and development of economy during the period of transition] (Harbin: Heilongjiang University, 2008).
ly pledged that Russia would not limit its ties to the weapons’ trade, and would help Vietnam to develop the South China Sea.

Third, population decline and limited purchasing power restricted the potential productive capacity of the region. Following the loss of central government subsidies in the 1990s, economic development in the Far East lagged far behind the European part of Russia. Low incomes, high prices, and a sharp decline in the standard of living were the result. Social infrastructure and the living environment failed to improve, and neither did education. Many, including a large percentage of those with scientific and technological expertise, chose emigration to other countries or western Russia. Climate conditions are hostile to the population. These negative factors contributed to massive Far East depopulation. The population dropped from 8.04 million (1990) to 6.29 million (2010), an alarming 1.75 million over 20 years. This population decline limited the region’s purchasing power, which was inadequate even for the domestic market, let alone to facilitate integration in a growing Asia-Pacific market. At the same time, the continuous population decline has caused a labor shortage in the Far East and leaves it unable to participate in the labor-intensive industrial competition in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s labor contribution to the Asia-Pacific Economic fully illustrates this point. The population of the Far East is not large enough to establish a stable economic structure and a wide range of external economic ties. Without a recovery of labor resources, the Far East’s integration into the Asia-Pacific would hardly be possible.

Fourth, there is a degree of psychological ambivalence regarding the position of the Russian Far East within the Asia-Pacific integration process. While considering the Far East an important Russian gateway to the Asia-Pacific, both the central government and local authorities remain sensitive to border issues left over from a previous era of Sino-Russian relations. A contradiction exists between the desire to promote the Far East as a part of the Asia-Pacific economic integration process, and the conception of national strategy which prioritises federal political goals over regional and local economic interests. About a third of Russian Far Eastern territory was acquired through colonial expansion. However, the population density here remains lower than one person per square kilometer, which is ten times lower than China’s Heilongjiang and Jilin Provinces. As a re-
sult, Russian scholars pointed out that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia faced the “problem of 1995”, i.e. the geopolitical vacuum stretching from the Balkans to the Pacific. This may be potentially advantageous for the Far Eastern power centers (Japan and China) but presents a danger for Russia.\footnote{Wang Jinliang, \textit{Zhuangui shiqi Eluosi duiwai maoyi yu jingji zengzhang guanxi yanjiu} [Russian foreign trade and development of economy during the period of transition] (Harbin: Heilongjiang University, 2008), 130.} The cumulative effects of these issues means that the policies formulated by the Government of the Russian Federation downplay the importance of economic development in the Far East, exert a negative impact on the regional economy and leads to new economic contradictions.

Considering all of the above constraints, is Russian Far Eastern integration into the Asia Pacific hopeless? Surely not. On the political level, Russia and the Far Eastern regions are demonstrating aspirations for joining in with Asia-Pacific integration. Since economic trends are leading to the rise of China as well as America in the region, Russia faces the danger of losing influence in the Asia Pacific, including damage to the economy as well as being excluded from the very process of integration. Therefore, Russia has had to re-frame its foreign policy, as demonstrated by the visits of Vladimir Putin and Dmitrii Medvedev (as well as other high officials) to the disputed Kuril Islands, or through participation in the 2012 RimPac Joint naval exercises of 22 nations’ navies led by the US. For the Asia Pacific and the US, Russian engagement may contribute to the balance of power in the region, especially since the “peaceful rise of China” is deeply disturbing to the United States, who would likely want to engage Russia to counterbalance or even isolate China. Therefore it looks as though the prospects for Russian involvement are quite broad.

From an economic perspective, Russia is still largely outside of Asia-Pacific economic integration, with a number of practical obstacles still to be overcome. But as the country possesses abundant energy resources, there is a strong inducement to integration coming from Northeast Asia. Russian scholars strongly oppose the over-exploitation of energy and other resources, but under existing economic conditions, Russia can only capitalize heavily on the export of energy and raw materials. It is ab-
olutely necessary to facilitate energy infrastructural development and to deepen cooperation with both East and Southeast Asia. This may serve as a starting point for cooperation in other fields. In addition to playing the energy card, the economy of the Russian Far East should adapt its labor market to the Asia-Pacific region in order to achieve mutual benefit and a win-win outcome.

Finally, the Russian Far East should improve the economic environment by 1) reducing tariffs, developing preferential tax rates, and attracting investment; 2) improving transportation and other infrastructure in land and marine transport; 3) adjusting its industrial structure, especially its processing industries, and 4) expanding the free trade zone, encouraging foreign enterprise. In short, the Russian Far East’s economic development strategy should become receptive to expanding and deepening cooperation with other Asia-Pacific countries through bilateral trade, science and technology transfer and investment. The only way is to share in the fruits of regional cooperation and use foreign investment to kick-start the region’s economic growth. Without its Asia-Pacific partners the Far Eastern economy is difficult to rebuild. In this sense, Russian Far Eastern integration into the Asia-Pacific has a long way to go.

**Russian Integration: China’s “Window of Opportunity”**

It is an established fact that the Asia-Pacific region is the world’s fastest growing economic region, which has already surpassed the European Union and North America. The root of these achievements is regional cooperation. From the 1990s, China developed economic and trade relations with North Korea and the Russian Far East, simultaneously deepening regional cooperation in order to open a path to the sea for Northeast China, to help it revitalize its old industrial base. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) invested US$30 billion in the Tumen River Area Development Program. This program focuses on the Tumen River Area’s access to the sea; it aims to strengthen economic cooperation between the neighboring countries and construct a Tumen River regional economic community. However, 20 years of multi-national economic cooperation programs have brought forth few results, primarily due to the ideological concerns of Russia and North Korea. Regional eco-
nomic development requires greater effort, and as Russia now seeks integration into the Asia-Pacific this is a moment of good opportunity. The APEC meeting held in Vladivostok in September last year (2012) was followed by President Vladimir Putin taking office and establishing a Ministry of Development of the Far East – measures revealing a Russian desire to develop those areas in the proximity of the Tumen River.

What are the opportunities for China in this process? May Northeast China and the Russian Far East become the main area of future cooperation?

- Cooperation in energy and other resources. The former Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin claimed that 35 percent of Russia’s federal budget revenues are coming from oil, petroleum products and natural gas. Oil alone brings in more than 18 percent. About 60 percent of foreign currency is earned from energy exports. Russia is known as “the world’s gas station” and possesses huge oil and gas reserves in the Far East and Siberia. Northeast China’s economic development (and China’s western development strategy) relies on cooperation with the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia regions due to its urgent need for oil, gas and power resources. The priority areas for developing a Sino-Russian investment program are in the establishment of energy cooperation frameworks. A breakthrough has been made in recent years when the “oil-for-loans” agreement was concluded: from 2011 to 2030 15 million tons of oil would be exported annually to China (300 million tons of oil in total), while China would provide US$25 billion of long-term loans to Russia. From April 27, 2009, the construction of the Sino-Russian Eastern Siberia-Pacific oil pipeline was launched: it began in Skovorodino (Amur region) and continued all the way to Mohe County (Heilongjiang Province), then went through Heilongjiang and Inner Mongolia to the city of Daqing. The length of the pipeline is 999.04 km, of which all but 72 kilometers are in Chinese territory. The project was completed on Septem-
ber 27, 2010, which marked the beginning of cooperation – the first 15 million tons went through. China is looking to diversify its oil imports to meet growing demand; Russia is diversifying its exports through the expansion of the oil market in the Asia-Pacific region. The Sakhalin region is rich in natural gas resources. Although China dominates the trade with Primorye and Khabarovsk in such fields as fuel, mineral raw materials, metals and forest products, it still lags behind Japan and South Korea in Sakhalin Gas development. At present China’s share in Sakhalin’s foreign trade is only 9.4 percent, compared to 46.1 percent for Japan and 34.6 percent for South Korea. China plans to increase its acquisition of Sakhalin oil and gas, and participate in Sakhalin III project. According to China’s National Energy Bureau, China and Russia have reached a framework agreement on gas cooperation. Russia plans to supply more than 70 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually to China. Additionally, China has invested US$1.7 billion in timber and wood processing. The Russian export of energy to Heihe has reached US$ 41.5 million. China’s investment projects include Khabarovsk pulp mills, agriculture, and construction; Russia has invested in China’s Lianyungang nuclear power station project, and the Jiamusi City titanium factory. The prospects for further cooperation in energy and other resources are truly broad.

- Development of transportation infrastructure. Access to international markets plays an important role in the development of international trade and economic relations, in the adequate flow of resources within the region, and in protecting national industries. One of the obstacles for the Tumen River Area Development Program is the obsolete nature of the regional transport infrastructure, which impacts on the integration of Northeast China and the Russian Far East into the Asia-Pacific economy. It is necessary to establish an international transport hub in the Tumen River Area to serve Northeast Asia and the Russian Far

East. A variety of factors such as harsh natural conditions, a lack of resources, and the political and economic situation are restricting the transformation of the region into one of the most developed areas of the world economy. But despite this, it is still possible to make use of China’s financial and material resources and market potential, South Korea and Japan’s capital and technological innovation, and the Russian Far East and Siberia’s energy resources to create an effective and mutually accessible transportation hub. The city of Hunchun is at the crossroads of China, Russia and Korea and is about to be announced as a Special Economic Zone by the Chinese government. Intra-Sea of Japan international links are already present, including the Hunchun-Rajin (DPRK)-Busan (ROK) regular container shipping route, the Hunchun-Zarubino (Russia)-Sokcho (ROK) transshipment corridor, the Hunchun-Pos’et (Russia) container route, the Zarubino-Niigata (Japan) bulk line, and Hunchun-Zarubino-Sokcho-Niigata air routes. When preparing for APEC, Russia invested US$330 million in highway construction and the transformation of Vladivostok into a center of international cooperation. The effectiveness of the transportation systems may also improve cross-border procedures (e.g. customs clearance), and may help with the establishment of logistics and service centers at border crossings.\(^{14}\)

- The special economic zones, etc. Such zones are one of the most realistic instruments of integration. They enable states to differentiate their tariff policy in foreign trade, while maintaining a unified tariff policy domestically. These zones may help avoid the constraints imposed by free trade agreements following the liberalization of foreign trade. There are three spatial models of special economic zones, which are the integrated industrial zones (e.g. in Harbin and Shenyang (China), Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk (Russia)), those established on the basis of already existing trade zones (in Heihe, Suifenhe, Nakhodka, Chukotka, Kamchatka) and the cross-border

\(^{14}\) This region is considered an underdeveloped economic periphery within the respected state. Currently both China’s Northeast and Russia’s Far East belong to such category.
zones (e.g. Dongning, Manzhouli, Slavyanka, Kraskino). The establishment of these zones may overcome the constraints of small-scale primitive trade patterns in favor of more complex ones (combining different technological stages, e.g. including production, processing, export, etc.). Such zones may also serve to attract investments.

- Development of land and human resources. While Russian Far East displays a serious gap between territorial potential and a labor deficit, China’s Northeast is characterized by high population density, a deficit of arable lands, and a high unemployment rate. The situation would appear complementary, and provides a broad spectrum for cooperation. But, due to historical factors and security considerations, Russia has a deeply rooted distrust towards China’s presence. This imposes limits on the Chinese labor force. Facing depopulation, in order to stabilize its population, the Russian government has made considerable efforts to attract immigrants from Russian diasporas abroad and domestic migrants from further the west, but with limited success. According to the Russian Ministry of Economy, the APEC summit opportunity may be used to announce plans to lease arable lands of the Far East to farmers in order to cultivate potato, rice, and other crops. It is estimated that the size of the individual lease-area would be 15-20 hectares, leased for 50 years at 50 rubles per hectare. This information provoked a great deal of reaction among the Russian public, both for and against. If this plan were ever to materialize, it would surely provide an opportunity for China to export labor to the Russian Far East. This plan may be equally appealing to Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, Japan and Korea. In fact, for the last 20 years the Russian Far East has been losing highly educated specialists, and any potential development of the region would require this kind of cadre. And this is a challenge for China which has had to raise the labor skills of its industrial personnel.

