Introduction

to Border Studies

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Введение в исследования границ / под ред. С.В. Севастьянова,

Учебник, подготовленный международным коллективом авторов, представляет
собой первую попытку систематического освещения в учебных целях обширного
предмета такой области современного научного знания, как исследования границ.
Главы книги рассказывают об истории развития исследований границ и их
методологии, сущности и многообразии типов социальных границ, трансграничных
отношениях и связанных с ними региональных процессах, специфике пограничной
и трансграничной политики. Один из разделов учебника дает обзор состояния и
функционирования государственных границ во всех основных регионах мира.

Издание предназначено для студентов, изучающих проблемы социальных границ,
а также для исследователей и практиков, всех тех, чьи интересы связаны с данной
научной областью.

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Introduction to Border Studies / edited by Sergei V. Sevastianov, Jussi

Textbook, prepared by an international team of authors, represents the first system-
atic attempt to cover in training purposes such a vast subject area of modern scientific
knowledge as border studies. Chapters of the book tell the history of the development
of border studies and their methodologies, the essence and variety of types of social
boundaries, transborder relations and related regional processes, specificity of border
and transborder policies. One section of the textbook provides an overview of the condi-
tion and functioning of state borders in all major regions of the world.

The publication is intended for students studying problems of social boundaries, as well
as for researchers and practitioners, all those whose interests are related to this sci-
entific field.

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The emergence of a new textbook is generally quite ordinary and even a routine event. In many disciplines new textbooks are published almost every year, and the number of textbooks that are used concurrently in a particular country may reach several dozen. There are, however, also numerous rapidly evolving branches of scientific knowledge, for which textbooks of their own have yet to be written. This may be because of different reasons, but often indicate that the particular branch of science has not yet matured enough to produce a comprehensive book for teaching purposes. However, as a field of study evolves, it, sooner or later, reaches an essential milestone by having its principal provisions, peculiarities, problematics, and methods systematically explained in form of a textbook.

Despite the rather young age of border studies as a field of study, and the impact of various confrontational factors that will be discussed later, it has made significant progress and proved its academic merits. In our opinion, there is quite a wide range of external (social) and internal (scientific) circumstances, which indicate that border studies are ready to create its own textbook and really need it.

Border studies do not of course exist in a vacuum, but its evolvement and turning into a full-fledged scientific field has been largely dependent on external conditions relating to various social systems and their boundaries. During the last decades, social systems and their boundaries have gone
through revolutionary changes in terms of speed, scope and depth. It can be argued that the previous time a social transformation of such an importance was in the sixteenth – seventeenth centuries, when Europe, and behind it the rest of the world, entered the era of nation-states.

The main symptoms of the changes occurring before our eyes are well known. Since the mid-twentieth century the number of states in the world increased by about three-fold, which has brought the national, political-geographic structure of the world into a new level of complexity. At the same time, a host of non-governmental (including exterritorial) actors (ranging from small cross-border business to larger transnational corporations, and from informal local movements to international non-governmental organizations) appeared on the international stage, some of which are now fully proportional in terms of their resources and influence to those of states.

All this was accompanied by a remarkable increase in the volume and intensity of international interaction, including interstate, transnational and cross-border. The strengthening of mutual cohesion between various states and their regions contributed to the formation of new communities, distinct in their spatial configuration, up to the “global society”. The genesis of these social (and political) communities is reflected in the wide use of such concepts as “internationalization”, “transnationalization”, “regionalization” and “globalization”. These processes also caused a discernable surge in international (and internationalized) conflicts, the most precarious features of which are not their quantity and destructive potential, but rather their novelty, their exceptional diversity, as well as, their low predictability and manageability.

Obviously, all the occurring contradictory changes are connected with social boundaries, and particularly with state borders. It is probably not an exaggeration to argue that boundaries are in the epicenter of erosion of the modernistic world social and political order, and formation of the post-Modern order. Boundaries, on the one hand, are markers and mediators of these complex and not fully understood processes, but on the other they may serve as important instruments of their regulation. However, strategic, long-term management of boundaries, and with the help of boundaries that of states and societies, requires to high level of usable knowledge about them, their structure and functions.

While science certainly has its own internal logic of development, and the study of borders is no exception, these profound social changes have impacted its state of affairs considerably. Border studies emerged largely within political geography at the end of the nineteenth century, yet much has changed since the pioneering framework of early border
studies. The focus of border studies has developed in relation to the predominant geopolitical models and visions – from studying borders as delimiters of territorial control and ideology towards areal differentiation and later towards more dynamic role of borders as bridges rather than barriers. The emergence of globalization and the rhetoric of a “borderless world” only fuelled interest in borders. The apparent renaissance of border studies that followed acquired an increasingly interdisciplinary take.

Since then, the number of academics regarding themselves as border scholars has multiplied and geographically speaking the scope of the academic community now extends far beyond North America and Western Europe, the core areas of early border studies. What stands out even more is the increased array of scientific literature on borders and boundaries, which now consists of various types and genres of publications – from working papers and articles to major theoretical volumes and encyclopedias.

Undeniable progress has also been made in the terms of formal institutionalization of border studies as a field of study: specialized (governmental, university, and public) research units have been set up in many countries, while the number of existing professional associations, largest and most influential of which is Association for Borderland Studies (ABS), are providing communications of professionals in this field at the supranational, macro-regional and, more recently, the global level.

Border studies have not only grown as a field of its own, but also the topics under study as well as the methods used have evolved and become increasingly more diversified. The attention has shifted from the actual borderline, its geography, its delimitations and demarcations, to cover a variety of forms and types of social boundaries, both in their material and symbolic dimension. Boundaries are studied as complex, multifaceted phenomena inextricably interlinked with the states and societies they demarcate. Border studies have not only been expanded in terms of its problematics, but also into terms of its geographical reach as the field now effectively covers all the continents. It is also understood that many of the studied issues lie beyond the boundaries of a single discipline. The drive to study broad ranging and intertwined problems that encompass a complex mix of phenomena and processes, has impelled the conduct of research that necessitates inter-, if not postdisciplinary approach. Border studies today is thus an increasingly multidisciplinary and multi-paradigmatic field, where different theoretical approaches and empirical methods from different disciplines of social science and humanities are effectively combined to better understand the complex reality we live in.
The rapid evolvement of the field has, of course, not happened without any complications or contradictions. The speedy growth in very different directions has caused, among other things, blurring of the margins of research subject and overextended the border metaphor, uncertainty of its scientific status vis-à-vis more traditional disciplines, and at times, doubts about its own identity. The blurred boundaries of border studies are expressed in, and reproduced because of, the absence of well-established and coherent curricula and system of training of graduates, although there certainly are individual courses and even educational programs in many universities around the world.

Another problem of the expanding border studies is the low level of internal integration, the great diversity in terms of the subject interpretations, conceptual languages, paradigms and approaches as well as informal, but practically very important, academic traditions. This heterogeneity, both in interdisciplinary and international dimensions, often becomes an obstacle to mutual understanding between representatives of different segments and subfields of border studies, and sometimes leads to mutual ignorance of each other's works.

All borders are unique, and each of them is related in various ways to local, regional, state-bound, and supranational processes. As a result of this, however, concerns have been raised that border studies have been overly focused on descriptive case study material, which has been thought to overshadow attempts to develop the discussion of concepts, theories, and common ideas. There is little abstract theorizing in border studies, and those who have attempted to theorize on borders have run into unique circumstances that make it difficult to conceptualize broad scale generalizations. In order to theorize on borders, scholars need to engage in a dialogue on the methodological strategies as well as the tools used and pick those that can enhance our explanatory power. We need not restrict ourselves to mere case studies, but go one step further to establish broader conceptualizations, trajectories, and even a common glossary. While all borders are unique, they are still affected by the same global phenomena; it is their regional implications that differ.

These briefly described social and scientific conditions for the appearance of this textbook determined the duality of its aims. Firstly, the present book aims to draw specific interim results of previous development of border studies worldwide and to provide a systematic coverage of what has already been studied and recognized in the field of knowledge. Secondly, the authors of this textbook aim to contribute to the clarification of the subject specificity of border studies, the overcoming of conceptual and methodological barriers and misunderstandings between different disciplinary
and national traditions as well as provide solutions to some specific theoretical and empirical gaps in knowledge within the field.

The present book does not, of course, claim to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive review of border studies, or resolve its basic contradictions. It is rather hoped that this book will be particularly useful for undergraduate students from social sciences and humanities interested in border issues. We hope that this book will also be valuable for those who have already commenced an independent research work in this field, but would like to gain more knowledge on studied issues and used approaches. This textbook is meant as a guide that will help researchers and practitioners alike in charting their own path in the vast and unstructured body of knowledge that is available.

This book is a collective effort by authors representing several different countries, disciplines as well as different fragments of border studies, yet even collectively the book cannot grasp the richness and diversity of this scientific field. In this book, authors from dissimilar traditions join forces in an unseeing fashion, and seek to provide multiple different angles to a common research subject. While the diversity of this textbook is perhaps its greatest strength, it may also be its weakness. The numerous conceptual and methodological controversies existing within border studies remain apparent also in this Introduction and an attentive reader will notice differences in the interpretation of the same terms and approaches, in the priorities as well as styles of academic writing by the authors of the different chapters. Substantial difficulties were also caused by the parallel aims of seeking to prepare a book with both educational and research impact.

Anticipating possible critical notes, we would point to the subfields and problems of border studies that due to the objective (the state of the scientific field) or subjective (preferences and omissions of the editors and authors) causes have not received adequate coverage in this book. If one pay attention to the temporary (historical) dimension of the subject of border studies, mostly outside of the textbook remains the long era of pre-industrial, pre-modern societies, in which lie the roots of many features and challenges of current social boundaries. On the other hand, we did not have time to analyze in the textbook the significant events of recent years and even months (especially important changes in border and transborder policies of the EU), which reiterates that the logic of history (including the history of boundaries) is more complex than convenient linear progressist schemes.

Talking about the spatial aspect of the same subject, we should recognize that the authors left on the world map at least two large “white spots”: the region of North Africa and
the Middle East, the turbulent revolutionary and military processes in which impede the construction of objective and reliable scientific picture of the regional borders, transborder relations and border policies, as well as the vast spaces of the oceans, the delimitation and, accordingly, the research of which are still in their initial stage.

In terms of methodology of border studies, the most serious omission of the textbook is, in our view, the lack of a special chapter on empirical methods. Meanwhile, it should be emphasized that the scientific study of the boundaries is not reduced to speculative reflections of armchair scientists and relies today on the impressive arsenal of qualitative and quantitative methods and techniques, related in origin with a wide range of social, human, natural and exact sciences.

Finally, in this book there is no systematic review of the issues of relationship between formation, functioning and development of social boundaries and similar processes in the structures of the physical space of the Earth. These important issues lying at the junction of the fields of border studies and such sciences as social and physical geography, and ecology, no doubt will be attracting growing interest of scholars and practitioners.

The above subfields and problems of border studies deserve attention and study on a par with those of their themes that more fully reflected in the chapters of our textbook. We hope that the shortcomings of this book, no less than its probable strong points, will become a stimulus for the further scientific development of various subject segments of border studies, prompting to this, first of all, a new, younger generation of scientists. For our part, we would like to outline those directions of border studies that, in our opinion, are the key, crucial for their future development.

The editors of this textbook agree with the researchers that connect the main perspectives of the development of our field with a comparative study of the state and other social boundaries. However, in our view, an understanding of the objectives of comparative studies of boundaries needs to be clarified. These usually include empirical comparisons of cross-local, cross-national and cross-regional types, in space and time. However, theoretical accounts that compare the already existing theoretical models of borders, transborder relations and border policies, as well as the concepts, approaches and paradigms behind these models, are as important as the empirical studies. Such targeted comparison of theories, concepts and approaches is necessary in order to ensure that their interaction will not get transformed into an eclectic assembly, but will be based on their thoughtful mutual positioning and demarcation. The simultaneous and oncoming development of theoretical and empirical comparative border studies has the potential to contribute to the
consolidation of the field, while avoiding the dangers of national and disciplinary centrism and reductionism.

Of course, the full-scale comparative studies are impossible without the implementation of large international scientific projects, regular cooperation and discussion of scientists and practitioners from different countries and regions. Since in this sphere the researchers of borders, as all citizens of modern states, are depended on the prevailing social and political situation, such international dialogue can face serious difficulties. However, this dependence and these difficulties should not be overestimated. By this book, we have attempted to testify against this premise by creating an international team of authors that extend beyond, and hopefully erode, the persisting divides between East and West as well as between traditional and more recent circles of border scholars. Whatever it will, we remain optimistic. Perhaps, because our experience in studying boundaries convinces us that even the deepest splits in the social reality cannot be eternal and insurmountable.

In conclusion, we would like to thank all the authors of this book, which took an active and diverse participation in the long process of its creation. Significant assistance in this work on a textbook was provided by the valuable and meaningful comments of our reviewers. We thank personally V.N. Karaman for his great and selfless work for the preparation of the manuscript of this book to print. On behalf of the team of authors, the editors are grateful to the Far Eastern Federal University, the support of which provided an opportunity for the publication of our textbook.

Sergei V. Sevastianov,
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SECTION 1.
BORDER STUDIES AS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FIELD OF KNOWLEDGE
Introduction

Today, borders are widely recognised as complex multileveled and -layered social phenomena related to the fundamental organisation of society as well as human psychology. This is not, however, been always the case, but the way borders have been viewed and interpreted has evolved—much in line with broader discursive shifts in social sciences as well as in relation to overlying geopolitical events. This has resulted in clear discursive shifts in understanding and framing borders. The traditional definitions and comprehension of borders have been challenged primarily because the context in which they were created and existed has also altered.

By now, border studies has evolved into an interdisciplinary field of study developed in parallel by political scientists, sociologists, ethnologists, psychologists, anthropologists, linguists, economists, physical geographers and even specialists in more technical sciences. While many border scholars today cross the borders between different academic disciplines not just in their own work but also to engage in multi- and interdisciplinarity debate and cooperation with scholars from other fields in their search of more multifacet-

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ed understanding of borders, in the past border and boundaries were largely studied from a disciplinary specific perspective and premise. Although some classical sociologists such as Georg Simmel discussed the roles of boundaries in social life,\(^2\) it was largely geographers and, to a lesser extent, historians, who played a pioneering role in early border studies. Problems of political boundaries and their delimitation were fundamental to geography, which as a discipline has thus accumulated a rich theoretical heritage in the field of border studies.\(^3\)

However, much has changed since the pioneering framework of early border studies. The focus of border studies has developed in relation to predominant geopolitical models and visions. To better understand borders and their significance today, we must first understand how they came to be historically. In this brief introductory overview, I wish to step back in time and seek to explain how borders have been conceptualized in the past and how the concept of a border has evolved. The description presented here is far from being all-inclusive, but it aims to provide a much needed reminder that both borders as well as border studies are of much older origin than what the contemporary literature commonly presumes.

As O’Dowd has aptly argued, in privileging spatial analysis – space over time, that is – much contemporary border studies lack an adequate historical analysis.\(^4\) A failure to acknowledge this historical development leads easily to a disfigured perspective on the present. Over-emphasizing the novelty of contemporary forms of globalization and border change, propped up by poorly substantiated cases from the past, fails to recognize the "past in the present," and brings with it an inability to recognize the distinctiveness of contemporary state borders and to deceptively discount the "extent to which we continue to live in a 'world of diverse states'".\(^5\)

**History of borders**

The history of borders has a lot do with rulers’ and governments’ attempts to control people’s freedom of movement. As Dowty points out the most sophisticated civilizations

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\(^3\) Kolossov, "Border Studies," 607.


\(^5\) O’Dowd, “From a ‘Borderless World’ to a ‘World of Borders,’” 1032–34.
arose where migration was heaviest and where newcomers brought in new ideas and change, adding thus also to a region’s wealth by contributing to taxes and serving in local armies. The first large scale attempts to restrict movement were put in place however already in the Roman Empire during the third and fourth centuries AD. At first, controls were lax but they became ever stricter under the Roman Emperor Constantine (AD 309–37). Boundaries organised the Roman Empire according to a hierarchy of spaces – territories of varied dimensions and functions, which included settlements, cities, provinces and regions. The outer boundaries of the Empire were seen as a border between civilization and barbarism.

By the Middle Ages, a sizeable share of Europe’s population was bound in particular place and traded like chattels. However, rather than having clear boundaries, chattels and cities of the era alike had somewhat ambiguous borderlands. What is noteworthy is that neither borders nor identities were defined in terms of allegiances to precise territories, but rather to rulers and religions: i.e. the church. However, largely thanks to geographers, evolving mapping technology allowed rulers to have an increasingly spatial view of their possessions. Consequently, what were originally fuzzier borderlands or border regions progressively became more strictly defined boundaries or frontiers. Soon, the vocabularies of space began to reflect this evolution, refining meanings so as to differentiate between boundaries, borders, borderlands and frontiers.

During the early Renaissance period serfdom began to crumple, yet the potential for freer movement was soon downplayed by the increased power by rulers and governments. People were viewed as wealth, a valuable workforce to be kept within a country’s borders. The developing ideology of nationalism proved its usefulness in uniting a vast range of cultural groups and classes on the basis of loyalty to the state, designating in so doing others as “outsiders.”

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11 Dowty, *Closed Borders*. 
Countries such as Spain and France ordered mass expulsions of ethnic or religious minorities.\textsuperscript{12}

The Peace of Westphalia can be regarded as an inauguration of the modern political order based on boundaries of sovereign, international recognized and territorially demarcated states. The Peace consisted of a series of peace treaties signed between May and October 1648 ending the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) in the Holy Roman Empire, and the Eighty Years' War (1568–1648) between Spain and the Dutch Republic and establishing boundaries for the territorial possessions of England, France, Dutch-land, the German principedoms, Muscovy, Poland, Turkey, Spain and Sweden. The treaty marked the beginning of the era of the nation-state and nationalism, and gave rise to a new type of a political ideology that dovetailed a group of individuals with a nation. These sovereign states soon became to form the basis for nation-states, which soon became the principal way to divide the Earth's surface. As self-determination and sovereignty became the leading organizing principles, ever stricter boundaries were drawn to delineate modern states.\textsuperscript{13}

The real spark for the nationalistic thought was given by the American and French Revolutions late eighteenth century. Thus, the emergence of nation-states was associated with the breakthrough of democracy and the victory of popular sovereignty, grounded in the principle that the legitimacy of the state is created and sustained by the will or consent of its people. The significance of nationalism lies in its power not to mould a territory into "national space," separated by borders from other corresponding units. The resultant bounded space became to be regarded as to enclose not just a definable population subject to a hegemonic administration, but also a particular and separate culture,\textsuperscript{14} contributing thus to the overly popular supposition that 'nation' would be equivalent to "society."\textsuperscript{15}

Nation-states appear drawn on the political map of the word in such a permanent manner that, at times, they may seem even as "natural formations,"\textsuperscript{16} as manifestations of the highest form of effective social organization within the world.

\textsuperscript{12} Dowty, Closed Borders.

\textsuperscript{13} Brunet-Jailly, "Theorizing Borders," 635.

\textsuperscript{14} Tim Edensor, National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 37.


system and a major – if not always the principal – sources of political, cultural and social identity. Accordingly, the political borders that divide them have also taken over much of the borders studies. The bias of contemporary border studies towards nation-states as a point of reference is therefore a legacy of the extraordinary impact state building and state consolidation have exercised on our understandings of history – "Western" history in particular. For better or for worse, many of the leading border scholars, such as Friedrich Ratzel, Richard Hartshorne, Ladis Kristof and Julian Minghi have all highlighted the co-evolution of borders and states – i.e. that borders only came into existence with nation-states – making in so doing the consolidation of state sovereignty to appear as an evident historical process and effectively downplaying the setting before the Westphalian revolution as a subject of study. As Kolossov et al maintain, it is however important to remember that border studies has its origins in historicist and cultural determinist traditions inspired by specific interpretations of Herder, Hegel, Darwin, Fichte and others, in which the emergence of nation states and their borders was understood as an expression of historical necessity and/or "God’s will."  

The early development of border studies

The pioneering framework for early border studies focused, either implicitly or explicitly, on questions of justifiable state borders. Much of the credit has been given to the German geographer and ethnographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), who drew from the theories of both Malthus and Darwin to create a holistic anthropo- and politico-geographical corpus that could tie both physical and human (social) elements together. In his 1897 Politische Geographie, Ratzel introduced the first systematic approach to political geography that was grounded scientifically in laws of natural selection and evolution. It put forth an exceptionalist myth about the "organic" relationships between volk (people), boden (territory), and staat (state), and introduced the notorious concept of lebensraum (living space), by which Ratzel depicted the state or an empire as a living organism with

17 Kolossov, EUBORDERSCAPES, 11.
18 Kolossov, EUBORDERSCAPES.
19 Kolossov, EUBORDERSCAPES.
internal organs, external protective boundaries, and an inherent drive towards expansion.\textsuperscript{21}

Borders become insignificant for Ratzel himself in that in his view an advancing, developing, and thus successful and dominant, state had to continuously seek to enlarge its life-space through annexation of territories controlled by adjoining, less powerful states – referring invariably to German expansionism and Prussian superiority.\textsuperscript{22} In so doing, however, Ratzel became to reject the static conception of borders and to suggest instead that state as a living organism could not be hemmed in by immovable borders but required living frontiers or borders that were dynamic and subject to change. His conception of a border was thus not a fixed rigidly defined boundary-line, but rather a zone of transition and a peripheral organ.

Frederick Jackson Turner (1861–1932) sought to take distance to the "European germs" and the "Germanic origins" and depict the frontier is the line of most rapid and effective Americanization. Turner presented his famous frontier thesis in an address in a special meeting of the American Historical Association in Chicago at the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition.\textsuperscript{23} For Turner, the frontier was the outer edge of the wave – the meeting point between savagery and civilization. Its advancement meant diminishing dependence on England and promotion of the formation of a composite nationality for the American people. Turner held that the frontier played a major role in shaping the unique national character of America and that the experience of rugged and challenging life in the frontier regions of the country as it expanded ever westward was instrumental in fostering self-reliance and sectionalism.\textsuperscript{24} He specified that the American frontier was different from European frontiers, because whereas the latter ones consisted of fortified boundary line running through dense populations, the former one lay at the hither edge of free land.

\textsuperscript{21} Friedrich Ratzel, \textit{Politische geographie: Oder die geographie der staaten, des verkehres und des krieges} (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1903).
\textsuperscript{22} Friedrich Ratzel, \textit{Erdenmacht und Voelkerschicksal} (Stuttgart: Stuttgart University Press, 1940).
Back on the European continent Ratzel acquired a number of followers, who developed the organic state theory further. Rudolf Kjellén (1869–1922) in particular was struck by Ratzel's ideas. Kjellén can be taken as a founder "geopolitics," defining it as: "the theory of the state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in space." Being a Swede, Kjellén's writing focused largely on the Swedish state, but the influence of German realpolitik and Aryan ideology was clearly visible in his geopolitical vision and commitment to the expansion of the Germanic empire. Particularly in his famous *The State as a Living Form*, Kjellén builds heavily on Ratzel in portraying the state as a living organism having a soul and a brain embodied in the government, the empire forming the body, and the people as its members. He also underlined that state as a geographical unit had to be demarcated by natural borders. Perhaps the key concept that Kjellén identified in his work was that of Reich as an amalgamation of Raum/Lebensraum and the establishment of a strategic military shape that could be defended by a strong military and overseen via a centralized governmental body.

His coeval in England was Sir Halford MacKinder (1861–1947), whose political pivot of geography made a case for the relevance of geography to statecraft. MacKinder was clearly a devotee of imperialist politics, but one who recognized that geographical boundaries were subject to change or flux and that the map of the world was continually being redrawn as a consequence of imperialism. In his well-known discussion of the Eurasian heartland, MacKinder theorized that whoever controlled the heartland controlled the world and that this heartland represented the greatest natural fortress on earth. The heartland thus becomes a key position on the battlefield of the world island and looks to be essentially an extension of military tactics to the grand strategic

level. His theory involved concepts diametrically opposed to the notion of an American naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) about the significance of sea power in world conflict. Mahan departed from Turner on the concept of the frontier and from MacKinder with respect to the possible demise of sea power and its replacement by land transportation power. He maintained that the nation-states that had achieved great power status had been able to do so because they mastered the sea.\textsuperscript{31} Mahan agreed with MacKinder however in the belief that heartlands did exist and that their borders were commonly dynamic – an idea suggested earlier by Ratzel.

The organic state theory was later adopted by Karl Haushofer (1869–1946), whose had gotten exposed to earlier geopolitical theorists such as MacKinder, Mahan, Ratzel, and particularly Kjellén. Haushofer strived to develop political geography into an applied science and focused on studying borders as delimiters of territorial control and ideology. Like his predecessors, he was captivated in geopolitical concepts such as frontiers, \textit{lebensraum}, and autarky. Haushofer believed in the existence of an organic state and underlined that the will to expand is part of a natural survival strategy of any developing state\textsuperscript{32} – an idea that influenced and largely justified the development of expansionist strategies in Nazi Germany.

Haushofer saw geopolitics as the scientific foundation of the art of political action in the struggle of state organisms for existence and for \textit{lebensraum}.\textsuperscript{33} He claimed that the world was divided into a number of \textit{panideen} or pan-regions based upon the regional dominance gained by the great world powers and acquiring control over key strategic areas of was an indispensible step forward. As Germany also held some overseas territories, it was Haushofer’s contention that it was the logical development to assume more control over these regions.\textsuperscript{34} Haushofer stood for less mutable frontiers and even though he supported Turner’s frontier thesis, he nonetheless stressed that world powers ought to seek control over their frontiers as part of a larger effort of ensuring the stability and security of its own heartland.

Ellen Semple, in turn, successfully promoted the German school of \textit{anthropogeographie} in the United States

\textsuperscript{31} Alfred T. Mahan, \textit{The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783} (1890) online edition.
\textsuperscript{32} Karl Haushofer, \textit{Zeitschrift Fur Geopolitik} (Berlin: Vowinckel, 1938).
\textsuperscript{34} Weigert, "Haushofer and the Pacific."
and introduced some of Ratzel’s ideas to the Anglophone community.\textsuperscript{35} She came to the conclusion that natural geographic frontiers, where humans cannot settle, were ideal boundaries. Lyde and Holdich in turn turned the focus on the virtues of boundaries categorising them either as good or bad depending on their intrinsic merit in cultivating or preventing tensions and conflicts between states.\textsuperscript{36} Brigham, in turn, argued that boundaries should provide economic equilibrium.\textsuperscript{37}

It was, however, Otto Maull, who actually systematized Ratzel’s principles in practice. For Maull, natural determination was the central element influencing the Society-Environment-System (\textit{Mensch-Umwelt-System}), but he also emphasized the importance of the "willful political act" in establishing states and borders. Maull specified that state was not an "organism" in a biological sense, but rather an "organization," created by human societies to ensure the survival and viability of cultural groups.\textsuperscript{38} While studying state formation in Europe, Maull focused attention on the morphological features of borders, and their relations to the political conditions of nation-states. He elucidated the distinction between "good" and "bad" borders further on the grounds of their morphological features and their relations to political conditions of nation-states. Good borders dovetailed with natural and/or socio-ethnic borders, whereas anti-structural bad borders neither corresponded to physical features of the landscape, nor followed the borders of socio-cultural areas. In addition, bad borders did not have an actual border zone, within which the actual border could function as a connecting factor or, on the other hand, as a filtering feature allowing trade and cooperation to flourish, while simultaneously protecting the state from external threats. These kind of bad borders are, according to Maull, places where conflicts between two states are most likely to happen.\textsuperscript{39}

The presented views have been taken to mark the beginning of a debate on the functions of boundaries.\textsuperscript{40} Boggs, in...
particular, underlined the specific functions of boundaries and clarified that these may vary both in space and in time.\textsuperscript{41} He adopted the division between good and bad boundaries, arguing that while the former serve the purposes for which they have been designed, with a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of friction, the latter ones – borders that did not respect organic territorial limits – tend to be the cause of interstate conflicts.

This idea led Spykman to suggest that the territory surrounding the boundary is central to understanding power relations.\textsuperscript{42} For Spykman, it was the periphery and not the core that was the key to global power.\textsuperscript{43} Spykman argued that the peripheral states of the rimland, such as Japan, were likely to develop into superpowers over time because they were in greater contact with the outside world or the countries that were not part of the heartland itself, and were thus more prone to new innovations.\textsuperscript{44} In fact, Spykman devoted much of his career in challenging MacKinder’s concepts and thinking. Spykman’s thinking, in turn, was adopted and developed for example by Peattie, who contended that boundaries should strengthen state power, and later by Jones, whose research focused on the emergence of borders based on forms of social-political organisation and processes of nation-building.\textsuperscript{45} He suggested that international organisation should alleviate boundary tensions and insisted on the uniqueness of individual borders and the difficulty of making sweeping generalisations about the nature and evolution of borders.

\textbf{From determinism to possibilism}

In contrast to the systematic approach of the German school, French geographers focused more on regional differentiation. This was manifested in particular in the works of Paul Vidal de la Blache (1845–1918), the founder of the French School of Geopolitics. While Vidal de la Blache was strongly influenced by the German thought on geopolitics,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Whittermore S. Boggs, \textit{International Boundaries: A Study of Boundary Functions and Problems} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940).
\item \textsuperscript{43} Harm J. de Blij, Peter O Muller, \textit{Concepts and Regions in Geography} (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2003).
\item \textsuperscript{44} Nicholas J. Spykman, "Geography and foreign policy," \textit{American Political Science Review} 32 (1938): 28–50.
\end{itemize}
from which he adopted the close linkage between human societies and their natural milieus, he became more known for having initiated a long tradition in geography based on a conception of the Man-to-Nature relationship and underlining the notion of "possibilism" in opposition of the more traditional environmental determinism put forth by Ratzel and his followers. Vidal de la Blache maintained that while people were not entirely free to determine their own directions, the natural environment offered possible avenues for human development and it was very much a human decision to choose which one was preferred. This, according to Vidal de la Blache, resulted in a "human world full of different genres de vie [lifestyles], distinctive to particular people living in particular places."

Vidal de la Blache's work combined the disciplines of geography and history and attracted many followers in interwar France. Among them were Lucien Febvre (1878–1956) and Marc Bloch (1886–1944), who were at the forefront of the intellectual developments of the influential and innovative Annales School. Febvre elaborated the concept of possibilism further and depicted man "as a master of the possibilities" provided by the environment and "the judge of their use." Bloch, in turn, depicted individual actors as a social force that could change events and steer human development.

Élisée Reclus (1830–1905) was the first to employ the term "social geography" (or rather géographie sociale), whereby he distanced himself from the Vidalian notion of landscape and suggested instead that space be viewed as a social product and thus as inseparable from the functioning of society. Whereas for Vidal de la Blache geography was "a science of places and not a science of men," Reclus maintained that geography was "nothing but history in space." For him, it was not "an immutable thing," but it was rather made and remade every day by men's actions.

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48 Cloke, Philo and Sadler, Approaching Human Geography, 64.
49 Febvre, La terre et l'évolution humaine, 439.
52 Reclus, L'Homme et la Terre, 335.
53 Reclus, L'Homme et la Terre, 335.
Chapter 1.1 A historical view on the study of borders

It was, however, the French Marxist sociologist Henri Lefebvre (1901–1991), who really expounded the concept of the (social) production of space. Like the Annales Schools, Lefebvre underlined that change is never restricted to economy and ideology but involves everyday life. Thus, social transformation had to be conceived in terms of possibilities rather than determinations. In his famous *La Production de L’Espace*, Lefebvre argues that space is a social product, or a complex social construction (based on values, and the social production of meanings), which affects spatial practices and perceptions.\(^5^4\) The argument can be seen as a major catalyst in shifting the research perspective from space, and its borders, to processes of their production.

Brenner and Elden have brought Lefebvre’s distinction between the perceived, conceived, and lived dimensions of social space to bear on the question of territory – giving rise, respectively, to: territorial practices, representations of territory, and territories of representation.\(^5^5\) According to them, territorial practices would be the physical, material spaces of state territory, such as borders, fences, and walls marking its external limits, but also infrastructure enabling various kinds of flows.\(^5^6\) Representations of territory would include a range of imagined senses of the body of a nation translated into political practice (maps and charts; abstract ways of representing territory through cartography, and otherwise diagrammatically). Territories of representation are, in turn, created at the intersection of the previous two categories, but are not limited to these narrow definitions. Just as Lefebvre insists with his notion of lived space, territory takes on meaning through the everyday practices and lived experiences, which occur within and beyond it.\(^5^7\)

**Toward scientism and "value-free" studies of borders**

Back on the German side, Walter Christaller (1893–1969), amongst others, took a more scientific approach by focusing on locational analysis and the spatial organization of functional regions. He saw borders as elements of the phys-

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ics and geometry of social relations. According to his central-place theory certain settlements functioned as "central places" providing services to surrounding areas, and as nodal centres through such movements of people, goods, and alike were organized.\textsuperscript{58}

August Lösch (1906–1945), who is commonly regarded as the founder of Regional Science, also introduced a hierarchically structured spatial pattern of his own. He built on Christaller’s work though turned its main logic upside down by beginning with a system of "lowest-order" in contrast to Christaller’s "highest-order." As an economist, Lösch described borders according to neoclassic economics, as artificial obstacles for trade equating them with distances.\textsuperscript{59} In his opinion, state borders truncate regular market networks, resulting in economic losses. "Tariffs are like rivers," he argued, "which separate their banks economically more than would correspond to their actual width."\textsuperscript{60}

Border scientism was also advanced by Torsten Hägerstrand (1916–2004), who stressed the temporal factor in spatial human activities. Relying on theoretical and methodological developments in science, he attacked the Durkheimian idea that space and time were social categories. In his attempt to explain how and why individuals link to each other and move between places, Hägerstrand developed a multidimensional time-geographical approach which went beyond social constructionism by emphasizing the physical constraints on human action and the wider networks of competing opportunities that they set up which act to steer situations.\textsuperscript{61}

The determinism that had helped provide the theoretical foundation for imperialist geopolitics and national-socialist ideology would be replaced after World War II by a generally positivist drive for objective facts, scientific rigor and "value-free" studies of borders.\textsuperscript{62} Although, the wider institutionalization of academic disciplines accelerated, borders remained relegated to sub-disciplines such as regional politics, regional

\textsuperscript{58} Walter Christaller, \textit{Die zentralen Orte in Süddeutschland} (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1933).

\textsuperscript{59} August Lösch, \textit{The Economics of Location}. (New Haven: Yale University Press 1954), 196; See also, Charles Engel and John Rogers, "How Wide is the Border?" American Economic Review 86: (1996).

\textsuperscript{60} Lösch, \textit{The Economics of Location}, 200.


economics and regional sociology, political anthropology, political geography and geopolitics.\textsuperscript{63} The latter two sub-disciplines had a long tradition of empirical research on borders, but in the 1960s and 1970s they almost died.\textsuperscript{64} Particularly political geography remained fragmented and lacked a central metatheory until the late 1970s. Instead, functionalism, positivism, and a focus on Kantian space prevailed.\textsuperscript{65}

Within the above mentioned parent disciplines, studies of border focused towards description, classification and morphologies of state borders, but became also concerned with the emergence of core areas of nation-state formation and the "centrifugal" (i.e. fragmenting) and "centripetal" (i.e. integrating) forces that influenced the growth and development of states.\textsuperscript{66} The widely used, but a "fundamentally illogical"\textsuperscript{67} division of "natural" and "artificial" borders came to an end, when political geographers began to emphasize that all political borders are consequences of conscious choices and, thus, artificial\textsuperscript{68}.