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15 “Eluosi yuxiang Ya-Tai guojia chuzu yuandong baiwan gongqing nongtian” [Russia will lease million hectares of agricultural lands]. Huanqiu qang. 2012-02-01, 11:56.
In addition to the aforementioned spheres of cooperation, there are other possibilities in tourism, technical exchanges, cultural initiatives, and so on. Particularly cross-border tourism requires a considerable improvement in such spheres as tour organization, hygienic standards, service quality, and other areas. Whatever areas of cooperation are discussed, both sides should develop this on the basis of mutual trust and aim to create a win-win situation. This is the only way to ensure the integration of both Northeast China and Far Eastern Russia into the Asia-Pacific.
The decision of China’s authorities in the late 1970s to integrate with the global economy required it open its borders to flows of capital, people and goods. While the central government retained control over the border itself, the gradual decentralization of the decision-making process provided local bureaucracy with opportunities to take an active part in initiating, facilitating and managing cross-border economic activity through administrative control, international economic projects and public business. When in the second half of the 1980s China started cross-border cooperation with neighboring countries, the external economic sector was already decentralized, though it was still undergoing gradual reform.

In this paper I choose the case of Heilongjiang province to investigate the nature of the local authorities’ participation in cross-border cooperation during the period of China’s reform. The territory of the province shares about three fourths of the Sino-Russian border and its bureaucracy took a leading position in producing a discourse on how to promote cross-border collaboration with Russia.

The main aim of the paper is to explore why the Heilongjiang authorities were active in promoting cross-border cooperation with Russia, especially in contrast with their Russian counterparts. Within the framework of what Wallerstein defined as the liberal ideology that dominates the contemporary social sciences, this question seems to be both primitive and strange.

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1 In the paper I intentionally use the terms “bureaucracy”, “authority” and “government” as synonyms when analyzing local leadership. Sub-national leadership in China is de facto appointed and a part of the huge bureaucratic machine of the Chinese state, so cannot be treated as autonomous entities dependent mostly on local society. Also I use the terms “local” and “provincial” as synonyms, and analyze counties’ initiatives only when they were part of the discourse of provincial authorities.

2 Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, The End of the World As We Know It: Social Science for the Twenty-First Century (MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 87-103
in some ways, because liberal values such as globalization and openness suggest a belief that borders create a positive impact on economic development if accompanied by appropriate governance. Under the influence of this paradigm, the mainstream of research on borders has been to help the state find out how to intensify and accelerate cross-border interactions. While problems of effectiveness have been brought to the forefront, scholars have formulated measures to be implemented and goals to be achieved in cross-border cooperation: the decentralization of administrative and economic resources to the borderlands that would eventually lead to post-national governance, the provision of financial and political support by national and supranational authorities in the realization of cross-border projects, a high level of openness of borders, a clear conceptualization of integration processes and the pursuit of common objectives by local authorities on both sides of the border. In some ways, all countries were supposed to follow the historical path of the Western world. Of course, some scholars have pointed out that local governments may have incentives other than economic ones, and

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5 Óscar Jáquez Martínez, Border People: Life and Society in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1994), 5-10

even identified these empirically, but at the same time defined them as dangerous to the very nature of democracy and liberalization, and didn’t perform a thorough analysis.

Answering the question of “why” requires moving away from a liberal ideology that studies the formal rationality of politics. In order to do this and to give a systematic explanation of the Heilongjiang authorities’ actions related to cross-border cooperation during the past 25 years, I intend to invoke some ideas of Pierre Bourdieu on symbolic capital, bureaucracy, and political and bureaucratic fields.

According to Bourdieu, a bureaucracy exercises power independent from the state leadership for two main reasons: first, to secure its systemic self-reproduction, and second, to carry on a permanent struggle against different agents within the administrative apparatus and against other key social groups. The nature of this struggle must not be reduced to achieving economic goals or seeking objective values, as it is a result of the collision of subjective perceptions by social agents, who impose their beliefs on each other in order to receive benefits in the political, bureaucratic and other fields. While applying this theoretical approach to cross-border cooperation, the border can be defined as the means by which the local authorities gain economic and other types of capital both directly (through rent, business, career development, etc) and indirectly (by producing symbolic capital and by representing its subjective construction of reality for others). In the last case, the border fulfils a function of distinction which helps the bureaucracy distinguish

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8 Wallerstein, The End of the World As We Know It, 137-156
10 Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 229-251
11 Symbolic capital is any form of capital when perceived by an agent endowed with categories of perception arising from the incorporation of the structure of its distribution.
12 Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 238
itself within the economic, political and bureaucratic fields of the state.

As Anssi Paasi has noted, the construction of boundaries is carried out through numerous social practices and discourses, exploited first of all by central governments for the creation of territorial identities and for other purposes. Boundaries as a social construct are rarely produced in border areas.\(^\text{13}\) While this is certainly the case, in this paper I want to develop the idea that local authorities are not powerless reproducers of the central government’s discourse, but creators and active exploiters of the symbolic meanings of boundaries within the state.

From the practical point of view, this analysis doesn’t aim to find an optimal strategy and to define problems that should be solved by central or local authorities. It’s merely an attempt to understand the discourse of a particular Chinese Borderlands’ bureaucracy on cross-border cooperation with Russia.

**Borderlands’ bureaucracy and economic capital**

I want to start the empirical part of the paper by quoting from the published work of Finnish scholar Erlin Yang, who was commissioned by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy of Finland in 2007 to conduct research on opportunities for Finnish companies to enhance collaboration with Heilongjiang and other northeastern provinces. Based on Heilongjiang’s official and scientific publications, as well as interviews with local government officials, experts and entrepreneurs,\(^\text{14}\) it can be considered representative of the discourse on cooperation with Russia that the Heilongjiang bureaucracy was producing within China in the 2000s. Here is an example from this work:

The border trade between Heilongjiang and Russia reached USD 7 billion in 2006, accounting for 20 percent of the whole bilateral trade of two countries... A batch of powerful enterprises from Heilongjiang has initiated international business in Russia in areas of timber cutting, mining exploration, real estate development, pulp and wood processing... The Heihe Bridge and the Luohe Bridge, which both across the Heilong River

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\(^\text{14}\) Erlin Yang, *Business Opportunities in Northeast China: Jilin and Heilongjiang* (Finland: Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2008), 137-143
are under construction, will link north-east China railway lines and Russian far eastern railways... The province ranks the first in China in the number of qualified personnel, particularly in both Russian language and Russian technologies, and in studies on Russia. In the early 1950s, Russian and Jewish people living in the region numbered up to 200,000. With some nostalgia, their descendents have been showing high interest in investing in the province.\footnote{Yang, Business Opportunities, 70}

None of the statements in the passage above correspond to the reality of Sino-Russian cross-border cooperation, which can be grasped only through a comparative study of different types of Chinese and Russian data and field study. The above-mentioned bridges were not even in the preparatory stage of construction by 2013. By 2012, investment from Russia and Israel accounted for a tiny share of the total foreign investment in Heilongjiang (less than 1 percent),\footnote{Heilongjiang Statistical Yearbook 2012 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2012), 521} so the “nostalgia” hasn’t had any real economic consequences. The statement about the many provincial enterprises doing business in Russia (at least in the formal economy) also doesn’t have any real basis.\footnote{Natalia P. Ryzhova, “Investichionnaia komponenta modeli korporativnoi integratsii Kitaia i Rossii [The Investment Component in the Corporate Integration Model between China and Russia],” Spatial Economics 3 (2011): 35-37} Even the cited official statistics regarding Heilongjiang’s trade with Russia is flimsy ground for the local bureaucracy’s claiming Heilongjiang’s leading position in Sino-Russian economic relations (which will be discussed below).

Errors in the quoted text cannot be attributed to mere accident, but rather to the absence of possibilities to check the facts. Misrepresentation of the reality of cross-border cooperation with Russia by the provincial bureaucracy is a systemic phenomenon. By studying only Heilongjiang’s official materials on such “trans-border projects” as cross-border trade zones (\textit{hushi maoyi qu}), the Cross-Border Trade Economic Complex Suifenhe-Pogranichnyi, cross-border bridges, the twin city of Heihe-Blagoveshchensk,\footnote{Unlike with Heihe authorities, by the 2010s Amur oblast and Blagoveshchensk city officials had never announced the twin-city project as a path to economic integration with Heihe, and only recently have launched tourism program “Twin-Cities” independent from the Chinese side. Furthermore, in Russia, the “phenomenon” of Russian-Chinese twin cities Blagoveshchensk-Heihe is of little scientific interest and has never studied as a political issue, but as} there is every likelihood that one
would be convinced of the reality of these projects on both sides of Sino-Russian border. In fact, from the late 1980s to the early 2010s, the province had limited success in developing the economic sectors associated with cross-border cooperation.

Heilongjiang border cities and counties, which indeed accounted for 80-90 percent of the provincial trade with Russia in the 2000s, mainly fulfilled an intermediary function in trade between the eastern part of China and Russia. The concentration of trading in several border municipalities no doubt favored their accelerated economic growth, but such a development model was not what the central government expected to see when it initially planned to boost the Borderlands’ productive sectors by delivering tax relief and permitting administrative preferences in cross-border trade. This preferential policy was restricted only to the goods of local origin in case of export and to the goods for local consumption in case of import. These requirements were impossible to implement, and the borderland’s companies used these preferences to trade all goods irrespective of the place of its origin and destination. “Cross-border” trade intermediaries have obviously accumulated huge amounts of money and have recently traded not only with Russia: the border city Suifenhe, after obtaining a license to purchase crude


oil, has been increasing its imports from Arab and African countries.22

The preferential treatment that was granted by the Chinese central government to its borderlands in order to attract foreign and domestic capital also hasn’t lived up to expectations.23 At the same time, the local bureaucracy hasn’t succeeded in creating an export-oriented production sector. According to provincial authority estimates throughout various years between 1992 and 2013, the share of goods of local origin in Heilongjiang’s total exports has experienced a persistent decline, from 50 percent in the 1990s,24 to 36 percent in 200325 and 20 percent in the early 2010s.26 When announcing these statistics, officials didn’t take into account the previous estimates and consistently highlighted significant improvements in comparison with the past. Historical “amnesia” appeared once again in the 2013 Report on the Work of the Heilongjiang Government, where it was stated that the share of locally produced goods in exports continued to grow.27

Provincial plans to establish industry oriented towards processing raw materials imported from Russia have also had limited success. For example, by the end of the 2000s, Heilongjiang companies imported 20-30 percent of total wood pur-

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22 Sergei A. Ivanov, “Usloviia formirovaniia,” 141
23 Natalia P. Ryzhova, “Rol’ prigranichnogo,” 63-64
chased outside China;28 meanwhile provincial enterprises harvested approximately 7 percent of wood in China.29 As a result, the province had a huge raw-materials base: in 2006 the lumber companies and trade intermediaries of Heilongjiang had at their disposal 17 million m$^3$ of wood, or 17 percent of China’s wood market. Since the second half of the 2000s, Heilongjiang government reports argued that the region had succeeded in creating wood-processing industry clusters. However, the official national and provincial statistics reveal the opposite as the share of Heilongjiang in China’s wood processing industry fell from 2 percent in 2006 to 0.4 percent in 2011, the pulp and paper sector from 0.82 percent to 0.39 percent, and the furniture industry from 1.25 percent to 0.42 percent.30

The fragmentary and incomplete analysis presented above was not designed to explore the effectiveness of the Heilongjiang bureaucracy in deriving direct economic benefits from cross-border cooperation with Russia. Moreover, I believe it’s wrong to associate all success and failure in economic development with the authorities’ actions, as still nobody can give a certain answer to Weber’s question about what economic effect is exerted by bureaucracy.31 There are many more significant factors – for example, the historically unfavorable structure of the economy in comparison with the eastern part of China,32 the limits and instability of the Russian market and state,33 etc. – that could


33 Maria V. Aleksandrova, “Chetvert’ veka torgovo-economiceskogo sotrudnichestva RF I KNR (na primere provintsii Heiluntszian) [25 Years of
explain the impossibility of the provincial authorities performing much better than they did and their tendency to use the border as an instrument to extract rent from cross-border flows through supporting the intermediary trade sector.

However, the analysis presented above is enough to reveal that the economic potential of the Sino-Russian border and direct economic capital deriving from it were much lower than what Heilongjiang authorities consciously and unconsciously represented within China. In this regard, two interrelated questions will be focused on in the following part of the paper. First, if the border for the past two and a half decades appears to have limited economic potential for the province, why did local bureaucracy systematically falsify information (almost always in a positive way) about the reality of cross-border cooperation with Russia? Second, who were the consumers of this falsified information?

**Borderlands’ bureaucracy and symbolic capital**

In answering the questions raised above, I suggest returning to the passage of the Finnish scholar in order to understand the essence of the misrepresentation. Ideas which the bureaucracy sought to represent in it are: 1. significant penetration of the Russian commodities market; 2. developed and promising cross-border communication; 3. free access to Russian technologies; 4. the existence of some kind of historical and cultural relationship. The same statements could be found in Heilongjiang’s numerous official materials and scientific papers by provincial scholars on economic integration with Russian borderlands in the 1990s-2000s. All of these positions are within the frame-

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work of liberal ideology and serve to represent significant integration between the Russian and Chinese parts of the border.

Why was it so important for the Heilongjiang provincial bureaucracy to impose such a “reality” of cross-border cooperation as occurring?

First of all, the thought of the bureaucrat pervaded by the official representation, by the belief that bureaucracy as a “universal” group is endowed with the intuition of, or a will to, universal interest. In authoritarian China the universal interest was imposed by party leaders, who since the 1970s adopted liberal ideology in policymaking. From this point of view the Heilongjiang bureaucracy was obliged to produce the same discourse as the central government did.

However, a simple recapitulation of the principal points of the new ideology was not enough to hold Heilongjiang authorities’ position in the bureaucratic and political field of the state. Policy towards integration with the world economy put them under pressure. Heavy industry and the military industrial sector – the major sources of capital formation in the region during the period of centrally planned economy – were uncompetitive on the international market. It was impossible to convince Beijing to subsidize the province’s budget (which in a certain sense means subsidizing the survival of the bureaucracy), as until the late 1990s the central government moved away from distribution of economic resources within the state. As a result, the main sources of income for local authorities were diminishing fiscal returns and revenue from state-owned enterprises under their jurisdiction. Fiscal and administrative preferences, the main instrument of regional policy for the central government until the beginning of the 2000s, were mainly granted to the regions that, due to their geographical position, had the potential to develop foreign economic relations.

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35 Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State,” 2


Heilongjiang lacks an outlet to the sea but it did have the border with USSR/Russia. This border was used by the local bureaucracy as an instrument to increase its significance within the framework of China's foreign economic policy, and subsequently, since the early 2000s, to access the distribution of preferences and economic capital meted out by the central government. In other words, the above mentioned misrepresentation was essential as a means of producing symbolic capital that later could be transformed into material resources or political benefits (career development etc.).

The economic significance of the Sino-Russian border for national foreign economic strategy was claimed by the Heilongjiang bureaucracy from the very start of the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. It was made through deliberately identifying the initiative to start cross-border cooperation with the former General Secretary Hu Yaobang. His statements on economic cooperation with China’s northern neighbor, especially the phrase “Shenzhen in the South, Heihe in the North – they should take off side by side”, allegedly made while inspecting the province in August 1982 and 1984, were endlessly repeated by Heilongjiang authorities and scholars.

While there is no evidence from the central authorities’ sources that the Heilongjiang border was really viewed as crucial to foreign economic strategy (including the absence of any information on the importance of the above mentioned Hu Yaobang’s trips to national economic strategy), appealing on the

38 By the middle 2000s, there was not only authorities of border city Heihe who had claimed to gain symbolic status of “Northern Shenzhen”, but almost all relatively big cities along the Sino-Russian border. See, “Suifenhe shiwei shuji E Zhongqi: fahui youshi, dazao “Beifang Shenzhen” [Suifenhe Municipal Committee Secretary E Zhongqi: we should use the advantage to create “Northern Shenzhen”], last modified April 24, 2007, http://chinaneast.xinhuanet.com/2007-04/26/content_9896622.htm; “Fengshengshuiqi kan Hunchun [Take a Look at Prosperous Hunchun],” last modified December 20, 2010, http://www.jl.gov.cn/ggkf/dwkf/qykfkf/201012/t20101220_925513.html; “Manzhouli neng chengwei beifang Shenzhen ma [Is it possible for Manzhouli to become Northern Shenzhen],” Qingnianbao [Youth Daily], April 24, 2000, 4

grounds of statements made by one of the party leaders pressured the central bureaucracy to give the same preferential treatment in the foreign economic sector as that which the coastal provinces had been given.\textsuperscript{40} In August 1990, the Heilongjiang Government Study Group on Economic Cooperation with the USSR reported to Beijing that the latter should establish a Heihe Special Economic Zone, as Heihe was unique in allowing the development of an export-oriented economy. To realize this potential, Beijing was asked to give preferential treatment to infrastructure projects, to provide tax breaks and to reduce income tax rates, to allow for the abolition of the collection of local taxes, to provide funds for capital construction, and so forth.\textsuperscript{41}

A symbolic bargain between the province and Beijing over its exclusive power to carry on cross-border economic collaboration with the USSR\textbackslash Russia in the late 1980s and the early 1990s was described in the memoirs of the former vice-governor of Heilongjiang province, Du Xianzhong.\textsuperscript{42} The belief that Heilongjiang needed special treatment from Beijing and that the local bureaucracy should struggle to get this treatment runs throughout the book.

The symbolic significance of the border itself in the discourse of the Heilongjiang bureaucracy has declined since the mid-1990s when the political elite recognized the limitations of the direct economic\textsuperscript{43} and, more importantly, symbolic benefits that could be gained from emphasizing cross-border cooperation. This was a result of two factors: the stagnation of economic ex-

\textsuperscript{40} For example, in January 1986, vice-governor of Heilongjiang province Du Xianzhong while giving a speech at the conference on economic cooperation and trade with Soviet Union and Western Europe, organized by the central government and border provinces, based his arguments for giving the same preferential treatment to border municipalities that Shenzhen was given, on the two-year old statements of Hu Yaobang and relative similarity of conditions in Shenzhen and Sino-Russian border municipalities. See, Du Xianzhong, \textit{Bianmao Mouluo} [Stratagems of Border Trade] (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1995), 8-10


\textsuperscript{42} Du Xianzhong, \textit{Bianmao Mouluo}, 582

\textsuperscript{43} Heilongjiang nianjian 1994 [Heilongjiang Yearbook 1994] (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1994), 3
change between Russian and Chinese regions and, more importantly, the end of the era of preferences applied to small territories as one of the major instruments of Beijing’s regional policy. Since the late 1990s, the central government has increased its ability to redistribute economic resources within the state, one that focuses on macro-regional, large sub-provincial and industry-specific projects.

Such changes led to a transformation in the nature of the arrangement between the province and Beijing. The Heilongjiang bureaucracy partially “rebranded” its ideology of participating in national foreign economic policy: the idea of the border as a narrow strip of counties and cities was transformed into the concept of a “broader” border, where the whole province was presented as a bridge between China and Russia, and, in the future, between China and Northeast Asia.\(^44\) If in the late 1980s and early 1990s Beijing was asked to provide Heilongjiang border counties and cities with fiscal and administrative preferences in foreign trade and investment, in the 2000s the emphasis in bargaining shifted to establishing integrated development plans which covered all or most of the province’s territory and sought to attract direct funding from Beijing. This distinction can be traced on the basis of information from the sessions of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in the second half of the 2000s \((\textbf{Table 1})\), where the Heilongjiang delegates suggested various initiatives. Of course, NPC sessions are not the only way of promoting local initiatives at the level of central government, and the examples listed below are a small part of a provincial discourse on the cross-border location of Heilongjiang.

**Conclusion**

The empirical analysis in this paper raises serious doubts about the adequacy of the conventional liberal approach to studying political and administrative authorities’ efforts in cross-border cooperation, at least in the non-western world. Economic benefits were not the only, and perhaps not even the most important, incentive for the Heilongjiang bureaucracy to promote

\(^{44}\) Sergei A. Ivanov, “Vostok Rossii v prostranstvennoi organizatsii vneshnei politiki Kitaia [East of Russia in the Spatial Organization of China’s Foreign Policy],” Russia i ATR [Russia and the Pacific] 4 (2010): 94
cross-border cooperation. Although I use the term “cross-border cooperation” in this paper, the most appropriate question is to what extent claims to promote “cross-border cooperation” are about collaboration with international partners, and to what extent they are about bargaining or simple imitation internal to the discourse of the bureaucracy within the political field of China.

Over the past 25 years, provincial authorities represented the border territory under their jurisdiction initially as an important facility to implement national foreign economic strategy and later as a platform through which other territories of the state could cooperate with Russia. The meaning of this representation was twofold: first, to produce the same discourse as the central government, and second, to gain symbolic capital that could later be transformed into material resources or political benefits in bargaining with Beijing, the major consumer of provincial information about cross-border cooperation. That’s why the message of the provincial bureaucracy was in line with the liberal ideology adopted by the central government and aimed to increase the power of the province within the state with regards to foreign economic activity with Russian border regions.