Borders as functions of historical evolution

For Richard Hartshorne, geography was a study of areal differentiation.\textsuperscript{69} Accordingly, his research on borders was grounded in the study of border landscapes; he suggested that the interaction between political borders and cultural landscapes were an important source of spatial differentia-

\textsuperscript{66} Houtum and Scott, Boundaries and the Europeanisation of Space, 7–8.  
tion. Hartshorne elicited a genetic border classification, according to which borders could be classified as pioneer, antecedent, subsequent, consequent, superimposed or relic. These were typologies based on the stage of development of the cultural landscape in the border area at the time the border is laid down.\footnote{Hartshorne, "The Functional Approach in Political Geography," 128.} He understood that the geodeterministic mindset of the German tradition of 

\textit{Anhtropographie} had served to discredit Political Geography and proposed that the analysis of the functioning of the state would provide a meaningful context for scientific rigor.\footnote{Hartshorne, "The Functional Approach in Political Geography," 129.}

Ladis Kristof, Julian Minghi, and Victor Prescott, all prominent scholars of the functionalist school, focused research attention on the emergence of borders based on forms of social-political organization and processes of nation-building.\footnote{Kristoff, "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries;" Minghi, "Boundary Studies in Political Geography;" Prescott, \textit{The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries}.} Kristof, followed Hartshorne’s ideas on political geography, and similarly devoted himself to the systematic study of borders as aspects of ‘Realpolitik’ and as organizing elements of the state. Kristof considered borders first of all as legal institutions: "...in order to have some stability in the political structure, both on the national and international level, a clear distinction between the spheres of foreign and domestic politics is necessary. The boundary helps maintain this distinction."\footnote{Kristoff, "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries."}

Kristof also made a distinction between frontiers and boundaries by suggesting that "while the former are the result of rather spontaneous or, at least, ad hoc solutions and movements, the latter are fixed and enforced through a more rational and centrally coordinated effort after a conscious choice is made among the several preferences and opportunities at hand."\footnote{Kristoff, "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries."} He specifies that etymologically, the word "frontier" refers to what is in front, the foreland, of the hinterland, the motherland, the core of the state, kingdom or empire: "Thus the frontier was not the end... but rather the beginning... of the state; it was the spearhead of light and knowledge expanding into the realm of darkness and of the unknown."\footnote{Kristoff, "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries," 270.} Whereas boundaries are \textit{inner}-oriented, frontiers are \textit{outer}-oriented, with their attention directed to those areas of friendship and danger, which exists beyond the state. Accordingly, boundaries, in Kristof’s conceptualization,
are *centripetal* in their function; they divide and separate, strengthening the territorial integrity of the state, while frontiers, in contrast, are *centrifugal* in character; they are outwardly oriented, integrate different ecumenes and challenge the control functions of the state.\(^{76}\)

Minghi urged political geographers to acknowledge that "boundaries, as political dividers, separate peoples of different nationalities and, therefore, presumably of different iconographic makeup."\(^{77}\) He suggested, that political geographers should work towards a more interdisciplinary approach and undertake investigations in the sociological, cultural, and economic areas "for the spatial patterns of social behavior can be even more important than other patterns in determining the impact of a boundary and its viability as a national separator."\(^{78}\) Prescott, in turn, was mainly concerned with identifying spatial relationships between politics and geography. He saw the exercise of political sovereignty, of which borders are the formal delimiters, as an important source of morphological and functional variation of space.\(^{79}\)

**Borders as complex social constructions**

While the dynamic role of borders had been overlooked and borders as a research topic neglected during the preceding decades, the predominant geopolitical atmosphere directed research interests back to borders around the turn of 1970s and 1980s. Increased velocity and volatility of globalization and, later, the post Cold War "disorder" and the associated tearing down the East-West division revealed that the empiricism, description, and categorization had their deficiencies. With the end of the Cold War, the previously stable border concept began to change and border studies began to be acknowledged as a discipline in its own right. Influenced by the broader critical turn in the social sciences, border studies became more inclusive towards the ethics of borders.

Since the end of the Cold War era, state borders have increasingly been understood as multifaceted social institutions rather than solely as formal political markers of sovereignty. Whereas the field had earlier pre-dominantly focused on the study of the demarcation of *boundaries* (i.e., the borderlines), the focus arguably shifted to *borders* as broader constructions. Dissatisfaction with the apolitical and "objective" assumptions of empiricism fuelled the application

\(^{79}\) Prescott, *The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries.*
of various critical approaches. Some of them became associated with postmodern and poststructuralist perspectives, which analyze the social construction of borders in terms of discourses, agency, and practices.\textsuperscript{80} Border scholars became interested in the social production of borders, sites at and through which socio-spatial differences are communicated. Borders, as a consequence, became viewed as relational, not given.

In order to interpret the broad socio-political transformations that manifest themselves at borders, a multifaceted understanding of borders is needed. In order to achieve that, it is first necessary to acknowledge how the border concept has developed historically. The brief description of the history of border studies presented above seeks to underline the need to recognize that border studies are of much older origin than what the contemporary literature commonly presumes. The understanding of border has not only evolved during the last centuries and decades, but there are also various understandings and conceptualizations that exist concurrently.

\textsuperscript{80} Houtum and Scott, Boundaries and the Europeanisation of Space, 23.
Recommended reading:


Section 1. Border studies as an interdisciplinary field of knowledge


**Internet resources:**


Chapter 1.2
Theoretical Approaches in the Study of Borders

Boundaries are a complex social phenomenon associated with the fundamentals of the territorial organization of society and human psychology. The geographers are ones of the first who began to study the borders of the state. The problem of boundaries of all kinds and the delimitation of them is one of the main problems of geography. The history of mankind is largely a history of wars, and the ultimate goal of most of these wars was the changing of borders. The title of a famous book by the French geographer and geopolitician Yves Lacoste sounds symbolic "Geography is first used to make war". Governments and policy makers need to justify territorial claims and annexations, and the redrawing of borders gave rise to the need for applied research on their delimitation and demarcation. Much attention is paid to borders in the so-called new political geography that emerged in the mid-1970s as a result of the renovation of its theoretical framework, using more rigorous scientific approaches and strengthening links with other social sciences.

By the end of the last century, border studies, or limology, became a rapidly widening interdisciplinary field of knowledge, developed by geographers, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, ethnologists, lawyers, economists, and even experts in the technical scienc-

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es. This was reflected in the proliferating number of articles and atlases, the emergence of specialized scientific journals, among the best known of which are the Journal of Borderlands Studies and Eurasia Border Review, and the organizing of centers for border studies. One of the first such units in Europe became the International Boundaries Research Unit at the University of Durham in the UK, tasked with linking academic research with practical issues of international law, and the Center for Border Studies at the University of Nijmegen (Netherlands). A number of scientific departments to study borders, particularly the Mexican-American border, were set up in the United States. Since the 2000s a growing number of scientists; geographers, political scientists, sociologists, and historians, have been engaged in the study of borders in Russia. In addition to Moscow and St. Petersburg, such research is conducted in Petrozavodsk, Kaliningrad, Kursk, Belgorod, Orenburg, Chelyabinsk, Chita, Birobidzhan, Vladivostok and other cities.

Naturally, the development of empirical research led to the need to develop deeper theoretical principles and generalizations. Further specialization in the study of borders gave rise to the idea that a general theory of boundaries, which would overcome the barriers between disciplines, synthesize knowledge about the world system of political and administrative borders and explain its evolution, would be impossible, although we should not rule out the emergence of new approaches, destroying the walls between sciences. This chapter characterizes the evolution of theoretical approaches to the study of borders, developed by representatives of different disciplines from the beginning of the last century to the present day. Of course, identification of these approaches is conditional, since modern science inherently bases on cooperative use of different approaches.

Traditional approaches

There are several consistently emerged theoretical approaches for the study of borders, which can be divided into traditional and postmodern ones. New approaches are not applied in isolation, but together with the old, which are constantly improved and do not lose their value. Traditional approaches include the historic-cartographic, the typological, the functional, and the geographic-political approach.²

The historic-cartographic approach, based on the mapping of changes in boundaries, their morphological features and the socio-geographical study of border areas, originated on the basis of generalization of numerous case studies and was applied in research related to the allocation, delimitation and demarcation of borders after the First World War. Its main achievement were, firstly, a comprehensive study of changes in boundaries over space and time, with special attention paid to the formation and stability of the border line. Secondly, it analyzed the relationship between the functions of borders, the political regime and the foreign policy of neighboring states. Thirdly, it proved that there was a deep connection between the regime, the functions and sometimes even the morphology of the boundaries on the one hand, and the economic, political and military might of neighboring states. A stronger state often forced the line of the border and its functions upon a weaker neighbor.

Fourth, usage of the historic-cartographic approach made it possible to refute the theory of "natural" political borders, according to which borders, optimal for the state, should coincide with natural boundaries – mountain ranges, large rivers, etc. This theory was justified by not only through convenience for the defense of borders and the economic integrity of the national territory, but also by "ideological" factors, including (after the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel) the likening of the state to a living organism requiring a certain space for development.

The desire to bring state borders into line with ethnic, linguistic or religious boundaries is, in essence, a variant of this theory of "natural" borders.

The theory of "natural" borders is widely used to justify territorial expansion. We know of many examples when the expansion of national territory to certain natural boundaries became part of the official foreign policy doctrine and national idea. So, in the early twentieth century, the only recently united Italian state sought to shift its northern border to the main Alpine watershed. As a result, the territory of Italy came to include South Tyrol, now a province of Bolzano (Bozen), an area with a mainly German-speaking population, which was long-contested and only resolved by the end of the century. In Croatia, after the collapse of Yugoslavia, there once again appeared the idea of the state's historical border as being on the river Drina, which implied the joining of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Croatia.

The classification and typological approach to the study of political borders has almost the same long history as their
mapping. It has proposed, in particular, numerous classifications of borders by natural properties – varying degrees of coincidence with natural boundaries and morphology (degree of tortuosity and correlation of their length with the square of the national territory). The configuration of borders has been studied at the different levels of national, regional and local, where it has a particularly strong effect on the intensity and nature of the interactions between neighbors.

Much attention was paid to geometrical borders, often in the form of straight lines, and usually differentiating the possessions of colonial powers or sparsely populated habitats such as deserts. In Africa, there are borders which, drawn in a semicircle, supposedly indicate the gravity of a border town. A particular case of geometric borders are "astronomical" ones, along parallels and meridians.

Geographers were traditionally engaged in the study of the degree of coincidence of state borders with the ethnic, economic and demographic structures of the territory through which they ran. They identified the antecedent borders, drawn before mass settlement and the economic development of the territory, and subsequent borders, that divide an area already mastered and homogeneous in socio-cultural and economic terms.

Value was also placed on typologies of borders by origin or historical circumstances of delimitation: inherited from the colonial period; formed as a result of the collapse of empire or a former single state (e.g., Yugoslavia, the USSR and Czechoslovakia); established through postwar peace conferences or treaties; imposed in the past by a more powerful neighbor (the border between the US and Mexico), etc. It is important to take into account the "age" or historical maturity of different sections of the border: the longer they exist, the greater the adaptation of neighboring countries to them. "Young" borders often have heightened tensions.

One traditional approach, which has not lost its value for interdisciplinary research, is the study of so-called phantom borders. These refer to non-existing political borders that now manifest themselves in various forms and activities and social practices – for example, in the political preferences of the voters. In a broader sense, phantom borders can be defined as political and cultural boundaries that existed in the past but that have lost or altered in whole or in part their functions or symbolic value, but continue to manifest themselves in various forms of economic, social and cultural activities. In other words, phantom borders can be considered former state borders, which become administrative, or, for example, the former borders between provinces or regions, which are now municipal boundaries. The most famous examples of phantom borders, such as the borders between the former Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian
parts of Poland, the border between Western Ukraine, which in contrast to other areas of the country had before the Second World War never been part of the Russian Empire or the USSR, and other regions of the state. These boundaries, these "scars of history", are clearly visible on the cultural, economic, and partly on electoral maps of these countries.

Such boundaries are also called "phantom", by analogy with phantom pains – such as the pain felt by patients with amputated limbs. Lost territories in society often produce such "pain" – nostalgic moods manifested in cultural life and sometimes poured into powerful social movements. These movements proclaim irredentist slogans – reunion with the state, whose part this territory was in the past, or a restoration of previous borders. The strong nostalgia for the lost lands of, for example, Hungary, which with the Treaty of Trianon (1919) gave up territory in which Hungarians still make up the majority or a significant part of the population. Maps of the state's "historical" borders are sold widely in Hungary.

The subject of such studies are differences in the identity of the population on both sides of the phantom border, its inclusion in the current administrative-territorial division, expression in the demographic and electoral behavior, manifestation in cultural and symbolic landscapes (the presence of memorable places and characters), and the role in modern cross-border interaction and cooperation.

Borders have varying degrees of legitimacy: recognized by the international community and the rules of international law, delimited and demarcated on the ground as a result of agreements between neighboring countries, including on the basis of a referendum or international arbitration; not completely legitimate (for example, agreed with a neighboring country only in certain sections, or delimited in an agreement, but not yet demarcated); illegitimate, not recognized by all countries or a majority of countries; for example, between unrecognized or partially recognized states and the state to which the territory previously belonged.

Also proposed have been synthetic typologies based on a combination of different features. All this has aided a better understanding of, on the one hand, the influence of the physical-geographical and social characteristics of the region, the history and politics of neighboring countries on the delimitation of borders, and on the other hand, the impact of borders themselves on the life of society and the cultural landscape.

The functional approach was developed by several generations of researchers, mainly after World War II. The focus of their attention was political and territorial factors determining border functions. A particularly large contribution to the development of this approach was made by the Brit-
ish geographer John House, who offered an effective model for the study of transborder flows. The essence of this model is that, firstly, levels of interaction between two neighboring countries are: a) the interstate, between border provinces of each state, b) between their border provinces and municipalities, c) between subjects of economic and other activities. Second, House allocated many kinds of interactions, for each of which the factor of border has a different and changing value. A border is usually taken as an unchanging reality and studies focus on its transparency to various activities and influences on society. The functional approach is now widely used in the management of social processes in border areas and transborder cooperation.

It distinguishes three main functions of borders as being that of barrier, contact and filter. The barrier function is used to separate the economic, cultural, political, legal and other spaces of neighboring countries. The contact function, on the other hand, serves as a liaison between neighboring countries for the control and partial pass of flows of individuals, goods, capital, energy, and, in some degree, information (North Korea, for example). However, the border is also a membrane designed, with the help of the visa regime, customs duties, quotas and other tools, to filter flows. On the border, those flows that are undesirable for the state are stopped or restricted, for example, the entry of unskilled workers or goods, whose domestic production is uncompetitive on the world market. Under the influence of many factors, but chiefly state policy, on every part of the border dynamic relationships emerge between contact, barrier and filter functions. Border regimes are a very flexible tool in the hands of the state. Strengthening of the contact functions of borders in the context of globalization has led to an increase in the economic importance and political subjectivity of border areas as an interface between the spaces of neighboring countries.

Functional classifications are related to the typology of borders by the degree of openness, which depends on, in particular, the use of a visa regime, the difficulty of obtaining a visa and its price, access to visa centers, complexity and latency of the border and customs controls in different seasons, days of the week and hours of the day, the density and location of border crossings, quality of communications, economic development of the territory, and so on.

The American political scientist Oscar Martinez, after many years studying the borderlands between the Unit-
ed States and Mexico, suggested another well-known universal typology for the degree of openness of borders, which has been modified by other authors. Martinez identified four main types of borders.\(^5\) Alienated borders rigidly divide two countries, border areas are militarized scenes of confrontation and conflict, transborder traffic is minimal and cooperation between the parties is virtually nonexistent. Most land borders in the world, however, would qualify as coexistent borders. Such borders are primarily for the filtering of transborder flows, while the parties maintain contact and cooperate when required to solve common problems. Interdependent borders arise between countries that have achieved a high degree of political rapprochement and mutual trust and which have coordinated foreign policy: the visa regime is lifted, border areas are fully demilitarized, and there is the development of intense cooperation between the authorities of both states at different levels, as well as business entities and NGOs. Finally, integrated borders are completely open; cross-border agglomerations and regions with their own governments are created, regulating the most important spheres of activity.

A special kind of alienated border is a frontal border, which divides countries whose populations usually belong to different ethno-linguistic and religious groups with different political cultures; those countries are included in different economic and military-political blocs; and the relationship between their citizens are often burdened with the past and mutual distrust. The notion of frontal borders was formerly attributed to the border between Finland and the former Soviet Union and to the borders between some countries of the socialist bloc and their West European neighbors.

The political approach to the study of borders was developed mainly by political scientists,\(^6\) who studied relations between the main paradigms of international relations and the functions of state borders. In the "realist" paradigm, states are perceived as the most important subjects of international activities, and the borders between them are treated as rigid dividing lines that protect state sovereignty and national security. According to the "liberal" paradigm, states are not the only, and sometimes not even the main political actors, and the primary function of state borders is to ensure contacts between the neighboring countries and facilitate their interaction. Hence the need for a speedy resolution of border conflicts and the comprehensive development of transborder relations.

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infrastructure. Finally, in a "global" paradigm, special attention is paid to networks of interaction between the different actors of international activities – both state and non-state. Through the development of these networks, state borders are gradually transformed into virtual lines, and replaced with economic, cultural and other dividing lines.

"Postmodern" approaches

Despite the accumulation of abundant information and important theoretical publications, border studies for a long time suffered from a lack of theoretical understanding. Traditional positivist approaches explained the phenomenon of state borders primarily through political factors, treating them as a mirror of the military, economic and political powers of neighboring states. The essence and policy of the states, as well as the hierarchical relationships between them, were rarely taken into account. States were considered as unchanging realities acting as a single entity. Political and administrative borders and cultural boundaries have hardly been considered as a single system, which corresponded to the strict separation of researches on foreign and domestic policy.

Over time, it became clear that borders cannot be studied only at the level of individual countries. On the one hand, an increasingly prominent role in the world is being played by supranational organizations, while on the other, the internationalization of the economy and unifying of culture evoke regional identity, which contributes to the development of secessionist or irredentist movements that undermine the existing system of political borders. Traditional approaches have not been able to explain why, in many cases, even small changes of the border cause in society a deep emotional response, while in other cases, new borders are perceived by public opinion as justified. Existing works had no answer to why some border areas, which seemed peaceful for a long time, suddenly transformed into an arena of bloody conflict, and why government circles and public opinion are painfully sensitive to all matters affecting the state borders.

Gradually, the preconditions for a new, postmodern, paradigm were emerging and evolving from the late-1980s. It is based on many concepts proposed by political scientists, philosophers, sociologists and social psychologists. Along with political geography in general, border studies were significantly influenced by, first, the theory of world systems, especially the idea of interdependence and the role of the processes taking place at different spatial scales. Second, the importance of the theory of structuralism associated with Anthony Giddens, who advanced the idea of a certain freedom of action for subjects of economic and political activity
and public institutions at different territorial levels. Third, border studies now widely use notions of political discourse and its role in the construction of space, developed by the French philosopher Michel Foucault and his followers.

The postmodern paradigm in border studies can be divided into several approaches. Often elements of the different approaches are used simultaneously, with differences only of emphasis.

**World systems, identity and borders.** The most notable achievement in the study of political borders in the 1990s was a synthesis of theories of world systems and territorial identities. Its essence is that, first, the combined study of the place of a particular border in the system of borders in the world at different spatial levels — from global to local. Followers of Wallerstein, Taylor and other theorists of the growth of global interdependence focus on objective economic factors — the deepening of the international division of labor, improvement of transport and means of communication. These processes are interpreted as the formation of global networks based on relations of domination and subordination in the structure of ‘center — periphery’. Supporters of the theory of integration, on the contrary, emphasize the leading role in this process of subjective factors — political will and political institutions.

The internationalization of economic life and rapid growth of transborder flows of people, information, goods, capital, energy, and pollutants are associated with the increasing influence of transborder subjects in different spheres of activity (ethnic and social movements, non-governmental organizations). As a result, the state’s borders lose part of their barrier functions. The transfer of state functions to regional and international organizations is seen as a manifestation of the general crisis of the Westphalian system of nation-states. No country today can be completely isolated from its neighbors. Even if bilateral relations are very cold, neighboring countries are generally interested in transit, the development of communications, joint use of natural resources and international river basins, prevention of unfavorable and dangerous natural and man-made phenomena, etc.

Another starting point for contemporary border studies was the origin and evolution of territorial identities. The meaning of the border in people’s lives is not able to be understood without analyzing its role in public consciousness and the self-identification of a man with territories at dif-

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ferent scales (country, region, and locality). This approach was based on the achievements of related social sciences, especially Bart’s work in cultural anthropology and ethnology. A great contribution to the development of this approach was made by the work of the Finnish geographer Anssi Paasi. He started from the hypothesis that nationalism apropos of David Harvey is one of the main forms of territorial ideology and the foundation of nation-building. Nationalism always involves a struggle for territory or protection of rights to it. Paasi showed how public perceptions about the "indigenous population" and its culture, the security of the state, perceived or real external threats, historical myths and stereotypes influenced the attitude of the people and the political elite to a specific border.

According to this view, the configuration and functions of a border are ultimately determined by the loyalty of citizens to their state on both sides of the border. To legitimize the borders of multinational states, a majority in the world today, is necessary to form a political nation, which unites all citizens, regardless of their affiliation, on the basis of common symbols and values. Overall political identity, as a rule, is formed by the state and nationalist elites. Borders are one of its main elements. It follows a simple political formula: if there is no stable political identity, there can be no stable borders or stable state. Thus, border problems are inextricably linked with the analysis of the functions and activities of the state, which is defined as a "political-territorial unit with clear and internationally recognized borders, within which the population possesses a certain political identity."

For example, most of the newly independent states that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union are multietnic. Moreover, in many of them a significant role is played by regional identity, which is very different from region to region. Therefore, the newly independent states must simultaneously solve two problems – firstly, the consolidation of the titular group based on a single ethnic identity, and, secondly, the strengthening of the new, common political identity of all citizens. Many CIS countries have not managed to solve this problem. Ethnic, cultural and regional groups of significant sizes have not yet shared the officially proclaimed values and ideas about the origin of the state, its historical mission, its borders and place in the world, its "natural" enemies and threats to national security, and so forth.

Sharp differences of identity are one of the main reasons for the collapse of many states. Unrecognized or partially recognized states and territories uncontrolled by the central government (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Abkha-

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zia and South Ossetia, parts of the territory of Afghanistan, Colombia, and others) have become integral parts of the global geopolitical order. Their border regimes do not correspond to their official status. Therefore, boundaries are first created in social representations, and then they are delimit ed on the map.

World systems theory is based on the classical tripartite scheme "center – semi-periphery – periphery". Attached to limology this means, first, the study of territorial boundaries at three levels of global, national and local, and second, that the concepts of center and periphery are relative.

Subsequently, these levels were complemented by two others – macroregional and regional. An example of the deliberate formation of a macro-regional (supranational) identity is the EU's activities to strengthen pan-European political identity, which is still quite weak.

The strengthening of macro-regional identity can help to reduce national identity and the barrier functions of borders between member states within the integrated grouping. However, the state identity is being eroded not so much "from above" (from the level of macro-regions) as "below", from the inside.

The achievement of the world-systems approach in border studies was to gain greater understanding of the role of the local level. Local territorial communities are not passive subjects of exposure to central authorities, but actively influence the formation of identity, and the nature and perception of borders in neighboring countries. Local communities often develop specific border identities, based on common interests and culture. This identity can be transborder, especially if the residents of the regions adjacent to the border are similar in language and culture.

It is clear, however, that a world without borders is hardly possible, if only because the mobility of capital requires certain differences between national political and legal spaces.\(^\text{10}\) The discourse about a borderless world concerns only "integrated", open borders, mainly in Europe and North America. They constitute no more than 5% of state land borders.\(^\text{11}\) In addition, the state border is an important barrier, even in areas where the process of integration is far more advanced. Thus, despite the high degree of dependence of the Canadian economy from the United States, the total trade of the "average" Canadian province with other Canadian regions, measured in terms of population and GDP per capita,
is 12 times greater than with neighboring American states, and the exchange of services more than 40 times greater. Migration between Canadian provinces is 100 times more intense than the transborder migration exchange with American states.\textsuperscript{12} The same pattern can be observed in the EU.\textsuperscript{13}

**Geopolitical approaches. The impact of globalization and integration on political borders.** Postmodernist conceptions allow us to bridge the gap that exists between the study of foreign and domestic policy, between state borders and other boundaries. In fact, both the state border and the boundary of a municipality outline a space controlled by members of a social-territorial community through limiting the territorial rights of those who do not belong to this group. To paraphrase an expression of Benedict Anderson, one can say that any political or administrative boundary is aimed inward to consolidate a social group and externally to separate it from its neighbors. The bottom line is the redistribution of functions between the boundaries of different levels and types under the influence of globalization and integration.

More and more people associate themselves simultaneously with two or more ethnic and cultural groups. There are intensified cultural and linguistic, religious, social and professional identities, which are not always clearly linked to a specific territory. This leads to a weakening of national identity, since not only the elite but now the middle class tends to identify itself with a particular place of residence, such as a village, a municipality, an area, to be fenced off by rigid administrative barriers against "outsiders" (migrants, the poor, people of other faiths and nationalities, and so on).

This both accounts for and accelerates a growing individualism. People want to live in isolated, socially homogeneous and strictly controlled communities (gated communities). To become a member of a prestigious community, a small walled commune in the suburbs, is often more difficult than to acquire the nationality of Western European or North American countries. This boundary is a social barrier that is extremely difficult to overcome. The identity of social groups living on either side of these boundaries is based on their opposition to each other and control of "their" territory.\textsuperscript{14}


The sense of external threat gives rise to a desire to minimize or stop contact with an undesirable or dangerous neighbor. If you cannot get rid of him, if it is impossible to subdue, control, or to resettle him elsewhere, he must to be fenced off. This strategy has been adopted by entire states erecting "great walls" – the Great Wall of China, Hadrian’s Wall, the Berlin Wall, and in our time, the barrier with which the Israeli government seeks to protect its citizens from the Palestinians. The trouble is that these border walls only aggravate conflicts. Insulation creates ignorance, a lack of knowledge leads to fear and mistrust, and the perception that a neighbor is the strongest obstacle to reconciliation and any real solution to the problem.

In border studies has formed the idea that the political demarcation of the space at all levels is the means to meet two basic needs of society: 1) security (protection against external and internal threats) and 2) separating the territory controlled by specific political, cultural and social groups possessing a strong identity, shared values and who want to preserve their originality, not allowing strangers to "own" land.

Thus, political, administrative and cultural boundaries constitute a single, coherent and hierarchically organized social system. Differentiation of various social and political communities of different hierarchical levels must be recognized as a single process. The elements of this system are very stable, despite the frequent redrawing of boundaries.

Naturally, cultural boundaries, within which exists a certain common identity, do not always coincide with formal (de jure) borders. Cultural boundaries or boundaries de facto perform mainly external functions of contact between cultures, while the de jure border is mainly internal, ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, and social and ethno-cultural integration of its population. Former state borders become administrative or cultural boundaries, and vice versa. New political borders at all hierarchical levels almost never occur in "empty places" and rarely cutting old borders. Most often, cultural boundaries are transformed into a de jure borders. In turn, "demoted" formal borders under certain circumstances may recover their official status in whole or in part, once again becoming the borders of the state or a province.

**Geopolitical approaches. The approach to borders in terms of security.** The self-identification of people with a particular territory endows a high symbolic value to different parts of it. They become parts of national or ethnic identity. These territory-symbols include Sevastopol in Russia, Koso-
vo in Serbia, and the capitals of many countries. Since borders are meant to be a barrier shielding the inhabitants of the territory from "outsiders", mass perceptions of them are characterized by contrast ("or – or").

Accordingly, the perceptions of borders are inextricably linked with the concept of national security and use in its ensuring of the state apparatus of violence. Security is a multidimensional concept encompassing military, economic, and environmental security, among others. In the most general sense, security is understood as a reliable life-support system and lack of threat to the lives of people and their activities. In terms of limology, what matters is who provides security, and what is its object, the macro-region, the state or a part thereof. At its territorial edge is deployed border, customs and other public services; there is often an increased concentration of military units, especially in directions felt by public opinion to be threatened.

The perception of the security of a specific border depends on its symbolic role, historical traditions, image, and contemporary discourse. For example, in Finland, despite past conflicts, there are profoundly different social representations of the border with Sweden, which considered safe, and of the border with Russia, which is the source of illegal migrants, crime, environmental pollution and other threats.

The traditional understanding of the role of the state border in ensuring security is based, firstly, on the prevention of military threat. Accordingly, border areas have become zones for special regimes, in which the main priority is the combat readiness of army formations and special services, ready to repel an attack.

Second, one of the main tasks of the traditional approach to security in the border area is to maximally increase control of any transborder flows. The American political scientist Karl Deutsch introduced the concept of security of territorial communities (security communities). He considered the density of transborder interactions as indicators of the intensity of the integration processes, which can be perceived by the local community as a threat to its identity. From this perspective, the border is meant as means to stop infiltration into the country of undesirable persons, goods, information, etc. The more easily control transborder flows are, the less residents are in the border areas and the lower economic activity is in them. Therefore these areas are transformed into territories of economic stagnation – not only because of their peripheral situation within the state and the structural imbalances caused by this, but also due

to attempts to subordinate the needs of social life to security goals.

Third, this approach is based on ensuring the security of the state, and this problem can be solved only by the state. It is assumed that the security interests of border regions are completely identical to national ones. Geo-economics is subject to geopolitics. Political leaders in their discourse can transform economic problems specific to the border area into "geopolitical" ones; thus, foreign investment in border areas can be interpreted as an attempt to encourage separatist movements or to colonize new lands abroad.

The obsession with security has become a feature of the post-industrial era. In an attempt to protect themselves from terrorists, avoid the spread of social and political instability, or to stop the flow of illegal migrants, drugs or weapons territorial and political unities of all levels (supranational entities to municipalities) try to isolate themselves from unwanted external influences by any means, erecting on the borders not only "paper curtains", but also a powerful physical barriers.  

The total length of physical barriers along borders is estimated at 22,000 kilometers, and about a further 13,000 kilometers were under construction in 2013, representing a total of about 16% of the entire length of land borders in the world. These barriers can be the ditches, barbed wire in several rows, six-meter concrete wall, as around Jerusalem, or even a minefield. Paradoxically, only 16.4% of the length of these barriers arose as a result of armed conflict along the ceasefire line, for example, between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, in the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, and between Abkhazia and Georgia. Most of the border "walls" built along the now quite peaceful borders, for example, between the United States and Mexico or between some Schengen countries and their neighbors.

In practice, the concept of security has become a slogan with which to justify any cost or emergency measures. The new "Great Walls" and minefields along the border, the tightening of visa regimes and the introduction of increasingly stringent quotas for immigrants are acts of public communication, the reaction of politicians to the phobia of public opinion. The real effectiveness of such measures is low, especially in comparison with their economic and social costs. For example, an expensive Schengen visa regime applies

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only to 2 million people out of 50 million, annually entering France.\textsuperscript{19}

Between border security and the increasing need of all countries for greater volumes of transborder flows, which have become a condition for economic development, there is an objective dilemma: security in the current sense often means limiting communications, as openness and increased communication across the border is in public opinion usually associated with new risks and threats. This dilemma, searching for a balance between the interests of security and the "transparency" of borders, cannot be resolved, as is often hoped, through purely technological methods, such as the installation of sophisticated equipment remote control of cars or wagons.

The growing use of expensive equipment creates another dilemma, giving rise to a new vicious circle. The more complex the border control, the tougher restrictions on crossing the border, the higher the income of organized crime is from the illicit transborder traffic in migrants, drugs, weapons or other contraband, the more attractive this activity becomes, and ultimately the more crimes are committed. This then leads to further arguments from law enforcement agencies for new investment in border controls and for new tough measures.\textsuperscript{20}

The rapid development of modern technologies utilizing biometric features allowed for the movement of people across the country to be identified and tracked, starting from the moment they cross the border, in conjunction with the fundamental bases of personal data collected, including through the interception of telephone conversations and contacts on the Internet, give the secret services and law enforcement agencies virtually unlimited possibilities. Personal data is used in particular for the automatic generation of a "profile" of each person requesting a visa (his professional interests, hobbies, and contacts), allowing for states to deprive of the right to cross the border all those who are deemed undesirable persons. Under the pretext of the fight against organized crime it creates complex ethical issues, conditions for massive human rights violations, including of the right to mobility, and the emergence of new, formidable barriers between countries and regions. In fact, to whom can people appeal if the computers, in unknown locations, and anonymously programmed and controlled, create an unfavorable personal profile.


In "postmodern" research, other aspects of border functions are emphasized. This is how intense external economic relations usually involve the whole of the state's territory and border areas are transformed into engines of economic growth that shape transborder spatial systems of urban agglomerations, cooperative production, and so on. The demographic and social situation is leading to an increase in the number of mixed marriages, changing the ethnic composition of the population and its identity. There is a growing mutual trust and the disappearance of centuries-old negative stereotypes in perceptions of the neighboring country. In these circumstances, it is advisable to simplify or abolish border controls, and where they are maintained, to improve remote means of border protection. The goal is to find a delicate balance between border security and the development of transborder cooperation, the interests of the central government and the border areas.

Understandings of threats to national and regional security have also changed. It is based, first, on the fact that new threats cannot be overcome by military force. Even the most powerful army cannot confront illegal migration, international terrorism, drug and weapons trafficking, the risk of epidemics and pandemics, transborder transit of pollutants and global environmental disasters, etc.

Second, a growing belief that attempts to keep control on increased flows across borders using previous methods, strengthening barrier functions, are not only ineffective, but harmful to the economy and society. On the contrary, close cooperation is effective, and for this is required mutual trust, demilitarization of the border zone and open borders (de-securitisation).

Third, according to the postmodern approach to border security, the state should promote transborder cooperation at the level of regional and local authorities. The central authorities must not ignore the specific interests of border areas and prevent their direct cooperation. Thus, the concept of security acquires a very significant regional dimension.

Fourthly, it develops a complex approach to the protection of borders. This means that it is necessary to ensure the security of the entirety of a country's territory, not only its borders. The fight against illegal migration and drug trafficking cannot be reduced to a barrage of measures at the border. As international experience shows, on the border can be intercepted at best 5–10% of trafficked drugs. Moreover, almost all these flows pass through official crossing points. Therefore, state's need to deal with the sources of
these flows, the international criminal organizations, together with their neighbors. This is through a transparency of information on transborder flows, the ability conduct international audits and remote control using modern technologies.

Consequently, the concept of "border space" now covers not only the area adjacent to the border, but also the hinterland. The development of transport, international trade and communications creates the appearance of borders located toward the center of the state’s territory – for example, around international airports, special customs and free trade zones.

Modern borders become more and more "differentiated": they are not equally permeable for different flows and types of activities and actors. The state establishes different borders for them, often in different locations. As a result different social groups and activities have "their own" borders and border zones. For the economic elite or members of international criminal groups, more stringent visa regimes hardly represent a serious obstacle. For larger enterprises, especially multinational companies, customs fees and border formalities do not play a significant role, whereas for small or medium-sized enterprises located in the border area, they have become a factor in forcing them to focus their activities on domestic or local markets.

Thus, the system of boundaries evolves from single lines, to a set of lines, from lines to zones, from physical boundaries to the cultural, from impenetrable barriers to lines of interaction.

Of course, in practice it is difficult to follow the new concept of border security. This is prevented by the inertia of traditional ideas, the peculiarities of geopolitical culture, the imperatives of nation- and state-building, the need to strengthen the symbolic role of the border, the character of border space and other factors.