The symbolic significance of the frontier needed to be proved with factual materials. As a result, the Heilongjiang authorities and experts deliberately or unconsciously produced a corrupted information flow for Beijing and other consumers within China. This raises the question, is it possible to find appropriate ways of governing cross-border cooperation based on this sort of misrepresented data? The situation gets worse if we take into account the fact that misrepresentation with its own characteristics can also be found in Russia. So the question “why” agents do what they do, and say what they say, is vital for studying “how” agents should act in improving cross-border cooperation.
Table 1. Proposals advanced by Heilongjiang province delegates at group discussions of national policy within National People’s Congress sessions, 2005-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NPC session, year</th>
<th>Mover of the proposal</th>
<th>Proposal description</th>
<th>Support required from Beijing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd session of the 10th NPC, March 2005</td>
<td>Tang Xiuting, head of the provincial Development and Reform Commission</td>
<td>The province should take the lead in creating a national energy and raw material base due to its proximity to Russia and border location</td>
<td>Beijing should appropriate special purpose funds from central budget to back large-scale projects. Import VAT and customs duties on all raw materials need to be abolished for provincial companies. Enterprises should be allowed to process all types of raw materials and sell products on their own.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th session of the 10th NPC, March 2006</td>
<td>He Hongda, party official of China’s Ministry of Railways, former head of Harbin Railway Bureau</td>
<td>Heilongjiang private companies which import such a strategic resource as wood from Russia need to be supported. The companies have flexible mechanisms of doing business needed while collaborating with Russian border regions.</td>
<td>Details of required support were not announced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th session of the 10th NPC, March 2006</td>
<td>Wang Shuguo, president of Harbin Institute of Technology</td>
<td>Research and development sector of the province should be supported due to developing agriculture, developing the manufacturing industry and proximity to Russia.</td>
<td>Heilongjiang should be given a bigger stake in inter-provincial redistribution of financial resources in the research and development sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st session of the 11th NPC, March 2008</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>National integrated experimental zone of border openness should be established in Heilongjiang</td>
<td>The project should be granted the status of national strategy which means funding from the central budget, and the highest possible administrative and fiscal preferences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session</td>
<td>Delegate</td>
<td>Proposal</td>
<td>Funding and Administrative Preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th session of the 11th NPC, March 2011</td>
<td>Shi Jiaxing, head of Secretariat of People’s Government of Harbin</td>
<td>«Border belt of the northern part of China’s Northeast” should be established in almost all of the territory of Heilongjiang</td>
<td>The project should be granted the status of national strategy, which means funding from the central budget, and the highest possible administrative and fiscal preferences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st session of the 12th NPC, March 2013</td>
<td>Wang Dongguang, head of provincial Development and Reform Commission</td>
<td>National strategy of border openness should be adopted towards Heilongjiang and Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>The project should be granted the status of national strategy, which means funding from the central budget, and the highest possible administrative and fiscal preferences.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6 “Heilongjiang sheng daibiao changtan kuan lingyu duocengci kaizhan dui e hezuo [Heilongjiang Province Delegates Exchanges Ideas on Expanding the Fields and Increasing the Layers of Cooperation with Russia],” last modified March 16, 2013, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/dbdhhy/12_1/2013-03/16/content_1786303.htm
North Korea’s Special Economic Zones and East Asia
(Focusing on SEZ Strategy and Location)

Jongseok Park

This paper discusses the political and economic meaning of North Korea’s Special Economic Zones. It will outline the economic importance of countries which are in close geographical proximity; definition and types of Special Economic Zones; the two major types of socialist system; what SEZs mean in a socialist system; the significance of SEZs to the North Korean economic system; and the attitude of North Korea towards reform and opening.

The Economic Importance of Countries in Geographical Proximity

In order to understand the economic importance of countries in geographical proximity we can examine the current major trading partners of Japan. The current ten “big” trading partners of Japan are as follows (Table 1).

Table 1. Current “Big” Trading Partners of Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Country or Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There are many “near” counties in the list. Only two are “remote” countries (the USA and Germany). However, absent are many European countries with large economies, such as England, France, Spain or Italy. This suggests that countries in close geographical proximity either are an economically significant partner or could be such in the near future. So even though North Korea is a small trading partner for Japan now, it could well become a more significant one in the near future, as in the cases of South Korea, Taiwan or Hong Kong.3

Definition and Types of Special Economic Zones

A Special Economic Zone can be defined as a specially designated area in which certain special economic policies are to be executed, in order to boost the economy of the whole country. We could point to three main types: 1) Tourist Zone, 2) Trade Zone, 3) Export Processing Zone.4

Two Major Types of Socialist Systems

The socialist system can be classified into several subclasses, or types5, and two major ones are as follows:

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3 It might be interesting to compare the populations of these countries. The population of South Korea is about 49 million, that of Taiwan is 23 million, and that of Hong Kong is just 7 million. And that of North Korea is 25 million. See “Country Comparison = Population,” The World Factbook, accessed April 1, 2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html.


5 Jongseok Park, “A Study on Changes in the Socialist System (in Japanese)”, Law Journal of Hokkaido University, 61(3) (2010), 333-378. In the article, I established five types of Socialist system. One of them is “the pure socialist
1) The Orthodox Socialist System. In this system, private economic activity is eradicated by the socialist state. The state privileges a situation where no private economic activity is performed as the ideal society.

2) The Reformative Socialist System. In this system, private economic activity is in the process of reintroduction and religitimation. The socialist state has changed its policy towards private economic activity. While private economic activity was deemed evil and useless initially, because of the failures of the orthodox system the state came to realize that private economic activity is useful for achieving economic growth, which itself was one of their major aims when they established the orthodox socialist system.

What SEZs Mean in a Socialist System

In SEZs capitalist firms are invited to conduct business. This has two corollaries in a socialist system:

1) As foreign firms are invited in, it means the socialist system changes from a closed one to an open one.

2) As private firms not managed by the socialist state, it means the socialist system changes from the orthodox one to the reformative one, at least in the designated area.

Significance of SEZs in the North Korean economic system

North Korea’s SEZs are potentially important to the current economic system in the following ways:

1) North Korea’s relations with the outside world change from being closed to being open.

2) Within the zone there is a change from the orthodox socialist system to the reformative one.

3) Geopolitically, all four SEZs are located in border regions, with Russia, China or South Korea. Border regions can be areas of cooperation or confrontation, depending on circum-

system” conceived of by socialist thinkers and politicians to be their ultimate goal, never attained in the real world. The other four types are, “the socialist system under construction”, “the orthodox socialist system”, “the reformative socialist system” and “the transformative socialist system”, all of these being real ones.
stances. These four SEZs imply that North Korea is ready to cooperate with the outside world, especially with South Korea, Japan and the United States.

4) Administratively, at the time when the four SEZs were established, there were five cities administered directly by the central government. Among those five, three cities are in SEZs.⁶

**Attitude of North Korea towards Reform and Opening**

In 1978, China made a dramatic shift in their strategy for economic growth. Initially, the leaders of China expected that the Chinese economy would grow fast under a socialist system and sooner or later the people of China would become rich, while political oppression and economic expropriation would disappear. However, aside from problems of political oppression and economic expropriation, their economy had been flatlining for many years. It is reported that three years prior to the strategic shift of 1978, Zhou Enlai said that, “Our country is unhappy. Already 26 years have passed. But, the situation is that 600 million people face an everyday struggle for sufficient food, yet must sing to the communist party and praise the leader. This reality shows our party has failed.”⁷ Acknowledging this situation, China changed strategy and experienced rapid economic growth, especially in their four SEZs.

North Korea hesitated for a long time about whether to imitate China or not, having witnessed its neighbor’s unexpected success. After 13 years of observation, North Korea finally began to show some shifts in their strategy concerning economic growth. What is distinct is that, in contrast to China, which executed internal reform and external opening at the same time, North Korea is very reluctant to reform its internal economic structure by reviving private economic activity. However, the state has demonstrated its interest in outside engagement through establishing SEZs, which means making their economy connected with the outside world, although in limited regions.

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⁶ They are Najin-Sunbong, Sinuiju and Kaesong. The other two cities are Pyongyang and Nampo.
This hints that they want to boost the growth of their economy through establishing SEZs, avoiding structural changes in the economic system for as long as possible.

**Establishment of North Korea’s SEZs**

The change of North Korea’s attitude towards SEZs can be divided into four phases *(Table 2).*

**Table 2. Change of North Korea’s Attitude towards SEZs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Before 1980 ● Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>1980 – 1991 ● Observing China’s Experiment with SEZs ● Considering the necessity and possibility of SEZs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>1991 – 2002 ● Established the Najin-Sunbong Zone in 1991 ● Testing its possibility and potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Since 2002 ● Active ● Established 3 more Zones in 2002 (Sinuiju, Mt.Kumgang, Kaesong)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: compiled by the author*

In Phase I (before 1980), North Korea was negative towards SEZs, because they were deemed to be a space of appropriation by foreign capital. In Phase II (1980 – 1991), witnessing the development of the Chinese SEZs, they considered the necessity and possibility of operating their own. In Phase III (1991 – 2002), in the aftermath of the collapse of the socialist system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the North Korean economy collapsed and many people are believed to have starved to death. The situation encouraged a shift in attitudes towards SEZs in 1991, when they announced that they intended to establish SEZs related to the “Tumen River Area Development Program” introduced under the auspices of UNDP (United Nations Development Program). In December 1991, they established the “Najin-Sunbong Free Trade Zone” as the North Korea’s first SEZ. In Phase IV (2002 – ), they were very active towards SEZs. After this period of experiment, they established
a further three SEZs in successive months in 2002: in September the “Sinuiju Special Administration District”, in October the “Mt. Kumgang Tourist Zone” (Kosong area) and in November the “Kaesong Industrial District”.

How do North Korea’s SEZs Function?

In order to understand the functioning of North Korea’s SEZs, we can take the case of Kaesong as representative.

1. Control and development of the district.

Firstly, the organization that supervises the development of Kaesong is the “Central Control Agency of Industrial Districts” (Kaesong Industrial District Law,8 Article 5). Other departments of the central government are not permitted to intervene (Article 6). This shows the intention of the North Korean government to promote efficiently the development of Kaesong District.

Secondly, the work of developing Kaesong District will be performed by the “Developer” designated by the “Central Control Agency of Industrial Districts” (Article 2 and 10). This means that the Developer would have the exclusive right to develop the district. Here the developer is the South Korean firm, “Hyundai Asan”.

Thirdly, it is the “Kaesong District Control Organization” that manages Kaesong District under the supervision of the “Central Control Agency of Industrial Districts” (Article 2 and 10). This means that the “Kaesong District Control Organization” deals with the everyday management of the district and has reasonable authority over the district. This “Kaesong District Control Organization” consists of members suggested by both the developer and the “Central Control Agency of Industrial Districts” (Article 24 and 26). This means that the developer, Hyundai Asan (and later, in addition, the Korean Land Public Company) has authority not only in developing the district but also managing it.

2. The main economic policies to be pursued in the district.

8 Reunification Department of South Korea, accessed December 20, 2009, http://www.unikorea.go.kr. (in the search window type the phrase “Kaesong Industrial District Law” in Korean (that is to say “개성공업지구법”)).
Ownership and use of the means of production: Land is still solely owned by the state and will be developed by the developer through leasing (Article 2). Investors who are to perform business in the district will lease land from the developer (Article 18). The duration of the lease is 50 years, and this can subsequently be extended (Article 12). The ownership and inheritance of assets invested from abroad will be guaranteed (Article 7).

Market: Prices of commodities will be determined by the market (Article 40). Foreign convertible currencies and credit cards will be used (Article 41).

Business activity: Koreans living in South Korea or other countries, individual foreigners, foreign corporations and economic organizations can invest and establish firms, branches, and offices in the district (Article 3). They should employ North Koreans as ordinary workers (Article 37). They shall be required to pay all taxes, such as enterprise income taxes, transaction taxes, local taxes, etc. The rate of enterprise income tax will be 14 percent, and in some fields 10 percent (Article 43).

Foreign relations: People can enter the district upon obtaining a “Certificate for entering the district” issued by the “Kaesong District Control Organization” without the need for a visa (Article 28). Tariffs will not be imposed within the district (Article 33). Foreign currency can be carried into and out of the district without limit, and profits from business can be remitted overseas (Article 44).

North Korea has tried to develop the Kaesong district as a “general SEZ”, taking advantage of its location near South Korea. During its development, in order to smooth the process, they were ready to execute “reformative” economic policies, even if those policies were limited to the district.

Performance of North Korea’s SEZs

How successful have the North Korean SEZs been?

- Najin-Sunbong SEZ. North Korea developed a grand design for the region. Based on this design, a more concrete “Soliciting Investment Plan” emerged, which called for a
North Korea’s Special Economic Zones ...

total US$4700 million of investment to be invited to the region, of which US$3600 million was for industry, US$900 million for social infrastructure like roads and factory sites, and a further US$100 million for services like hotels. And the result? Poor enough to be called “a big failure”. Looking at the statistics for the years 1991 – 1997 (the only years to haven been published), only US$58 million was invested, just 1.2 percent of the original plan!

- Sinuiju SEZ. The establishment and development of Sinuiju SEZ was a drama with many plot reversals. To the surprise of the outside world, a “self-governed SEZ” was announced, in imitation of Hong Kong. And more surprisingly, a Chinese-Dutch named Yang Bin was appointed as the top official of the SEZ. However, only three days after the appointment, Yang Bin was arrested by the Chinese authorities on suspicion of tax evasion and illegal money borrowing. Sinuiju SEZ was left stranded in its first phase. Following that incident, North Korea tried to invite several other individuals to take the post. But the situation didn’t improve, so they announced “the temporary halting of the SEZ” in 2004. Even after that, North Korea invited China to invest in the region, but without much result.

- Mt. Kumgang SEZ. In contrast to the cases of Najin-Sunbong or Sinuiju, Mt. Kumgang SEZ initially promised to be an SEZ success story. Development of the region, such as the railroad between South and North Korea, advanced quite smoothly with the strong support of the Kim Dae-jung and Rho Moo-hyun governments. Tourist numbers increased steadily, to some 300,000 in 2005.\(^9\) The developer Hyundai Asan had said that 500,000 was the break-even point of their business, and were optimistic it would be achieved. But, to their disappointment, relations between the two Koreas quickly soured after Lee Myong-bak was elected as President of South Korea. At the time of the election campaign, he had advocated “a pragmatic line”, even though the candidate of the hawkish “Hannara Par-

\(^9\) This project was quite profitable to North Korea, even before the developer gets to the break-even point. According to their agreement, every tourist should pay US$70 to the North Korean authorities as an “entrance fee”. US$70 is a lot of money in North Korea, considering that the monthly salary of a worker in the Kaesong SEZ was about US$70 at the time.
Many pragmatists cast votes for him in the hope of economic recovery, as he was once the president of a large firm within the Hyundai Group. However, unexpectedly, he began to show a very hawkish attitude towards North Korea, and tourism to Mt. Kumgang was halted after a South Korean tourist was shot by a North Korean guard in the area. The paralysis of the Mt. Kumgang SEZ has essentially continued until now.

- Kaesong SEZ. Like Mt. Kumgang SEZ, Kaesong initially showed promise of being a successful SEZ. Development of the region—railroads and the preparing of sites for factories—proceeded smoothly with strong North and South political support. Production and exports grew rapidly, as shown in the table below, even though the absolute amount is not large. However, after Lee Myong-bak was elected, support from the South Korean government weakened, as shown in their reneging on a deal to build a dormitory for workers, and the district lost the vitality it had initially shown. Since then, the situation has not significantly improved.¹⁰

### Table 3. Production and Export of Kaesong SEZ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amount of Production</strong> (1000 US$) (growth rate)</td>
<td>14,900 (395 %)</td>
<td>73,740 (151 %)</td>
<td>184,780 (36 %)</td>
<td>251,420 (36 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amount of Export</strong> (1000 US$) (growth rate)</td>
<td>8,660 (129 %)</td>
<td>19,830 (100 %)</td>
<td>39,670 (-10 %)</td>
<td>35,840 (-10 %)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** compiled by the author

¹⁰ Lately, the tensions between the two parties (North Korea being one party, South Korea and the United States being the other party) are growing higher than ever. Evacuation of North Korean workers by the North Korean authorities is the vivid sign of the exacerbated situation. See Nocutnews, April 8, 2013, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.nocutnews.co.kr/Show.asp?IDX=2457453.
In the case of Sinuiju, North Korea tried to create a “self-governance zone” by giving the zone the status of a “Special Administrative District” and appointing a Chinese-Dutch as the top official, whose title was “Administrative Minister”. In Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong they designated a South Korean firm – Hyundai Asan – as the “Developer”. Through such strategies they tried to alleviate doubts from abroad as well as escape the financial burden of developing the SEZs themselves (which proved reasonably successful under favorable conditions).

Relevance of geography for North Korea’s SEZs

North Korea planned to develop their four SEZs as follows;

1) Najin-Sunbong: Center of Trade and Transportation + Export Processing Zone.
2) Sinuiju: Center of Trade and Transportation + Export Processing Zone.
3) Mt. Kumgang: Area for Tourism.
4) Kaesong: Export Processing Zone.

Are these plans realistic or not?

- Najin-Sunbong: a) As the region connects North Korea, China and Russia, it is promising site for a Center of Trade and Transportation. For example, China is interested in developing the region for harbors to connect the North-Eastern Region of China with foreign countries. So China is actively repairing the Najin harbour, and underwriting the cost, in return for exclusive use of part of the harbor for 50 years.\(^{11}\) b) The area is not ideal as an Export Processing Zone. If there is any country interested in investing in an export processing zone in the Eastern part of North Korea, it would be Japan. But for Japan, Wonsan would be the most suitable region for that purpose, being more ac-

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cessible from Japan than Najin-Sunbong. Wonsan is also much closer to Pyongyang, the most populated region of North Korea.

- Sinuiju: a) The region connects China and North Korea and so is suitable as a Center of Trade and Transportation. b) The area is not ideal as an Export Processing Zone as Sinuiju is not a good harbor, so the region is disadvantageous for export,\textsuperscript{12} except towards China.\textsuperscript{13}

- Mt. Kumgang: The region has tourist potential as the mountain is renowned as "the most beautiful mountain in the world" among Koreans. And the region is near South Korea and Japan, whose citizens are expected to form the majority of the would-be visitors.

- Kaesong: The region is reasonable as an Export Processing Zone. It is near Seoul, so is convenient for transporting items to South Korea. The region is also advantageous as a transportation node for Pyongyang.

**General Assessment**

In sum, North Korea’s SEZs have not been particularly successful. What have been the problems?

First of all, North Korea failed to improve its relations with foreign countries, particularly South Korea, Japan and the United States. It is true that bad relations with these countries are not solely North Korea’s responsibility. For example, it was not North Korea but the United States that scrapped the 1994 Geneva Agreement in which the US promised to build a light-water nuclear power plant in Yeongbyon, in exchange for North Korea’s freezing of its nuclear activity. In any case, it is obvious this failure has had a bad effect on the performance of the North Korean SEZs.

Secondly, they have not aggressively sought foreign investment. Were North Korean SEZs so attractive to foreign in-

\textsuperscript{12} This aspect was pointed out by Hyundai Group when the firm and North Korea were negotiating for a site for an export processing zone. See Weekly Donga, December 24, 2008, accessed October 30, 2009, http://weekly.donga.com/docs/magazine/weekly/2008/12/17/200812170500014/200812170500014_1.html.

\textsuperscript{13} But China could hardly be a good market for items made in North Korea. North Korea needs to aims at South Korea, Japan and the United States as their future markets.
vestors, this would not have been necessary but,不幸地, North Korean SEZs are not considered so charming. Therefore, they needed to try their best to lure foreign investors by, for example, developing the SEZs themselves, giving more advantageous conditions to would-be investors or giving more autonomy to the authorities of the SEZs.

Thirdly, their choice of SEZ locations can be criticised. The priority was to develop Export Processing Zones, so it is hard to understand why they wasted time trying to develop Naju-Sunbong and Sinuiju, instead of more promising regions like Wonsan, Haeju, Nampo, and so on.

**Conclusion**

Politically, North Korea needs to improve its relations with the outside world, particularly with South Korea, Japan and the US. Irrespective of its justifications over why they have failed to improve its relations with the outside world they need to search for a new compromise after analyzing the current situation surrounding them.

Regarding the location of the SEZs, they need to reconsider where they would be best situated. They should establish Wonsan as an SEZ in order to entice Japanese investment. Wonsan is the best location for connecting North Korea and Japan, and has the advantage of being near Pyongyang. Rather than Sinuiju as a Self-governed District, they need to focus on Nampo\(^\text{14}\). Unlike Sinuiju, Nampo has a good harbor and is part of the most-populated area of North Korea, near to its capital Pyongyang. So it is better than any other region of North Korea for connecting North Korea and the outside world, for producing industrial goods and for mobilizing labor.\(^\text{15}\)

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\(^{14}\) Even after Yang Bin was arrested by the Chinese authorities, North Korea has tried to put some foreigners in the post. For example, there was a report that a Chinese American named Sha Rushang would take the post. (Yonhap News, September 2, 2004, accessed October 20, 2009, http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=104&oid=001&aid=0000757530.) This shows North Korea is quite determined to establish a Self-governed District.

\(^{15}\) Since North Korea is now undeveloped, the ratio of goods sold to its people will be low in the meantime. But as its economy might develop as a consequence of its growth strategy, including establishing SEZs, the ratio of goods sold to its people will also grow.
The outside world should offer a new compromise to North Korea, probably something that resembles the 1994 Geneva Agreement, in order to stabilize East Asia by lowering tensions between North Korea and the outside world. Until now policy has oscillated between two poles with regard to North Korea. One is the hard line, probably intended to disrupt the North Korean regime and absorb it into South Korea. It requires North Korea to resolve its so-called nuclear issues prior to economic engagement, and is the policy of Lee Myong-bak as South Korean president. The other is the soft line aimed at coexistence and reuniting the two Koreas peacefully. It practices economic cooperation and solving North Korean nuclear issues simultaneously, and characterized the period of the two previous South Korean presidents, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. If we evaluate the two policies over time, then the hard line has not succeeded in lessening tensions between North Korea and the outside world, or reducing the pain of people separated as the result of the Korean War (1950 – 1953), or indeed of controlling North Korean nuclear activities. It could be suggested that the hard line is almost bankrupt. On the other hand, the soft line showed some possibility of lessening the tensions between North Korea and the outside world, reducing the agony of separation and controlling North Korean nuclear activities.

16 There could not be a strikingly different compromise than the 1994 Geneva Agreement. In this respect, I think that it was unwise for the United States to scrap the 1994 Agreement with some unclear excuses. Long years have passed, and both parties have lost much. The United States reduced the possibility of preventing North Korea becoming a new nuclear-armed country. North Korea has lost the long time it could have spent recovering its impoverished economy.

17 President Bush practiced the hard line when he scrapped the 1994 Geneva Agreement in 2002.

18 At the time of the 1994 Geneva Agreement, North Korea was suspected to have some 12 kg of reprocessed plutonium that might be used for making two or three nuclear weapons, if they had sufficient technology. But in 2008, they were suspected to have about 40 kg of reprocessed plutonium that might be used for making about 8 nuclear weapons. (Newsis, February 1, 2008, accessed October 30, 2009, http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=003&aid=0001946940.) This means its nuclear capability grew significantly after the scrapping of the 1994 Geneva Agreement.

19 We need to pay attention to the fact that during the period when the 1994 Geneva Agreement was alive (1994-2001), North Korea's nuclear capability was frozen. But hard liners were complaining about the fact that North Korea's nuclear capability did not become null instantly, which is a silly dream in the arena of international conflict.
Even though the process might not be smooth, the only possible way to solve those issues peacefully is compromise between the two sides, not the submission of either side. The outside world needs to work on proposing a new compromise, which might be accepted by North Korea.
Recently East Asia has seen an escalation of some high-profile territorial conflicts, mainly along the borders of Japan, the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea. In this article the ideological approaches to territorial disputes of the above-mentioned East Asian countries and their interpretations of history are compared and analyzed. Also analyzed are the mythological archetypes used by the concerned parties in order to explain the essence of the territorial disputes in the region, and the use of history as a sacred narrative.