**Borders as social representations.** The functions of borders, and often the very borderlines themselves, are determined by discourse and the formation of mass representations that have constituted in recent years a separate subject for border studies. Accounting for the discursive nature of borders is especially important if any of their segments are controversial and a cause of international conflict.

Discourse about borders has several never entirely overlapping layers. According to the theory of critical geopolitics, developed by Toal and other authors, there is a distinction between "high" and "low" geopolitics. "High" geopolitics is the sphere of activity of political figures and experts develop-
ing concepts designed to substantiate and justify the actions of a country in the international arena. "High" geopolitics is divided into theoretical and practical, and is engaged primarily in strategic research, structural questions (the world order, the structure of international relations, and so on). Its discourse concerns the place of a country in the world, the whole system of the world’s borders and especially its "frontal" borders. To legitimize state actions, what matter is how "high" geopolitics corresponds with the "low".

"Low" geopolitics is a set of geopolitical representations, symbols and images contained in the media, advertising, movies, cartoons and elsewhere. It is created by the education system, mass culture, and first and foremost by the media. On "low" geopolitics is based the geopolitical vision of the world, it being a necessary element of ethnic and political identity and a tool of state-building.

The geopolitical vision of the world is understood as a set of ideas about the relationship between the various elements of political space, national security and threats to it, the advantages and disadvantages of a particular foreign policy strategy, and so forth. The geopolitical vision of the world also includes representations of the territory of an ethnic group or political nation, its borders, preferred models of government, historical mission and those factors which impeded its implementation. The role of borders is interpreted quite differently by different social groups.

Geopolitical discourse analysis helps define the boundaries of so-called informal regions in the representations of political leaders and public opinion (for example, North and Central Europe, the Muslim world, etc.). So, for the leaders of the states of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s it was important to present the borders of their countries on a global scale as being the boundaries of Europe, the boundary between East and West, while on the macro-regional they were the "historic, ancestral" boundaries of their peoples, and at the local level they were the results of wise, though painful, concessions for the sake of international stability.

"PPP-approach" ("policy – perception – practice"). This approach has recently appeared and is an attempt to synthesize theoretical developments in recent years with traditional approaches that have not lost their relevance; particularly the functional approach. According to the "PPP-approach", the border is not only an international legal institution, which is the subject of international conflict and diplomacy, but also a product of activity (or social practice in Lefebvre’s terms) of inhabit-

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ants in border areas, the result of a long historical and geopolitical development and an important symbolic marker of ethnic and political identity.

The approach is a combined analysis at different spatial levels; firstly, the practice of transborder activities, which is related to transborder flows and influenced by the proximity of the border. Great importance is attached to the presence of informal networks of interaction between enterprises, local authorities, and so on. The scope, form and purposes of these activities depend on the understanding by the state, supranational and regional political actors of the national security and the role of the border in its maintenance. Activity at the border is determined by the border regime, but also itself influences that regime.

Secondly, also on different levels is analyzed the border policy, understood in the broad sense as being the state and the international institutional and legal infrastructure that support transborder flows and determine the ratio between the border's barrier and contact functions. This infrastructure reflects the priorities of the state, the border regions and local authorities, includes incentives and constraints on transborder activity, and regulates the processes of internal and external (transborder) territorial integration.

Third, it investigates perceptions of the border, including the nature, evolution and channels of influence on social representations of the border, border areas, of relations with neighboring states and regions, and of transborder cooperation, including the relevant discourses on "high" and "low" geopolitics. The border activities, perceptions of the border, and the institutional and legal infrastructure are interdependent: the question of "primacy" or the prioritizing of any of these three elements in the analysis is incorrect.

The "PPP-approach" is close to a theory of behavior for people in border areas, being also associated with the functional theory of J.W. House and with postmodern approaches. According to this theory, the proximity of the border constrains the freedom of citizens' behavior, changing their motives and hampering movement. As a result, it alters the sphere of human life in general. In ideal model, an individual's area of interaction would form concentric circles, reflecting the drop in intensity of a person's contacts depending upon the distance from his place of residence and on gender, age, education, social status, transportation, political, legal and other factors. Under the influence of the barrier functions of the border, these circles become deformed, with the influence of the state border particularly noticeable depending upon the level of education. So "intellectuals" (teachers, journalists, civil servants) are closely connected with their state and more dependent on it. Their entire life cycle is
strongly affected by the influence of state borders to a much greater extent than the life cycle of less educated people.

The external factors include socio-economic conditions (level of development, the degree of regulation and the market prices for goods, services, capital and labor, transportation and communications, the spread of the media and others.), as well as administrative and legal constraints. The internal factors include spatial preferences, "mental maps" that exist in the human mind, and value systems, which characterize both each individual and the social group as a whole. The most important place belongs to ethnic and political identity.

**Eco-political approach.** It is known that natural processes know no boundaries. Many common mountain ranges, river basins, habitats of animals, birds and fish, monuments of nature, inland seas and other natural areals are separated by political and administrative borders. Often, mineral deposits, including oil and gas, are also separated by borders. At the same time, the holistic nature of such areals lead to the spread of pollutants in the air and water. Awareness of the severity of regional and global environmental problems is a strong incentive for international, including transborder cooperation. In border studies, a strong interdisciplinary branch has developed that studies transborder eco-political problems, consisting mainly of political scientists, specialists in international law and geographers-naturalists. Analysis of their work goes far beyond the scope of this chapter.

Here, we will offer only one example of their work – the basin approach, which allows for the linkage of social and natural-geographic research, and, in particular, contributes to the solution of many international conflicts, developing new principles of management of the environment and territory. River basins not only possess a high degree of unity in natural and anthropogenic processes, but also form the basis for the development of the systems of settlement and transport, and often define the boundaries between historically established territorial and cultural communities. At the same time, issues over the use of their water, energy and biological resources, pollution, shipping and transit are "classic" reasons for international and border conflicts.

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Border studies is now a rapidly growing interdisciplinary field. It faces a number of important tasks. Firstly, the number of dyads and extent of international borders recently increased significantly due to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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ion, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and new ways of dividing the world’s oceans. The ideological and geopolitical obstacles to the involvement of vast regions in the world economy and globalization have been removed. Dozens of territorial conflicts continue to poison international relations, even if they are not active and exist only in a latent state. Research on Russia’s borderlands is becoming increasingly important.24

Secondly, under the influence of globalization and international integration, the functions of borders and border areas are changing rapidly, which requires a thorough scientific analysis. The impact of these factors on borders is so complicated and varied that the effects of ongoing changes are far from clear. Globalization and liberalization of the economy, along with the development of new technologies and means of communication has gradually converted national borders from the barriers of alienation into lines of integration for social systems. This trend is also due to growing international awareness of global environmental, energy and other issues. These tendencies reinforce the prerequisites that the resolution of border conflicts will occur on the basis of international law. Many contradictions can be overcome as a result of the separation of economic and ideological functions of borders.

Improvements in international transport, as well as the quality and density of the telecommunications network, modifies economic space, reinforcing the importance of its key elements as being world cities, major ports and logistics cent-

ers. On the one hand, this process often deepens territorial contrasts within countries, causes the growth of the barrier functions of internal borders, and blurs the distinction between political and administrative dividing lines. However, on the other hand, it facilitates transborder cooperation, which is both the result and the cause of this growth of transparency in political borders.

New approaches tend to research border and transborder cooperation at various territorial levels as a single system, and can successfully supplement traditional methods of studying borders. Moreover, the scale of analysis is not fixed, being a social construct which can be used to identify the object and subject of the conflict. New approaches allow us to understand to what extent, and how, political discourse affects the position and roles of certain borders and border areas in foreign and domestic policy, and thus contribute to a critical understanding of political decisions.

However, the evolution of the world system of boundaries is far from linear, and does not lead to their simplification. In contrast, the distribution of functions between political and administrative boundaries at different levels dramatically increases the diversity of their geographical contexts and consequently creates numerous new types of boundaries. Of course, globalization does not guarantee the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America. For example, in Africa, 42% of land borders set by the former colonial powers are along parallels, meridians and equidistant lines, which suggests a high potential for future conflicts.

The proposed in recent years approaches have revealed new "dimensions" of globalization. Their use has helped us to analyze the relationship between the globalization of economic exchanges and international migration on the one hand, and the transformation of territorial identities, perceptions of borders, border areas and national security on the other. New methods have demonstrated that the same processes are treated differently in different countries and regions, and peculiarities of perception can play a decisive role in making economic and political decisions regarding borders and border areas. Globalization often results in a defensive reaction, and enhances ethnic, national or regional identities, which, in turn, contribute to the strengthening of the border regime.


Foucher, Fronts et Frontières
One of the major methodological challenges remains the separation between the impact on borders of common problems and the impact of specifically border problems. Indeed, the question of whether the functions and regime of certain state borders are only a reflection of national or geopolitical issues, such as the fight for self-determination by an ethnic group or rivalry between world and regional powers, still remains. That space modifies the effect of general political processes at the borders and border areas suggests that this is not the case, but the mechanisms of this effect are not yet clear.
Recommended reading:


Kolosov, V.A., and O.I. Vendina, eds. Rossiysko-ukrainskoye pogranič’ye: dvadtsat’ let razdelennogo yedinstva [The Russian-


Vardomskii, L.B., and Golunov S.V., eds. Prozrachnyye granitsy. Bezopasnost’ i mezhdunarodnaye sotrudnichestvo v zone novykh pogranichnykh territoriy Rossii [Porous borders. Security and in-
ternational cooperation in the zone of the new borders of Russia].
Vardomskii, L.B. Rossiiskoe Porubezhe v Usloviakh Globalizatsii
[Russian Borderlands in Conditions of Globalization].
SECTION 2.
CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS OF BORDER STUDIES
This chapter will discuss the significance of the category of the boundary (borderliness) to the overall understanding of being (ontology) in connection with philosophical and scientific knowledge of human being. The issue will be discussed in a methodological manner, as follows. What are the reasons for the significance attached to the concept of the boundary, among all the areas of man’s knowledge, becoming today more and more crucial? In a further embodiment: What peculiarity of human being requires the use of the concept of the boundary, and why do modern philosophy and science focus on this feature?

It should be borne in mind that until now the idea of borderliness has not received the full attention of anthropological teachings, which means that the heuristics of this approach in terms of border studies remained largely unutilized. Therefore, the material here focuses the reader on the prospect of such a study.

Why the idea of boundary is claimed by modern science?

One of the key changes that has occurred in modern science (such a change is called a change of scientific paradigm) is that the object of knowledge has become understood as an open system, i.e. as a system that is in constant interaction with the environment. Classical science asserted that the essence of an object was determined by its internal connec-
tions, with its external dependencies random (with respect to that essence). This assumption underlies classical physics’ experiments. It assumes the maximum possible isolation of the subject of study from external relations and to study the (internal) relationships between elements of the system. One example of a system of classical mechanics, the state of which is determined only by internal processes, is a mechanical watch. The watch is a conditionally closed system. The less such an object is dependent on external conditions, the better.

However, science comes to seek knowledge of increasingly complex objects: objects of ever greater complexity. The more complex the object (system) is, the more it reveals specific dependences on external conditions (the environment). For complex systems, the abstraction of a closed system demonstrates limitations and even inconsistency. An example of an object not able to be understood in isolation from its environment is a living organism. The essence of living consists of the active exchange of matter, energy and information with the environment. It is thanks to biology that we have developed the modern version of the systems approach and an understanding of the object of study as an open system.

If classical science understood the system (the object as a system) in the form of a set of elements that generates the quality of integrity (emergence), the open system is defined by the ability to retain its integrity in its interaction with the environment. As such, an open system can never be represented statically. Such a system is always dynamic, engaged in transitions of various kinds (the transfer of matter and energy, the reflection of the environment in the internal processes of the system). An example is, again, a living organism. It is alive as long as it retains a boundary with the environment, maintaining this boundary through its intrinsic activity, and thus retaining its autonomy. The death of the organism means that it dissolves into the environment. Thus, when we research an open system, the question of its integrity shifts to the problem of how the system manages to maintain itself given the "challenges" of the environment.

The idea of openness does not eliminate the problem of integrity (and isolation), but problematizes it, establishing the preservation of integrity as a real process. The closed nature of a system is now defined as operating closeness, i.e. as operations of the system to retain itself as a whole. The combination of operating closeness and openness is generally defined as the principle of self-reference and is fixed in the theory of self-referential systems. The system is self-referential as it strives for self-preservation (autonomy) in interaction with the environment. The system, when it operates in self-referential mode, strives to transform external influences
(challenges) through its own operations. Thus, the response (reaction) to a challenge of the environment:

1. are never performed in the logic of the environment (in the order of how the external environment operates);
2. involve converting an external order of operations into the internal order;
3. suggest that this conversion (transfer) is still triggered by external factors;
4. lead to the self-modification (development) of the self-referential system (because of (2) and (3));
5. in some, the most significant, cases – the result of this dialectic leads to a growth in the complexity of the system (for example – the emergence of special bodies responsible for the implementation of the special operations of the system).

The theory of an open or self-referential system reveals a whole layer of problems that are not visible from a different point of view. Key among them is the problem of the boundary as a zone or place of meeting and transition between inside and outside. The key nature of the problem stems from the fact that boundaries between environments require distinct features. The process and order of conversion (transfer) is third, following the order of the external environment and operations of the internal environment. The boundary functions in a special mode different from the internal organs of a system. The presence of a separate logic of meeting and crossing the boundary between the internal and external environment is a condition for the possibility of special multidisciplinary knowledge, which today is called "border studies." This special logic covers the functioning of ecosystems, the interaction of cultures, and all communicative processes, due to the presence of national borders.

Thus, as modern science presents the subject of its knowledge as an open system, which presupposes the existence of an environment, by logical necessity this attitude implies the existence of the gap, differentiation, distinction, as a constitutive principle of being of all things. This constitutive principle is a boundary.

Previously it should be noted that although the use of the term "boundary" is an important marker of the meaning (conceivable content) implied by this term, the meaning is not necessarily expressed by the term itself. In general, "border studies" is determined by the problem, which involves the concept of boundary. The general sense of the term is simultaneously that of a topos (place) of difference, and a place of the meeting and transition from one to another (both in space and in time). This problem has always been visible to the thinking subject (scientific and philosophical knowledge), but has been designated in different ways and given different meanings in the system of knowledge of things. The di-
The idea of boundary in classical philosophy. The concept of the boundary is not a new one for philosophy as a whole or for anthropology. We can say that philosophy itself (the experience of thinking of being) emerges from an awareness of the limits of human knowledge. However, the modern understanding of borderlineness (of the knowledge and the human) is invested with additional meaning.

Kant, in "Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view", which can be considered the first philosophical work devoted to a systematic study of man, offers a clear distinction between two views on man. One is physiological, which asks, "what nature makes of human ", and pragmatic - as "the study of what he is as a freely acting being makes or can and should make of himself." The current situation with the investigation of man from a "pragmatic view" exactly can be described as the establishment of the limits of what people "can and must make of themselves." Man has reached a "pragmatic" limit, and it is difficult now to understand it in the same sense and respect as Kant did. It is to Kant's credit that this was the first time question about the limits of human possibilities had been clearly raised. This is one of the meanings of his great "Critique" ("Critique of Pure Reason", "Critique of Practical Reason" and "Critique of Judgment"). "Criticism" in the Kantian sense is the establishment of limits, which our minds, our actions and our judgment of taste in principle are unable to overcome.

This position of Kant provides us with a convenient basis for comparing the classical understanding of anthropological limits (boundaries) and the modern. For Kant the
boundary represents a limit beyond which you cannot go; the modern understanding is that a "boundary exists only as a suggestion to cross itself" (Luhmann). But yet in Kant’s thought, it is important to grasp the idea that it is the pursuit of the limit determines the nature of knowledge, and the ethical norm of obligation. Today we only reinforce this point of Kant’s teachings and talk about not just the pursuit of the limit, but also of overcoming it. As an example, let us look at communication. The modern individual, clearly recognizing their own authenticity / autonomy, is "by definition" forced to accept the same from the person with whom he comes into contact, and therefore for him communication appears as crossing of a boundary of mutual autonomy. It turns out that not so much the desire to communicate or its content determine the nature of communication, as conditions at the boundary. Desire and content are significant, but there is an additional factor which has to be considered reflectively – the boundary between subjects as a reality sui generis. This boundary is constituted through a clear awareness by the subjects of this communication that effecting this communication (the transmission of certain information) is determined not by the actors, but by the mediating link – the language in which they communicate. It is this language of communication that is the boundary, which suggest crossing itself, and at the same time creating specific difficulties. Among those difficulties, for example, may be different understandings of terms, different ways to interpret the message.

An idea of the boundary closer to the modern one is in Hegel’s dialectic. Although Hegel does not often use the term, the distinction and mutual transition (dialectic) between the internal (being-in-itself) and the external (being-for-itself) has a fundamental importance for him. The dialectic of internal and external, the unity and opposition of being-in-itself and for-itself, the transition from inside to outside and vice versa, is precisely the essence of the process which the concept of the boundary describes (represents). Accordingly, Hegel’s "Science of Logic" is a description of the transition from one category to another (from quantity to quality, essence to existence, form to content, etc.). Transition is measure (third category), which is within the meaning of the boundary "between". The most obvious example of this, is the shift from quantity to quality (called by followers of Hegel "the law of transformation of quantity into quality"). Hegel rightly observes that the dialectical relationship of quality and quantity is the measure (boundary!), so quantitative increments always lead to qualitative changes.

Hegel did not consider the concept of the boundary as being of particular importance in view of the fact that he believed that its meaning would be dissolved in the gener-
al dialectical movement of the spirit, but he made a number of provisions which essentially characterize the problem of the boundary. The general idea of Hegel is that the boundary is a denial, which should be understood as the limit of a thing or its condition. "Only in its boundary and because of it is something there. We cannot, therefore, regard the boundary as only external to actual being; on the contrary, it penetrates all actual existence." .... "Looking closer to the boundary, we find that it involves a contradiction, and hence, is dialectical, namely the boundary is, on the one hand, the reality of actual being, and on the other hand, it is its negation." But that negation does not mean (the appearance of) nothing – on the contrary, it is a denial that supposes something else. In the other <for all things> "its own boundary is objectified." Here we find, Hegel says, that something and the other are in essence the same, that one exists only through the other.

It is this dialectical situation, in which one (the state, culture, people) at the same time denies and claims another (the state, culture, people), that is intended to conceptualize the idea (regulatory principle) of the boundary.

The concept of the anthropological boundary in the light of phenomenology

Modern philosophy in general and philosophical anthropology, in particular, owes much to a strand of phenomenology developed by E. Husserl (1859–1938). His phenomenology, which can be defined as a descriptive (narrative) analytics of consciousness, uses a number of ideas and concepts that are needed to understand the borderlineness (transitional character) of human existence. Important principles of phenomenological description in this respect are: (1) intentionality (2) reflexivity, (3) the horizon.

(1) The main methodological principle for the understanding of consciousness in phenomenology is that the human Ego (I), as the center of synthesis of acts of consciousness in time, can be thought of only in relation to what consciousness is directed to. This focus of consciousness on the thing, one "external", is called the intension. Note that intentionality, essentially characterizing the work of consciousness, is one of the ways to present an open system. Consciousness is essentially open to the world. Description of the work of consciousness grants duality to the act of intention: on the one hand, the consciousness "goes out from itself" to the object and is independent of it, but at the same time, an act of consciousness is created (constituted) by this exit to the outside. Consciousness (thinking) should not be

viewed in isolation from what is thought. At the same time, the thinking and the conceivable are categorically different. This implies a shift of philosophical attention from the parties of a relationship (subject and object) to their relationship and the mediating link, which is language with its structural strength.

(2) The principle of reflexivity in phenomenology – the special case of self-reference. Reflection is responsible for the integrity of the consciousness, the unity of the human Ego. This unity is achieved through the synthesis of intentional acts. The unity of consciousness is achieved by the fact that every act (for example – saying) is reflexively attributed to an instance of Ego, i.e. "I". (That is, "I think about ...."; "I say that ...." etc.). Objects of thinking may be very different, but all statements about them belong to the same instance – I. To understand (know), what is an object, on which are directed act of consciousness, it is necessary to for there to be a clear boundary between it and the knowing subject. (In phenomenology there is special rule, called the "epokhe", which is responsible for this). Ordinary consciousness does not see this boundary and therefore confuses something that belongs to the object with the values which emanate from the subject. To overcome this natural illusion of consciousness, what must be investigated is how the consciousness itself works in the perception of the subject. Methodical reflection (phased phenomenological reduction) meets this task.

The fundamental methodological lesson that phenomenology gives us is that we can understand the other only if we understand ourselves.

(3) Intentionality and the reflexivity of knowledge together create a semantic horizon for the perception of anything, and the world at large.

Consciousness, reflexively aimed at an object, deals not only with its immediate reality, but with the fullness of its potential properties. Invisible at the moment, but implied in the fullness of properties of an object, is called in phenomenology a semantic horizon. This is, according to Husserl, the nature of any perception and experience. Conscious perception transcends the limits of the directly perceived properties of an object to incorporate those not yet perceived, but which are anticipated. Sensual image of "that tree" is never identical to what is currently reflected in the retina of the eye. This image also includes also that the subject knows and remembers about trees. So, the subject knows that this tree has another side, invisible at this moment. One merit of phenomenology (among others) is that it problematized the boundary (transition) between the immediately visible and the implicit in the act of perception. Phenomenology is particularly concerned with this ability to work with the semantic horizon of the perception of things, i.e., "to transit from
the visible to the invisible." Classical philosophy was aware of this distinction, aware of the dependence of the visible (individual) from the unseen (general), but it did not investigate the transition from one to another.

The subsequent development of phenomenology (Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others) spread the idea of the horizon as the arena of art for making boundaries. The aesthetic effect of artistic perception in fact is to "force" the viewer to transcend the field of direct perception and enter the arena of the imaginary. Merleau-Ponty (in "Eye and the spirit") describes a painting as a "window into another world." From a phenomenological position the aesthetic value of a work of art is determined by exactly what kind and scope of semantic horizon is beyond the directly visible or said. This attitude allows characterizing the creation of works of art as the art of making boundaries.

**Place of the principle of borderlineness in contemporary philosophical anthropology**

**Why and how today has changed human’s self-understanding?** The overall situation regarding man’s knowledge of the world and itself is such that as boundaries separating man from the world of nature, other people, and even from himself became quite distinct, they have acquired the status of empirical reality (factuality, as philosophers say). Somewhat simplifying the picture, we can say that a decisive change in the nature of human existence is that, while in the recent past people felt and thought of themselves as living in nature (the natural environment), today progressive mankind in fact sees itself as separated from nature (environment) through their own creations, creations which form a special world (another than the natural or the personal) of culture. Modern man lives entirely in an artificial world, outside of which he, of course, sees the natural world, and for which he therefore begins to feel some "nostalgia". (Hence the surge of different kinds of environmental movements that are impossible for homo naturalis (for "natural person").) But this is just a superficial fact of human existence. Because of the nature of the appearance of a distinct boundary it can be seen that it is a derivative of the original and primary feature of human activity: its productive (creative – in the phenomenal expression) character. The being of Homo sapiens is fundamentally different from that of an animal, because the animal adapts to the environment while man adapts (converts) the environment "for himself", thereby creating a "second nature," i.e., culture. Today this fact appears clearer than ever before. It is no accident that the modern economy is called "innovative" or "creative." As such, it is determined primarily by the subject of activity, by his
plans, projects, dreams, and only secondly by the conditions and resources of the environment.

The idea of an anthropological boundary is not preeminent for understanding the features of a human being. It is derivative (but necessary) from man's essential capacity for creativity. The modern era created the conditions under which this capacity could be developed at a meaningful cultural and social scale. In the middle of the last century, noting that "modern man used to create his life through thought, will and partly imagination", Ilyin poses the problem: "It is particularly important to understand and explain to people the essence of the creative life. This is the greatest problem for the generations coming after us. The structure of the creative act, which is building a culture, must be grasped in its depth, updated from the bottom and, moreover - in all areas, and spiritual vocations." This feature of modern human existence today is celebrated as almost common place in a variety of manifestations. Well-known works that capture significant social implications of changing the nature of human action and the human condition should be noted. These include the works of Robert Florida on the establishment of the creative class and their decisive influence on the entire social structure of a modern society; the book of Hyde on the principle of creative gift in the modern world; the book of Howkin on the creative economy and so forth.

Not every individual employed in typical modern activities (science, engineering, arts, management, and entrepreneurship) clearly understands its creative character. But almost everyone is concerned about their self-realization, which is only a subjective expression of the essential nature of the creative act, as a process of going from the inside out (from the being-in-itself into being-for-itself). The most accurate description of the nature of human existence is given by Charles Taylor, who terms the entirety of the modern era "culture of authenticity", and argues that the main motivation and concern of modern man is self-realization (self-fulfillment). Note that the concept of authenticity characterizes the state of a person who is clearly aware of the boundaries between self and Other, who does not identify himself with the things that he owns, and the things which own him, and

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even does not identify (draw a boundary) between the Self and flesh. After all, authenticity is what remains unchanged despite all the changes in human corporeality (age, for example).

The modern era reveals that through his productive (creative) activity, man himself makes and develops the boundary between himself and the world of nature and other people. Hegel first noticed and described ("Phenomenology of Spirit") this process as an inevitable alienation of result from its parent process. On the one hand, alienation is needed to further the self-realization of the creative spirit, but on the other, it carries a considerable risk. The concept of the boundary aims to describe human being, because it is no longer possible to ignore the risks and challenges posed by the human desire for authenticity to the separation of man from his environment. Separation does not mean isolation. In order to convey a specific human means of interaction of the subject with the surrounding material world, with others and with his own body, a special category of the boundary is designed (and filled with new meaning).

The problem of the anthropological boundary is mainly one which confronts people in Western civilization, a civilization that defines itself as a "society of individuals", i.e. people who see themselves as autonomous units of society (individum – Latin translation of Greek A-tomos – meaning "indivisible"). In collectivist societies (such as Eastern societies), man is described quite differently as originally included in a particular community and it is not conceivable outside of it.

This issue is a pressing one, which requires first the outline of the problem, and then a solution (Although, to date, this has not yet been found).

The idea of the boundary in the theoretical and systems approach of Luhmann and the synergetic anthropology of Khoruzhiy. With regard to the human world, there are two theoretical and methodological approaches that are based on the recognition of the importance of the boundary in the implementation of the world: one developed within the framework of Luhmann’s theoretical and systems approach, and another in Khoruzhiy’s framework of synergetic anthropology. In our view, these two approaches have signs of complementarity. The instrumentality of Luhmann’s theory is well complemented by the existential meaning of the boundary in its anthropological dimension.

The heuristics of Luhmann’s theory is that it reveals the relationship of the boundary with reflexive (self-referential)
processes; it shows how the system implements its reproduction through operations of self- and other-reference and by focusing on "their own operations". "The boundary of the system is nothing other than a kind and a specificity of the operations of system, which individualize it."

Synergetic anthropology proposes to consider man not as a category of separate personality or spirit, as anticipated for almost the entire history of European philosophy, but within the framework of relations with the Other, and thus, in terms of the boundaries of human existence, and the energies, divided by the boundaries. Khoruzhiy argues that the "study of any anthropological phenomenon must begin with an anthropological localization, i.e. revealing, to which topic this phenomenon of the Anthropological Boundary belongs." Under this provision, "anthropology can develop as a description of the 'anthropological boundary'; the boundary of the sphere of all human manifestations and capabilities, the limits of the horizon of human existence." In our interpretation, this means that since anthropological boundaries "are invited to transcendence," in doing so they generate a special kind of energy, an energy of development. Therefore, personal identity exists and can only be thought about within the framework provided by the synergetic processes that occur at anthropological boundaries.

It is sufficient to extrapolate this synergetic logic to social reality, and we can easily go into the discourse of Luhmann's theory. From the point of view of this theory, we can say that the anthropological boundary separates actual human energy (acts and actions) from the operations of the social system. Luhmann proposes to distinguish the autopoiesis of social systems and the autopoiesis of mental systems while at the same time supposing their interpenetration. "The boundaries of a system can be taken over in operating area of another system. Thus, the boundaries of social systems fall into the consciousness, related to mental systems." Both "systems" operate on the basis of self / other-references. It is within this similarity any form of culture can be described as a set of border operations within an "environment."

11 Luman, Sotsial'nyye sistemy, 290.
Connection between the principle of openness and borderliness of human existence in the modern philosophical anthropology. The principle of openness of man to the world is recognized as the source of the human being in modern philosophical analytics. This principle is derived from the phenomenological analytics of consciousness by Husserl and is academically established (in that form) through the work of Heidegger and Sheler. The principle is particular significant for the phenomenological and existentialist version of philosophical anthropology. This analytical principle excludes the possibility of saying something sensible about man (as the subject) outside of his real relationship and interaction with the world. The empirical fact, which is behind this principle, is that all that is human, that is in each of us, is taken from the outside, mainly through the transfer of experience from one subject to another. The newly-born human being is for a long time completely helpless. The baby, if it lacks a human environment, if it is not brought up humanly – does not become a reasonable creature (The main example of this is language training). As acknowledged by anthropologists, man’s ability to be trained through the transfer of subjective experience (knowledge, skills – figuratively speaking, "through the transfer of thoughts") is considered to be a distinctive species ability of humans.¹²

Such an understanding of the human being-in-the-world corresponds to the total attitude of modern science to the study of open systems. From this perspective, one might even say that man is the most open system possible. It could be argued that there was an evolutionary logic for the creation of more and more open, which means – universal, systems, the "crown" of which became man, potentially capable of accommodating the Universe in his inner world.¹³

Openness of the rational subject to the world is multi-dimensional. To not just be born, but also to become a man, one must have communicated openly with another person, thus able to learn from the experience of others, and to be actively open to the world of objects, thus capable of learning from experience (Age psychology and Psychiatry suggest that it is not easy). These two forms of openness must be added two more (due to the complexity of the issue, we will merely note them here): the ability of the subject to shape the experience of their own physicality (the flesh) and experience of the transcendent (visually represented in the mystical and

¹³ By the Universe is understood not only an inventory of the totality of things, but the totality of opportunities that rational being can envisage and be capable of expanding from possibilities into reality. These are the ontological conditions of creativity.
religion experience of any culture). The main thing here is to grasp the following principle: within the creative openness of a subject to the Other is formed the boundary, as a meeting place for the Subject (self) with another Subject, with the Object, as well as with the requirements of his own Flesh and Transcendent.

Combining the principle of openness with the idea of borderliness, or formulating the principle of openness in terms of the boundary, is because maintaining oneself in an open state represents a significant challenge for the Subject. Another Subject and an external object is always a challenge, to which it is required to provide an answer. This response is a way out "from himself" (existenting), the transition of a boundary, and it requires effort. From this perspective, the essence of man can be defined as the ability to give a creative response to the challenge of the Other.

The idea of the boundary allows us to understand why, at a meeting with the Other, the too common solution is not a creative response to the challenge, but an attempt to close in boundaries, to turn the boundary to barrier. The idea of the boundary allows for a focus on the possibility of alternative solutions related to the very principle of borderliness: that the boundary is both protection from the environment and a meeting place with it.

The principle of openness also has its opposite — isolation. But there isolation is considered more as an "option" of exclusion. The boundary we think differently: both as a form of protection and as a place of transition. The most important difference between the question of the human being-in-the-world through the logic of openness or the logic of borderliness is that borderliness attracts the attention of the researcher to (1) their own logic of transition, and (2) the issue of the fundamental mediation of human relations.

It is not enough just to talk about the openness of the human being-in-the-world. It should be borne in mind that this openness is always indirect (See the "Science of Logic" of Hegel on the logic of mediation). The mediating link of relations constitutes the boundary between, providing a special procedure for a relationship. The human "life world" is a world of mediation, i.e. culture. Culture is a universal semantic mediator (a "mediator of sense") in relationships of the subject with other subjects and objects. As such, culture is a form of human life, simultaneously providing the self-reference and other-reference of human existence. This law of form\(^\text{14}\) allows us to treat culture as a boundary. From the aspect of content, Bakhtin offers a similar vision of culture:

\(^{14}\) This law was the starting point for the theory of self-referential systems of N. Luhmann, thanks to the work of G.-S. Brown (G.-S. Brown, Laws of form (New York, 1979)).
"There is no inner area in the cultural field: it is all located on the boundaries, the boundaries are everywhere, through every moment of it, and the systematic unity of culture is in the atoms of cultural life, as the sun reflects on each drop of it. Every cultural act essentially lives on the boundaries: this is its seriousness and importance; distracted from the boundary, it loses ground, it becomes empty, arrogant, degenerate and die."\(^{15}\)

The principle of borderliness is related to one of the main cultural forms – ritual. The ritual in anthropology is generally defined as a rite of passage from one world or state to another. The ritual implies that (1) there is a boundary between the individual and the clan, between children and adults, the earthly and heavenly order, and so on, (2) that there is a need to transit this boundary, (3) and that, thanks to this transition, a connection is established between the worlds. The ancient and deep foundations of ritual mark the symbolic transition between different forms of cosmic and social order (alive – lifeless, human – superhuman, natural – social, etc.). However, the main social function of ritual is that it provides a transition from the private (individual) to the general (generic).

An example of the logic of the borderland and culture (mediating link of relationship) is language, because its essence is to ensure the communication of subjects. (This corresponds to the position of theoretical linguistics, where language is considered primarily as a means of communication). Language has its own logic (it is represented in the hierarchy of its organization: phonemic, lexemic, morphemic, syntactic, and discursive). In order to begin actual human communication, one needs to master the language. Language gives us access to the subjectivity of the other, and isolates us from it. (Remember: "The thought expressed is a lie ..."). The problem is that, the more subjectively important a transmitted thought (image, experience) is, the more it is subjectively saturated (has personal meaning) – and the greater obstacle is to there being a common language (and it can not in principle be another). But because of we are aware of the difficulty of discursive crossing the boundary between the actors, we begin to think about the science and art of overcoming boundaries, begin to improve the language itself. In particular, this is the mission of poetic language and poetics – as the science of transmission of subjective sense.

Thus, the idea of borderliness in the intersubjective relationship allows us both to see the real complexity of in-

\(^{15}\) M.M. Bakhtin, "K voprosam metodologii estetiki slovesnogo tvorchestva [To methodology of Aesthetics of verbal creativity]," In Bakhtin M.M., Sobraniye sochineniy, Vol. 1. (Moscow: Russkiye slovari, Yazyki slavyanskoy kul'tury, 2003), 282.
tersubjective processes, and to create mechanisms to overcome these difficulties. The principle of boundary shows here its heuristics, i.e. the ability to generate a new vision of the problems and open prospects for solutions. (Clearly, if we do not notice and do not identify the problem a solution is impossible).

A structurally similar situation arises in the subject-object relationship. Since this relationship is human, it has a principally mediated and, hence, marginal character. This relationship is instrumental or technical. Technique and technologies are the creative and cultural response of humans to the challenge of nature (the overall world of objects). Technique (technical mediation) is not necessarily conceived in terms of the boundary. It was never conceived in that way before the modern era, when technique becomes a source of environmental problems, a factor of anthropological impact on the environment. Those environmental issues give special relevance of the concept of borderlineness. Today, they are widely discussed in terms of whether man has reached the limit of his capabilities to transform the nature. Towards this, the mass movement of conservationists show little understanding of the issue. We can say that they do not understand the essence of technique as the boundary between man and nature. By itself, technique (as the principle of mediating action) does not carry a special threat to the environment – on the contrary, it contains the full capabilities of protection for it. The danger is not in technique, but in the economic demands (the motives and limitations) of its use. Thinking of technique as a meeting place between man and nature, and as a transition from the world of man to the natural world (the garden is an example) enables us to solve environmental problems without leading to a dead end by demanding the isolation of nature from human impact. Modern so-called "green" and "blue" economies can improve the productivity and diversity of natural processes.

The main conclusions of this chapter we can express in a few theses:

- The general condition of modern philosophical and scientific knowledge (so-called "post-nonclassical science") is characterized by the fact that there was a change of privileged subject of the knowledge. If classical science studied the processes in closed systems, modern science mainly considers open systems and, consequently, processes on the boundaries of internal and external environments.
- A boundary is a zone or an event of meeting, and of transition from one place or state to another.
- Modern philosophy conceives of man as an "open system." Openness, conjugated with specific "operational reticence", is understood as the essential characteristic of a human being. The concept of boundary or borderlineness is
intended to express the dialectic of openness and isolation in human existence. The formula of human existence: it is the being that reflexive correlated with the Other.

- The actual boundary of human existence is a form of culture, which mediates intersubjective relations and the relation of man to nature.
- The model of an anthropological boundary is communication as an intersubjective relationship.
- It is borderlineness, as the main condition and the main problem of human existence, which determines the relevance of the study of boundaries in other areas of philosophical and scientific knowledge.
Recommended reading:


The concept of a symbolic boundary and the history of the boundaries of social systems

Interpretation of the concept of "boundaries of social systems" (which includes "social" (in narrow sense), "ethnic", "racial", "religious" and other boundaries) is the subject of long and heated discussions. These discussions are due to their huge variety of forms and the historical volatility of such boundaries, as well as the influence of fundamental ideological and methodological contradictions in science and society.\(^1\) Perhaps the most striking example of these discussions was a dispute, originating with Ratzel and de la Blache and ongoing since the end of the nineteenth century, regarding the ratio of "naturalness" versus "artificiality" in social boundaries, the extreme expression of which is to oppose the concepts of "natural" and "symbolic" boundaries.

As with most binaries, an absolute opposition of "natural" and "symbolic" interpretations of social boundaries is unable to be substantiated. Any social boundary will be genetically and/or functionally related to the properties of the physical-geographical space and conditions of the environment to which the given social system is adapted in one

\(^1\) These contradictions, in particular, include the splits between realists and nominalists in sociology and between primordialists and constructivists in ethnology.
form or another. At the same time, the boundary of a human community inevitably exists within the consciousness of its members, and hence to some extent is subjected to mental processes and patterns. In this sense, no social boundary can be deprived of a symbolic component. However, the ratio and relative importance of "natural" and "symbolic" in social boundaries allow for many variations.

This variety in the balance of natural and symbolic components within social boundaries can be traced in the process of their historical development. The boundaries of ancient egalitarian communities (tribal communities of hunters, fishers and gatherers with their "appropriating economy") were probably largely determined by the territorial differentiation of the natural environment. Depending on the economic specialization of such communities, the configuration of the territory used and controlled by them quite clearly reflected the spatial limits of certain landscapes and the areas of distribution of certain species of plants and animals. In other words, the boundaries of social systems of this type were incorporated into the structure of their host biosphere complexes (as supersystems). They were strongly influenced by the organization and dynamics of adjacent physical-geographical and biological systems. Indeed, the consanguinity of traditional communities should be considered as valuable factor in encouraging exogamy. It was kinship ties that ensured the right to possession of a territory within defined boundaries. Thus, from an early stage, communal and tribal boundaries began to acquire a symbolic significance with sacred connotations (as the limits of "ancestral lands", "homeland", etc.).

With the development of a productive economy (from the ninth millennium BC), there emerged clearer and more stable representations of the division and contrasting organization between the world of nature and the social space developed by humans (such as areas of settlement or cultivated fields).

The process of politogenesis and emergence of state entities contributed to the further separation and autonomization of social boundaries out of the structure of natural landscapes. This was clearly manifested in ancient and medieval imperial states. These vast multiethnic empires were charac-

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3 Exogamy is the demanding to marriage with representatives of other groups.
terized not only by relatively rapid and large-scale changes in their external borders, but also frequent and often quite arbitrary redrawing from "above" of the boundaries between the peoples they incorporated. Under the influence of state policy and the increased intensity of inter-state and inter-ethnic interactions and conflicts, social boundaries came to be filled with more complex symbolic content and endowed with new cultural and religious meanings as, for example, the line of separation between the "civilized" and "barbarian" worlds or between the "faithful" and "infidels" (gentiles).

The next stage in the development of ideas about boundaries and their representation was associated with the growth of complexity of the conditions of social and political life in the era of Modern (capitalism). The beginning of this era was marked by a tendency by the states of Western Europe to strengthen central authority. Ultimately, it was a process of erasing traditions and boundaries associated with the era of political fragmentation that led to the emergence of internally unified nation-states of the Westphalian type in the region. Their unity was not based only on objective, and above all, economic, relations, but was the result of a deliberate policy of standardization in the field of arts, education and lifestyle. Relying on new information and organizational technologies (the printing press, the media, and mass education), European states achieved an unprecedented level of sovereignty, including control over the formation and functioning of their borders. State borders, along with administrative-territorial and other social boundaries, became mainly a product of political activities, and their symbolism acquired a predominantly political character.4

Currently, the existence of different types of social boundaries is still to a large extent determined by political-symbolic practices. However, a feature of the last few decades (the post-Westphalian era) is that along with state elites, an increasingly active and influential role in the debate on the creation and destruction of symbolic boundaries is beginning to be played by a variety of non-state (supranational and sub-national) entities.

The development of the concept of symbolic boundary in the social sciences

In cognitive practice, the realization of the phenomenon of the boundary occurred primarily in philosophy. Philosophers understood a boundary in the "metaphorical" sense,

i.e. as a purely abstract concept, meaning a division between "internal and external". It is noteworthy that the formation of the social sciences, and sociology in particular (Spencer), in the nineteenth century in Western Europe was associated with "organic" representations (the state as a clearly defined and bounded organism). However, even before this, Marx had proved the significance of class divisions within society. Later, at the turn of the nineteenth century, social theorists, and above all Durkheim and Weber, drew attention to the complex internal differentiation of society. Due to the nature of this phenomenon, they arrived at the concept of the "symbolic boundary." This concept was soon being utilized to discuss social, racial, religious, and other issues. It was no coincidence that the French researcher Moss would soon state that the social world is a world of difference.

The end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s again saw important changes in interpretations of the concept of the boundary, associated with the development of the systems paradigm in the field of natural science. Dissatisfaction with simplistic ideas regarding the interaction between system and environment (input-output, stimulus-response, etc.) focused attention on the internal organization of systems, their self-description (self-reference) and the functioning and self-reproduction of systems in operational isolation. In this context, the significance of the boundary in general and of symbolic boundaries of systems have become widely recognized. A significant role in the formation of these new ideas was played by such scientific fields as reflective cybernetics (von Foerster) and neuroscience (Maturana, Varela). In sociology, the importance of the boundary was supported in the social system theory of the American researcher Talcott Parsons.

However, in general, the socio-humanitarian sphere at this time developed other approaches to solving problems, similar to those engaged with by the natural sciences. First of all, there was the almost universal "disappointment" in the utility of the system paradigm. These sentiments were largely due to the proliferation of postmodernism, whose creators (Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, and other "poststructuralists"), claimed that order and interconnectedness are not properties of the world, but instead represent the requirements of the knowing subject, i.e. man. Consequently representatives of different disciplines of this branch of knowledge, when discussing their problems, began to point to the importance of "constructivism." This approach is based on the assumption that if in the physical, chemical and other "worlds" there are certain patterns, in the social sphere all is constructed by people on completely subjective grounds rather than being based upon objective causes. This position was set out 1966 by the authors of the "Bible of social construc-
tivism", Berger and Luckmann, who wrote that, "... we modified Durkheim's theory of society through the introduction of a dialectical perspective, characteristic of Marx, and emphasizing, in the spirit of Weber, that the structure of social reality is constituted by subjective values."

The important point was the idea of a symbolic universe that formed, "the matrix of all socially-objectified and subjectively-real values; the whole historical society and the whole biography of an individual are considered as a phenomena occurring within this universe."

In the 1970s there emerged such direction as the "radical constructivism". As pointed out by one of its creators, von Glasersfeld: "This is an unconventional approach to the problem of knowledge and cognition. This approach takes for granted that knowledge, no matter how determined, is contained in people's heads, and that the subject of thought can only be constructed on the basis of what he or she knows on the basis of his or her own experience. The only world in which we consciously live is constructed from our experiences...." Not surprisingly, the supporters of extreme constructivism had already received a warning that in some of their positions, they consolidate with a completely solipsistic and even agnostic ideas. It is clear that in these circumstances, the concept of the boundary does not really matter, because it can be constantly redefined by different actors. In their theories, the constructivists grant the greatest importance to the psychological category of "identity".

Meanwhile, all these postmodernist, constructivist quests can be seen as attempts of scholars seeking a simple answer for the "challenge of complexity." In general, the meaning of this challenge can be summarized as follows. In the case of the states, society, politics, and other phenomena of this kind, a researcher is not able to holistically examine the object of study directly, and must be content with only a partial representation of them (In literature on this problem, the parable of the elephant and the three blind men became once again popular). In such situations, we need to understand how we can, if we can, garner a holistic vision of the phenomenon under study, which is characterized by complexity. Further still, we should understand to what extent the properties of the knowing subject and the methods he uses correspond to the characteristics of the object of research, and how they relate to one another.

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6 Berger and Lukman, *Sotsial'noye konstruirovaniye real'nosti*, 158.
This challenge, first realized in physics and the other natural sciences, was formulated as a problem of observation and the properties of the observer carrying out these operations. It should be noted that problems of this kind earlier touched also some disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, especially history and later anthropology. However, this happened even before the articulation of the principle of complexity. As a result, at the present level of development, these sciences are not ready to realize the meaning of a multiplicity of interpretations offered by different observers (experts). In addition, the "information explosion" should be taken into account, making impossible a real integration of all these observations. Currently, we have an increasing number of circumscribed sciences with an artificially defined boundaries of objects of their research, and the arising for any reason pluralism of conflicting views of their representatives ("observers") that, in the absence of clear procedures and criteria for verification of observation, allows to question the scientific status of the disciplines of the social and humanitarian sphere. In this context, the desire of some theorists of this branch of knowledge to reduce all problems to the definition of the boundaries of complex phenomena is understandable. In other words, they again use a simplistic approach to solve the problem, instead of thoroughly analyzing the basic properties of related phenomena. Nevertheless, they still faced serious methodological difficulties.

In this context, it becomes obvious that postmodern constructivists deal exclusively with observations and observers, noting with delight more and more data on their limited opportunities. Of course, earlier in the social sciences on the practices of observation and the role of the subject's qualities has been neglected. It should also be recognized that the study of these aspects of the epistemological order has its difficulties, due in particular to a reflexive loop. As shown by Khitsenko: "In social systems where observers are both the objects of observation and the participants, there is a special kind of uncertainty. The reflexive loop comprises of a perception of reality, actions on the basis of this perception, not always correct and always incomplete, the impact of these actions on reality and then once again the perception of that reality – this is distinct from the study of natural phenomena." The author also pointed out the need to take into account data from such fields as Gestalt psychology, which shows the dominance of synthesis over analysis in the visual perceptions of humans. As a result, subjective descriptions of reality, including testimonies, tell us more about the

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observers, the differences of their mentality and cognitive processes, than about observed objects themselves.\(^9\)

However, observation ("fixation") is only one aspect of the problem, with another being the question of the real properties of complex entities, such as socio-political systems, and existence within them of all sorts of symbolic boundaries. As the research of Lamont and Fournier states: "...one of the most important challenges that we face today is understanding how we create boundaries and what are the social consequences of such actions."\(^10\) These authors also noted that there are three main approaches to interpreting symbolic boundaries: they are the boundaries in our heads, in interactions or in socio-political systems. In their view, these approaches correspond to the three basic dimensions of social life: cognitive, communicative and political.

It is significant that according one definition (Epstein) a symbolic boundary is understood as the line that includes and define some people, groups and things, while excluding other phenomena of the same order.\(^11\)

At the same time the concept of the "symbolic boundary" can be used to determine the internal differences in classification systems, as well as temporal, spatial or visual cognitive differences.\(^12\)

In other words, in studies of the problem of symbolic boundaries we have the same diversity of opinions, due to the use of data from different observers, as obtained under different conditions. Is it still possible to do something with this data to help us in understanding the real nature of symbolic boundaries? To answer this question we need to consider in more detail existing attempts to solve the problem, in order to understand their basic approaches and the results of such investigations (observations).

Among the authors who have tried to operatively overcome this problem, we can examine the British social theorist Walter Buckley, author of the book "Sociology and Modern Systems Theory" (1967).\(^13\) He acknowledged that the large objects as society can no longer be considered as the in-

\(^9\) Khitsenko, "Neskol'ko shagov k novoy sistemnoy metodologii," 12.
\(^12\) R. Wagner-Pacifici, *Theorizing the standoff: contingency in action* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
tegral facts. They are available for our study only at different levels of relationships or processes occurring in them. Among these processes, Buckley was inclined to pay most attention to communication and information networks, because organic systems, including societies, are characterized by the process of information exchange. The important point is the idea of an inseparable connection of action and self-awareness (consciousness).

In recent years, growing attention has been paid to the social system theory of the German "philosophizing sociologist" Niklas Luhmann, in which the concept of the boundary is assigned a very significant role. Luhmann accepted the challenge posed by complexity, according to which "the world has shifted to the sphere of unobserved." Following this logic, the author concludes: "society has ceased to be identical with itself, and what is stated as it, in fact is no longer a society." Crucial is the fact that the study of society involves the use of a special methodology, because social system is auto-topoietic, i.e. capable of reproducing itself on the basis of internal communications within a certain boundary.

This approach allowed Luhmann to make a definite conclusion: "... systems theory can formulate that any unity used in the system (whether it be the unity of the element, of the process or of the system), must be constituted by the system itself, and not inputted from the world around her." However, Luhmann understands that any social system is not isolated, but surrounded by other systems that make up that system's environment. Therefore, quite naturally, he comes to the following conclusion: "The system has its boundaries. This separates the concept of system from the concept of structure. Boundaries are impossible to think of without the idea of an "abroad". Thus, they suggest the possibility of their intersection and reality of the outer world. Therefore, in a general sense, they have the double function of separating and binding a system and environment." Under such circumstances, Luhmann believes, a system is a distinction, i.e. defining the boundaries of a particular system, which separates it from the rest. "Therefore, the most important requirement for the identification of systems, along with the constitution of their own elements, is the definition of boundaries."

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16 Luman, Sotsial'nyye sistemy, 58.
17 Luman, Sotsial'nyye sistemy, 59.
For a more precise fixing of the boundary Luhmann, in particular, proposed to introduce a distinction between the information, specific to the interaction of a system with the environment, and communication, inherent to the internal operations of the system. On this basis, he considered it necessary to clarify that a system reproduces itself through communication. Within such self-reproduction, the author assigned great importance to the operations of self-observation for the system. So, in his understanding, the system is, first of all, something that can distinguish itself from its environment through self-observation (self-reference). Therefore, Luhmann stated: "... the system through its own operations creates the boundary, differentiates itself from the outside world and only then and the only way it can be seen as a system."

Further development of this important thesis allowed Luhmann to reduce the study of the properties of the system to the operation of observing as the system observes itself. It is clear that the author had to incorporate an external observer in his reasoning. In fact, according to his ideas, the observer can simultaneously capture the two-sided (border?) form combining the system and the environment, difference of which creates the necessary unity. As a result, the author came to the remarkable epistemological conclusion that: "We do not need to know what the world is, if we know how it is observed, and know how to navigate in the field of observation of the second order", that associated with the observer himself.

Thus, even this schematic presentation of Luhmann’s theory of social systems allows us to state that he managed to connect some of the provisions of the systems approach and the significance of the study of boundaries, linking them together with the operation of observation. However, this originality was achieved at the cost of renouncing earlier ideas regarding the properties of a system (integrity) and the reduction of all problems to the operation of creating and observing the boundaries of bilateral forms. No less remarkable is the tendency of this author to separate social systems from mental ones, and exclude from them real people (individuals). Nevertheless, the return into social sciences the ideas about the significance of differentiating system and external environment, and the introduction to this field of the operation of observing, that more correctly, compared with Constructivism, represent an epistemological problematic of

18 Luman, Sotsial'nyye sistemy, 83–84.
19 Luman, Sotsial'nyye sistemy, 94.
20 Luman, Sotsial'nyye sistemy, 183.
21 Luman, Sotsial'nyye sistemy, 145.
the social sciences, can be viewed as a positive contribution of his theory.

**Ethnic boundary as a variant of symbolic boundary**

The advantages of Luhmann’s approach become especially noticeable when compared with proposals for the solution to the problem of symbolic boundaries in Ethnology/Anthropology. At the beginning of the last century, Mogylyanskii suggested that the object of study for ethnography must be the concepts "people" and "ethnic group" in the form of "ethnic individuals" with a set of inherent exceptional qualities, but not issues of their culture. This idea was developed by Russian/Soviet ethnology in the framework of the theory of ethnos in the 1920s, and then, after a hiatus in which ethnology and Marxism were deemed incompatible, was "revived" in the late 1940s by Kouchner, Tokarev and Cheboksarov. In the early 1990s, a "requiem for ethnos" was once again proclaimed, with a focus on foreign theories of ethnicity. Thus the problem of ethnic boundaries themselves never became the subject of discussion in Russian/Soviet science. Therefore, our analysis is limited to the achievements of western anthropology.

Note that for a long time the western, and primarily Anglophone, scientific tradition was concerned with issues of race and racial boundaries. However, over time it became clear that the scope of this concept was unable to cover the diversity of human communities, so an alternative was sought. Thus in the 1960s interest emerged in the idea of ethnicity. To date, western anthropology continues to value one of the first concepts of ethnicity created by the Norwegian scholar Barth. This author linked the definition of ethnicity with the concept of an ethnic group, which is understood as a community that meets the following criteria:

1. is biologically self-perpetuating;
2. has common fundamental cultural values, embodied in a certain unity of cultural forms;
3. provides a space of communication and interaction;
4. has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same level.²²

The reasons of the ideas, which Barth further develops, are quite understandable: "First, we give primary emphasis to the fact that ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus have the characteristic of organizing interaction between people...

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to observe these processes we shift the focus of investigation
from internal constitution and history of separate groups to
ethnic boundaries and boundary maintenance."\(^{23}\)

Barth then notes that "... boundaries persist despite a
flow of personnel across them... stable, persisting, and often
vitaly important social relations are maintained across such
boundaries, and are frequently based precisely on the dichot-
omized ethnic statuses."\(^{24}\)

Today we can only envy the optimism of F. Barth be-
thieved that "... ethnic boundaries direct social life, often form-
ing quite complex organizations of behavior and social rela-
tionships ..."\(^{25}\) At the same time he expressed confidence of
the following kind:"... boundary maintenance is unproblem-
atical and follows from the isolation which the itemized char-
acteristics imply: racial difference, cultural difference, social
separation and language barriers, spontaneous and organ-
ized enmity."\(^{26}\) He therefore proposed that:"The critical focus
of investigation from this point of view becomes the ethnic
boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that
it encloses. The boundaries to which we must give our atten-
tion are of course social boundaries, though they may have
territorial counterparts."\(^{27}\)

By refusing to incorporate this 'cultural stuff' in his pro-
gram of research of boundaries, Barth was inclined to attach
major importance to the identity of group members, since it,
in his opinion, is the criterion for the inclusion of certain in-
dividuals and exclusion of others. "Common to all these sys-
tems is the principle that ethnic identity implies a series of
constraints on the kinds of roles an individual is allowed to
play, and the partners he may choose for different kinds of
transactions.' In other words, regarded as a status, ethnic
identity is superordinate to most other statuses, and defines
the permissible constellations of statuses, or social personali-
ties, which an individual with that identity may assume."\(^{28}\)
At the same time, offering to take into account the territorial
analogue of social boundaries, he was more concerned with
the need to "... explore the various ways in which they are
maintained, not only as a once and for all fixed, but as a con-
tinuous confirmation and ratification."

It should also be borne in mind that Barth consid-
ered boundaries of these kinds as variants of "... social con-
tacts between people of different cultures: ethnic groups ex-
ist as a significant communities only when they simply

\(^{23}\) Barth, *Ethnic groups and boundaries*, 10.
\(^{24}\) Barth, *Ethnic groups and boundaries*, 9–10.
\(^{25}\) Barth, *Ethnic groups and boundaries*, 16.
\(^{26}\) Barth, *Ethnic groups and boundaries*, 11.
\(^{27}\) Barth, *Ethnic groups and boundaries*, 15.
\(^{28}\) Barth, *Ethnic groups and boundaries*, 17.
represent differences in behavior, i.e. the sustainable cultural differences." Thus Barth had already laid out here the idea of the significance of processes of interethnic interaction, both for maintaining the boundaries of different groups, and for the proper study of ethnicity. No less important for understanding his methodology is another remark: "That which can be attributed to the articulation and separation on a macro level corresponds to the limitative systematic set of roles at the micro level." In fact, here we have an indication of the author’s commitment to the methodological individualism.

It should be noted that Barth tried also to take into account the reality of modern states with multi-ethnic populations: "The positive bond that connects several ethnic groups in an encompassing social system depends on the complementarity of the groups with respect to some of their characteristic cultural features." But, according to the author, the value of ethnic boundaries is also preserved under such circumstances. This is for the following reasons: a) complexity is based on the existence of important, complementary cultural differences; b) these differences must be generally standardized within the ethnic group – i.e. the status cluster, or social person, of every member of a group must be highly stereotyped – so that inter-ethnic interaction can be based on ethnic identities; and c) the cultural characteristics of each ethnic group must be stable, so that the complementary differences on which the system rests can persist in the face of close inter-ethnic contact.

Nevertheless, Barth still had to admit: "In some social systems, ethnic groups co-reside though no major aspect of structure is based on ethnic inter-relations..." Therefore, he quite rightly called for studying this relationship, considering the agents of change as, first of all, certain individuals, with adopted strategies and established forms. To participate in large social systems, these agents (the elites), must choose between the following basic strategies: 1) to make a breakthrough and be included in a certain industrial society and dominant cultural group; 2) take the status of a "minority", and adapt to it due to the concentration of cultural differences in non-public (non-articulated) sectors, and take part in other sectors of activity within the large system of the industrialized group; 3) start to "puff out" their ethnic identity, using it to achieve new positions and develop new models for the organization of activities in these sectors, previously unknown in their society or modified to achieve new

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29 Barth, Ethnic groups and boundaries, 16.
30 Barth, Ethnic groups and boundaries, 17.
31 Barth, Ethnic groups and boundaries, 18–19.
32 Barth, Ethnic groups and boundaries, 30.
goals. Barth takes into account that many modern forms are fairly politicized, but in his opinion, it does not make the nature of them less ethnic.

Thus, we can say that the basic ideas of this work of Barth on ethnicity bear the imprint of the time when constructivism had not yet acquired its subsequent influence, and metatheories and meganarratives had not yet been criticized by postmodernism. Therefore, this author, paying tribute to the importance of ethnic boundaries and mechanisms of identity, called for the study of the territorial analogs of boundaries, factors of interethnic interaction and the realities of countries with a multi-ethnic composition of the population. In this sense, there is a remarkable similarity between the ideas of the Norwegian Barth and Yu.V. Bromley, the creator of the "Soviet theory of ethnos". Bromley paid attention not so much to the issue of ethnic boundaries, but the phenomenon of ethnicity (ethnic community) itself and its main features. At the same time, his study found a place for themes of both the ethnic consciousness ("ethic paradox"), and the inclusion of ethnic groups, in the narrow sense of the word ("ethnikos"), in ethnos in the broader sense, as the "ethno-social body."

No less significant is that, in declaring the importance of maintaining the boundaries for the existence of ethnic groups, Barth did not pay special attention to the establishment ("instrumentalization") of boundaries and further research of them. In this sense, his position is close to the conception of Luhmann, who also did deeply probe the problem of fixing and revealing the boundaries. Luhmann presumably supposed that the boundaries of social systems will be apparent to the researcher ("observer"), who will competently apply the proposed methodology for analyzing them.

It is noteworthy that subsequent authors, partially following Barth’s approach, began to develop only some individual aspects of ethnicity and ethnic boundaries, being more concerned with the idea of identity. For example, there is Bourdieu’s thesis that "ethnic groups are real due to the production of faith of people in their reality." The logical continuation of this trend can be seen in the concept of the nation as an imagined community, associated with Benedict Anderson. In his definition of the nation Anderson stated that it is "an imaginary political community ... It is imaginary because the representatives of even the smallest nation

33 Barth, Ethnic groups and boundaries, 33.
34 Barth, Ethnic groups and boundaries, 34.
will never know most of members of it, meet them, even hear about them; and, nevertheless, in the minds of each of these people exists an image of their community." A similar "virtualization" of the phenomena of ethnic community and nation can be seen in the work of Brubaker on the possibility of the existence of ethnicity without real communities. In general, it must be noted that the problem of the definition of ethnic boundaries has not yet received a conceptual solution within the framework of ethnography/anthropology.

On the question of an interdisciplinary research of boundaries

In the second phase of the development of border studies, as noted by Wilson and Donnan, it became common for interdisciplinary researchers to adopt the ethnographic, or more generally the anthropological, approach to studying the problems of borders. Unfortunately, as these authors correctly noted: "While scholars regularly reiterate that border studies is now an interdisciplinary field, they rarely explain precisely what this entails.

Therefore Wilson and Donnan not only began to talk about the postdisciplinary status of their field, but also tried to justify this special position, stressing in particular the importance of cultural, anthropological and ethnographic aspects for the study of boundaries.

Given the complexity of the phenomenon of boundaries, Lamont and Molnar offer three basic approaches to study them within their postdisciplinary methodology. The first one of these was an analysis of the properties of the boundaries. The second approach should undertake a systematic cataloguing of the key mechanisms associated with the activation, maintenance, transposition, disputation, bridging, crossing or dissolution of boundaries. Finally, the third approach, in their opinion, should focus on the theme of cultural membership. The authors did not forget the cognitive (socio-psychological) component of boundaries, which concerns processes of stereotyping, self-identification and categorization.

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Paraphrasing Lamont and Molnar, we can say that they are encouraged to study the real properties of boundaries and conditions of their functioning. In addition, they show the need for research on cognitive processes of fixing and the subsequent interpretations of boundaries, analysis of existing discourses regarding boundaries and the role of social groups and individuals in creating, maintaining and destroying borders, as well as shaping the images of boundaries and giving them a certain meanings.

However, it seems, that the proposals of Lamont and Molnar have not exhausted all the possibilities of an anthropological approach to the study of boundaries. In the light of the significance of observation and the role of the observer (observers) in postdisciplinary studies of complex phenomena and issues, including boundaries, we can identify additional aspects of anthropological research. Wilson and Donnan have noted that: "The anthropology of borders helped to remind social scientists in and outside of anthropology that nations and states are composed of people who should not be reduced to the images that are constructed of them by representatives of the state, the media and academics." 41

In the case of symbolic, including ethnic, boundaries, and their establishment and operation, of course, it is difficult to overestimate the role of psychological mechanisms, and symbolic and discursive practices. Therefore, we must study the cognitive processes of categorization and stereotyping by real individuals in the social environment. Then we will understand how individuals think of themselves as equivalent and similar to, or incompatible with, others, and of how they "perform" their differences and similarities. Another side of this problematics that concerning the researchers themselves was shown by Marilyn Strathern in her definition of interdisciplinarity as self-consciousness about the ability to mix knowledges from different sciences. 42

However, at the same time, we must not ignore the social and biological determinants of mental processes and the conscious perception of symbolic reality. It appears that a significant contribution in addressing issues of this kind could also stem from new disciplines such as neurosociology. In the light of the ideas of Alexander about the independent of human diversity nature of the phenomenon of culture, the influence of cultural factors on individuals and communities formed by them also must be taken into account. 43

Besides that, there is the obvious importance of the political factor in solving these problems. Finally, let’s not forget about the factor of ethnicity, in a narrow sense, which could benefit from another new field, that of neuroanthropology.\textsuperscript{44}

Under these conditions, in the context of current trends and approaches in scientific theory and methodology, the restrictions of the constructivist way of solving problems of social, ethnic and other symbolic boundaries become clear. Of course, these problems are characterized by the dominance of the anthropological ("subjective") component. However, this does not negate the fact that the symbolic (psychomental) sphere of human existence is a special reality, which has its own determinants, not just the free will of the individual (individuals). However, recognition of the legitimacy of such a conclusion suggests going beyond the principle of methodological individualism dominant in Western science and adopting an alternative approach – a methodological collectivism.

\textsuperscript{44} D.H. Lende and G. Dawney, eds., \textit{The Uncultured Brain: An Introduction to Neuroanthropology} (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012).
Recommended reading:


Chapter 2.2 Symbolic boundaries of social systems


Among the many types of social boundaries in the Modern era, those that form the borders of the state are, of course, the most important. Despite the impressive growth since the mid-twentieth century of scientific interest in anthropological, gender, professional, ethnic and cultural forms of differentiation of space, it is state borders that remain the object of most border studies. This is not by accident. State borders, covering today almost the entire territorial surface of the globe, exert the most powerful and versatile influence on social relations. The exceptional importance of this type of social boundaries is a direct result of the role the state plays in modern society.

Nature of the state and the specificity of the state’s border

It is impossible to understand the modern significance and specificity of state borders without taking into account the history and essential features of the state, of which it forms a crucial part. Contemporary societies, regardless of whether they are postindustrial, industrial or pre-industrial, possess a state form of organization. In other words, currently the existence of a state organization is (and, no less important, is widely recognized) a mandatory attribute of any self-contained social system (the nation). However, this reality, and such representations, appeared rather recently. Although the first states emerged around 3000 BC (in Egypt
and Mesopotamia), for a long time, most human societies remained stateless. The state became a global phenomenon only at the end of the nineteenth century, after the division of the world among the colonial empires. And only at the end of the twentieth century has the world in general become a system of sovereign, i.e. at least formally independent, nation-states.

In the social sciences there are a number of significantly divergent definitions of the state, often stemming from the large national and historical variability of the phenomenon and the multiplicity of methodological and ideological perspectives that can be brought to bear upon its examination. In this chapter, the state will be understood as a special type of social system, which has a legitimate monopoly on sovereign political power within the territorial limits of a given society (societal system). The present definition refers to the three essential, the most stable and specific, characteristics of every state: 1) public political power – power over society (the population of the state), but separated from it and existing as the legitimate monopoly of specialized government institutions; 2) sovereignty – the rule of state power over this society in relation to any other power; 3) territoriality – limitation of the state’s sovereignty within a certain territory.¹

The state border is the direct embodiment of the above characteristics of the state. The state border can be defined as a sub-system of the state, establishing the spatial limits of its sovereignty, and ensuring the authoritative regulation of social (transborder) relations. As part of the state, the state border is a mechanism of public political power, the control of which is a monopoly of specialized institutions. The state border has political rule over all other types of social boundaries (often cutting or even destroying them) and is independent of the government and the borders of other states (i.e. it possesses an international legal status). Finally, the state border is territorial, i.e. it fixes the limits of state sovereignty within physical-geographical space, including land, water and marine areas of the earth’s surface, its atmosphere, and the depths of the earth.

In addition to these three essential (permanent) features of state border, its distinctive features are a high degree of complexity and formal legal institutionalization. The complexity of the state border is associated with the inclusiveness of a politics covering all spheres of society, and the desire of the modern state to control in one way or another all transborder relations related to these spheres (political, so-

cial, economic, cultural). Formal institutionalization of the state border is due to the fact that the law is specific and increasingly important means of implementing the will of the state. The degree of regulation by the state of its borders is directly related to the breadth of use of this means. The two characteristics of state borders given above are variables, the measure of which has varied between the states of different historical periods and regions.

It should be emphasized that these permanent and variable features of state borders, in their entirety, serve to clearly distinguish state borders from other social boundaries sufficiently only at a generalized, theoretical level. In reality, the differences between them may be blurred, allowing for the existence of transitional forms. As the state depends on the peculiarities of coexisting and interacting with it other social systems and society as a whole, so the state border is influenced by the properties of a variety of different social boundaries related to it. Historically, it formed on the basis of the intermittent and frontier boundaries of different non-state communities (local clans, tribes and chiefdoms, cultural, religious and economic regions) and emerged through their gradual complication and transformation. In the case of the disintegration or absorption of the state, its borders can be transformed again and develop features associated with other kinds of boundaries. Thus, with all its distinctive characteristics, the state border remains an integral part of a broad class of boundaries of social systems.

The state border system: composition, structure, and functions.

Modern states are very complex systems. In the course of their long historical development, they have reached a high degree of specialization in their functions and a tremendous differentiation in their internal structure. One result of this specialization and differentiation is the emergence, in almost all stable and viable modern states, of the special subsystem of the state border.

The degree of specialization of state borders within the structure of various states is not identical. It depends on many factors: the political regime and form of government, the level of socio-economic development and social welfare, the length of the border and severity of the borders contradictions. The main indicators of the degree of specialization of the state border system are the proportion and relative role in its management of non-specialized, supreme (the head of state, government, parliament) and related (economic, social and other agencies) institutions versus institutions specialized in the regulation of transborder relations as in the main purpose of their work.
Specialization of the state border system is closely related to its integrity. If specialized border institutions are directly subject to various non-specialized state bodies, the level of integrity of the system may not be high. Under certain conditions, it could seriously hamper management of the border and reduce the effectiveness of its functioning. In order to improve the integrity of the border system, many states concentrate the most important functions in its management and relations with non-specialized state bodies under the authority of a central higher border institution or a coordinative, inter-agency structure.2

Another feature of the state border system in general is its position in the general structure of the state, its place within sectoral and hierarchical organization. If we consider the sectoral organization of the state as the separation of branches of power, the state border system is usually a part of the executive branch. In turn, within the executive branch, the key authority in border management can be concentrated in the bodies of defense and national (state) security (the US, Russia, China), the police (Germany) or socio-economic agencies (France). The political significance and degree of specialization of the state border system is usually revealed by the level of the institutional hierarchy of the state of which it is part. An indicator of this level may be the status of the central (or coordinating) border institution. In some countries it has the status of a special supreme body of the executive branch (the Ministry), while in most states it is just one of the units (the agency, department, or service) of such a body.

The internal structure of a modern state border system is very complex and heterogeneous. It is this complexity and heterogeneity that has led to the emergence of a number of different definitions of the state border. Thus, according to one definition, the state border is understood as a system of formal institutions (functionalist approach), while according to others it is as a system of behavioral practices (informal institutions) (anthropological approach), or as a set of social representations for a third approach (constructivism).3 All of these definitions are justifiable, but they focus only on parts (aspects) of the system. If one were to try to give a more com-

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2 For example, in Russia since 2003 such coordinative structure is the State Border Commission.

plete description of the state border system, five main types of elements can be distinguished in its composition:

- Objectified phenomena of consciousness (the legal and ideological framework of the state border system);
- Non-objectified phenomena of consciousness (mass, cultural and psychological, representations of the border);
- Formal roles and institutions (official institutions, organizations and positions in the state border system);
- Informal roles and institutions (stable individual and collective practices of "border people");
- Material tools and resources (physical, natural and artificial, objects used in the functioning of the border).

The types of elements of the state border system listed above correspond to different types of its structures and spaces (*Table 1*).