It is necessary to clarify in the very beginning how the terms myth and mythology are interpreted in this chapter. Nowadays these terms are often used synonymously with words such as false, hoax or mistake, not only in everyday life but also in some scientific articles. This interpretation of the words “myth” and “mythology” leads to a contra-position of a myth to a fact, as false opposed to true. It in turn leads to identifying the term myth with something opposed to true facts, and, for some researchers, to a necessity for debunking myths. On the contrary, in this chapter mythology will be viewed as a universal narrative containing certain models for behavior based on archetypal thinking. In this case, a myth is seen as a sacred narrative or as an explanation of events through personal perception and not just as a folkloric description of a historical event. Owing to the fact that the inner logic of the myth is subconsciously perceived as the only true or correct version, myth itself becomes identified as truth by the collective consciousness.

A number of researchers have examined myth as a sacred narrative from the standpoint of psychology, history, and social

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anthropology. Carl Jung wrote about myth as a “universal socio-psychological mechanism” connected to the collective unconscious.\(^3\) Claude Lévi-Strauss defined mythology as “a structural sign system, a special language, built on top of the common”.\(^4\) According to Lévi-Strauss, myth solves intellectual problems. Furthermore, Lévi-Strauss suggested that the modern counterpart to myth is politics.\(^5\) Mircea Eliade proposed in his works a thesis that history is more superficial than mythology in its explanation of human life, but myth carries an absolute knowledge of the world in itself and thus explains more than a direct description of facts.\(^6\) A prominent Russian philosopher and philologist, Aleksei Losev, wrote that one of the main characteristics of myth is that it is malleable, and is not intended to be recognized as the only indisputable truth but is extremely practical and vivid. The logic of myth is therefore straightforward and easily understood. A myth is not scientific and does not require special skills for understanding; it provides universal answers without any need for evidence, conclusions, or analysis. This is why it is intuitively understandable and finds a positive response in the public consciousness.\(^7\)

Due to the previously mentioned characteristics, myth has served as a basis for the construction of political ideology since antiquity until the present day. Moreover, the archetypes of the classical myths are still widely adopted in modern ideological schemes. From the seemingly localized myths of Atlantis and El Dorado to the universal mythologemes of the Golden Age, a Promised Land and the lost lands, and from ancient Greek and Chinese mythology to the modern myths of a post-Cold War era, the archetypal matrix of myths has stayed the same, changing only its appearance and exterior shape to match different times and places. However, the inside core of the key myths stayed similar through various countries and different ages. The ar-

\(^3\) Levon Akopian, Foreword to Karl Gustav Jung o sovremennykh mifakh [Carl Gustav Jung on modern myths] (Moskva: Praktika, 1994), 12.
\(^7\) Aleksei Losev, Dialektika mifa [The dialectics of myth] (Moskva: Pravda, 1990), 2-125.
chetypes of the fundamental myths of Europe and East Asia are surprisingly similar.\(^8\)

It should also be stated that although mythology is constantly used in different political situations, it becomes especially important in cases when factual events are vague or hard to understand by the general public and when there are opposite points of view on the same event by different actors. National security, territorial, and border issues are ones where mythology is often utilized to explain the essence of the territorial conflict, or to prove the righteousness of certain actions. Territorial and border issues in East Asia are not an exception: all major territorial disputes in the region are thoroughly mythologized in the public consciousness and in the political ideologies of the concerned parties as well.

In terms of mythology used to explain the essence of territorial issues, three disputes stand out among all territorial and border issues in East Asia. They are the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute between Japan and People’s Republic of China; the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute between Republic of Korea and Japan; and the Southern Kuril islands/Northern territories dispute between Russia and Japan. In this chapter these territorial issues will be viewed from the standpoint of a mythological narrative established in the public consciousness and used in the official policies of the concerned countries rather than from the standpoint of international law. To differentiate government policies from the attitudes of the general public, in this chapter, official statements by the countries’ leaders and the position of the ministries of foreign affairs will be regarded as government policies over territorial issues. Mass-media coverage and the remarks of other political figures will be viewed as displays of public consciousness. The objective of the chapter is not to prove the correctness or incorrectness of the territorial claims of one country or another but to spotlight archetypes and mythologemes in approaches to East Asia’s border issues.

For the purpose of convenience, in this chapter the archetypes used by the concerned parties in East Asia are called mostly by the names of European myths where these archetypes can also be found. It does not necessarily mean that political

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ideologies of modern Japan or China directly use Greek and Roman mythology. It is the archetypes that are used, and these archetypes are same or very similar in local myths of East Asian countries and in the globalized European mythology.

The archetypical pattern of border issues can be traced back to the myth of the Golden Apple of Discord given to three Greek goddesses by Eris, goddess of strife, and their dispute over its possession. This archetype corresponds with the actions of the countries contesting certain territories; i.e. that the main argument in policies regarding border issues is that a certain country “deserves” to have this territorial equivalent of the Golden Apple more than others. It also should be noted that, in a global context, many of the modern territorial disagreements were generated with the contribution of a third party. For example, border issues regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands; Dokdo/Takeshima; and the Southern Kuril islands/Northern Territories are all related to the post-Second World War delimitation by Allied powers.9

Some governments’ reluctance to appeal to international organizations – such as the International Court of Justice – also corresponds with the archetype of the Judgment of Paris, where Paris, the king of Troy, awarded the Golden Apple to one of the goddesses after receiving a bribe. The refusal of the Republic of Korea’s government to take the islands dispute with Japan to the International Court of Justice is a notable example of this kind of archetypical thinking turned into policy. Rather than to take chances with the decision of international judicial organisations, and face the possibility of defeat, the government of the Republic of Korea has chosen to continue de-facto control of the territory.10

The myth of El Dorado contains another powerful archetype of a magical country of innumerable treasures. Interestingly, this archetype can be applied to the country seeking mythological supporting points for gaining the territory as well as the

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country which *de-facto* administers this territory. In the latter case the El Dorado archetype can be used both for emphasizing the necessity to hold onto the territory, and to provide counter-points against the challenging country as it displays the challenger as wanting to get the disputed “El Dorado” for oil, natural gas or marine resources, etc. This last interpretation of an archetype is applicable to both the Southern Kuril islands/Northern Territories and Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and can be successfully used by governments to influence internal public opinion about the nature of the dispute.¹¹

Another instrument in creating an effective policy regarding disputed territories is a mythologem of lost lands. This mythologem contains an archetype of longing for the territory that was once part of a homeland for time immemorial but recently unjustly separated by an opponent. This mythological perception of a “lost” territory can prevail in both the public consciousness of the concerned countries and in government policies regarding the disputed territories. One notable example involves the Southern Kuril islands/Northern Territories dispute, where the Japanese public consciousness and government policy coincide with each other, interpreting the Northern Territories as Japanese land unjustly lost after Second World War.¹² Whereas Russian government policy and the public consciousness regard the Southern Kuril islands as a lost land separated after the Treaty of Shimoda.¹³

It is necessary to emphasize that for the successful implementation of policies based on the above mentioned archetypes, actual correspondence with the norms of international law, historical records, or real control of a disputed area makes little difference as mythology doesn’t necessarily reflect reality in

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a strict sense. In other words, myths are answering the question “Why” instead of just showing “What”. This characteristic makes myth (on the condition of its successful inception into the public consciousness) a good basis for a government policy regarding territorial and border issues, especially when dealing with various claims and counter-claims. The difference between myth and reality, when it occurs, does not mean that the myth is not true. On the contrary, mythological archetypes in the public consciousness are able to directly and indirectly affect reality, namely the real control of disputed lands and the laws of the countries concerned. However, for the greater success of the policies, it is preferable for the concerned party to incept the suitable archetypes, models for behavior, and thinking not only into the public consciousness of its own country but also into public consciousness of the opponent. It means that it is crucial to use a common medium that the two countries and their peoples share. In the case of East Asia, history has become this medium.

Compared to those of Japan and Russia, Chinese and Korean political ideologies display a more noticeable trend of turning territorial issues into historical issues. This does not mean to suggest that Japanese and Russian official histories are not mythologized, but when dealing with territorial and border issues between each other the governments of these two countries recur to particular mythological archetypes (the Golden Apple of Discord, El Dorado, lost lands), while the governments of the Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China turn to history, that they see as a chain of events containing mythological archetypes of behavior. Effectively, it draws a conception of history closer to that of a myth in its above mentioned meaning, as myth also doesn’t contain the exact depiction of events but rather the interpretation and the explanation of events through the personal perception. It should be noted that, in their policies concerning border issues with Japan, the governments of China and Korea use the whole concept of history not so much as a source of exact information about the circumstances of the dispute’s origins as they use history to interpret this information. In other words, they use not history based on facts, but the history based on the interpretation of facts.

To a certain degree, mythologisation of history is not uncommon among all the countries, but the approaches to the in-
terpretation of history established in China and Korea remain remarkable examples of viewing the whole national history as a myth. Owing to the fact that the histories and myths of Japan, China and Korea are interrelated, by turning a border issue into an issue of history, the logic of the present day issue starts to correspond with certain rules and models of behavior found in common mythologised history. For example, by urging the Japanese government to show the “correct understanding” of history regarding past events or present territorial issue with the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese government revives the sinocentric point of view according to which Japan was one of the barbarian countries, and the only “correct” version of history could be a Chinese one. Such special attention to the interpretation of mutual history formed a basis for the Textbook Issue between the People’s Republic of China and Japan with much of the emphasis put on terminology, as well as the names of historical events and disputed territories.14

Another example of the strategy of turning territorial issues into issues of history and the importance of a naming is the campaign to rename the Sea of Japan promoted by the Korean government.15 In the public consciousness of the Korean people, the territorial dispute became inseparably associated with the history of the colonization of Korea by the Empire of Japan. When laying counter-claims about the name of the Sea of Japan, or stating its position regarding the sovereignty over Dokdo/Takeshima, in the public consciousness of Koreans, Japan is represented as an invader with groundless claims. In the light of this successful inception, it appears only natural for the Korean government to further promote internationally its policies regarding the territorial issue with Japan, using the same narrative of history as a base.16

Another relevant example is Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute between Japan and the People’s Republic of China, in which the

governments of the two countries have completely different interpretations of the same historical events, regardless of international treaties and actual control of the territory. Representing the issue through the narrative of history being interpreted as a myth led to conflicting claims by both governments, arguing that they, and not their opponent, have entire control over the islands at the present moment. However, despite having opposite points of view on the sovereignty over Senkaku/Diaoyu, Japan and China share a similar mythological outlook on themselves in the global international context. In the public consciousness of both countries’ citizens, their country appears vulnerable and desolate, stripped of its righteous possessions and suffering from past humiliations.

The narrative of national humiliation is especially pronounced in the People’s Republic of China where in the public consciousness of the Chinese people, humiliation by European countries and Japan continues to be an unresolved trauma. This tendency of keeping memories of past humiliations alive can be traced back to the legendary story of King Goujian who waited for many years until he had a chance to get revenge on King Fuchai of the neighboring country. To always remember the time Goujian was imprisoned by his enemy, he slept on brushwood and tasted gall every day. At the same time as showing his obedience to Fuchai, he conducted economic and military reforms necessary for eventually defeating his former captor. The archetype of the story of King Goujian has been used as a basis for a policy towards territorial and historical issues with Japan with an emphasis on the need of avenging the humiliations of the past.