The most important and specific component of the state border system are formal roles and institutions, and the linking them structures of activities. As subjects making and implementing management decisions, these institutions (customs, immigration, border guard, informational and health agencies, etc.), first of all maintain the integrity and distinctiveness of the system of the border, and at the same time, its subordination to the interests of the state as a whole. However, the complexity of the composition of formal institutions, the density and degree of centralization of the structure of their political and administrative activities, and their power relations are quite different in different countries. So, in some emerging states the only formal border institutions are bodies of border guards (or army units) as part of a system of vertical control, while in developed countries this system consists of a range of different agencies related through a variety of subordinative and coordinative relations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of elements of the border system</th>
<th>Types of structures of the border system</th>
<th>Types of spaces of the border system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objectified phenomena of consciousness</td>
<td>Rational-logical connections</td>
<td>Mental space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-objectified phenomena of consciousness</td>
<td>Sensual-emotional ties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal roles and institutions</td>
<td>Structures of activities</td>
<td>Social space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal roles and institutions</td>
<td>Structures of behavior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material tools and resources</td>
<td>Physical connections</td>
<td>Physical space</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the author
The functioning of the formal roles and institutions of the state border would not be possible without the presence in the system of normative and ideological phenomena of consciousness objectified in official documents. Ideological values and legal norms, logically ordered in doctrinal and legislative systems, set long-term goals for the state border and establish the limits of what is permitted in its functioning. The structure of logical relationships of normative and ideological elements of the border system is characterized, above all, by the degree of its integrity and internal consistency. The contradictions in this structure are able to significantly reduce the efficiency of the entire state border system and even lead to its complete disorganization.4

A lot of research reduces the study of the state border to an analysis of formal institutions, ideologies and legislation. However, this approach, especially in the modern era, is too simplistic. Like many other social systems, state borders exist not only at the level of explicit, public and documented manifestations, but in an informal, latent level. In particular, along with the formal, one can detect informal roles and institutions, and the linking them structures of everyday practices. The informal component of the state border consists of individual and collective actors, who, while not having legal status, however, have a significant and direct impact on its functioning. In democracies such actors (e.g. the groups of cross-border population, the diasporas, the business communities) operate relatively freely and can articulate and implement at least some of their interests through formal border institutions.5 In the context of an undemocratic regime, the state, suppressing the political activity of society, often tends to exclude informal roles and institutions from the system of the state border. However, to solve this problem completely, as a rule, is not possible. This is because the informal component of the border system does not solely consist of civil society actors external to the state apparatus, but also of officials and whole organizations, to the extent that they are involved in informal practices, including corrupt behavior.

The composition and structure of relations of informal roles and institutions of the state border (as well as formal) can be evaluated according to the criteria of complexity, density and centralization. In addition, an important characteristic of the composition of the informal actors and the structure of their practices is the degree of their compliance with

4 It is noticeable that the process of creating common borders of the EU or the EAEU also started with the ideological and legal unification of the borders of the states integrated in them.

5 For example, through public and expert councils at the state border bodies.
the official ideology, norms and institutions of the border: it is in terms of this that they can be regarded as informal (extra-legal, supplementing official), semi-legal ("gray", partially contradicting the official) or illegal ("black", essentially, totally at variance with the official)\(^6\).

On the implicit level of the state border, there are also non-objectified phenomena of cultural and psychological layers of consciousness, unconscious or partly unconscious mass representations, values, stereotypes and their sensual-emotional ties. Manifesting through the informal behavior of individual and collective subjects, they are sometimes able to influence the functioning and development of the border to a greater degree than the state’s ideology and laws.\(^7\) The key characteristics of the structure of cultural and psychological consciousness are its degree of integrity (social, subcultural fragmentation) and differentiation (extent to which it reflects the real complexity of the border).

A special component of the state border system is its material tools and resources and the structure of their physical interactions. This includes both the natural objects (landscapes, relief, water) used to establish and maintain a border system and the artificial objects (checkpoints, border settlements, roads, fortifications, transportation, facilities, weapons, etc.) necessary to formal and informal actors for the implementation of various forms of border activity and behavior. The main criteria for analyzing the composition and structure of the material tools and resources are their complexity, density and centralization.

Thus, the state border system is composed of several types of elements and structures of a varied nature. However, under normal conditions, these do not violate the border’s integrity. It is provided not only by the fact that all the elements and structures of the state border system are involved in the implementation of its general functions. Between the elements and structures of various types, there are immediate, direct and inverse genetic and functional relations that maintain a necessary degree of mutual similarity or isomorphism. Thanks to these relations, for example, cultural perceptions of the border may find expression within official ideology or legal norms, thus influencing mass behavioral patterns, while the allocation of border infrastructure reflects the organizational structure of border security institutions.

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\(^7\) See e.g.: Anssi Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness. The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1996).
In addition to its composition and structure, the state border system has such a parameter of description as the space. Space is often defined as a set of processes and relationships between objects. In this sense, the concept of "space" is close to that of "structure". However, these terms do not fully coincide. The fact is that a structure is a set of regular reproducible current relationship between elements in a system. The concept of space is broader: it includes both current and potential relations among elements. Each of the five revealed structures of the state border system corresponds to a certain space. At the same time, based on the similarity of their properties, these spaces can be grouped into three major groups: mental, physical and social.

The mental space of the state border system is the totality of all mental, objectified and non-objectified, phenomena and relations that are actual and potential conditions for the consciousness activity of actors within the system. The physical space of this system is formed by a set of natural and artificial physical objects and relations that are or may be conditions for the functioning of the border. Intermediate and binding positions between mental and physical spaces of the border make up its social space, and consists of all the physical, mental and social phenomena and relations that are actual and potential conditions for the practices (activities and behaviors) of formal and informal subjects of the state border system.

The wide range of functions performed by the modern state border system can be divided into two main groups: constitutive and regulative. Performing constitutive functions, state borders contribute to the reproduction of the state's system and the maintenance of its integrity and self-identity. This group includes two important functions: marking and socializing. The marking function of the state border system materially designates the limits of the state (and also the society and nation) in physical-geographical space. For this purpose, a variety of special symbols (border poles, buoys, signs, images), and large border objects (fences, walls, ditches and ramparts, fortifications, etc.) are used. The socializing function of the state border is the symbolic positioning of the state (society) by fixing its existence, and what it differentiates, in mental space. This function is performed by the border system through the formation of values, symbols and images, feelings and emotions, which are disseminated through information and educational channels to help citi-

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8 D. Harvey, Nauchnoye ob'яснение в географии. Общая методология науки и методология географии [The scientific explanation in geography. The general methodology of science and methodology of geography] (Moscow: Progress, 1974).
Table 2. The regulative functions of the state border (by social sphere)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function of the border</th>
<th>Objects of regulation</th>
<th>Examples of regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political regulation</td>
<td>Transborder relations of political power and influence, their participants, means and resources</td>
<td>Fighting international terrorism or intelligence activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic regulation</td>
<td>Transborder movement of material goods, factors of production, objects of exchange and consumption, actors, means and resources</td>
<td>Customs taxation of goods; quotas for the import of foreign labor; harmonization of national sanitary and technical standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social regulation</td>
<td>Transborder processes of production and reproduction of people as members of society, their participants, means and resources</td>
<td>Rules of obtaining residency or entering into marriages with foreigners; measures to encourage the educational migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural regulation</td>
<td>Transborder movement of the phenomena of consciousness, information, knowledge, values, behavioral patterns, its actors, means and resources</td>
<td>Censorship of imported foreign literature; registration of foreign media</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the author

Through the implementation of its regulative functions, the state border orders the transborder relations of the societal system with the external, international environment, and adapts their content and intensity to changes in system-wide interests (expressed in government decisions). The functions included within this category can be classified by the objects and by the purposes of regulation.

The distinctive quality of the state border, as already noted, is its complexity, i.e. ability to control phenomena and processes that belong to all major spheres of social life. From this perspective, there are four regulative functions of the state border system (Table 2).

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The regulative functions of the border system are divided into those of barrier and contact depending upon the purpose behind seeking to alter transborder relations. Barrier functions aim to increase the closeness of the state and society (in accordance with security priorities). The purpose of contact functions is to increase state and social openness to the outside, the international environment (in accordance with the priority of development).

Today it is unusual for barrier or contact regulation to be consistent across all objects and spheres of transborder relations. It is more common for the function of the border system in different spheres to have different purposes. Selecting one of the two main purposes of regulation in its four basic spheres gives a total of 16 different combinations of regulative functions for a single border. Given that barrier and contact regulation may also vary by degree (high contactness / moderate contactness / moderate barrierization / high barrierization) and orientation (regulation focused on a country’s outgoing or incoming flows), the potential combinations are much greater. A specific set of regulative functions performed on all forms of transborder relations of the society forms the functioning regime of a state border system. The search for the optimal functioning regime for the border system that provides the most balanced ordering of the relations between given society and other societies is the main content of the state’s border policy.

State border dynamics

The state border system, its composition, and structure can possess a high degree of stability, sometimes to the point of immobility. However, in reality, any state border, even the most immobile, is constantly in the process of changing. Depending on the mechanisms of change, the border system’s dynamics can be divided into cyclical and linear. A cyclical dynamic represents a sequence of local (internal) changes within a qualitatively definite system in which the main original and final parameters of the system coincide. A linear dynamic is a series of significant changes in the system, which alters its qualities (typological), and are irreversible. In reality, the cyclical and linear dynamics of state borders are closely intertwined with one another, but they need to be distinguished for both scientific and practical, including management, goals.


11 Problems of nonlinear dynamics of border are still poorly understood.
Relatively more attention is given today to the cyclical dynamics of state borders. A particularly important example of these is the so-called "life cycle" of the border. It is based on the fact that over the course of their existence, essentially all borders seem to pass through the same phases of formation, reproduction and destruction. Through a more detailed consideration of these basic phases of the life cycle of a state border, one can discern a number of sub-phases. Thus, the formation phase usually begins with the allocation of the state border through military (conquest) or peaceful (colonization) means, assigning authority over a particular area, and spreading the power of the state. The allocation of the border (in the case that it is a border of modern linear type) is followed by a sub-phase of delimitation. In this period, the state border receives international recognition and initial legalization, implying the conclusion of interstate delimitation agreements and the creation of official maps fixing the position of the borderline. The sub-phase of demarcation, i.e. the physical localization of the borderline on the ground and the drawing up of an appropriate demarcation protocol, completes the process of legalizing the border. However, to complete the formation of the state border, demarcation should be followed by a sub-phase of construction. Construction in this case refers to the creation (both purposeful and spontaneous) of all elements and structures of the border system, necessary for its full operation.

The next phase of the life cycle of the state border, called "reproduction", consists of routine performances by the border system of its functions, and may provide the impression of a monotonous, internally homogeneous process. However, it also contains a number of extended (sometimes of hundreds of years’ duration) separate sub-phases, each of which represents a particular cycle. These state border management cycles, which include adjusting the system shocks resulting from changes in transborder relations, processing these shocks, and then making decisions and implementing actions to regain the system’s control over managed object. Since changes in transborder relations are rarely of a cardinal, revolutionary character, these management cycles are usually pretty monotonous. However, despite this, over time


they lead to an accumulation in the border system of small changes which may contribute not only to its improvement, but also ultimately its degradation and destruction.

The transition of the state border to the phase of destruction can be the result of either a rapid, catastrophic event (disintegration of the USSR) or a long evolutionary process (the gradual integration of EU countries and the removal of barriers separating them). This phase also differentiates between two sub-phases of border destruction – formal and informal. The formal (de jure) destruction of the state border occurs due to the liquidation of the legal and ideological foundations of its existence and the dismantling of its institutional structure. At the same time, despite being deprived of its legal status, the former state border persists for a long time as a cultural boundary, manifesting itself in the minds and behavior of members of the various communities. Only after its informal destruction, the disintegration of cultural and psychological elements and structures of the border and disappearance of her image from the collective memory, can the border be said to have completely ceased to exist.

During its life cycle, any state border can be simultaneously involved in a number of linear dynamics. Most of these linear quality changes relate to the individual elements and structures of the border (in particular, the formal-institutional, legal and ideological, and material) and are the result of the state reforms. However, more profound, system-wide changes to the state border usually occur not through purposeful, but spontaneous actions, through a slow process of historical evolution. Such linear quality (typological) changes tend to exceed the life cycle duration of a single border, and even the life expectancy of an individual state or society. Identifying changes in historical types of borders is possible only due to comparative studies of the many boundaries of various states and pre-state communities.

One possible historical typology of boundaries, describing their linear evolution from ancient times to the present day, uses three main criteria: 1) the spatial (socio-geographical) form of the boundary; 2) the subject and sphere of boundary regulation; 3) the degree of stability in the configuration of the boundary. These criteria make it possible to identify six successive types of boundaries, each of which corresponds to a particular type of society and its political organization (Table 3).

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This scheme outlining the historical development of boundaries, as shown in Table 3, is very simplistic, of course. It does not reflect the regional and ethno-national features of pre-state societies and states, which over time contribute to the increasingly strong typological differentiation of their boundaries. In fact, the evolution of boundaries is of a multilinear rather than unilinear character, and its main trends at each stage of the historical process embodied a variety of options. The scientific study of the rich and complex linear dynamics of boundaries has just begun.

Types of state borders

Internal system complexity and the widespread prevalence of modern state borders causes huge variety in their characteristics. Therefore, the development of different classifications and typologies is one of the most important areas of research for border studies. However, despite the progress made, typological descriptions for the existing set of state borders are far from complete.

The criteria of the various typologies of state borders often utilize their genesis, the processes of their formation and development. There might be great value in examining the environmental conditions in which a border emerged. In terms of the physical environment of allocation, all state borders can be divided into three main types: land\(^{16}\), marine and air. However, it is far more difficult to describe the variety of conditions pervading in the social environment of allocation. The classical typology of Hartshorne, using this criterion, divided all borders into antecedent borders, i.e. allocated in virgin and unsettled space, and subsequent borders, drawn following development and settlement, in a pre-established social environment. In turn, subsequent borders can both coincide with a territory’s existing social boundaries (consequent border\(^{17}\)), or not coincide, cut them (superimposed, discordant borders\(^{18}\)).\(^{19}\)

Another typology of state borders is based on the method of its allocation by the state (relative to other states). Allocation can be done without the participation of other states (unilateral borders), or in the course of interaction with at least one other country (bilateral or multilateral border). Because this interaction can be both peaceful (signing the de-

\(^{16}\) Land borders can be classified in more detail on the characteristics of the landscape.

\(^{17}\) They are also referred to as endogenous or borders “from below”.

\(^{18}\) Also referred to as exogenous or borders “from above”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of society (and its main political organization)</th>
<th>Types of boundary</th>
<th>Typological parameters of boundaries</th>
<th>Spatial shape</th>
<th>The subject and the sphere of regulation</th>
<th>The degree of stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primitive society (community and tribe)</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
<td>dotted line</td>
<td></td>
<td>public non-specialized regulation</td>
<td>fluctuating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-industrial pre-state society (chiefdom)</td>
<td>Frontier</td>
<td>zone</td>
<td></td>
<td>public non-specialized regulation</td>
<td>expanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-industrial state society (nome state)</td>
<td>Forepost</td>
<td>dotted line</td>
<td></td>
<td>state specialized military-political regulation</td>
<td>expanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-industrial state society (imperial state)</td>
<td>Limes</td>
<td>zone</td>
<td></td>
<td>state specialized military-political regulation</td>
<td>expanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial society (nation-state)</td>
<td>Linear</td>
<td>full line</td>
<td></td>
<td>state specialized comprehensive regulation</td>
<td>stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-industrial society (post-state organizations?)</td>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td>dotted line</td>
<td></td>
<td>public non-specialized regulation</td>
<td>fluctuating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

limitation treaty) or not, bilateral and multilateral borders may be either contractual or power-based, respectively.\textsuperscript{20}

Regardless of how it is implemented, the allocation must determine the configuration (morphology) of that border. The morphological typology of state borders is based on the structures of different kinds of space, on which the state can engage in border-making. So the borders of natural morphology are molded by the structures of physical (physical-geographic) space, and particularly its orographic and hydrographic differentiation. The borders of social morphology are based on the structures of social space, including areas of ethnic, cultural, religious and other communities, the borders of pre-existing states, and so on. Finally, the configuration of borders of mental morphology reflects the structure of mental space, its sign and symbolic differentiation, conventional geometrical, astronomical, and other systems of description and reference. The correspondence of various configurations of borders with structures of particular kinds of space can be used by the state as a means to attract public support, as an argument to justify their military conquests, or as support for a position in negotiations on delimitation. Thus, we can say that there are respectively three types of legitimation for borders.\textsuperscript{21}

State borders can be divided by the extent of their formation. This can be expressed by such parameters as the international legal formalization of the border, whether it is contested and its variability. The absence of international legal registration, a high frequency of border conflicts and wars, and major and frequent changes in the borderline characterize unstable (military) type of border. An initial delimitation, moderate frequency of border conflicts and rare and minor changes in the borderline show the transition to a problematized (disputed) type of border. Finally, implementation of the exact demarcation of the border, the complete or almost complete absence of border conflicts (incidents), long-term immutability of borderline indicate the completion of the formation and appearance of the stable type border.\textsuperscript{22}

Considering that state border systems have different compositions, they can be divided into formal, informal and complete. Formal borders consist mainly of sets of state institutions and objectified (ideological and legal) phenomena of consciousness, but are deficient of informal practices, cultural norms, feelings and images, and consequently not root-


\textsuperscript{22} Kireev, \textit{Dal’nevostochnaia Granitsa Rossii}, 74.
ed in society. In contrast, informal borders exist at the level of social institutions and mass consciousness and are implicitly supported by state power, but lack the necessary formal organizations and legal support. Complete borders are characterized by a balance between the two, with a mutual correspondence of formal and objectified, and informal and non-objectified components.

The basis for a typology of state border systems may be the peculiarities of their structure, the relations between their elements and components. So, from the point of view of the prevailing order of elements and the equal or unequal nature of their relations, the state border can be of a centralized or decentralized type. If in a centralized system of borders, the leading role belongs to vertical, hierarchical relations between different institutions and forms of consciousness, while a decentralized systems is dominated by horizontal, coordinative relations. On the basis of such characteristic of structure as the orientation of relations, border systems can be divided into authoritarian and democratic. In authoritarian border systems, relations between formal, governmental institutions and objectified phenomena of consciousness, on the one hand, and informal institutions and non-objectified phenomena of consciousness, on the other hand, generally occur in one direction (from the former to the latter). In democratic border systems such relations are bi-directional and reciprocal to a much greater extent.

A number of typologies of state borders are based on a study of their functions and their effect on the environment. Depending on the number of regulative functions performed, state borders may be divided to monofunctional (regulating only one sphere of transborder relations) or polyfunctional (regulating two or more spheres of transborder relations) type. Based on the priorities of regulation, state borders can be described as dividing (barrier) or connecting (contact). This last typology is related to the famous typology of borders proposed by Martinez that focused on the impact of their regulative functioning on the nature of relations between borderlands. It presents four types of state borders: 1) alienated, 2) coexistent, 3) interdependent and 4) integrated.

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Despite the fact that in recent decades the social environment of the functioning of the state (at least in the most developed regions) went through qualitative change, this

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kind of social system and its boundaries remain viable. Any particular alternative to the state, which capable in the foreseeable future to take his place, has not yet appeared. However, it is also clear that in the twenty-first century, the states will not be able to remain faithful to the principles which became their foundation in Europe of Modern age. To ensure control over the new non-state boundaries and transborder flows, state borders will have to evolve, changing its structure and functions. Taking into account the vast differences in geographical conditions and especially socio-economic stages of different regions of the world, further transformation of state borders can have a variety of options. Apparently, in the future this will lead to a significant increase in the typological diversity of states and their borders on the planet.
Recommended reading:


Internet resources:

What we understand as transborder relations developed globally in the last third of the twentieth century, and is associated with the end of the 'Modern' era. The growing intensity of global political and economic ties and their regional manifestations caused a revival of cross-border cooperation along the borders of the international system.

The literature on the study of borders, sovereignty and related phenomena has experienced a change in emphasis. For a long period of time it appeared that the established system of international relations would serve to prevent the outbreak of global conflict. As a result the focus of research shifted from conflict to the development of commercial and administrative interests in the border regions of Europe, North America, and other parts of the world. Transborder relations have come to be considered as a system of interaction between actors of various sizes (from the government and regional political and economic elite, down to the population of border areas) in a process, through which integrated spaces emerge which transcend the borders of neighboring nations.

With the increasing permeability of barriers between the domestic and international environments, the policies of nation-states have been increasingly overlapping with those of neighboring nations and organizations. Subnational regions have begun to receive impetus for economic and cultural development from neighboring countries.
Definition of transboundary

Currently, in the social sciences, there is no single, generally accepted concept of "transboundary". It is defined in many ways in relation to "cooperation", "interaction", "region" or "territory".

The categorical basis and original meaning of "transboundary" formed within the framework of a traditional political-geographical approach. The essence of the concept consists of the meanings of the words "trans" and "boundary". The term "trans" (from Latin "trans" - through, across, behind) is defined as: 1) the movement through any space, crossing it; 2) a location on the other side of anything; 3) the designation or transfer through something. "Boundary" is a strip, surface, or line that separates, defines some otherwise homogeneous areas. Therefore, the key point of "transboundary" is that it is the passage of a boundary across an integrated territorial system (region).

"Boundary", as a rule, refers to state borders – the functioning and development of which falls within exclusive competence of high political authorities. Consequently, state borders, as projections of the institutions and policies of neighboring countries, is an integral part of the interaction of the participants within international relations, and depends on the characteristics of their political systems.

The formation of transborder cooperation in the context of the development of the state and the system of international relations

The motives and backgrounds of a political system are dependent upon stage of its development, and changes in this lead to a transformation of relations between the state and the border, changes to the structure for organizing cross-border cooperation and the management of outlying territories.

In the social sciences and modern political discourse, we rely on categories developed in the middle of the seventeenth century. Since the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the key political form of social organization (for

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the Modern era) has been the nation-state. Thanks to its capabilities, the state managed to provide a sufficiently high degree of administrative centralization and cultural unification of the population within its own territory. With the development of statehood came the more rigid division of political space\(^3\) into the international and intra-national spheres, implying a high level of national self-sufficiency of social systems (including the establishment of internal markets and the autonomous political-legal and socio-cultural development of a country). As a result, some authors have come to the conclusion that the opposition of domestic and international is the result of the Modern project.\(^4\)

Self-sufficiency requires rigid separation from neighboring states. As a consequence, the struggle for territory and the mutual recognition of sovereignty between states saw the emergence of the "linear" model of the state border separating national territorial bodies. The most important features of this "linear border" are as follows: clear territorial delimitation and demarcation of spheres of state sovereignty; comprehensive and careful state control over the borderline; the dominance of internal relations over transborder relations; and the perception of borderlines as being a permanent phenomenon.\(^5\) This perception of borders promotes a military-political purpose and largely conceals the presence of other important border functions.

The basic principles of these state borders had formed by the middle of the seventeenth century as the result of state territorial competition. By the first quarter of the nineteenth century they had been generalized into a coherent system of international legal norms. The right of a state to establish its sovereignty over territory was on the basis of the following conditions: activities for the research and economic develop-

\(^3\) The basis of sociological interpretation of a space is notions of social differences in society that form social distances separating people from each other. As G.V. Pushkareva (after Pitirim Sorokin) noticed, the person usually interprets this distinctions in terms of the spatial correlation, saying "the higher and lower classes", "movement up the social ladder", "they are very close in their social status," "there is a great social distance", etc. (G.V. Pushkareva, "Politicheskoye prostranstvo: problemy teoreticheskoy kontseptualizatsii [Political space: problems of theoretical conceptualization]," Polis 2 (2012): 166–176). The political space as a kind of social space is primarily a set of political rules and regulations (i.e. institutions), which dominates in the life of a community of people.

\(^4\) V.S. Martianov, Politicheskiy proyekt Moderna. Ot miroekonomiki k miropolitike: strategiya Rossii v globaliziruyushchems mire [The political project of modernity. From the world economy to world-politics: Russia’s strategy in the globalizing world] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010), 54.

ment of the territory; the establishment of settlements; activity for the public administration of the territory; or for incorporating the territory’s residents as citizens. The key claim that establishes the right of the state to such territory was to confirm its legal status within international treaties.\(^6\)

All states that were part of the international community were forced to adhere to this system, because otherwise they risked engaging in territorial disputes with other states that could lead to military conflicts. All the more so, military action and the seizure of territories, followed by their annexation or concession subsequently recognized by treaty, was a generally accepted means of revising state borders.

As correctly noted by Calhoun, in 1648, even in Europe, the nation-state was hardly the dominant form of social organization. They came to dominate in Europe and the Americas only in the nineteenth century. Other parts of the world experienced their heyday of state nationalism in the twentieth century.\(^7\)

Even in the nineteenth century the authorities of some state entities did not have a clear vision of the contours of their territory (such as accurate mapped data), the extreme limits were determined by the vague representations of the settlement areas of "vassal" peoples (frequently, in fact, independent or subject to another state or ruler). For example, the rulers of the Qing Empire for a long time did not attach importance to the establishment of state borders, and made no distinction between a border province, vassal territory or an independent state (or its residents) having trade or diplomatic relations with China.\(^8\)

In contrast to the feudal era, when the difference between the private ownership of land and the territorial sovereignty of the state did not exist, in Modern period, private rights to land were clearly separated from the sovereign power of the state over territory. In this regard, all the issues relating to changes in the state’s border (the declaration of war and territorial claims; the conclusion of international


agreements on the recognition of borders; the establishment of military blocs to ensure own territorial integrity and the integrity of their allies; border security), were exclusively attributed to the competence of the supreme authority of the state.9

The possibilities for isolating any national socio-economic system had been limited. Bureaucratic and military systems of state control in the nineteenth century were in a formative state. The implementation of border and customs control was carried out in densely populated border areas and at the main logistics points through which major transborder flows passed. The great powers of the late colonial period considered the development of transborder relations as temporary phenomena related to their expansionist plans to reshape the world.

As the political situation evolved, the attitude of the state authorities to transborder contacts changed. In the early twentieth century, state-sponsored nationalism had become stronger and manifested itself in a number of measures to restrict transborder activities. The international community entered a cycle of global military conflicts and the total militarization of all spheres of social relations. As a consequence, the border began to be perceived as a line of forward defense, an unbreakable and impenetrable barrier to any hostile intrusion.

After World War II the cycle of global military conflicts ended. The post-war international order was characterized by the division of the world into two socio-political systems (capitalism and socialism), which were in a state of permanent confrontation, characterized by constant mutual threat and the arms race. This split of the world was reflected in the constant strengthening of the military might of the two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union. It was institutionalized in the constant confrontation between two military-political (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) and politico-economic blocs.10

Outside of the socialist bloc, local cross-border cooperation between neighboring countries began to emerge from the 1950s, in the absence of state bans on business activity and free trade. By the 1970s in Western Europe, transborder projects had become a common phenomenon in areas with populations characterized as having a shared history.

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10 P.A. Tsygankov, Teoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy [Theory of International Relations] (Moscow: Gardariki, 2005), 479.
and similar cultural and socio-economic characteristics. One example is the Basel region that unites the communities in the border areas of Switzerland, France and Germany. These relatively simple organizations were characterized by the limited scope of cooperative interactions, as they attempted to work together to solve common local problems.\textsuperscript{11}

The Russian researcher Shishkov stresses that a deepening and strengthening of relations and a growing interdependence among member countries takes place at all "levels" of society: in the productive, technical, economic, political and legal spheres. All of these aspects interact, complement and reinforce one another. Being previously quite independent and autonomous, mono-state societies transform themselves into a holistic poly-state organism. And soon this merging of national reproduction processes becomes irreversible.\textsuperscript{12} This perspective corresponds with a functionalist approach that perceives of borders as "integration tools."\textsuperscript{13} Various modifications of this approach were applied to the design and research of integration projects in 1950–1970s, which went through a quantitative growth and then decline in activity in various parts of the world.

In 1980–1990s the transborder region as a phenomenon gained a new level of cooperation, while actively expanding its geographic scope into East Asia\textsuperscript{14} and Latin America. This process can be traced to a basic document on cooperation between border regions ("European Outline Convention on Transborder Co-operation between Territorial Communities or local authorities", 1980, hereinafter – the Convention), which gave a central position to the concept of "territorial community". This meant that local and regional functions are executed not only by state authorities or administrative


\textsuperscript{13} According to the Russian theory of regionalization, integration is understood as a complex, multi-faceted and self-developing historical phenomenon, which first emerges in the most developed, from technical, economic and socio-political point of view, regions of the world, and step by step involves in this process the other countries, as they achieve the necessary economic, political and legal conditions.

\textsuperscript{14} In the Asia-Pacific region began to appear new transborder entities in the form of "triangles of growth" that are transnational economic zones (three or more countries), based on a strategy of integration of border areas of neighboring countries. Such entities use opportunities of factor complementarity, promote the free movement of labor, capital and technologies, and have quite clear boundaries.
bodies, but also by other communities, considered as such in accordance with the national law of each state.

The adoption of this Convention in 1980 in Madrid was a key step in institutionalizing transborder cooperation as a phenomenon distinct from border and cross-border relations. It promoted state’s developing official positions regarding the development of transborder relations and supporting these forms of cooperation at the legislative level. These legal and institutional factors determine the administrative status of transborder cooperation, while its space and scale is defined by the development level of its social, economic, political and socio-cultural community.

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the strengthening of integration and regionalization processes has changed the content and understanding of many institutions and phenomena, including borders and national sovereignty. A reconsideration of social space is taking place, in which more attention is paid to its heterogeneity and the activity of its individual elements. At the subnational level, regions show greater economic and political independence.

One of these trends was focused upon by Samuel Huntington, who gave his attention to the increasing transparency of state borders and its relation with the role of civilizational unity in the formation of state coalitions. According to him, all these changes "have led to the fact that many have witnessed the gradual withering away of the state as a solid "billiard ball", generally accepted as the norm since the time of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 ... and the emergence of a complex, diverse and multi-level international order that is strongly reminiscent of a medieval one." Of course this does not mean a return to a feudal political system, but rather a change of social relations from those associated with the Modern era to a new type of society, characterized by some as post-Modern.

Participants of transborder relations in the context of globalization

The above mentioned changes are directly related to the dynamics of globalization, often characterized as the deepening interdependence in all spheres of activity, the emergence of a single global economy, the spread of Western cultural standards and democratic institutions in all parts of the

world, as well as erosion of national sovereignty and the "dying" of borders.

The phenomenon of globalization has been mainly developed under the influence of the most powerful national and transnational political and economic structures, seeking to fill the vacuum formed in the international system after the collapse of the socialist bloc, the Soviet Union, and, consequently, the bipolar world order. In connection with the "end of history" of global political confrontation, there seemed to be no longer an urgent need for rigid military border protection.

With globalization, the geographical factor conditionally loses its importance, or becomes insignificant with the establishment and maintenance of transborder political-economic or socio-cultural relations seeking to cover the entire planet. An integrated global political and economic system directing intense flows of goods, ideas, people and finance is under formation. In some scientific and socio-political works, this new world order is described using vivid journalistic metaphors: "transboundary world", "global city", etc.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, transborder relations are acquiring a new political meaning. The perception of borders and their surrounding areas has changed and the focus has switched to forms previously considered as secondary.

The very idea of free crossing of the state border by subnational actors in order to aid their regional interests does not correspond to the classical scheme of the hierarchical subordination of all national areas to a single metropolitan center. A new theoretical understanding of the structure of social space was offered based on postmodernist and poststructuralist approaches. These approaches are built on principles of deterritorialization and destratification, which reject binary oppositions of spatial terms, such as: "depth-surface", "external-internal", "center-periphery", etc. According to Deleuze and Guattari, spatial environments are attributively devoid of lines of demarcation and privileged "points", and are thus open in principle for the creation within them of any kind of toposes - "subspaces".

17 V.I. Kamyshev, "Informatsionnyye TNK. Politicheskiye i polittekhnologicheskiye protsessy i ikh vliyanie na razvitiye sistemy mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy [Information TNCs. Political and political technology processes and their influence on the development of international relations]," in World Politics: Theoretical problems of identifying and modern development (Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia, 2006), 259.

To identify various aspects of the space of social relations and its structural branches the concepts of globalization, regionalization (regionalism) and transborder cooperation are widely used. Designating phenomena of the same essence, they are aimed at strengthening the interaction between disparate parts of a unified whole, and differ mainly in their geographical scope. The internal content of these processes are similar, but different concepts focuses on a particular aspect of a phenomenon. So regionalism can be perceived as a stage within the development of an actor in the global economy (any economic organization or authority at the national and sub-national levels), occurring when factors of production have grown beyond individual nations, but have not yet reached the global scale. If we focus on the international dimension, regionalization incorporates the relations of whole countries within a single space, while transborder cooperation does not involve compulsory membership in any supranational institutions and focuses on solving local practical problems. If we consider regionalization as the emancipation of subnational regions, transborder cooperation emphasizes their role in international processes without going beyond state sovereignty.

From the point of view of the state, as the most organized structure of social relations, arbitrary processes transforming social institutions stemming from globalization are undermining the future of national integrity. An adequate response of states to globalization is to find and strengthen a new identity within the framework of a common space (a regional association of countries), to establish regional preferences and collective protection. The basis of this counteraction to globalization is the desire of the authorities and public institutions to limit its negative impact on the national economy, and consequently on the standards of living of the national population.

The freedom of action for states has gradually narrowed under the influence of the international community, with a gradual limitation on their sovereignty occurring. Transnational institutions seek more or less significant limits on the power of the state in spheres like human rights, economic activity, etc. The result is that, on the one hand, there is a growing interdependence between states, reducing their freedom of action under the influence of self-limitations or restrictions imposed from the outside, while on the other, the internal processes of some states are increasing dependent on outside influences.

In such circumstances, the state should seek an appropriate responses to the challenges of globalization. According to Ilyin, the so-called erosion of sovereignty is a dan-
gerous deviation from the modern standard of statehood, under which we understood the state’s ability to direct the flows of globalization and be in the trend of world development. In this regard, Waters stated that “states are resisting fiercely, clinging to their sovereignty and still remain an important factor in solving problems ... The state may be a last bastion of resistance to globalization trends and a key indicator of its ultimate effectiveness. If states survive globalization, it would be difficult to consider globalization as strong a force as it seems at the moment (the end of the twentieth century).”

The trend is for many modern social problems to be solved through institutions and instruments that go beyond a single nation-state and form new decision-making centers, called "transnationalism". This name also refers to the field of cooperation not only of states, but also non-state actors and organizations developing transborder cooperation. The main actors in determining the course of transborder relations include: government, non-governmental organizations (professional, business, educational institutions, etc.), and transnational corporations, as well as the border administrative-territorial units: municipalities, administrative regions of neighboring countries and their active populations.

Diversification in mobile actors led to a change in the system of political relations and public administration. As a result, in the early 1990s, the theory of multi-level governance emerged (generally attributed to Gary Marx). Initially it was an analytical construct that reflected the characteristics of the regional and structural policy of the European Community, which focused on networking among authori-

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20 Cited by: K.S. Gadjiyev, Geopoliticheskiye horizonty Rossii (kontury novogo miroporyadka) [Russia’s geopolitical horizons (the contours of a new world order)] (Moscow: Ekonomika, 2007), 151.
23 Subsequently, the European Union.
24 The network can be defined as a combination of relatively stable, decentralized, non-hierarchical relations that bind actors of the different nature (state and non-state). The network, as a relatively stable, long-term relationships, allows to mobilize and bring together the scattered resources in order to organize a collective (or parallel) actions aimed at achieving a common goal in politics.
ties of different levels, as well as the interaction of governmental and nongovernmental actors.

Multi-level governance is defined as a complex political process involving sub-state, state and supra-state levels, as well as the activities of governmental and nongovernmental actors. The absence of a single center of power requires networking between all parties in the international political processes. The nation-state is not a single organizer, and parts of the state may devolve from the control of the center and independently enter into an alliance with a supranational actor. Reducing the role of the nation-state and increasing the role of sub-national and supranational actors are reflected in the partial transfer to them of national sovereignty.

The levels correspond to the scale of the tasks: problems that can be effectively addressed at the regional and national level are not to be solved at the level of the supranational and vice versa. This promotes the division of responsibilities between different levels of government, reduces the role of the nation-state and increases the role of the regions.

Changes in national states themselves are taking place which is resulting in the emergence of a system of multi-level governance. The nation-state in Europe is conventionally divided in half, which means the two levels of government have equal opportunities to represent the interests of their citizens. Local communities can realize their interests, on both the national and supranational levels, where a powerful institution – the Committee of the Regions of the EU - operates, capable of acting as an arbiter between the national and sub-national actors. In such circumstances, border regions have more freedom of action in carrying out transborder projects.

This model reflects the most favorable direction for the development of cooperation across the border. Despite the narrow civilizational scope in which this model has been applied, the European experience provides an invaluable theoretical base that enriches scientific research by the well-defined concepts revealing different features of transborder cooperation. So, in document 181/2000 of 13 March 2002, entitled "Strategies for promoting cross-border and inter-re-


ginal cooperation in an enlarged EU — a basic document setting out guidelines for the future,” the Committee of the Regions offers the following definitions:

1. Cross-border cooperation is a bilateral, trilateral or multilateral interaction between local and regional authorities (in which may be involved para-state or private organizations) to be carried out in adjacent geographical areas. This also applies to areas divided by sea.

2. Inter-regional cooperation (transborder cooperation) is a bilateral, trilateral or multilateral interaction between local and regional authorities (in which may be involved para-state or private organizations) to be carried out in a non-contiguous geographical areas.

3. Transnational cooperation, which implies interaction between national, regional and local authorities in programs and projects. This form of cooperation covers broader adjacent zones, and the participants belong to at least two Member States and or third countries.

These definitions concretize the statutory definition of European transborder practices and move beyond the necessity of adjacent territories; that is, the interacting subnational regions should not necessarily have a common border for the implementation of cooperative projects. More attention is paid to the political and legal status of the participants in cooperation, and to the social aspect of it as a whole. For example, the definition of transnational cooperation is not based on geographical proximity, but on status: belonging to a region and participant in an organization of general integration (i.e. the EU), which determines the degree of openness to external partners.

According to the theory of evolutionary maturity of the political organization, modern transborder cooperation has the form of a network, and involves interaction between actors at various levels while relying on nodes of global interaction to bypass territorial demarcations.

Aimed at promoting a higher level of integration, transnational cooperation contributes to the formation of diverse groups of (European) regions. The need to focus attention on the affiliation of a participant in cooperation with particular

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28 The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, "Zaklyucheniye O proyekte analiticheskogo doklada Komiteta regionov "Novyy yuridicheskiy instrument dlya transgranichnogo sotrudnichestva" [Conclusion About the analytical report of the Committee of Regions "The new legal instrument for cross-border cooperation"]," accessed July 15, 2015, http: www.coe.int/

29 Based on the conception of "hronopolitics", developed by M.V. Ilyin.

integration associations is the result of different approaches held by the countries in question to the model for socio-economic development and political structure.

Of course, the Western experience of transborder cooperation, an approach based on the theory of multi-level governance, requires adaptation to the realities and experiences of other socio-cultural communities. Such adaptation has been done by participants in Asian integration, who emphasize achieving economic development goals. Recognizing the uniqueness of the historical path of Asia and the special conditions of its modern development, some researchers estimate the European model as a good example to follow. For example, the Singapore scientist Lay Hwee Yeo has written that: "... the lack of collective political institutions is driving the further development of the (East Asian integration) into a corner. This lack clearly shows an inability to tackle common issues, in particular transborder problems such as the spread of SARS, tsunami warnings and the elimination of its consequences. Even the financial crisis in 1997 did not become a pretext for strengthening common institutions, so each Asian country has adopted national measures to prevent the crisis."  

Transborder economic relations

It is obvious that the economic processes in transborder cooperation outrun their political institutionalization. Already by the 1970s, the successful development of regional integration and emergence of a global economy (including the interlacing of socialist and capitalist systems through commodity exchange) had resulted in such new global actors as transnational corporations became a common phenomenon. Moreover, since the mid-1980s, the socialist system has undergone major changes, which marked the end of its ideological role and transformation into a system trying to operate within a framework defined by the liberal economic attitudes.

The development of transborder cooperation and international political integration depends on the state of economic relations. While developing initially in "technical" areas, the splicing of national reproduction processes soon becomes irreversible, and later the integration processes move to the level of "high politics." In other words, intensive functional connections eventually lead to the formation of joint supranational institutions or softer integration organizations

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32 Kamyshev, "Informatsionnyye TNK," 260.
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aimed at creating favorable economic and political conditions for their members.

Memberships of participants in cooperation within a single integrated association removes the restrictions imposed by state border security issues, providing greater freedom of action to the local (or territorial) community for the development of cross-border business, transborder communication and social networks.\(^{33}\)

In such circumstances, the border loses its "linear" character, becomes "blurred", and comes to represent a transition zone. This "blurred border" can be a space of integration, in which the overlapping of the social and economic systems of neighboring states occurs.

In conditions of increasing economic interdependence, the border areas of some countries in Europe, North America, and Asia have entered a new stage of development with the construction of transborder clusters (transborder territorial-production complexes). By their nature, these complexes are interdependent combinations of industrial enterprises and settlements, placed on both sides of the border and operating in conditions of strong technological ties. The economic impact of companies that make up these transborder territorial-production complexes is generated by the optimal (in terms of technological combination and management) selection of enterprises in accordance with natural and economic conditions, transport, and economic-geographical position.\(^{34}\)

Dynamic interaction between border regions is impossible without the development of the infrastructure for the transborder territory. The formation and development of infrastructure links at the state border includes transport crossing points, communication lines and power grids, along with market infrastructure. As a result, a transborder area forms on the basis of unified and stable interacting border areas. The former often has a basis in a common physical geography.\(^{35}\)

The developed system of transport and communications provides the infrastructure for the global system of trading, while the institutionalization of free trade increases the in-


tensity of trading activity. As a consequence, this increase in economic activity stimulates the transition from trading to established cooperative relations, forming vertically integrated industrial groups, leading to the establishment of joint industrial parks and so on.

The state of transborder infrastructure is directly related to the economic activities of the state, sub-regional and other participants in international economic relations, aimed at the spatial development of the country and accompanying development of international interaction channels. Within these areas, tens of kilometers distant from the borderline can be placed various structures of foreign economic cooperation: joint ventures, shopping centers, and tourist agencies, all focused primarily on interaction with border territories of a neighboring country.

The formation of an economic system of transborder integration space is influenced by the structure of the market (in which companies operate) and the institutional environment (defined by the state and subnational actors).

The market structure of transborder relations is based on the principle of interchangeability. Because of the differences in factors of production, economic entities specialize in manufacturing products other than those of the transborder neighbor. Thus, on the one hand, lower production costs and increases in productivity are achieved, and, on the other hand, favorable conditions for a transborder division of labor are formed. One of the main "levers" that trigger mechanisms of transborder economic cooperation is endowment of a region with factors of production. The fact is that some of the available factors are redundant for local production, some are sufficient, and some are deficient. Herein lies the main reason for the emergence and development of intra-regional economic relations, which, on the one hand, are manifested in the deepening of the territorial division of labor, and, on the other, in the movement of factors of production between sectors of transborder regions. Moreover, extreme positions (redundancy and deficit) determine the degree of spatial mobility of factors of production, i.e. their ability for transborder movement. The greater the difference between the extreme values of factors of the same type on both sides of the border, the more favorable are existing conditions for transborder cooperation.

States compete for mobile factors of production by changing economic policy and the institutional environment, as well as conducting and participating in activities of inter-

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national cooperation. The same can be said regarding regional alliances and international organizations.

However, the abundance of international projects and the availability of state borders is not a guarantee for the rapid development of border areas, or the development of transborder spaces. This is only a possibility. Therefore, we need to understand the difference between the formal level of transborder relations (an "integration from above"), the main outcome of which is bureaucratic projects, and the more modest level of real transborder economic relationships (i.e. limited demand for integration "from below"). In this regard, transnational cooperation between wealthy subnational regions will have much better prospects.

In addition, the formal level of transborder relations includes a social component. In this context, subnational integration is an attempt to produce transborder public goods and to solve the problem of transborder externalities.

**Migration and cultural aspects of transborder relations**

Economic interdependence increases the openness of national socio-economic systems and their dependence on the world market. It also widens their involvement in the global financial, industrial and especially migration processes. In the context of a liberalization of state borders, one of the objective consequences of developing global and regional socio-economic relations is an increase in transborder migration flows.

Economists and the business community tend to notice the beneficial effects of migration on the development of transborder economic relations. For example, cheap labor from developing countries reduces production costs in the recipient country, national diasporas become the basis of wide production networks, and due to tax deductions migrants swell the budget of the donor country.

For example, the Chinese diaspora has played a fundamental role in developing supranational institutions in Southeast Asia, due to its significant political and economic influence in the countries of the region. In Europe divided peoples with a common history and language have also contributed to increased transborder activities in such countries as Belgium and Switzerland.

The political analyst Turovsky, on the basis of Russian international and foreign economic contacts, highlighted the

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key role of ethnic communities in the development of transborder relationships that form self-organized networks.\textsuperscript{39}

The Russian economists Heifetz and Liebman reveal the factors determining the regional nature of migration flows are as follows: on the one hand, linguistic, cultural and geographical proximity stimulate the concentration of migrant flows and the formation of networks based on interpersonal contacts, while on the other these network structures are a factor for the convergence of countries, for maintaining linguistic unity in the region and for promoting common patterns of behavior.\textsuperscript{40}

Indeed, cohabitation promotes mutual understanding even between peoples belonging to different civilizations. Yemchenko identified sociocultural factors in the transborder interactions of transborder region populations, the essence of which is the permanent exchange of elements of cultural traditions and borrowings between nationally heterogeneous societies divided by the state border. This relationship is more intensive in areas in which neighboring societies merged due to the need to adapt to natural environmental conditions for coexistence.\textsuperscript{41} But the reverse could also occur, with the community incorporating a large number of representatives of other cultures, who did not go through an adaptation to the new conditions, in a short time.

The adaptation of society to new conditions can be of a defensive character. This type of reaction may occur when carriers of cultural values of other countries aggressively invade the everyday life of a given society, and when the behavioral standards of other cultures are widespread in a country. To clarify this dialectical relationship, the British sociologist Roland Robertson proposed the concept of "glocalization", which includes such meanings as "international", "transnational", "transregional", and "transcultural").\textsuperscript{42}

So, the term "glocalization" is often used to describe the spread throughout the world of a negative reaction to the global expansion of the Western way of life. Glocal reactions can be expressed in the growing popularity of reactionary religious movements ("Islamic revival"), and other traditional institutions and mechanisms (ethnic criminals and business

\textsuperscript{39} R.F. Turovsky, "Subnatsional'nye regiony v global'noy politike (na primere Rossii) [The sub-national regions in the global policy (on example of Russia)]," Polis 2 (2011): 99–117.
\textsuperscript{40} Heifetz and Libman, Korporativnaya integratsiya, 12.
\textsuperscript{41} D.G. Yemchenko, "Transgranichnyy region kak sotsiokul'turnyy fenomen: dal'nevostochnaya model' [The transborder region as a sociocultural phenomenon: the Far East model]," (PhD diss., Chelyabinsk, 2011).
communities, etc.) operating in parallel to modern social and economic institutions worldwide.

With open borders, these migration and cultural problems become more global. During the last two hundred years, the world’s population increased more than 7 times. The growth of indigenous populations in developed postindustrial countries has declined while in the developing countries natural population growth remains high. This situation stimulates an increase in migration flows, eroding national identity of modern states. At a time when decisions on the status of some territories is made by referendums, the nation-state, its borders, and the prospects of transborder cooperation become under threat.

The situation in Kosovo provides a vivid example of how a border area with a migrant population has been transformed into an independent state with local centers of ethnic and religious conflicts. The metaphor of the "blurred border" is applicable not only to transborder relations within the EU, but also to the territorial expanse of Afghanistan, where a transparent trade in drugs, arms and other dangerous activities occurs.

The ties between transborder actors can have a different character and categorical designation: a cooperation that implies clearly positive, mutually beneficial ties, or neutral ones; an interaction that depending on context can be mutually beneficial, but often has a neutral or conflictual character.

The external environment has a major impact on transborder relations. Open borders must therefore be carefully governed by identifying threats and challenges to national interests.

The formation of transborder cooperation in a country depends on the systematic development of the initiative "from below". This can be driven by the consolidation of regional interests, the ability of domestic corporations to become a guiding force in the global economy, or the consolidation of local diasporas, as well as political and economic activities of that population. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which subnational actors can be exempt from the control of national central authorities. Even the Western experience of multilevel governance does not imply absolute autonomy of subnational actors. The aim is to improve communication with national centers and the division of levels of authority.
Recommended reading:


Gadjiyev, K.S. Geopoliticheskiye gorizonty Rossii (kontury novogo miroporyadka) [Russia's geopolitical horizons (the contours of a new world order)]. Moscow: Ekonomika, 2007.


Kamyshev, V.I. "Informatsionnyye TNK. Politicheskiye i polittekhnologicheskiye protsessy i ikh vliyaniye na razvitiye sistemy mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy [Information TNCs. Political and political technology processes and their influence on the development of international relations]." In World Politics: Theoretical problems of identifying and modern development. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia, 2006.

Kireev, A.A. "Spetsifika dal'nevostochny granitsy Rossii: teoriya i istoriya [Specificity of the Far Eastern border of Russia: Theo-
Chapter 2.4 Transborder relations


Internet resources:


The notion of the border as a line or transition strip separating adjacent areas which differ in some essential attribute is a multidimensional one and has many implications. In its most widespread traditional sense, the phenomenon of borders is directly related to the emergence of the state as an institution and the delineation of its territories, with such limits protected by force. However, there are other borders often mentioned besides political and administrative ones: geographical, economical, ideological, cultural, civilization and so on. Borders both become actualized and lose their importance in various aspects during the historical development process, and the balance between the various functions performed by borders – as barriers, contact-points or filters – also changes.

Due to processes of globalization and regionalization intensifying since the middle of the twentieth century, the nature and functions of borders has undergone a radical transformation. Earlier ideological divisions finally lost their significance, and various interactions across state borders became more intensive and institutionalized, contributing to the further erosion of the borders themselves. According to Harsche, on the one hand, states in their current form become too small to solve growing number of large-scale problems. At the same time, they remain too large to react adequately to the growing diversity in local needs and re-
quirements'. Ohmae, who defines national states as "nostal-
gic functions", has highlighted the growing role of regions in
the world order, on the basis that regional economies, with
no social commitments, can reach a higher level of economic
efficiency. Although states continue to remain key establish-
ers of borders, regions acquire a higher degree of importance
and meaning as new sources of differentiation in the current
international environment.

Regional systems: notion and types

Definition of a region. The notion of regional subsystems
is often used in international studies along with the notion
of a world system of international relations. Briar and Jalili
believe that the existence of the world system of interna-
tional relations inevitably affects the whole of international
life. However, despite its integrity, the world system of in-
ternational relations inevitably contains gaps because some
international interactions occur autonomously rather than
within this system. As a consequence, regional subsystems
come into existence as an assemblage of specific interactions
underlain by common geographic affiliation. Manifestations
of such interactions are, in particular, the European, Pan-
American, African, Asian and other regional and sub-region-
al subsystems. Nonetheless, the issue of regional and sub-re-
gional subsystems in international relations and of regions
as such still remains a matter of discussion. Differences in
typologies of international systems are caused by the diversi-
ty of approaches to the systematic study of international re-
lations. The key problem complicating differentiation in the
international system and the identification of regional sub-
systems is the lack of generally accepted criteria for defining
a region as a really existing object and subject of study.

The notion of "region" as a means of distinguishing a
certain entity – a separate state or the world as whole – has
been used by various social sciences as a research tool for a
long time. Initially, the criterion for differentiating a region
was everything that made it different from the whole entity
or other parts of this entity. A serious disadvantage of this
distinction or separation criterion was that it focused not

1 R. Harsche, "Globalization and Process of Border Change in Interna-
tional Relations," in East/West: Regional Subsystems and Regional
Problems of International Relations, ed. A.D. Voskresensky (Moscow: Moscow
State Institute of International Relations (University); Russian Political En-
cyclopedia (ROSSPEN), 2002), 58.
2 K. Ohmae, The End of Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies
3 P.A. Tsygankov, Political Sociology of International Relations (Mos-
on the region itself but rather on aspects it lacked in comparison with other parts of the entity. As an alternative to this, the idea of an approach based on the similarity of internal characteristics or homogeneity was suggested. Some scholars believed that the key characteristics of homogeneity are objective indicators such as geographic, economic or social factors (Odum and Moore). Other scholars stressed the importance of subjective and dynamic parameters such as interdependence and commitment. In this case, it was suggested considering a region as an area with a higher level of interdependence compared with neighboring areas and where people are united by links based on common interests, or an area whose residents intuitively feel they belong to (Vance). Other scholars pointed out at the importance of ad hoc problems or spatially optimal possibilities for control, and interpreted regions as zones of an administrative optimum (Davidson, Fry). An integrated effort to differentiate "objectively existing" regions of the world based on mathematical and statistical analysis methods was undertaken in the late 1960s by Russett. The criteria for regions in his study was factors (conditions) serving as prerequisites for successful regional integration. They included: (1) cultural similarity; (2) common key political values; (3) economic interdependence; (4) available formal institutions contributing to the expansion of interaction and strengthening consent; and (5) geographic contact. However, these five different criteria for international regionalization ultimately yielded five regional typologies differing in their content. The overall conclusion of Russett was that there is no region or an assemblage of units which might be, in the strict sense of correspondence of their borders, identified as subsystems of the international system.

In modern region-related studies, the region (regional sub-system) is more often understood as a socially constructed phenomenon rather than as a naturally occurring or actually-existing object. According to such an approach, the region is, on the one hand, an intellectual construction in our

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minds, created as a means to select and study spatial combinations of complex aggregates of phenomena occurring across the globe. On the other hand, a region is a process and result of a particular process of social construction. Jessop stressed in this connection that, "instead of looking for an evasive object ... a criterion for definition of a region, region should be construed as an emerging socially created phenomenon." Hettne and Söderbaum state that the region is undoubtedly based on a territorial space encompassing a limited number of states (their separate parts), interconnected by geographic inter-relations and some degree of interdependence. The key interest in regions relates to opportunities for regionalization – a process during which various patterns of cooperation, integration and convergence come into existence, and in the prospects for regionalism – programs and policies aimed at strengthening integration and cooperation within a regional space. In essence, this is the process by which "birth" is given to a region. Its content is governed by the geographic region’s advance towards higher levels of "regionness", its gradual transformation from a passive object to an active subject acquiring an ability to articulate its own transnational interests. The evolutionary logic of this process is determined by a number of stages – from regional space to regional complex, regional society, regional community and region-state – and, in each of these stages, geographic space acquires a new property gradually transforming into a region as such. Hettne and Söderbaum point out that, although it is often asserted that any region represents a limited number of states connected to one another by geographic relations and some degree of interdependence, it should not be considered merely as a simple aggregation of states because regional boundaries may cut across the territory of a particular state, thus positioning some of its parts inside the emerging region and other parts outside this re-

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8 Citation from: Yu.N. Gladkiy and A.I. Chistobayev, Regional Studies (Moscow: Gardariki, 2000), 22.
This circumstance brings to the fore another important task relating to the classification and typology of regions.

**Regional interaction levels and a typology of regions.**
The approach to regions as social constructions opens up opportunities for their alignment and classification as proceeding from the scale and content of the social interactions that govern their formation. One of the first attempts to create a typology of regional interaction and, accordingly, regions was made by Yamamoto and Hatsuse, who singled out four key types of regionalism: "micro-regionalism", "meso-regionalism", "macro-regionalism" and "mega-regionalism". Such a typology, no matter its advantages, can hardly be considered satisfactory given that the terms used for designation of the identified typological groups are not strict and definite. Thus, the notions "macro" and "mega" both indicate something at a large-scale, while the meso- and micro-levels of regionalism, as the authors themselves admit, are covered by a common notion of sub-region.

Another potential alternative typology of regional spaces may be their differentiation based on two integrated parameters – space and scale of interaction (Pestsov). The key dimensions of the space of interaction are as follows: (a) number of participants; (b) level of compactness (regional affiliation); and (c) distances. The second parameter – scale of interaction – is determined by (a) functional area of joint activities; (b) tasks and tools (means); and (c) level of institutionalization. In this case, the four basic levels of regional interaction will, in descending order, be as follows: trans-regional, all-regional, sub-regional and, finally, trans-border. Of these, all-regional and sub-regional interaction fully encompassing a certain regional space or its individual segments (parts) characterized by a certain, already established, level of regionness can be categorized as "regional" interaction proper. The two other levels should be categorized as intermediate or transitional. The trans-regional – upper transitional – level implies the progressive expansion of interaction with "non-regional" actors provided that they are a minority of participants. Another variety of the transitional

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level – trans-border level – is normally represented by cooperative formations which encompass immediately adjacent parts of territories of neighboring states forming a separate sub-region. As a rule, both transitional levels indicate emerging and/or potential regions with their content and boundaries not defined yet.

**Logic and mechanisms for the formation of transborder regions**

The growing interest in state-to-state interactions limited by the boundaries of individual regions is directly related to the European integration experiments of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Those experiments have provoked a great many similar initiatives encompassing the whole globe. Beginning from the latter half of the 1980s, active development of state-to-state cooperation at a regional level has given rise to declarations regarding the advent of an era of "new regionalism", one surpassing previous regional experiments in its scope and dynamism. Today, regionalism and regionalization reveal themselves in various ways, even in areas where they had been represented quite modestly before. Along with the expansion of their spatial scale and the boundaries of their distribution, regional interaction demonstrates in-depth organizational diversification and an expansion in the diversity of patterns with which they reveal themselves. An important role among the specific features of "new" regionalism is played by the trend towards the expansion and invigoration of cooperative interaction at the lowest level, within the transborder aggregations differing in their format and content.

In its most general sense, the notion "trans-border interaction" implies any possible form and variety of contacts involving, to a greater or lesser degree, contiguous parts of territories (their populations, resources, infrastructure, etc.) of two or more neighboring states. In their content, they can be conflicting (varying from border disputes to local armed clashes) or cooperative (varying from sporadic unorganized trade to formal integration agreements). Both interaction types reveal themselves as more intensive in areas where political and administrative borders of states cut across a natural or historically existing unity of geographic, cultural, civilizational, economic, or other spaces. An objective basis for the stimulation of the emergence and expansion of transborder interaction may be both similarities, in the economic and living conditions, ethnic origin and language, religion and culture, and differences, in available natural and labor resources, economic development models and rates, living standards, and so on, of neighboring territories. Trans-border interaction may also be encouraged by some other factors resulting from the internal specifics of states bordering...
upon one another. Such factors may be, for instance, the remoteness (and separation) of peripheral border areas from the rest of the territory and especially from the economic and administrative centers, due to specifics of the geographic position, organization of the national economy or political and administrative structures. All these factors may to an equal degree be barriers to the development of trans-border interaction and drivers for local conflicts between states. Borders become areas of inter-connecting cooperation if the advantages arising in such areas due to the joint use of economic and cultural resources prevail over advantages arising from existence of borders.\footnote{Beáta Fehérvölgyi, Zoltán Birkner and Erzsébet Peter, “The Trans-border Co-operation as the Successful Realization of the Glokal Philosophy,” Deturope – The Central European Journal of Regional Development and Tourism 4 (2) (2012): 73–74.}

It is hard to term trans-border cooperation, as a variety of trans-border interaction, as a new or exclusively contemporary phenomenon. Trans-border cooperative processes come into existence together with appearance of borders. However, due to their limited nature and underdeveloped condition, they do not necessarily develop beyond rather simple interactional patterns in territories immediately adjacent to borders. This was because all these interactions were largely related with trans-border communication and trans-border cooperation. Currently, such interactional patterns activated as components in contemporary regional dynamics acquire new degrees of scope and quality. The scale, intensity and diversity of their forms expands significantly. The replacement of former definitions of trans-border cooperation with a new notion of trans-border cooperation, wider in sense and content, reflects this new quality.\footnote{Serhii Ustych, “The indexation and monitoring of the modern trans-border processes,” accessed March 18, 2015, http://www.statistics.gov.hk/wsc/STS096-P2-S.pdf.} It is important in this connection that, as Perkmann and Sum believe, the construction of trans-border regions has become a more or less explicit strategic goal to be implemented by various public forces within and outside border regions.\footnote{M. Perkmann and N Sum, “Globalization, regionalization and cross-border regions: scales, discourses and governance,” in Globalization, regionalization, and cross-border regions, ed. M. Perkmann and N. Sum (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).} Therefore, trans-border cooperation is implemented in the form of associations and groupings which are limited in the number of their participants and in the scope of the tasks being undertaken. It is characterized by (a) participation in the cooperative interaction processes by the individual territories (districts, regions) of involved states; and (b) the delegation of powers to operate and manage cooperative projects to specialized gov-
ernmental institutions and/or local administrative structures. At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish two types of trans-border cooperative interaction: cross-border cooperation and trans-border territorial cooperation\textsuperscript{19}. Specific features of the former type are: (a) inclusion in cooperative interaction of territories immediately adjacent to the border (individual parts of intra-state administrative units); (b) participation in such cooperation of primarily local (non-governmental) actors; (c) instability, sporadic nature and limited effect of such interaction at a local territorial level only. On the other hand, trans-border cooperation normally (a) encompasses considerable portions (whole administrative units) of territories of neighboring states larger than immediate cross-border areas; (b) is coordinated by local authorities under the control and with the support of central governments; (c) results in larger-scale, steady and long-term effects.

Initial stages in the formation of trans-border regions are normally characterized by the dominance of simple and locally limited interaction patterns in the form of trans-border trade exchanges. Such interaction may be of an uncontrolled or formal, legal or illegal, sustained or sporadic nature. Cross-border trade is normally based on differences in the availability of natural resources in adjacent territories and in levels of economic and social development. The second, somewhat higher, level is characterized also by traditional patterns of trans-border cooperative interaction in the form of the coordinated joint exploitation of natural objects (rivers, lakes, etc.) located in the contiguous territories of several states. In this case, the issue is, as a rule, the distribution of benefits gained from such objects and the organization of joint control to ensure the observance of rules established for that purpose. The next stage is simple cooperation or joint use of limited resources to achieve mutually beneficial objectives. In this case, cooperation may be equally focused on solutions to economic and environmental tasks. More developed trans-border cooperation is characterized by the transition from a simple summing up of available resources by the participating countries to the integration of production factors on a complementary basis in order to gain a synergetic economic effect. Finally, the last stage is characterized by a proactive cooperation aimed at the utilization of the benefits of geographic and/or resource potential located within the adjacent territories of partner countries in order to strengthen their strategic potential and increase capacity for further external expansion. It should be stressed that the genesis of trans-border cooperation and the formation of trans-border regions does not call for a strict logic of progress from simple to more complicated forms, although

\textsuperscript{19} Ustych, "The indexation and monitoring."
in some cases such logic can be undoubtedly traced. On the one hand, the issue may be that of potential, emerging, established, or integrated border regions or their disintegration in reverse (Kornevets)\(^{20}\). On the other hand, it allows some scholars to use this criterion to differentiate between simple border and trans-border regions. In their opinion, all advanced stages of trans-border cooperation are evidence of trans-border rather than border regions (Baraniy)\(^{21}\). Another alternative, based on differences in the scale, depth and frequency of interaction between two parties on the border is categorization of the following four types of border regions: (1) isolated border regions; (2) co-existing border regions; (3) inter-dependent border regions; and (4) integrated border regions (Martinez)\(^{22}\). The latter type of border region – integrated border territories – is the result of an optimum scenario under which the economies of two countries become functionally unified and stable. The same criterion – intensity of cooperation – can in some cases be used as a basis for singling out so-called new spatial forms of economic integration, which are institutionalized regions at varying scales, being essentially trans-border regions. These are understood as spatial entities which include the regions of several states and are characterized by intensive trans-border cooperation contributing to social and economic development (Degterev, Zhusupova & Pryakhin)\(^{23}\).

**Regional projects and models of transborder regions**

As one of varieties of contemporary regionalism, trans-border cooperation may theoretically precede the development of broader (sub-regional, all-regional or trans-regional) forms or, as much more frequently occurs in practice, be a consequence of such a development. As a result, noticeable differences in the forms of organization of trans-border cooperation and overall picture of their evolutionary development in various parts (regions) of the world are largely caused by the characteristics of the broader all-regional (sub-regional) integration entities to which they belong. Their specifics determine the spectrum of opportunities for the organization of trans-border interaction at local levels inside these

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\(^{21}\) Fehérvölgyi, Birkner and Peter, "The Transborder Co-operation," 73–74.


The following aspects can be considered as key parameters governing specific features of organizing trans-border cooperation: (1) patterns of regional state-to-state cooperation; (2) role of national and/or supranational power institutions; (3) nature of the border; (4) nature of border regimes; (5) types of borders and border territories (Perkmann).

Patterns of contemporary regional cooperation and integration differ, on the one hand, in their reliance rather on formal (de jure) or informal (de facto) interaction and, on the other hand, in their focus on in-depth (overall) or limited (partial) integration. This, in turn, determines the place and importance of trans-border cooperation and the strategy for its organization and development. The second parameter, the role of central state institutions, indicates the fact that policies of states in most cases play a governing role, both from the viewpoint of opportunities for the establishment of sustainable trans-border cooperation and of its potential forms. Indeed, any contacts crossing national borders inevitably impact upon issues of sovereignty and are related to the competence of the central government. In this connection, it is hard to view trans-border regions as "naturally occurring" territories, because generally they are actualized through the deliberate policies of national governments.

At the same time, the nature and sense of these kinds of policies will be largely governed by the logic and targets of supranational integration and, therefore, by decisions made by the managing bodies of organizations of states. In such cases, this may mean that either greater freedom for "bottom-up" action is granted by national governments and supranational bodies to sub-national institutions and local communities (EU) or that trans-border interaction in required forms is initiated from the "top-down" (NAFTA). Such a differentiation of approaches is largely caused by the nature of borders and border territories and the nature of border regimes. The nature of borders is determined by whether borders are historically existing, stable and steady (Europe) or, conversely, unstable and disputed (Latin America, Africa). Paradoxically enough, stable borders expand opportunities for and facilitate the establishment of trans-border interaction because they pose a reduced threat to national sovereignty than in the case of uncertain or disputed borders. This, in turn, affects the nature of the border regime, which may be more open in the case of stable borders, regional projects which focus on integration or regimes se-

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25 Perkmann and Sum, "Globalization, regionalization and cross-border regions."
curing the existing border. In the former case, the contact functions of the border start to predominate over its barrier functions; while in the latter case barrier functions only partly give way to contact functions while simultaneously maintaining and even strengthening their importance.

Finally, the parameter of the type of borders and border territories makes provision for the influence of two indicators. First, whether borders are internal, between participants of a broader regional association, or external ones which separate them from neighbors who are not members of such an association, or who participate in alternative regional groupings. Second, whether these borders separate relatively developed and densely populated territories of neighboring states or, conversely, peripheral and economically backward areas with a small population. Both circumstances inevitably affect potential strategies for trans-border cooperative development, which may be focused on strengthening internal consolidation through the elimination of intra-regional differences or on the rapid intensification of integration at a local level (in the case of internal borders), or adaptation of future participants of a regional association and expansion of inter-regional cooperative contacts (in the case of external borders).

These factors in various combinations give rise to a wide diversity of spatial forms of trans-border interaction and, as a consequence, to models of trans-border regions. Trans-border cooperation in the European regional space develops primarily in the context of "open borders" and is accompanied by the progressive erosion of political, social and economic barriers. This model envisages the development of local trans-border regions in the form of institutionalized homogeneous transnational spaces. As a result, it is formed, on the one hand, of "bottom–up" initiatives in the form of trans-border network structures varying in their nature and, on the other hand, under the influence of a desire to regularize these initiatives and incorporate them into a strategy of pan-European regional integration at a broader scale.

Contemporary development of trans-border cooperation in North America is characterized by the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1989, which was succeeded in 1994 by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), with USA, Canada and Mexico as its participants. This regional integration mechanism is based on the idea of liberalizing and expanding economic and trade exchanges between participating states that differ significantly in their level of development. In this case, in the absence of a marked emphasis on in-depth and comprehensive integration, trans-border cooperation acquires lesser importance and develops under two different scenarios, typical of the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico border respectively. In the former case, it is based
on production (inter-company and intra-company) cooperation, projects for the joint management of water and energy resources, and coordination of environmental efforts. In the latter case, it is realized in the context of a partially open and strictly controlled border, and functions as a tool of compensation for the costs of a broader regional integration project.\textsuperscript{26}

Trans-border cooperation in \textit{East Asia} in the form of local integration patterns (economic growth zones) has been gaining momentum since the early 1980s. Among the first projects of this kind were the South China Economic Zone (SCEZ), which included two South China provinces, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and the Yellow Sea Rim Bloc (YSRB), which included three Northeast PRC provinces, several coastal provinces of South Korea and northern Kyushu Island in Japan. Their common features were their informal nature and a focus on the expansion of economic cooperation, with an emphasis on business networks which, nonetheless, did not decrease the importance of state policies governing both the opportunities and framework for trans-border interaction.

Trans-border cooperation has become one of the key areas of collective focus in institutionalized sub-regional zones gravitating towards integration, most prominently in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Trans-border cooperation is considered by ASEAN as an important tool for the solution of internal problems (the strengthening of intra-organizational unity, increasing the level of integration), external expansion (expansion of influence, quantitative growth) and to elevate its role as a collective player within regional and world policy. In the mid-1990s, three projects were launched within ASEAN that aimed to invigorate the trans-border cooperative interaction among the contiguous territories of individual members of this grouping. At the 4th ASEAN summit held in 1992, the idea of an Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) was placed on an organizational footing. A second, similar, project, the Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), was launched in 1993. One year later, the Brunei–Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) was launched. In 2000, ASEAN leaders approved the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), which placed special emphasis on collective efforts to reduce the gap between the levels of development of the participating nations and, first of all, between old and new members of the organization. In their Hanoi Declaration (2001), ASEAN member states con-

firmed once again the need for development assistance to new members through, among other tools, programs on sub-regional and trans-border cooperation, such as the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) program. The GMS cooperation model has three important features: (a) physical integration through infrastructure development; (b) coordination of policies and regulatory frameworks; and (c) development of sustainable partnership relations between the public and private sector. Two new programs within the Pacific archipelagic sub-regional cooperation (Asea-PPSC), between Indonesia–Papua–New Guinea and Indonesia–East Timor, can also be seen as trans-border cooperation projects that illustrate the aspirations of ASEAN nations to expand their zone of influence in another direction, southwards – and thereby "intrude" upon the ANZCERTA–SPF integration space lead by Australia.