20 Ibid, 76-86
The interpretation and explanation of facts and historical events that mythology offers, and the models of behavior that mythological archetypes propose, stand outside the black-and-white dualism between true and false. This is especially true when it comes to their application in politics in general, and in government policies concerning territorial and border issues in particular. As all major territorial disputes in East Asia are thoroughly mythologized in the public consciousness and in political ideologies of the concerned parties, they are directly and indirectly affecting reality. Owing to the fact that myth is intuitively understandable and the inner logic of the myth is subconsciously perceived as true or correct, political ideologies and governmental policies towards border issues use mythological archetypes in order to influence public opinion. Therefore, understanding mythological archetypes, and their use in political ideologies, can help forecast trends in relations between countries, including those connected with issues of national security, territory, and borders.
THE RISE OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN EAST ASIA:
THE CASE OF THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS

Sergei Iu. Vradii

Although it is rare that border and territorial disputes in East and South-East Asia turn into open conflicts, it is impossible to underestimate their potential to damage inter-state relations. The Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, Diaoyu (Senkaku), Dokdo (Takeshima), and finally the Southern Kurils are all subject to disputes, involving nearly half of the countries of the region, including Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam.

This particular paper attempts to briefly analyze the origins and development of the conflict over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The Diaoyu archipelago (the Japanese name is Senkaku, and in English it is sometimes rendered Diaoyutai, or the Pinnacle Islands) is a group of small volcanic and virtually uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, a distance of 120 nautical miles from the northeastern tip of Taiwan, 200 miles off the Japanese island of Okinawa and about the same distance from mainland China. They have a total land area of some 7 sq. km.

Both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) have claimed that the Chinese discovered these islands and subsequently used them as navigational aids. Sailors of the Liuqu Kingdom (today’s Okinawa islands) used them in the 6th century to navigate the seas. 14th century references to trade routes mention the Diaoyu to guide merchants, and the mid-Ming dynasty (1368 – 1644) tributary records describe the islands extensively. Most of China’s historical claims over Diaoyu come from these tributary records.

China contends that the islets were transferred with Taiwan to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the 1894 – 1895 Sino-Japanese War, and should have been returned after the Second World War, under provisions of the 1943 Cairo Declaration, 1945 Potsdam Proclamation, and Article 2 of the San Francisco Treaty.

In the 1951 San Francisco Treaty, Chapter 2, Article 2 states that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formo-
sa and the Pescadores.”1 In fact, the United States made a point of including the Diaoyu islands in the Okinawan chain in order to maintain strong naval protection during its occupation of Japan.

Japan claims that it discovered the Senkaku Islands and incorporated them in 1895, when they were still unclaimed. It maintains that the incorporation met with no Chinese protest and that the islets were always treated as part of Okinawa. Japan views the 1971 Ryukyu (Okinawa) reversion agreement with the United States as validating its sovereignty.

No one really cared about the issue until a UN Commission announced in 1969 the possibility of oil near the Diaoyu Islands and the US, in 1972, returned political administration of Okinawa to Japan. The then Japanese occupied the islands, thereby inciting protests from overseas Chinese students who regarded the Diaoyu Islands as belonging to China. Since then, the Japanese navy has been occasionally dispatched to drive away Chinese fishing around these islands.

Human history is full of wars, the purpose of which has been to capture new territory, or to regain former possessions. The second half of the last century saw many territorial conflicts in Africa and Latin America (a legacy of colonial regimes), while its end drew attention to Asia and the former Soviet Union.

Today, Asia is a region with many territorial disputes, and there is a serious risk of new conflicts. People have greater social expectations, and desire economic prosperity, even as social inequality increases. Asia is also highly susceptible to political challenges due to high rates of population growth and urbanization. At the same time there has been rapid military build-up and signs of growing nationalism across the region.

Asia as a whole, and especially East Asia, has recently been peaceful due to rapid economic development. However, this equilibrium is very fragile and could be destroyed by any disagreement. The possibility for this could lie in a large number of contentious issues. Among them are:

- PRC dissatisfaction with the independent status of Taiwan;
- The unresolved question of the Southern Kuril Islands;

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• The Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea create the risk of collision between China and a number of South-East Asia countries;
• The territorial dispute between Korea and Japan over Dokdo, a small rocky island (Takesima in Japanese) located 90 km to the east of the Korean Ulleungdo Island and 157 km north to Japan;
• The dispute over the Diayou / Senkaku Islands between Japan and China.

Often the islands of contention become an excuse for political and diplomatic battles and sometimes lead to bloody armed conflict. The reasons for the battles are usually not the islands themselves, but what’s around them – oil fields, commercial fishing areas, and so on. Possession of one or another island gives its government the right of economic control over vast surrounding ocean areas.

Since major differences in the Asia Pacific are associated with maritime waters, the desire of the countries in the region (especially those with a long coastline) to strengthen the naval component of their armed forces is understandable. The countries of potential conflict are: PRC (14500 km of coastline), Vietnam (3260 km); India (7516 km), South Korea (2413 km, along with North Korea – 4908 km); Indonesia (54,716 km), Malaysia (4676 km), the Philippines (36,289 km).²

In January 2003, the Japanese daily newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun* published a report that the government had paid 183,000 U.S. dollars to an individual as the previous year’s rent of the Senkaku islands. That statement, according to Japan’s largest newspaper, was intended to consolidate the management and stabilize territorial control of the islands.³ Tokyo also intended to ban visits by foreign vessels from the territorial waters of the islands.

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³ In September 2012, the Japanese government decided to terminate the lease agreement that had been in effect since 2002 for the islands, purchasing three of the main ones from their Japanese owner. After that, relations between the two countries worsened, and Chinese patrol boats began to appear near the islands.
Immediately after the publication of the Yomiuri Shim-bun article, the Foreign Ministry of Taiwan made a declaration that the Senkaku Islands, known under their Chinese name, Di-aoyu, historically belong to Taiwan. The PRC’s Foreign Ministry Asian Affairs Department sent to the Embassy of Japan in China a protest note and demanded an explanation from the Japanese side.

As usual, the roots of today’s problems are deep in history, in issues that were not resolved in the past. In 1895, after defeat in the war with Japan, China was forced to sign the Shimonoseki agreement and Taiwan, the Penghu archipelago and the Diaoyu Islands were transferred to Japan. Although Japan gained possession of the Senkaku Islands with the signing of the Shimonoseki agreement, the rights to fish in the territorial waters of the islands were assigned to Taihoku Prefecture, which Taipei City, Keelung City and Yilan County were called in the years of Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan.

According to Article 2 of the 1951 San Francisco American-Japanese Peace Treaty, Japan renounced all its rights to Taiwan, and the Penghu archipelago. However, Article 3 of the same treaty referred to the Diaoyu Islands as being under the guardianship of the Americans in Okinawa.4

On April 9, 1971 the U.S. State Department published a report that President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato had reached an agreement under which the United States promised to return in 1972 the Senkaku Islands to Japan. This statement provoked sharp protests from Taiwan and Hong Kong, as well as demonstrations from Chinese abroad, which resulted in the beginning of the so called Diaoyu movement in China and abroad.

In general, the study of boundary and territorial disputes enable us to make an interesting observation. Despite all the differences between the parties regarding the history, intensity, and validity of positions, all of the arguments have a common feature: the initiative in the process belongs to the claimant on the territory, while the national authority actually administering the area can only hope to preserve the status quo. At the same time, the state that claims the territory can regulate the

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temperature of the political conflict at its discretion. It may, for example, silently observe the status quo, or organize aggressive demonstrations of its claims, and even stage a military provocation.

A propos, border or territorial claims are primarily an instrument of policy, which allow a claimant to set and achieve goals not necessarily related to these rights over territory. In the case of the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, control over the islands, as is well known, is in the hands of Japan, while China is a claimant. In the spring of 1978 the two countries were preparing to begin negotiations for the Treaty of Peace and Friendship on the initiative of China. However, the Japanese side began to believe that the treaty was a unilateral concession to China and was starting to experience doubts regarding the wisdom of such a move. Then, just a couple of days before the date negotiations were to start, and for the first time in the ten years of the territorial dispute, China decided on a spectacular demonstration of its claims. A large fleet of Chinese trawlers invaded the waters off the islands. Posters were hung on the vessels, affirming the rights of China to the Senkaku Islands. After staying in the waters of the islands long enough for the Japanese government to protest – and for the Chinese to reject the protest – the boats left. Later, the Japanese government signed the treaty.

Another feature of many border or territorial disputes is that they allow any politician in any country to exploit the nationalist sympathies of the voters. Slogans such as “I will defend our land” or “return our land” are designed to create a mobilizing effect. Many politicians are more than happy to aggravate the situation, since the greater the intensity of emotions in a society is, the richer the political dividends may be. Under such circumstances, attempts to resolve border and territorial disputes seem doomed to failure.

Therefore, is it even possible to settle such border and territorial disputes? The question is not academic; it is also not purely a legal matter. International law contains sufficient criteria for determining sovereignty over territory but it frequently remains unapplied. The questions are often practical ones. Is it possible to leave border and territorial disputes unsettled? And is it possible to determine some general principles, the imple-
mentation of which would facilitate the use of the legal criteria for resolution?

Control over the border and territorial disputes, and any other conflicts, requires the establishment of, first, some of the rules, which you do not want violated by anyone, and secondly, an execution procedure.

With all the respect to the countries claiming territorial redistribution, the required rules will have to limit their ability to escalate the dispute with an opponent to unacceptable levels. Initiative, as we know, belongs to the challengers. There could be two such rules.

The first one is contained in the ever-memorable Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the 1975 Helsinki Declaration). It postulates the inviolability of frontiers, while recognizing that they “can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.”5 Why should we not try to extend this rule to the entire world, proclaiming all the existing boundaries in their current form inviolable, but not unchangeable, and determining the penalties to offenders?

The second rule follows from the first. As soon as the existing borders are recognized as inviolable, all members of the international community should strictly follow the status quo, that does not mean refusal of their legal position be critical for the relevant situation.

There is nothing particularly difficult or impossible in the proposed rules. What is important is that they have to be applied without exception, discounts on special circumstances, on an impeccable reputation of the offender, i.e. absolutely impartial.

The issue regarding the definition of the general principles of settlement of boundary and territorial disputes is more complex. There are some possible options.

One such principle, and possible the crucial one, could be found in the writings of Vladimir Ul’ianov (Lenin). In 1920, discussing the boundary settlement between Soviet Russia and Estonia, he expressed the view that the Soviet side had made

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territorial concessions because they believed that the establishment of good relations with Estonia, in order to win the trust of the Estonian people, was a much more important goal than the preservation of territory.⁶

Indeed, if both sides of a border or territorial dispute truly prefer good relations and mutual trust over territory, then great opportunities for agreement will open up. With new terms and conditions the contenders will be able to apply, honestly and impartially, criteria for determining sovereignty over territory. An atmosphere of mutual trust will not exclude the emergence of presently unimaginable, new and creative options, such as a shift in the disputed zone from the concept of “border-line” to the very old concept of “border-zone”, which could open the possibility for the joint management of the territory.

In addition to the general risks present in the Asia-Pacific region, such as terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, there is the serious threat of conflict over territorial claims. Diaoyu’s past will remain a hot topic between Japan, the PRC and Taiwan for the foreseeable future. However, the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands will be finally resolved only through negotiations, and non-violence.