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Trans-border cooperation and trans-border regions are gradually turning into an important tool for expanding and deepening integration processes in different parts of the world, and they significantly influence the geopolitical situation in regions. Implementation shows that the form, content and intensity of trans-border interaction are largely governed by the strategic goals of the participating nations, their understanding of the potential benefits and their prospects for being included in activities of such kind27. Along with their aims, officially declared and common to the majority of trans-border cooperative associations, such as strengthening mutually profitable cooperation, facilitating economic development, and strengthening stability and security, their importance is determined, as a rule, by two factors. One is each participants’ understanding of their internal priorities, while the other is their understanding of their "external" priorities and, accordingly, the position and role of respective local structures and actions in a broader context – sub-regional, regional and even global. From this point of view, several potential strategic reference points may be considered for trans-border associations and organizations being established.

In the first case, trans-border cooperation and trans-border regions may serve as tools for the consolidation of internal unity and integration within the framework of broader (in terms of membership and scope) regional structures.

The goal here is the leveling of existing economic and social differences between member nations through an intensification of local interactions, or seeking to "experiment" with opportunities and prospects for multilateral regional integration. Therefore, through stimulating development of backward peripheral national areas inside trans-border regions or through bringing state-to-state cooperation within a local (trans-regional) framework to a higher level, interaction patterns of this kind are intended to "consolidate the foundations" of existing regional integration structures.

In the second case, trans-border cooperative interaction and emerging trans-border regions may cross lines of division between existing sub-regional and/or all-regional groupings and "erode" them, through more active contacts at a local level between participants of various regional structures or states which are not their members. Trans-border regions perform here as "contact" spatial structures. As such, they can perform as nodes to prevent the division of global space into separate regional blocs or as a demonstrational model of the potential benefits to be gained through participation in a broader regional integration projects. In this case, the intensification of trans-border cooperation and the appearance of "contact" trans-border regions become a factor of change in existing (emerging) regional boundaries of the zones of influence and the spaces mutually gravitating towards integration.
Recommended reading:


Harsche, R. "Globalization and Process of Border Change in International Relations." In East/West: Regional Subsystems and Regional Problems of International Relations, edited by A.D. Voskresensky. Moscow: Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University); Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN), 2002.


Perkmann, M. and Sum N. "Globalization, Regionalization and Trans-border Regions: Scales, Discourses and Governance." In


Internet resources:


The formation and functioning of state borders and the origin, development and destruction of transborder relations and regions are often the spontaneous processes. However, this form of dynamic is associated with particularly high political and social risks, and in certain situations may have catastrophic effects for individual states, societies or entire regions of the world. It is not surprising, therefore, that over time these processes increasingly become targets of deliberate regulation, of various forms of political management. A reflection of this long-term trend is the growing interest shown by researchers of borders in the problems of border and transborder policies.

The essence of border and transborder policies and political reality

The formulation of and solutions to problems of border and transborder policies to a large extent depends on our understanding of the term "political reality". In political practice and political science the term is used in different senses. In the broadest sense, political reality may be said to refer to all activities that involve the expression and authoritative realization of collective interests, or the achievement of any...
kind of public goal. In this sense, the term "political reality" is closest in scope to the concept of "politics" that encompasses the various activities of non-state actors, members and institutions of civil society. In a narrower sense, the political reality is deemed the separate from society, specialized and professional management of the latter. In this sense, political reality is largely (but not completely) confined to "state policy".

In its origins the concept of a border policy was connected with the policy of the state. Because state borders as a phenomenon, as well as transborder relations, emerged simultaneously with the state, it is possible to say that in one form or another border policy has been around for five thousand or so years. However, it should be borne in mind that for most of this period border policy usually consisted of fairly primitive and disparate decisions and actions associated with responses to some extraordinary and critical situation (the threat of war, mass migration, the spread of epidemics and the like). Government decisions and actions relating to borders and transborder flows were for a long time not a consistent and unified policy and were not separated from other, more developed and more important areas of the state’s domestic and foreign affairs.

Only in the period that saw the formation and development of industrial societies did border policy begin to turn in an independent, specialized and institutionally organized direction of state policy. The prerequisites for this process were a significant complication of the structure and differentiation of functions of nation-states, which with the advent of the concept of territorial sovereignty securing the political and legal foundations of the Westphalian world order have become the leading actors within intra- and inter-societal relations. Even in Europe and North America (not to mention other parts of the world) the development of border policy, inextricably linked with the evolution of the nation-state and its linear borders, has been by no means fast, consistent and uniform. However, significant institutional, legal and technical progress in this area, begun in many countries during the industrial revolution and accelerating in the twentieth century, would be hard to deny.

The border policy of the state in the modern era can be generally defined as being a set of actions undertaken by the state authorities aimed at regulating transborder relations within the border space (within the territorial limits of the sovereignty of the state). Thus, the basic final object of border policy is the transborder relations of society, or rather that part of them which lies within the borders of the state.

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At the same time the state border itself is the most important complex instrument of border policy, and simultaneously its main direct object.

The connection of border policy with a particular state and its sovereignty determines its strength and at the same time, its limited capacity. The foreign sources and factors within transborder flows and the movement of these flows beyond the state usually place them beyond the reach of such a policy. This limitation on national border policies, which has become more apparent with the historical growth of transborder processes, was the objective precondition for the emergence of a new kind of policy – that of the transborder.

Transborder policy is no less ancient in origin than border policy. Early attempts of elementary political regulation by states of important transborder relations (especially economic) beyond their borders could take the form of intergovernmental agreements or long-term alliances. However, only relatively recently, in the second half of the twentieth century, was transborder policy develop its own conceptual foundations. The specialization of transborder policy was promoted by advances seen within the most developed societies of the world in the post-industrial era, which gave new, unprecedented impetus to the processes of internationalization and globalization, and consequently stimulated the growth of all forms of transborder relations.

Transborder policy can be defined as a set of decisions and actions made by state authorities and other international, supranational and sub-national, actors that are aimed at regulating transborder relations within a transborder space (within territorial sovereignties of two or more states). Thus, the object of transborder policy is essentially the same as the object of border policy, but in this case it covers a much larger geographic scale, and ultimately implies achieving a higher level of efficiency in the management of transborder relations. However, the claims of transborder policy to larger scale and greater efficiency have their flip side. The process of developing and implementing transborder policy, taking place as it does in a decentralized, anarchic environment where actors do not recognize general rules or a higher authority, is difficult and risky.

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2 Most often, these were trading, customs unions. For example, such a union (Zollverein) in 1830 became the basis of the process of unification of the German states.

Therefore, one essential difference between border and transborder policies relates to features (the scale) of their objects. Another distinction between border and transborder policies arises from differences in their subjects. While focused on the same strategic goals of security and development for their subjects (inherent in any policy), border and transborder policies are based on the interests of the social systems of different levels and types. If a border policy is aimed at ensuring the security and development of a separate state (or nation, a sovereign society) within its border space, a transborder policy should ensure the overall security and development of two or more states (societies) within the framework of their common transborder space.

To clarify the specifics of border and transborder policies allows for a review of relations between them and other policies. Modern political life is a highly differentiated and specialized activity. However, the major bases for such differentiation and specialization stem from the subjects and objects of political action.

The main types of policy in terms of subject are those of state and of public (civil) actors, while in terms of the object they are divided primarily into domestic and foreign. And if the first of these divisions of political labor, due to the almost complete absorption of society by the state for most of the pre-industrial and industrial period (up to the nineteenth century), can be considered relatively late development, the second is much more ancient. The beginning of the differentiation between domestic and foreign policy related to the appearance of early states and their borders, while its conclusion was in the final formulation of the concept of state sovereignty in the Westphalian era. The object of domestic policy had become the relationship of state and public (non-state), implemented within the territorial limits of the sovereignty of a given state, while the object of foreign policy was the same kind of relationship, but implemented outside of these limits, beyond the state’s borders. With the increasing complexity of state and non-state relations "inside" and "outside" the state’s sovereign boundaries, along with the allocation of new spheres to them and the parallel expansion in the responsibilities of governments, both domestic and foreign policy underwent further differentiation.

From this understanding of domestic and foreign policy it follows that (according to definitions offered above) border policy is the result of differentiation of the first, and transborder policies of the second. However, it must be noted that border and transborder policies occupy within the structure of domestic and foreign policy respectively a special place.

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Firstly, unlike many other types of domestic and foreign policy they are allocated not on a sectoral basis (i.e. based on the type of regulated relations, as in the cases of economic, social and cultural policy), but using a spatial (territorial) criterion in order to regulate societal relations that cross the state border - within a certain border spaces or common transborder space. Both border and transborder policies are multi-sectoral, potentially covering all possible types of inter-societal interaction. Secondly, by virtue of the position of their objects in physical and social space, border and transborder policies are characterized by spatial contiguity and close interconnections. With this adjacency and interconnection, border and transborder policies play a role of a sphere in which there is the most direct coordination and interpenetration between domestic and foreign policy.

The development of such phenomena as the rule of law and civil society and the spread of democratic regimes were the prerequisites for the second major division in political labor – the separation from state policy of the political activity of non-state actors, i.e. civil policy. This new differentiation was imposed upon and significantly complicated preexisting structures of political life, and could not help but effect border and transborder policies. In the second half of the twentieth century there had emerged in many developed countries, along with state border and transborder policies, border and transborder policies of a civil type5, which were aimed at the same object, but differentiated from them due to their actors and interests, as well as their institutional forms and methods.

Even in the most democratic countries in the world, the development of civil border and transborder policy has been rather slow, which is especially noticeable against the background of a more active deregulation of other spheres of political life. This is due to the close connection between borders and transborder relations and the problem of ensuring of national sovereignty and security, the importance of which (sometimes strongly and deliberately exaggerated) is often used as an argument in favor of maintaining the monopoly of governments, on not only the implementation, but also the formation of border and transborder policies.6

Nevertheless, the general trend towards the growing influence of non-state actors in the field of border and trans-

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6 The activity of government, targeted to convince the citizens that a problem is associated with the national (including border) security, is named "securitization." See: Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers. The structure of international security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 4, 70–76.
border policy is currently impossible to ignore. According to some researchers (primarily representatives of transnationalism and globalism), this process will not only lead to a redistribution of political power within the existing nations, but will, under favorable conditions, lead to the development of civil border and transborder policies more and more independent of the state. Together with the intensification of transborder relations, this may lead to the erosion of national societies and formation of transnational communities with their own distinct contours. It is clear that these processes should be accompanied by the destruction of state sovereignty in the modern sense, and a further blurring of the line between domestic and foreign policies. In this scenario, the classic nation-state structure of political life will give way to transnational, and ultimately global, structure of policy ("world society" and "world government") having some other principles of differentiation. However, observations of political processes even in such an innovative region as Europe do not provide any grounds for expecting the implementation of such a scenario over the short term. As for most other regions of the world, civil border and transborder policies – this hypothetical embryo of a future world order – still occupy a very modest place in their lives.

Systems of border and transborder policies.

To the untrained observer, policy is reduced to the activity, to a specific sequence of decisions and actions. But these empirical, visible decisions and actions of "output" (in the words of D. Easton), usually hide the more complex and for this reason less obvious and less easy to understand reality – the mechanism of the policy, the system resulting in it.

In claiming that policy in general (and any version of it) should be considered as a system, we do not mean that it has a high degree of integrity and orderliness, or a well thought out, rational organization. In most types of policies, not excluding border and transborder policies, the reality is that this is not the case. However, the level of complexity of modern border and transborder policies is so high that even their description, not to mention their theoretical explanation, without the aid of a systems approach is hardly viable.

Considering the specifics of border and transborder policies, we have already mentioned that their common object is transborder relations. Border policy adjusts the scale of this object to that covered by the sovereignty of the state and in

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its border space, while transborder policy engages with the more complete geographic extent of transborder space. As an object of impact, transborder relations are not included within the system of border (transborder) policy. They belong to the system’s environment, its most important part, as the priority for the functioning of the system. In addition to transborder relations, within this environment there are other political and non-political relations between the interacting societies that can be significant factors in border and transborder policies.

The main function of any system of policy is to manage its object in the interests of its subject, referring to a particular social (including societal) system. The complete cycle of functioning of a system of policy or political cycle\(^8\) is thus of two major phases: 1) representation of social interests and 2) management aimed at their implementation. Accordingly, the functioning of a system of border policy implies the expression of interests of the individual society (nation) and their implementation in the management of its transborder relations within the border space. A system of transborder policy has a more complex organization. Its functioning includes the representation and reconciliation of the interests of all societies engaged in transborder relations (or parts of them, such as their regions) and the implementation of a coordinated multilateral management of these relations within the transborder space.

The structure of the system of policy includes three main components (groups of elements) – subjects of policy, means and goals (problems). The above components in the systems of border and transborder policies are very similar, but they have important differences, which will be discussed below.

Initial subjects of both border and transborder policies, as already noted, are societies (societal systems), or parts thereof, those social systems\(^9\) particularly actively involved in transborder relations. However, societies and large social communities, for objective reasons, don’t as a rule take part in the formation and implementation of border and transborder policies directly, so they can be regarded only as its indirect actors. Direct participation in these processes incorporates political institutions and operating within them (and sometimes beyond them) elite groups representing the interests of indirect actors.

The dominant position among the direct subjects of border policy is occupied by state institutions, which can be both specialized and non-specialized. For a long time, until the

\(^8\) That is the functional cycle of political system usually called policy in the ordinary sense of the word.

\(^9\) Social communities differentiated on their position in the social (professional groups, layers, classes) or physical (regions) space.
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, border policy virtually everywhere was under the control of non-specialized state institutions, primarily military bodies. In many developing countries, military authorities still continue to play the role of leading policy actors. However, in developed countries as well, in the face of the supreme bodies of legislative and executive power, at the strategic level non-specialized institutions are usually actively involved in the development of the state’s border policy.

The need to improve the efficiency of the management of transborder processes has led to the emergence of state institutions for which such control is the main or even sole function. Among these specialized subjects are customs and monetary institutions, immigration and visa services, institutions of health and environmental monitoring, agencies of border protection and state (national) security. In different countries listed agencies may have different levels of authority, subordination and degrees of autonomy in the process of forming and implementing border policy. The measure of differentiation and centralization of specialized border institutions, and the leading role among them of economic agencies or military authorities depends primarily on the level of development of the society, its political system, morphological features and the length of its borders. However, a strong influence on them may be a particular international situation. The increase in tension in the world after the events of September 11, 2001 resulted in a strengthening of inter-agency coordination and the centralization of state institutions of border policy in dozens of countries, including such diverse states as the United States, European countries and Russia.

In democratic societies, a prominent role in the formation of border policy is played by direct actors like non-governmental institutions. The most active in this regard are typically those organizations which seek to protect the rights of migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons, ethnic and diaspora associations, business associations, and some large corporations. These non-state institutions rarely specialize in border policy, but through lobbying a variety of social groups with transborder interests, they are, in some cases, able to exert a decisive influence on the general course of government in this area.

All of these state and non-state institutions can act as subjects of transborder policy. At the same time, as well as national and subnational, the subjects of transborder policy may also be supranational institutions, which incorporates both those coordinating bodies created by the state and non-state institutions of societies which interact with one

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10 This suggests that in such countries border policy has not yet become specialized direction of activity.
another, and those international governmental and non-governmental organizations which are unrelated to these societies directly but affected their relationship.

In their activities, the subjects of border and transborder policies use a variety of means, i.e. resources and methods. Resources for border and transborder policies can be divided into the material, social and mental. The material resources for border and transborder policies are primarily the built infrastructure (border crossing points, ports, roads, outposts, fortifications, etc.) and technical equipment (automated systems of control and monitoring, telecommunications networks, weapons, etc.) of state borders, as well as the budgets and staff (as a living, physical strength) of specialized government agencies. In a broad sense, these resources are limited by the overall transborder potential of the society (or societies) and that portion of the national product which a state (or states) can spend on its management.

The social resources for border and transborder policies are the people involved in its formation and implementation as carriers of social qualities, skills, and competencies ("human capital"), as well as the formal and informal relations existing between them and defining their social organization. The most important social resource for a policy is, of course, political, and especially state, power. Due to a combination of features, such as the legitimacy and coercion, state power is the most potent form of social relation.

To the category of mental resources for border and transborder policies belong those objectified forms of social consciousness ("symbolic capital") separated from people and embodied in tangible media, such as ideology, culture, religion, science, and law. In the postindustrial age the relative importance of this category of resources – and primarily the advanced and information technology necessary for the development and implementation of all policies – is growing at the greatest pace.

Depending on the specificity of the subjects of border and transborder policies and their goals, the changing conditions of its object, - transborder relations, - the resources for this policy can be applied in various ways. Methods of border and transborder policies can be divided into three main groups: administrative (based on coercion and impact on the body), economic (based on the promotion and regulation of access to material goods) and psychological (involving a belief or suggestion, with a direct impact on the consciousness). The same goal of the political regulation of transborder relations can be achieved using various methods. For example,

### Footnote

11 The examples can be the managing bodies (councils) of Euroregions established by regional and local authorities of neighboring countries.
a reduction in illegal migration can be achieved through the construction of fences along the borderline and mass deportations (administrative methods), transferring production to the territory of a neighboring state, removing the cause of migration (economic methods), or propaganda regarding the benefits of legal entry, stay and employment in the country (psychological methods). Sustainable preference of these or other methods is usually caused by the type of political system of a society – democratic, authoritarian or totalitarian. In addition, the choice of methods depends on whether this policy is carried out under the state’s sovereign control or outside of it. For example, in transborder policy the possibilities for using administrative methods, are, as a rule, much narrower than in border policy, because of the desire of the participating states to maintain a scrupulous respect for their monopoly on the use of force and the complexity of the coordination of joint military, border guard and police actions in this sphere.

Interaction of subjects of border and transborder policies with its object and the selection of relevant means occur within a certain problem. Neither policy (by virtue of resource constraints) is able to cover such a vast object as transborder relations completely and evenly. This achievement is further complicated because the development of transborder relations leads to separation and complication its secondary objects – borders and border regions. In practice, the goals of the policy include only those parts of its primary or secondary objects that are deemed significant and relevant for the subject. We have already mentioned the main priorities of border and transborder policy – the security and development of society (or societies), which defines a perception of transborder relations. These perceptions define the tasks and object to control and ultimately form the contours of a policy’s problematics. Due to tactical changes in the controlled object and restructuring the hierarchy of tasks of the subjects the contours of the problematics of border and transborder policies are constantly fluctuating, and its central focus moves. However, this does not mean that the goals of such a policy cannot have sustainable national and historical features.

So, in backward countries, or countries affected by a crisis in the entire set of transborder relations, the sole object of political management can be relations of an economic type, or some vital component of this such as labor migration and trade. If transborder relations are developing rapidly, diversifying by type, and acquiring resilience and their own systemic organization, this usually entails an expansion in the goals of policy and a specialization directed at this new phenomena, such as those related to the management of transborder regions. The result of this expansion in the goals of
regulation may be the transition from a border to transborder policy. In certain situations (such as the addition of new territories or qualitative changes in the composition or structure of transborder relations), the main problem of border or transborder policy becomes the creation or transformation of its own components, and above all, its means, including such an important complex instrument of this policy as a system of the state border.

Between the subjects, means and goals of border and transborder policies exists different relationships that contribute to the possibility of their integral functioning. A continuously reproduced order of these relations is understood as being the structure of a system of border (or transborder) policy. There are two main aspects of this structure – organizational and geographical. The organizational structure of a system of border (transborder) policy is the order of relations between its elements and components in social (political) space. This organizational structure is characterized by a certain distribution of functions, power and other resources between different actors within the border (transborder) policy – between the center and the regions, between agencies, between state and non-state institutions, etc. Accordingly, we can distinguish between the high- and low-specialized, centralized and decentralized (unitary and federal), democratic and non-democratic organizational structures of the policy.

The geographical structure of the system of border (transborder) policy fixes the order of relations among its elements and components in physical space. It is characterized by the relative locations of political actors, their means and goals, and the organizational relations between them, on the earth’s surface. The geographical structures of the various systems of border (transborder) policy can also be classified according to their level of differentiation (the number of relations and regional subsystems), centralization, density, etc. It is clear that between the organizational and geographical structure of border and transborder policy there is a definite correlation. In addition, they are both caused by the order of relations in the political and social systems of higher rank. However, at the same time, the organizational and geographical structures of a policy have their own characteristics and patterns of development. So, despite the fact that from an organizational point of view, the border policies of totalitarian regimes in the USSR and North Korea had many similarities, the geographical structure of Soviet politics, for obvious reasons, was much more differentiated.

As the complexity of both the organizational and geographical structure of a policy depends on the quantity of elements (and especially – subjects), it follows that the structure of a transborder policy is more likely to have a greater
degree of complexity than the structure of a border policy. This fact in itself speaks to a lower level of predictability in the system of transborder policy. Another structural feature of transborder policy is that the significant, often dominant, part in it played by networks, i.e. decentralized and horizontal relationships between subjects. By contrast, the structure of border policy is generally characterized by a predominantly hierarchical order, dominance of the center and vertical, subordinated forms of interaction among its participants.

The primary directions of border and transborder policies.

As noted above, in addition to the primary object (transborder relations), border and transborder policies have such secondary objects as borders and transborder regions. Accordingly, there are three basic directions taken by border and transborder policies – management of the formation and development of the border, management of transborder relations, and management of transborder regions – each of which is characterized by specific goals and means.

Management of transborder relations on the part of the state is impossible without such an important instrument as a border. Therefore, paradoxically, the border becomes an object of state policy prior to transborder relations themselves. This does not mean that the formation of a state border is necessarily initially controlled. The creation by a state of its borders from scratch and their arbitrary localization is only possible in uninhabited, undeveloped space. However, the majority of state borders did not emerge from nowhere, but rather on the basis of previously-established political or spontaneously-formed social, informal boundaries.

If the localization of the border has already taken place, the priorities of state management become its delimitation and demarcation. Until the twentieth century, the right to territory was usually acquired unilaterally by states: through military conquest or the discovery and development (colonization) of "terra nullius".\textsuperscript{12} Completion of section of the world and strengthening of the authority and effectiveness of international law has led to the establishment of sovereignty over territory being more often carried out through bilateral or multilateral international treaties. Delimitation of the state border often requires many years of negotiations, through which the parties (usually contiguous states) aim to secure an agreement on the location of the border line through its verbal description and mapping. However, for

\textsuperscript{12} Plotnikov A.Yu., Russian Far East border in XVIII – the first half of the XX century: Two hundred and fifty years of Russian movement to the East (Moscow: KomKniga, 2007), 10–27.
the modern state border to function normally, its delimitation is usually not sufficient. Therefore, following its delimitation, the participants begin the process of demarcation, i.e. the fixing and physical designation of the state border on the ground. Based on the results of this, they compile demarcation protocols that provide the most accurate coordinates for the border and which are attached to the border (delimitation) agreement.

It should be noted that the international legal formalization of a border is rarely definitive. Even in the absence of conflicts between neighboring states, changes in the social and natural environment of a border may mean it requires additional demarcation (redemarcation). Such further demarcation can be associated with both minor and major adjustments to the borderline, the legalization of which may necessitate the signing a new border treaty.

Legal registration of the border allows the state to proceed with the creation and development of other components of its system. The most important element in the construction of a state border is the task of building its material-technical and institutional components. The means utilized to resolve these problems depend upon the degree of priority granted by the state to the issues of security and development.

For example, approaches to the development of the material-technical base of the border depend on the functions that the government seeks to grant it. One approach, prioritizing security, is to create a physical barrier on the border, and this is an approach currently in vogue. The most famous example is Israel’s West Bank barrier, which separates Palestinian territories from Jewish settlements. During the Cold War, this approach was applied everywhere along the borders between the capitalist and socialist blocs. A second approach is to improve the technological infrastructure for a differential strengthening of both the barrier and the contact functions of the border. An example of a large-scale implementation of this approach can be found on the US-Mexican border. Since the late 1970s, the USA sought to provide high-tech equipment for the entire borderline, increasing the quality of control over border crossing. In 2011, the project was ended due to its high cost, and replaced by a strategy of extensively modernizing the most problematic parts of the border. A third approach to the construction of the material base of the border is closely connected to the decentralization of its management. In some countries, at different stages the central government has delegated authority for improving the border infrastructure to local administrations that, as a

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rule, been dictated by a policy to strengthen its contact function. In such cases, the development of the border is directly subordinate to the task of economically-developing peripheral areas of the state. The main targets for investment in this approach are checkpoints, cross-border transport and logistics, and any trade or tourism infrastructure.

Similarly, the priorities of the border policy of the state affect its approach to the formation of border institutions. Recently, there have been intensified calls on the part of non-governmental organizations and supranational authorities for national governments to carry out the modernization and liberalization of not only the material infrastructure of the border, but also its institutional components. In all countries, monitoring the passage of goods and people across the border is carried out by a variety of government agencies, the leading role among which is often played by the customs service. In their stead, Canada in December 2003 implemented a model of a single body policy by establishing the Canada Border Services Agency. However, experts of international organizations such as the World Customs Organization, noting the promise of this approach, do not consider it the only possible. There are some other institutions that seek to reduce the barrier properties of borders. These include: institutions of joint management to ensure a constant exchange of information and experts between supervisory authorities of different countries; the use of common infrastructure; "single window" systems, which allow for all the documents required for crossing the border to be dealt with in one place; joint border checkpoints, which employ the staff of two states, and so on.

Creating a developed state border system is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the state (and society) to properly manage their transborder relations. The border system must effectively perform its functions, selectively and actively increasing permeability or impermeability to transborder flows. Consequently, not only achieving a high level of efficiency at the border, but assessing its current level of effectiveness is an extremely difficult management task. The complexity of adjudging the efficiency of the border is increased when incorporating the interests of not just one state, but a number of interacting states.

Transborder relations are extremely diverse, so mechanisms for their regulation are not able to be reduced to a limited set of formal institutions. Normally a border (as indeed transborder) policy is seen as an external ordering of chaotic relationships resulting from the activities of individuals, companies or organizations. Thus, it is reduced to state

practices of coercion and control. However, management of transborder relations can be based on not only the practices of government control, but also on those of civil society organizations and informal rules, which sometimes play a key role in the formation and implementation of the border, and especially transborder, policy. Many scientists and experts believe that in the future, regulation of transborder and transnational connections should be carried out by non-state actors.\[^{15}\]

Nevertheless, currently the methods of state coercion (in its administrative, economic and psychological forms) are, if not the most efficient, the most powerful tool for managing transborder relations. From this perspective, the most developed and institutionalized direction for a border policy relates to the security of the state against threats arising from transborder relations. Border guards and customs authorities, phytosanitary and migration control – these are only part of a list of organizations that are to some extent responsible for the security of the state border and transborder relations. The work of these institutions is to first of all determine the degree of permeability of the border.

Evaluating the effectiveness of the management and control of transborder relations in terms of national security is a challenge. When it comes to the fight against a surge in foreign migrants, halting drug trafficking or just protecting the domestic market from cheap foreign goods, governments often resort to restrictive measures that affect border crossing. However, in practice these controls are rarely sufficient to fully eliminate the phenomena in question. The fundamental problem here is that this kind of policy is unable to be effective when reduced to a border (unilateral) policy. An effective solution to such problems always involves the interaction of a large number of state and non-state actors in different countries, that is, policy of the transborder type. Furthermore, a crucial role in this area is often played by human factors, whose influence on the security of the border depends on a variety of variables. Specificity of market behavior, peculiarities of bureaucratic work, local political interests and local culture can either reduce or enhance the effectiveness of a border security policy.

Another direction of border and transborder policies, which has reached a high level of development today, relates to the regulation of economic relations. Modern states have a wide range of means available to regulate transborder economic relations – from the traditional customs tariffs to a va-

riety of non-tariff restrictions (quotas for the import of goods and labor, export subsidies, licensing, standardization, and so on). However, with the steadily increasing interdependence of the economies of the world, the ability of these measures of border policy to ensure the accelerated development of a separate society is increasingly questionable. In view of this, from the second half of the twentieth century there has emerged at the supranational level a system of inter-state and inter-corporate institutions and norms, including multilateral and bilateral agreements on the regulation of international trade and investment, free trade agreements, international technical regulations, standards, controlling organizations, and so forth.

It is becoming increasingly obvious that active transborder relations give rise to many problems that can be solved only through international (transborder) control and regulation. Take the example of health issues on a global scale. Growing transborder contacts stimulate the migration of pathogens. This requires a joint solution to health problems by the world community, as even economically developed country are not immune from the various epidemics or pandemics. The interaction of states within this context may not only involve the provision of health care, or the exchange of vaccines and medicines. The rapid detection of disease, information sharing, and joint responses to outbreaks of viral diseases are often more important to prevent epidemics occurring on the national and global scale. Supranational institutions, most notably the World Health Organization, are developing guidelines and standards that allow for advanced technology and treatment practices to be spread around the world. At the same time one of the most effective mechanisms for containing disease can be the state’s borders, especially if border management is coordinated at the international level. The closure of borders (currently mainly unilateral) have actually been used during the spread of all highly dangerous viruses, including outbreaks of Ebola and the coronavirus.

The development of transborder forms of politics is a result of this intensification of transborder relations within social systems operating across borders, giving states a whole new set of problems to face. The management of transborder regions as a direction of transborder policy is most developed in Europe, but it is also, with varying degrees of success, used in many other regions of the world. Ideas regarding the management of spaces divided by the borders of two or more states emerged after World War II, which once again redrew the territories of European countries. The changing of borders created problems of separated families and issues over the sharing of infrastructure and natural resources (especially rivers). In such circumstances, joint mechanisms have
been developed at the national and subnational levels to address these issues. Under the influence of modernization theory in the 1960 – 1970s, such practices were considered as one of the most effective ways of developing the peripheral areas of nation-states. It continues to be believed that the development of a transborder co-controlled space can improve the quality of life, transport and logistics infrastructure, and balance the labor market in the peripheral regions of states.

Transborder regions are very diverse in type, size and level of complexity, with different goals and means of managing them. One of the main problems of managing transborder regions is that the space can be united in economic and socio-cultural terms, but not in political and administrative terms. Transborder ties may span administrative units (cities, regions, districts) of different states entirely or only partly. Another important issue in managing transborder regions is the fact that its effectiveness depends not only on the activities of the local authorities, businesses and the public, but also largely relies on the support of national and supranational authorities. These difficulties can be overcome only in the event of close cooperation between these supranational, national and local political forces and non-governmental organizations, as well as with the local populations in the neighboring countries.

There are three main forms of management of transborder regions. The first is that of specific multinational advisory institutions operating on a temporary or permanent basis. They are formed as a result of joint initiatives by local authorities in different countries. This type of "management" can be found in many parts of the world. Recommendations and suggestions offered by these advisory bodies are not binding on the participants in the transborder region, and focus on solving urgent problems in the spheres of transborder trade, economic and humanitarian cooperation, or environmental issues rather than on the creation of a single transborder identity or a single economic space. Another form is bilateral or multilateral inter-governmental commissions. The first such commission was established in the 1960s to control the transborder space of Germany and Holland. A key role in their activities is played by the central authorities of the nation-states. A third form of managing transborder regions are initiatives and programs sponsored by supranational authorities, which may involve a very wide range of actors, including government agencies, non-governmental organizations and private companies. Currently, this approach is most successfully implemented within the Euro-

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pean Union, although small-scale projects around the world are promoted with the support of the UN Development Program. Such programs are particularly promising in terms of the formation of a special identity for transborder regions. In particular, using this type of management, the EU is seeking to erase national borders and create a common European cultural space.\(^{17}\)

It is important to understand that the above forms of managing transborder regions do not replace and in the near future are unlikely to supersede the border and domestic policies of national states. They are now able to solve only a small set of tasks related to primarily economic, and, to a lesser degree, socio-cultural integration. Only the third, less common, form of transborder management involves the erosion of national hierarchies of territorial administration, political decentralization and implementation of the principle of "bottom-up".

**Historical models of border and transborder policies**

Peculiarities of border and transborder policies are determined not only by the individual properties in the structure of national states or the ethnic and cultural specificity of political systems. At a more fundamental level, border and transborder policies are determined by the historical stage of development of human societies. This poses for border studies the problem of identifying and explaining historical models of border and transborder policies.

Among the many ways of periodizing the historical process, the temporal typology of societies, one of the most generalized and universal is the division of history into three major ages – pre-industrial (traditional), industrial and postindustrial. Although very simplistic and primarily based on criteria derived from the technical and technological structure of production, this typology\(^{18}\) does allow us to describe and explain a number of fundamental historical features of societies, including their management of transborder relations and national borders. It reveals the content and the most important causes of main (stadial) changes in the objects, subjects, goals and means of border and transborder policies.


According to this three-part periodization, the existence of pre-industrial societies is founded upon agricultural production utilizing living energy, and especially physical strength of humans and animals. The possibilities of production in pre-industrial societies strictly limited the development of market exchange, which directly reflects to the amount, intensity and geographic scale of transborder relations. Pre-industrial societies are characterized, as a rule, by a high degree of isolation from each other and a high degree of autarky. All types of mutual contacts between them are characterized by weakness and irregularity. The states that emerged in this period (from the turn of the fourth millennium BC) had the form of local polities (city-states – nomes, polises), or large multipolities (empires) that acquired borders of the forepost or limes types, respectively (see chap. 2.3).

The lack of importance and rarity of transborder contacts among pre-industrial societies did not allow for their specialization as a specific object of government regulation. The most important function of forepost and limes borders is as a barrier against military threats. These types of borders had to perform primarily defensive, or at least patrol, tasks. Much less often they carried out customs functions, which were usually concentrated in big cities remote from the border. The reduction of state borders to instruments for the maintenance of political-military security did not create the preconditions for the emergence of specialized subjects (institutions), means and methods of border policy. In fact, throughout the pre-industrial period, border policy was a set of situational decisions and actions loosely associated with each other, part of as yet undifferentiated general state policy.

In the sixteenth century, Western European countries began the transition from the pre-industrial era to the industrial stage of development. At the end of the eighteenth century this transition was completed by Britain, and by the end of the nineteenth century by the majority of countries in Europe and North America as well as Japan. However, at the beginning of the twenty-first century a significant number of states in Africa, Asia and Oceania have still not completed the transition into an industrial state. The foundation of industrial societies is factory production, which is based on the massive and systematic use of machines. The sharp rise in commodity production was closely associated with the rapid intensification and spatial expansion of international trade, followed by other forms of transborder relations. The transition to industrial production and large markets was accompanied by the formation of nation-states and the creation of the state borders of the linear type.
The former "situational" model of border policy was not sufficient to respond to the high level of frequency and complexity within transborder relations among industrial societies. The regulation of transborder relations, covering all major spheres of society, could not solely be based on the priorities of military and political security. Significant attention needed to be paid to the problems of national economic, social and cultural development. The increasing complexity of the objects and goals of management required the creation of a special political subject, the system of specialized border institutions (customs, border guard, migration and others), with its own wide range of material, social and mental resources able to be applied on a regular and systematic basis. As a result of the gradual adaptation of the subjects and means of border policy to modified objects and goals, by the first half of the twentieth century most developed countries had come to define a new model of policy that could be termed "strategic".

In the second half of the twentieth century there were signs indicating that the most advanced industrial nations of the world had entered a phase of transition to the next, postindustrial, stage of their history. According to some researchers, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, in the United States, Japan and the UK this process of building a postindustrial society was largely completed. At the heart of postindustrial society is the production of information services and high-tech products, which are based on the use of computer technology and information and communication technologies. Changes in the content, technical and technological bases of production triggered explosive growths in transborder relations, which in many cases surpassed the volume and intensity intra-border relations and embodied different forms of international, inter-societal integration. One consequence of this was the multiplication and strengthening of various quasi-state, supranational and subnational, entities and the formation of transnational borders, intersecting with the linear borders of nation-states.