International Borders and International Relations Theory: In Search of Optimal Balances between Security and Economic Interests

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Most contributions in border studies have been oriented toward descriptive (interpretative) inference and few have taken on the task of contributing to International Relations (IR) theory systematically. This study offers a path towards integrating IR theory and border studies by asking how states balance between their security and economic interests when they design border policy. The analysis shows that variation in these balances confounds mainstream IR theories – political realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism. To address these puzzles systematically, the study explores the insights from evolutionary game theory – particularly on strategy, equilibrium, reciprocity, and the signaling of commitments. Three key recommendations for maximizing security and economic tradeoffs in border policy emerge: (1) differentiate border policies within the state and with other states; (2) reciprocate early, fast, and decisively – especially by returning to cooperation after other actors cease their free-riding activities; and (3) maximize engagement with multiple free-trading and other transborder blocs or groups of states.

Key words: border studies, international relations, realism, neoliberalism, constructivism, game theory, signaling, reciprocity, credible commitment, security, economic interest, border policy, Europe, Asia, United States
Understanding Borders: 
Potentials and Challenges of Evolving Border Concepts

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Against the background of optimistic scenarios of globalization and increased levels of international cooperation, the significance of borders has been in flux. At the same time, however, political borders have proven their endurance; we continue to live in a world of lines and compartments. Instead of disappearing, borders seem to be merely changing their institutional form. The way borders are viewed and interpreted has also evolved – much in line with broader discursive shifts in the social sciences. The traditional definitions and understandings of borders have been challenged, primarily because the context in which they were created and existed has also altered. This chapter traces the development of the border as a concept from the late 19th century until today. It suggests that in order to interpret the broad socio-political transformations that manifest themselves at borders, a multifaceted understanding of borders is needed. In order to achieve that, it is first necessary to acknowledge how the border concept has developed historically.

Key words: border studies, border concepts, historical development, socio-political transformations, social sciences, discursive shifts
The Historical Typology of Boundaries and Some Peculiarities of Russian Limogenesis

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This article builds a theoretical typology of social boundaries in their historical development. The successive genesis of the six types of boundaries – intermittent, frontier, forepost, limes, linear and transnational – is associated with the changing of the stages of socio-economic and political development of society and corresponding shifts in its territorial structure. On the basis of the proposed typology, the features of the historical evolution of the boundaries of Russia are revealed and the comparative chronology of Russian limogenesis in three macro-regions of the country described.

Key words: comparative border studies, typology, historical development, types of boundary, types of society, territorial structure, Russian limogenesis.
Theoretical Aspects of Transborder Territory Formation

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This article examines the theoretical basis for the studies of transborder regions, gives a definition of the term “transborder territory”, determines the functional levels of interaction within transborder systems, and outlines the territorial structure of the transborder region and its functional elements.

Key words: Russian geographic science, transborder regions, transboundary territory, territorial structure, functions, region-forming factors
Novoileksk Line as the Boundary Between Asia and Europe in a Historical Context

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The Novoileksk frontier line was created in the first quarter of the 19th century. It pushed against the boundaries of the Bashkir and Kazakh populations and altered traditional nomadic migration routes. In particular, the Kazakh Tabyn and Tama tribes (from the Little Horde / Kishi Juz) lost approximately 600,000 dessiatines of pasture. Two centuries later, it is the former “Novoileksk frontier line” that serves as the border between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan and divides two parts of the world – with the left bank of the Ural River situated in Asia, and the right bank situated in Europe. The Novoileksk line can be considered a “transboundary” region since it is located at the intersection of these different cultural worlds. This investigation into the features of this trans-border region, the history of its ethnic relations, and the variegated forms of its administration, will be of particular interest to scholars of frontiers and borderlands.

Key words: history of boundaries, frontier line, “transboundary” region, border policy, Novoileksk line, Kazakhstan, Russia, Asia, Europe
Northeastern Frontiers of Late Imperial China: Organization and Ideas

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The Amur basin was politically divided between Russian and China through a series of treaties in the middle of the 19th century. It is often viewed as a unilateral process resulting from a Russian imperial policy of acquiring access to the Pacific coast. The Chinese (or more correctly Sino-Manchu) side is usually portrayed as passive and lacking a clear understanding of the importance of peopling and administering the region (for various reasons). In contrast, this article presents an alternative picture of Qing China’s political practices and concepts. These differed significantly from patterns of European colonial expansion in various aspects, such as the Qing’s approach to ethnic and cultural diversity, structural organization, and concepts of territory and economy.

Key words: frontiers, imperial policy, political practices and concepts, Late Imperial China, the Amur basin, Russia
Formation of the Russian-Chinese Border in the Context of the Evolution of Foreign Affairs

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In this article an attempt is made to examine the history of the border settlement between Russia and China through the prism of the evolution of foreign affairs and bilateral Russian-Chinese relations. The author comes to the conclusion that a swift shift in the balance of power in favor of China has forced Russia to make a decision that is not quite beneficial for her but favors the further development of cooperation between the two countries.

**Key words:** Russian-Chinese border, history of border settlement, foreign affairs, Russia, China
Sakhalin / Karafuto: the Colony between Empires

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Sakhalin was a settlement colony in the Russian Empire, just as Karafuto was a settlement colony of the Empire of Japan. The Southern part of the Russian settlement colony became a Japanese settlement colony after the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. The Japanese occupying forces rapidly forced the depopulation of Karafuto through the slaughter and enforced repatriation of the Russian inhabitants. The fact that the Russian authorities had abandoned the land and population enabled the occupying army to carry out such operations. As a result, on the Russo-Japanese border emerged a Japanese settlement colony in which it was hard to see the border between mother country and colony.

Key words: Russian Empire, Japanese Empire, Russo-Japanese war, settlement colony, enforced repatriation, Sakhalin, Karafuto
Ohashi Kazuyoshi and the Transition of Karafuto into Sakhalin

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After the collapse of the Japanese empire, returnees from the colonies – repatriates (hikiagesha) – were an important phenomenon. Repatriates’ remembering of empire is often said to be based primarily on “colonial nostalgia”. By analysing a journalist’s recollections of repatriation from Karafuto (the southern half of present-day Sakhalin), this paper argues that during the 1950s repatriates’ thoughts and feelings towards their recent past were more complicated than existing research suggests. In the case of Karafuto, a deep tension existed among many repatriates torn between blaming the Soviet military, which had overrun Karafuto in August 1945, and the Japanese wartime colonial elites. Former members of those elites later encouraged the dissipation of this tension by producing an “official history”, and this was vital to how memories of empire were reformulated in post-war society.

Key words: Japanese empire, Karafuto, Sakhalin, repatriates, hikiagesha, remembering, nostalgia
Vladivostok 2012: Borders, Borderlands, and Dual-dependency in the Russian Far East

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The transformation of Vladivostok for the 2012 APEC summit demonstrated the Russian leadership’s commitment to and enthusiasm for a strategic, economic, and ideational re-orientation towards Asia; an associated desire to dematerialise the border between Russia and the dynamic economies of the Asia-Pacific region; and a domestic political imperative of developing Russia’s Far Eastern territories. This article examines the discourses surrounding Russia’s turn towards Asia and how they are played out and contested in Russia’s Far Eastern borderlands. It discusses the special dynamics of this region, and how state-led visions of national identity and national development are refracted and inflected by the realities, challenges, and alternatives presented by life on Russia’s Far Eastern periphery. The chapter seeks to elucidate how the opening of borders and domestic political imperatives of developing and ordering national-space can be interpreted and realised at the local-level in unpredictable and often unintended ways.

Key words: borders, APEC, Russian Far East, centre-periphery, Vladivostok
Vladivostok’s Perceived Role and Perspective as a “Global” City and Russian “Gateway” to Northeast Asia

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This article describes the role of sub-regional actors, especially megalopolises (“key” cities), in transcending the barrier function of borders in Northeast Asia (NEA). The main research subject is the city of Vladivostok, which in a very short period has transformed its role from a “bastion of military power” to “Russian window to the Asia-Pacific”. This paper describes recent positive changes in Vladivostok’s transportation and other infrastructure, while emphasizing its growing soft power, primarily represented by the newly formed Far Eastern Federal University. These state-led efforts should help Vladivostok to bridge the border between Russia and the countries of North East Asia by attracting more business, scholars, students, and tourists, and will allow it to become one of the important international cooperation centers in the Asia-Pacific.

Key words: international cooperation, subregional actors, megalopolises, APEC Summit 2012, Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok, Northeast Asia
Russia’s Integration into the Asia Pacific: A New Window of Opportunity for China

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Despite the long history of economic and trade co-operation with the Northeast Asian nations, Russia is still far from integrated into the regional economy. The reasons for this are multifold, including the lack of financial and demographic resources, an overdependence on energy and raw material exports, and a deficit of competitive and innovative technologies. Although regional economic growth is visible, institutional obstacles remain. Recently the Russian government announced the Eastern Development Strategy and outlined a series of policies, which aim at granting the region a pivotal role in the future of the Asia Pacific. This latter development opens a window of opportunity for both China’s Northeast and Russia’s Far East, especially in such fields of co-operation as energy and resource extraction, transportation infrastructure, and the development of special economic zones, land and human resources.

Key words: Russian Far East, Asia Pacific economy, integration, China, window of opportunity
Economic and Symbolic Capital at the Border of Globalizing China: the Case of Heilongjiang Province

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The paper explores the motivations of the Heilongjiang authorities in promoting cross-border cooperation with Russia since the second half of the 1980s. The author develops an idea that local bureaucracy are not powerless reproducers of central government discourse, but are creators and active exploiters of the symbolic meanings of boundaries within the state. In the local authorities’ discourse, the border fulfills a function of distinction which helps bureaucracy distinguish itself in economic, political and bureaucratic fields of state.

**Key words:** economic and symbolic capital, cross-border cooperation, local bureaucracy, central government, China, Heilongjiang Province, Russia
North Korea’s Special Economic Zones and East Asia  
(Focusing on SEZ Strategy and Location)

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This paper discusses the political and economic significance of North Korea’s Special Economic Zones. A Special Economic Zone might be defined as a specially designated area where special economic policies are to be executed, in order to boost the whole economy of the country. To establish SEZs in a socialist country means a transition from an orthodox socialist economy to a reformative one, at least in a limited region. North Korea has been very passive in introducing reform over its internal economic structure through reviving private economic activity, but has established SEZs. However, North Korea’s SEZs have not been successful, and have failed to improve relations with foreign countries, especially with South Korea, Japan and the United States. The outside world needs to suggest a new compromise with North Korea, probably something that resembles the 1994 Geneva Agreement, in order to stabilize East Asia by lowering tensions between North Korea and the outside world.

**Key words:** special economic zones, economic policy, North Korea, East Asia
The Mythology of Northeast Asia’s Border Issues

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Recently East Asia has seen an escalation of some high-profile territorial conflicts, mainly along the borders of Japan, the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea. In this article the ideological approaches to territorial disputes of the above-mentioned East Asian countries and their interpretations of history are compared and analyzed. Also analyzed are the mythological archetypes used by the concerned parties in order to explain the essence of the territorial disputes in the region, and the use of history as a sacred narrative.

Key words: mythology, border issues, territorial disputes, interpretations of history, archetypes, sacred narrative, Northeast Asia
The Rise of Territorial Disputes in East Asia: the Case of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

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Despite the fact that border and territorial disputes in East and South-East Asia relatively rarely turn into open conflicts, it is impossible to underestimate their negative potential for inter-state relations. The Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, Diaoyu (Senkaku), Dokdo (Takeshima), and finally the South Kurils are such disputes, involving the countries of nearly half of the region, including Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam.

Key words: border and territorial disputes, conflict potential, East Asia, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
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