The growth in the objective significance of the transborder kind of societal relations has led many governments to recognize that its selective stimulation and development is a more urgent and important goal of state policy than the provision of military and political security. Adjudged ineffective at achieving such a goal, the unilateral "strategic" model of border policy in the second half of the twentieth century began to give way to "coordinated" model based on the diplomatic interaction of the subjects of border policies in two or more states and the preemptive use of mental resources and non-violent methods of implementation. Along with the "coordinated" model of border policy, in this period there also emerged the "multi-level" model of transborder policy. Spe-
cific to this model is the even higher degree of multilateralism, and a significant expansion the range of the subjects managing transborder and border processes due to including the non-governmental, supranational and subnational, ac-
tors.19

The coexistence of "coordinated" models of border policy and "multi-level" model of transborder policy, as well as the parallel preservation of demands for older models of border policy, reflect the historical heterogeneity of the modern world. Even in the most developed countries, domination by the postindustrial economic and especially societal mode of life is not absolute, and in many other countries its allocation is limited to specific territories, primarily large urban centers and agglomerations. The majority of countries in the world, and most of the surface of the globe, still live with pre-industrial and industrial societal relations. The structures and patterns characteristic of industrial and pre-industrial ways of life prevent the export of innovative political experiences from those societies that have experienced the postindustrial transition. The direct transfer of such experiences outside these societies often leads to unintended and dramatic results. Prospects for expanding the application of the practices associated with the "coordinated" and "multi-level" models of border and transborder policies are inextricably linked with finding a solution to the temporal (stadiual) gap in development between world’s center, its semi-periphery, and periphery.

Recommended reading:


Chapter 2.6 Border and transborder policies


Internet resources:


SECTION 3.
MODERN BORDERS:
CONDITION, PERFORMANCE, MANAGEMENT
Chapter 3.1
State borders in Europe

Introduction

The twenty-first century enlargement of the European Union to include 28 member states by 2013, and the EU’s active engagement with neighbouring states increased the number of real and potential border conflicts within its expanded policy orbit. Yet, the Schengen border regime has entailed the progressive strengthening of the EU’s ‘external frontier’ to render it a hard border replete with customs posts, watchtowers, security force instillations, checkpoints, border patrols and, in a growing number of locations, razor wire fences and walls\(^1\). As such, Schengen presents a formidable challenge to interaction across the EU’s ‘external frontier’ because it frustrates mobility, intercultural contact and communication, and, therefore, undermines a conflict transformation enterprise.

Borderscapes which promote cross-border mobility, intercultural contact, communication and cooperation offer scapes that can help to neutralise fear of the ‘Significant

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\(^1\) Four non-EU member states - Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland - belong to the Schengen Area. European micro-states – Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican City – are also included. The only EU member states that are exempt from implementing Schengen rules are the United Kingdom and Ireland. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Romania and Croatia have yet to comply with Schengen rules.
Other’ and are thus beneficial to conflict transformation, especially where conflict has remained dormant but is unresolved and may flare again. European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) potentially counteracts the hardening effect of the Schengen border regime because it encompasses cross-border cooperation initiatives that extend beyond the Schengen border. Potentially, ENP can help develop borderscapes across the EU’s ‘external frontier’. However, the evidence suggests that, rather than counteracting hard border building, ENP is buttressing the Schengen border through its support for building the infrastructure of border security. The prioritisation of securitization and border management initiatives, which now involve the all-consuming self-interests of private security firms, means that cross-border cooperation is often recast in the service of the Schengen bordering enterprise rather than in the interests of border people.

The challenge of 2004+ enlargement for the EU’s peacebuilding objective stems from the fact that enlargement has entailed the incorporation of live and dormant national conflicts into the EU including, Poland and Germany, Slovenia and Croatia, Hungary and Romania, and Hungary and Slovakia. 2004+ enlargement also connects the EU directly to national conflicts and conflictual tensions on its new external borders including, Finland and Russia, Estonia and Russia, Hungary and Ukraine, Romania and Moldova, Croatia and Serbia, and on the island of Cyprus. Furthermore, ENP indirectly connects the EU to conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, Turkey and Armenia, Israel and Palestine, and Moldova and Transnistria; conflicts in the Caucasus republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria, as well as in North Ossetia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia; political instability in Egypt and Libya; and all-out war in Syria and along its Lebanese borderscape.

This chapter considers the serious challenges posed by Schengen and ENP to the EU’s peacebuilding objective. To do this the chapter examines the operation of the Schengen border regime and the cross-border substance of ENP. Is there evidence to suggest that the EU is living up to its peacebuilding myth through cross-border cooperation across its external frontier or has the border security turn militated decisively against that objective?

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3 Hizbullah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict underscores the association of borderscapes with conflict.
The shifting thresholds of Europe

In the twentieth century Europe was on the move. Moving from empires to nation-states and national states, and from East to West and West to East. James Joyce travelled from Dublin to Pula to Trieste to Rome to Paris then Zurich when Europe was also on the move from empires to nations, finishing *Finnegans Wake* in the late 1930s before the next wave of upheaval. Lesser mortals standing still were also on the move as Europe’s borders were drawn and redrawn. As the old Central Eastern European joke goes: "The old man says he was born in Austro-Hungary, went to school in Czechoslovakia, married a Hungarian, worked most of his life in the Soviet Union and now lives in Ukraine. ‘Travelled a lot, then?’ asks his interviewer. ‘No, I never moved from Mukachevo’" (as rehearsed by Garton Ash).

Border towns and regions have borne the brunt of the shifting thresholds of Europe with some towns and cities experiencing perpetual name change as the border danced around. For example, Lviv in Ukraine was L’vov in the Soviet Union, L’wów while in Poland, and Lemberg when annexed by Austria in 1772. It is in these border towns – often understood in Western Europe to be on the edge of Europe yet in ‘Central Europe’ - that the historical meaning of Europe and Europeanness is revealed as one of constantly shifting thresholds. These shifting thresholds entered a new, seemingly more benign phase with the movement of the EU eastward through the 2004 enlargement process.

2004 marked the largest single expansion of the EU in terms of population, states and territory. These shifting thresholds brought new challenges for accession states and new problems for their border regions, towns and people. As Jan Zielonka comments, ‘Enlarging the Union to include only some, more compatible post-communist countries replaces old dividing lines by new ones, with potentially destabiliz-

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5 Timothy Garton Ash, *History of the Present* (London: Allen Lane,1999), 379
6 Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 141
7 The 2004 enlargement was the largest single expansion of the EU. It involved the simultaneous accession of eight former Eastern Bloc states – the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, as well as the Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta. They were followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. In essence, 2004+ enlargement entailed the wholesale expansion of the EU into Central Eastern Europe.
ing implications for the entire continent’.\(^8\) For the pre-2004 fifteen Western member states enlargement eastwards gave rise to the increased perception of risks and threats from ‘international terrorism’, international crime and contested migration that have been deemed to require a response which secures protection for EU citizens. That response has been to attempt to create the EU as a ‘gated community’ which deploys sophisticated selection mechanisms which determine the entry of individuals. Henk van Houtum and Roos Pijpers apply the gated community analogy to the EU by way of an examination of its manifestation as a ‘defended neighbourhood’ on the domestic front: ‘A gated community is a kind of frontier land that is predominantly built and maintained by the private sector. Membership is paid for and non-members are labelled ‘guests’. The gates of such a community are not only the result of the desire to produce a specific space for the outsider, the stranger, but even more so a purified space for the insider. It is the commercialization of fear’.\(^9\) The private sector has become an increasingly significant actor in maintaining the ‘gates of Europe’ and commercialising Western European fear in the process.

The contested Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, bordering Morocco, represent the only EU territories that share a land border with Africa and present a vivid example of the ‘gates of Europe’ as an expression of the fear of mass migration. The enclaves are encased by hard border paraphernalia - fences, razor wire, watch towers, spotlights, noise and movement sensors, border guards, guns and bullets. Death has been a particular feature of these gates, as when the Ceuta border fence was rushed by hundreds of contested migrants in 2005. Fifteen people were killed in the attempt to traverse the gates.\(^10\) In September 2013, hundreds of sub-Saharan Africans rushed the Melilla fence en masse and broke through to the other side. Many were arrested but some managed to escape into ‘Europe’. The incident prompted the Spanish government to reintroduce razor wire to reinforce the fence (it had originally been introduced in 2005 but was removed because of serious injuries sustained by


migrants attempting to traverse the fence). However, the gates open to those who service the material needs of the enclaves. In the context of Ceuta, residents of the neighbouring Moroccan province of Tetouan are granted 24-hour visa exemption certificates to pass through the border checkpoint and work in Ceuta’s construction and hospitality sectors. The safe passage through the gates afforded to Moroccan border people as ‘guests’ offering cheap labour to the enclaves is in sharp contrast to the treatment meted out to contested migrants. They are met with the iron fist of border control should they attempt a crossing. For Felipe Hernandez and Maximillian Sternberg this treatment smacks of ‘theatrical performance’ to allay fears of mass migration from Africa to the EU. This is the fear of entry by ‘the Other’ onto ‘our’ territory and the implications that entry has for our comfort and sense of ‘Self’.

Generally, admittance to the EU through the issue of Schengen visas depends on individual credentials. Business people, university students, and public officials engaged in cross-border cooperation projects or enhancing border security regimes may be waved through with relative ease. Border people not matching the desired criteria but with family, economic and cultural connections across the border are confronted with a more difficult passage, not least through the compliance of their own local officials in supporting the enforcement of exclusionary border practices. Compliant neighbouring states have been recruited, by means of financial incentives and the prospect of acceding to the EU, to police the new border regime of this EU gated community. Consequently, their own people, who are without visas, are constituted as potential security threats to the EU. The denial of visas for borderscape people is a blatant contradiction of the EU’s objective of promoting the free movement of neighbours. This objective was contained in the European Commission’s key Wider Europe document which stipulates that neighbouring states ‘... should be offered the prospect of

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a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms).  

Visas, readmission policies and work permits have been introduced in some borderscapes in an effort to address this issue. For example, in 2007 the Polish government began to introduce work permits to Ukrainian workers with specific skills in an effort to plug gaps left by Polish workers who went West after Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004. However, they still excluded border people who did not match the criteria set. Enter the swath of illegal visa entrepreneurs who, at a price, provide forged documentation to the excluded and the disenfranchised. Risk and threat now become the burden of those border people availing of illegal entry opportunities in pursuit of cross-border familial and cultural connections or economic self-advancement.

Michael Keating maintains that ‘The EU has sought to valorize transnational spaces through cross-border and inter-regional co-operation programmes, providing resources and institutional support ...’. However, strong countervailing currents are also in play. Despite the operation of cross-border and inter-regional cooperation programmes, the EU’s prioritisation of security and the buttressing of ‘hard external borders’ militates against the valorisation of transnational spaces that may benefit ordinary border people on the EU’s ‘external frontier’ and contribute to conflict transformation.

The Schengen border regime

The Schengen Agreement (1985) initially highlighted the benefits of freedom of movement for EU citizens through the abolition of member state border controls within the EU. Implemented in 1995 through the Schengen Convention, the Agreement created the Schengen Area in which border controls were abolished, common rules on visas applied and police and judicial cooperation enhanced. The main tool aiding this cooperation is the Schengen Information System (SIS)


which is a shared information database containing millions of ‘alerts’ on missing identity documents and ‘persons of interest’\textsuperscript{18}. Its covert information gathering has been criticised for lacking democratic accountability, breaching fundamental human rights and stigmatising individuals as real or potential threats to the security of the EU\textsuperscript{19}. By 1997, all existing member states - with the exceptions of the UK and Ireland which negotiated opt-outs - had signed the Schengen Agreement. The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) absorbed the Schengen Area into the EU\textsuperscript{20}. However, the thrust of ‘Schengen work’ since then has focused on strengthening external border controls with neighbouring states in response to the 2004 enlargement.

Stretching to 1,745 km, the Schengen border has been criticised for the manner of its construction. It has been imposed by EU political elites without recourse to democratic procedures and controls. Schengen’s acceptance by the EU ‘demos’ may be questioned due to shortcomings in an EU sense of solidarity and shared European identity. With national identities preeminent across the EU, and its member states founded on a national principle, it follows that a democratic imperative demands that the national peoples of Europe should have been consulted on the dismantling of state border controls and their reconstruction on the outer-reaches of the EU\textsuperscript{21}. All EU member states, except the United Kingdom and Ireland, are obliged to join the Schengen Area once they are judged to have met technical requirements on border controls with non-EU states. While obliged to join the Schengen Area, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania, have faced objections to entry from some member states, particularly Germany\textsuperscript{22}.


\textsuperscript{19} Joanna Parkin, \textit{The Difficult Road to the Schengen Information System II: The legacy of “laboratories” and the cost for fundamental rights and the rule of law} (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2011), 23–26, accessed June 12, 2013.


\textsuperscript{22} Technical requirements are assessed in 4 areas: air borders, visas, police cooperation and personal data protection. However, in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania, objections to entry have been based on Council of Ministers’ concerns about anti-corruption measures and organised crime, as well as contested migration, particularly from Turkey. In the case of Cyprus, the ongoing conflict between the Turkish Cypriot North and Greek Cypriot
Schengen border guards, whether positioned on road, rail, and sea crossings or airport portals, have considerable discretion in the exercise of their gate-keeping powers with checks at some border crossings lasting up to five minutes on average. More often than not, non-EU citizens join long queues for the longer check. To rub salt into their wounds, EU, EEA and Swiss citizens are whisked through some border crossings in specially designated lanes leading to automated border gates which open upon recognising an appropriate biometric passport. Consequently, Schengen presents a countervailing dynamic to cross-border cooperation between the EU and neighbouring states through its manifestation of the EU’s ‘external frontier’ as a hard border barrier. Cross-border mobility for border people became much more difficult with the price of Schengen visa (in terms of money and time invested clearing bureaucratic hurdles) prohibitive for many. A ‘local border traffic regulation’ is aimed at easing cross-border mobility for border people living within 50km of the border through the issue of ‘local border traffic permits’. In theory, these permits - which are not stamped on entry or exit and state that the holder is not permitted to travel beyond the border area - enable the holder to move to a maximum of 50km beyond the Schengen border. In practice, the laborious application process, cumbersome border-crossing procedures, including long queues and delays at the border, and intrusive customs controls militate against Schengen cross-border mobility: ‘why bother? It’s more trouble than it’s worth’ is the probable conclusion drawn by many border people living beyond the EU’s External Frontier.

Jan Zielonka draws attention to the dividing and divisive effects of the Schengen border by commenting: ‘...Schengen has become a symbol of exclusion of the poor and allegedly less civilized European nations by wealthy and ar-

South renders impractical the implementation of Schengen on the island. Croatia joined the EU on 1 July 2013 and has been subjected to a similar process of scrutiny and implementation of required reforms to comply with membership of the Schengen Area. See SPIEGEL ONLINE, accessed February 21, 2015, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/press-review-on-blocking-romania-and-bulgaria-from-schengen-area-a-887668.html.


rogantly superior ones’. With its emphasis on security over freedom of movement there can be little doubting the deleterious effects of the Schengen border regime on relations between the EU and its neighbours. Expanding the rights of EU citizens at the expense of the rights of neighbours is hardly a sound strategy for winning friends and influencing people in the neighbourhood.

The Schengen border regime brackets unregistered visa-less border people beyond the gates of the EU firmly in the category of ‘threatening other’ and ‘security risk’ rather than pivotal interlocutors in the quest to reconcile differences, promote diversity and ameliorate conflict. From the perspective of cross-border cooperation and conflict transformation across the External Frontier it is, however, important to note the Western Balkans gates of ‘Europe’ were opened gradually after 2008. Citizens of Albanian, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia were admitted without a visa. Nevertheless, a ‘surge’ in the number of asylum seekers in Germany, Sweden and Luxembourg thereafter - overwhelmingy Roma travelling north from Serbia and Macedonia - led to calls for the suspension of visa-free travel for citizens of these states. Therefore, these gates, while open, still remain and could be closed shut again on a whim.

The Schengen border regime is riddled with such selectivity and inconsistency. The conundrum of Schengen is that its security objective is faced with the fact that it is not possible to control cross-border criminality and contested migration simply by reinforcing some border controls. The sheer length and complexity of the Schengen border alone dictates that no amount of possible security measures will prevent those determined to cross it from doing so. Moreover, multiple modes of transportation across it - by land, by sea, and by air - multiply the opportunities for successful clandestine crossing.

European Neighbourhood Policy

With its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) the EU explicitly aims to transport its peacebuilding experience over the Schengen border and into neighbouring states. Promot-

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26 Zaiotti, Cultures of Border Control, 227.
Chapter 3.1 State borders in Europe

ing prosperity, human rights, democracy, the rule of law and regional cooperation within ‘the neighbourhood’ is the ENP formula for spreading EU peacebuilding beyond the EU Pale.\(^{29}\) In the absence of accession to the EU the ENP may be viewed an alternative way to promote EU values and so-called ‘norms’ in neighbouring states. Through the promotion of regional cooperation ENP also presents opportunities for connecting neighbourhood states to the EU in a relationship based on mutual interdependence.\(^{30}\)

The ‘Wider Europe’ initiative of 2003, in which the origins of ENP lie, was aimed initially at Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.\(^{31}\) Association Agreements with neighbouring states underpin the ENP and require ratification by all member states. Upon signing an Association Agreement the EU conducts a Country Report and drafts an Action Plan agreed by the neighbouring state. Typically, financial and technical assistance through the ENP is offered by the EU in exchange for political and economic reforms in the neighbouring state based on the EU’s *acquis communautaire*. Furthermore, tariff-free access to specified EU markets may also be offered.

In the run up to the 2004 enlargement, cross-border programmes - PHARE CBC, INTERREG and TACIS - were the instruments for easing the future accession of candidate states during a ‘pre-integration’ preparation phase.\(^{32}\) Yet, funding from these programmes was also directed towards projects for developing the Schengen border. For example, to help Romania meet requirements for entry to Schengen the TACIS programme funded projects for establishing satisfactory customs and border posts in Moldovan towns - Ungheni, Leuseni and Giurgiulesti - bordering Romania.\(^{33}\) While this may help quell Western fears of an influx of migrants from Ukraine and farther East through Moldova and into the EU, the Moldovan horse may have already bolted through

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\(^{31}\) Smith, “The Outsiders,” 759.


the gates of the EU courtesy of the practice of the wholesale granting of Romanian passports to Moldovan citizens34.

EU enlargement was reduced to a trickle after 2004: Bulgaria and Romania both in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. Official candidates for accession include Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. Bahar Rumelili argues that the granting of EU candidacy status to Turkey in 1999 was the key event that helped to transform the Greek-Turkish conflict with ‘issues that would have easily escalated into serious crises in the past ... now carefully contained by elites’.35 In particular, candidacy status signalled an acceptance among the Turkish political elite that the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict was an important element in its EU membership process. Accordingly, bilateral cooperation agreements on, for example, economic development, tourism promotion, border landmine removal, and contested migration were implemented. However, Rumelili confirms that the development of cross-border cooperation in the Greek-Turkish case is impeded by the Schengen border security regime while Turkey remains beyond the EU gates.36 Thus, conflict transformation as peacebuilding from below is thwarted by Schengen in this borderscape. With official candidate status no guarantee of EU accession, cross-border cooperation for pre-integration purposes was all but defunct after 2004. Instead, the EU approach to cross-border cooperation within the neighbourhood is the vehicle for spreading its good acquis communautaire news to neighbours while, at the same time, denying them its Four Freedoms across the ‘gates of Europe’.

Russia has no interest in being subsumed in the EU. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russia’s inclusion in ENP would have threatened Russian dominance over the other Eastern neighbourhood states: Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine.37 Russia thus rejected participation in ENP opting instead for the ‘more equal’ creation of four EU-Russia Common Spaces – economic; freedom, security and justice; exter-


35 Bahar Rumelili, “Transforming the Greek-Turkish Conflicts: the EU and "What We Make of It"!” in The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Power of Integration and Association, ed. Thomas Diez, Mathias Albert and Stephan Stetter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 100.

36 Rumelili, “Transforming the Greek-Turkish Conflicts,”119.

nal security; and research and education - in 2003\textsuperscript{38}. In opting out of ENP Russia undermined it by dint of the fact that Russia is the EU’s largest, most powerful, not to mention most adversarial neighbour. An example of that adversarial relationship was played out to deadly effect in the Syrian conflict when Russia supplied the Assad regime with anti-aircraft rockets after the EU let its arms embargo to Syria expire in May 2013 and, in doing so, presented EU member states with the opportunity of arming opposition forces\textsuperscript{39}. With 100,000 lives lost by 2013 and cities like Aleppo and border towns like Qusayr reduced to rubble the impact of the EU on a conflict management venture in Syria has been insignificant\textsuperscript{40}. Much more significant was letting the EU arms embargo to Syria expire. Thus, far from mobilising ENP for conflict management and transformation purposes, the EU became a player in exacerbating the conflict.

**Conflict transformation in the Karelia borderscape**

Possible EU membership for Russia is not an option through which the EU can exercise leverage to a conflict transformation end.\textsuperscript{41} That said, the EU has had some enabling impact on Finnish-Russian conflict transformation through support for cross-border cooperation initiatives like those in the Euroregion Karelia which have been undertaken at the local and regional level.\textsuperscript{42} Karelia is a historic region now divided by the Finland-Russia border. The Republic of Karelia and the Leningrad Oblast are on the Russian side of the border and South Karelia and North Karelia on the Finnish side. The outcome of two Finnish-Russian wars – the Winter War (1939–40) and the Continuation War (1941–44) - was that most of the territory of Karelia was ceded by Finland to the Soviet Union and 400,000 Finns were evacuated from the Soviet Union side of the border and relocated with-


\textsuperscript{40} Qusary, on the border with Lebanon, was captured by Sunni insurgents during the Syrian war and retaken by the Syrian Army and Hizbullah on 5 June 2013. Before the war, Qusayr was 65 per cent Sunni, 20 per cent Christian and 15 per cent Shia and Alawites. Graffiti on a wall read "Shias and Alawites to the tomb, Christians to Beirut" (Michael Jansen, "Strategic Qusayr Reduced to Rubble," Irish Times, June 17, 2013, 12).


\textsuperscript{42} Joenniemi, "Border Issues in Europe’s North," 162.
in Finland.\textsuperscript{43} In turn, the territory was populated by people from the Soviet Union and became ‘russified’.\textsuperscript{44} The collapse of the Soviet Union presented an opportunity for the development of cross-border cooperation as conflict transformation. The Government of the Republic of Karelia in the Russian Federation proposed the formation of Euroregion Karelia in 1998 and, with the support of the Finnish regional councils - Northern Karelia, Kainuu and Northern Ostrobothnia - it was launched in 2000 for that purpose\textsuperscript{45}. This Euroregion was the first on the land border between the EU and the Russian Federation and is supported by the Euregio Karelia Neighbourhood programme which replaced Interreg IIIA and TA-CIS CBC programmes in 2007\textsuperscript{46}.

Cross-border visits in Karelia by people on voyages of discovery to battlefields, lost territory and war memorials has entailed a sharing of historical memories and a bridging of cultural differences.\textsuperscript{47} However, the Schengen border regime’s tightening of the EU’s external borders with neighbouring states inhibits the development of this borderscape for cooperation and socio-cultural interaction.\textsuperscript{48} Consequently, there remains a disparity between general public attitudes to Euroregion Karelia cross-border cooperation and the actors involved who view it positively. Certainly cross-border cooperation has failed to generate a common cross-border identity among Karelia border people.\textsuperscript{49} Moreover, explicitly connecting the process of Europeanisation to cross-border cooperation in the Finnish-Russian context is likely to be counter-productive for conflict transformation here since it is interpreted by the Russian state government as a subordination process to the neo-medieval construction of ‘Europe as Empire’.\textsuperscript{50}

The optimism generated at the launch of Euroregion Karelia as a cross-border venture has become tempered by the

\textsuperscript{48} Scott, "Wider Europe," 33.
\textsuperscript{49} 51 Liikanen and Virtanen,"The New Neighbourhood,"129.
\textsuperscript{50} Joenniemi, "Border Issues in Europe’s North," 162.
consolidation of the Russian state under Vladimir Putin, the recalibrating Russian nationalism and a Russian interpretation of Europeanisation as EU neo-imperialism. From this Russian perspective, ‘cross-border region building can easily be seen as a source of discord, or even threat’. Cross-border cooperation thus becomes a potential conduit for conflict exacerbation rather than a component of conflict transformation in the Karelia borderscape. Regression, in part, is caused by the implicit message of ENP, namely, that it is an ‘instrument’ for spreading the EU’s civilising mission beyond the gates to Europe to the ‘barbarians’ on the other side. With enlargement conceptualised in the intellectual context of neo-imperial expansion, ENP may be considered in terms of imperial over-reach.

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The paradox of a nascent ENP cross-border cooperation approach is that the EU is also hardening the border with its neighbours via Schengen, thus delimiting freedoms between the EU and those neighbours. Indeed, ENP also helps buttress Schengen by outsourcing border-building projects to neighbours, expanding the EU perimeter beyond the gates in the process. And paradox breeds paradox. The paradox of developing a hardcore border regime like Schengen, especially where there is a history of substantial cross-border traffic, is that it creates a space for illegal trafficking entrepreneurs who find ways of circumventing it for a price. And the prevention of cross-border criminal activity was a pillar of justification for the construction of the Schengen border regime in the first place. In the end the pitfall of Schengen ‘hypersecuritization’ is lucidly outlined by Rubin Zaiotti: ‘The quest for security ... can never be completely fulfilled, since this is an inherently subjective and unstable condition. As a result, security feeds more security, and the process can potentially go on ad infinitum. One of the side effects of this hypersecuritization is that the policies it entails become almost exclusively repressive, since they are aimed at sealing off Europe from potential threats’. A critical response to this hypersecuritization embedded in the Schengen border regime, and in ENP, may be borrowed from Franklin D. Roosevelt in remarks made during his First Inaugural Address in 1932: ‘... the only thing we have to fear is fear itself – nameless, un-

54 Zaiotti, Cultures of Border Control, 228.
reasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance. Fear begets fear in the quest for a safer Europe through casting the EU as an ‘internal security area’ against perceived threats beyond the gates.

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Chapter 3.1 State borders in Europe

Recommended reading:


The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of many thousands of kilometers of new borders. Adaptation of the population and the economy to these new borders is a long and far from complete process. The objectives of this chapter are, firstly, to show the specificity of post-Soviet borders in the light of modern theoretical approaches to the study of state borders (limology) and, secondly, to consider their symbolic role and the importance of public perception in legitimizing and equipping the new borders. The term "post-Soviet borders" here refers mainly to the "internal" borders between the fifteen former Soviet republics, including the Baltic States, but we also review the external borders of the former USSR, the functions of which in the newly independent states have changed a great deal.

**The main features of post-Soviet borders**

As was shown in Chapter 1.2, in recent years have been developed postmodern approaches to the study of borders that interpret them as social constructs and integral elements of the hierarchy of territorial identities, mythological symbols of social communities, the importance of which in the public consciousness is enhanced by the historical narratives and markers of political landscapes. According to these new approaches, people’s ideas about borders are inseparable from their geopolitical visions of the world, i.e. mass images and discourses on the status of their state in the world.
and its belonging to a particular political community. Thus, discourse on state borders is one of the foundations of nation-building.

The importance and priority of the different functions of the border depend on the size and nature of the state and the historical stage of its development. French geographer and diplomat M. Foucher, in his important book on the world system of state borders (1991), identified three types of states: "regular" sovereign states, "states under construction" and "empires" and, accordingly, has divided world borders into six types: between empires, between empires and sovereign states, between empires and "states under construction", and so on.¹ He considered the USSR and the USA as "empires", and the term "states under construction" referred to countries with an underdeveloped national identity, which is not always able to fully control its territory. Confrontation of "empires" determined the length of the existence of so-called frontal borders with dominant barrier functions.

Not all borders are equally important to the state. In addition, different borders have different meanings from different points of view. Weak states have serious reasons to give priority to the protection of borders, which perform a constitutive function or a function of national identity, so that these borders confirm the state’s right to exist.

Research on borders and on social representations of borders are often combined with traditional analyses of their morphology, functions, and role in international relations; the need for a synthesis of "traditional" and "new" approaches has been convincingly proved by the study of post-Soviet borders. This approach allows us to identify the following as their main features.

**Natural and morphological diversity.** The huge variety of functions and types of post-Soviet borders is determined by the great variety of natural conditions, population density and differentiation of economic activities in the territories they cross. Only the new borders of Russia account for more than 12,000 km. Some of them correspond to important natural boundaries – such as watersheds or large rivers. So, part of the Ukrainian border runs along the Sever-sky Donets River and the border with Lithuania along the Neman. However, perhaps the most famous Russian border on a large river is a significant portion of the Russian-Chinese border along the Amur, being now in accordance with the generally accepted norms of international law along the thalweg, although previously the entire river belonged to Russia / Soviet Union, so that the line of demarcation coin-

cided with the Chinese coast. The border with Georgia runs along the inaccessible Main Caucasian Range, although a small part of Georgian territory (Kazbegi district) is located on the northern slope of the ridge. There are few passes that are suitable for the construction of modern roads or railways. At the same time, many thousands of kilometers of post-Soviet borders cross relatively flat plains, especially in the areas of steppes and deserts. This contributes to daily contacts between the neighboring regions, but also makes it more difficult to protect the border.

**Maladaptation of communication systems to the new borders.** The introduction of new political borders in post-soviet space by 1991 triggered the polycentric disintegration of the USSR’s single transport system, which led to radical changes in transport networks on both sides of new dividing lines. Polycentric disintegration, caused by the creation of new foci in the network, has led to negative consequences in the peripheral parts of the old system with a simpler topological structure.

Although sooner or later transport networks adapt to new political borders and new capitals, this kind of adaptation usually takes a lot of time. Some parts of the transport system of the newly independent states are still fragments of a vanished integrated network, suffering from serious imbalances.

In Central Asia and Kazakhstan railway networks have been divided by borders into a large number of separate segments. The result was a strong mutual dependence of the newly independent states on transit through neighboring countries.

In Uzbekistan, the new state border divided the railway network into five independent units. To get from the west to the east of the country, it was necessary to cross the territory of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. To resolve this issue, since 1995 a few new lines have been built with a total length of nearly 700 km. The Ferghana Valley is now the only area where there is a railway section separated by the mountains and the territory of Tajikistan from the rest of the network. In 2016, with the completion of the Agren-Pape line (129 km, including 19 km of tunnel), this problem will be resolved.

The lack of direct communication between regions, caused by the configuration of the new borders and terrain features, is a major threat to the territorial integrity of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where the railway network has also undergone fragmentation into three and six isolated segments respectively. The very existence of these countries, the poorest in Central Asia, depends on communication between their northern and southern regions, which differ in their economic specialization, ethnic structure, cultural and religious characteristics.
In Kyrgyzstan, since the mid-1990s rail communication was discontinued between Bishkek and one of the main centers of the south, Jalal-Abad. The shortest rail route between the two cities crossed seven national borders and passed through the territory of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 1,200 of 1,375 km of this route lay in other countries. For the same reason there is now no rail link between Dushanbe and northern Tajikistan (the cities of Khujand and Penjikent).

In Soviet times, the rail connections of Kazakhstan and Central Asia with the outside world was almost exclusively through the territory of the RSFSR. The newly independent states are investing heavily in railway construction to gain access to foreign networks. This is accelerated by the competition between the different corridors and logistic schemes of relations being put forward by China and other countries of the Asia-Pacific and Western Europe. In 2015, the construction of the Kazakhstan – Turkmenistan – Iran line was completed, with a total length of 900 km, of which 845 km was on the territory of Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan has already, with the construction of the Tejan – Sarakhs – Mashad railway, opened access to the transport network of Iran, Turkey and the Middle East. In 2013, a memorandum was signed on the construction of a Turkmenistan – Afghanistan – Tajikistan railway. But probably one of the most ambitious projects runs from the city of Kashgar in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China and through the mountainous regions of Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan, with possible extensions into Iran and Turkey. However, its implementation is dependent on solving a number of complex political and financial problems.

In the South Caucasus, the railway network, formerly integrated, also collapsed. Since the beginning of the Georgian-Abkhaz war in 1992, the railway connection of Russia with Armenia and Georgia, along the Black Sea through Sochi and Sukhumi, was blocked. Only in 2004 was a passenger service restored between Psou-Sukhum. Another line from Armenia to Russia, running along the Caspian coast via Baku, is also blocked as a result of conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Transcaucasian roads were closed or used only for part of the year, even before the war in South Ossetia in 2008. Thus, reliable communication between Armenia and other countries of the Eurasian Union is only possible by air. Isolation is one of the main factors slowing down the development of the Armenian economy.

Russia is affected less than other countries by the deformation of transport networks caused by the emergence of
new borders. However, the eccentricity\(^2\) of the railway system increased, connectivity between its European and Asian territories decreased, and the railways of the Kaliningrad region are completely separate from those of "mainland" Russia.

Russian strategic railway communications towards its east cross the territory of Kazakhstan. More than 100 km of the Trans-Siberian Railway between Kurgan and Omsk pass through Kazakhstan. Two more routes also lay partially in the territory of Kazakhstan, of 700 and 1200 km respectively. The only route that runs entirely through the territory of Russia is not able to fully ensure communication between European Russia, Eastern Siberia and the Far East.

Between the Volgograd and West-Kazakhstan regions the railways also cross the border many times. Today, about 500 km of railways in Kazakhstan are owned by JSC "Russian Railways". Similar problems are observed also with the highways.\(^3\) In turn, Kazakhstan is dependent on transit through Russian territory. More than 300 km of railways in the Russian borderlands belong to the state company "Kazakhstan Temir Zholy", while Kazakhstan is actively building detours through its national territory.

After the collapse of the USSR, the North Caucasian network has become a sort of peninsula. The shortest train journey from Moscow to Rostov and then to the North Caucasus, which in Soviet times was mostly used for passenger services, now crosses Eastern Ukraine. To avoid delays caused by border controls since the mid-1990s, many trains connecting St. Petersburg and Moscow with the resorts on the Black Sea, go through Voronezh, although this way is longer. But even this line, wholly-owned by "Russian Railways", crosses 50 kilometers of Ukrainian territory. In April 2015, due to the worsening situation in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine, Russian railway troops began the construction of a bypass with a total length of about 150 km.

**Different origins and "age" of the borders.** As a rule, the longer a political border exists, the more it is organically integrated into national and ethnic identity, and the better a population and economy become adapted to the characteristics of the border areas. In accordance with the classification of borders by the historical circumstances of their drawing, almost all of the western borders of post-Soviet Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, parts of the Finnish-Russian border,

\(^2\) Eccentricity – a shift of the central elements of the system to the periphery.

and the modern borders of the Kaliningrad region of Russia are postwar products, having been established after the Second World War. However, most of the new state borders in the former Soviet Union can be classified as postadministrative, having arisen in place of the administrative borders that existed between the former republics of the Soviet Union.

The degree of historical maturity is another important characteristic of borders, which often change their status and functions, but not position. Many of the new Russian borders already played the role of state borders in the past. Among the most mature historically are the Russian-Lithuanian and Russian-Estonian borders. The first already in the thirteenth century functioned as a border between Prussia and Lithuania (Poland), and after the transfer of Lithuania to Russia in the eighteenth century it turned into a Prussian-Russian border. Only in 1945 did this section of the border lose its status as a state border, becoming an administrative border between Soviet republics. Thus, most of the Russian-Lithuanian border (with the exception of its extreme western section near Klaipeda) has existed for about 700 years, although in different forms.

For nearly seven centuries the Russian-Estonian border has existed, dating back to the historical boundaries between ancient territory of Novgorod and the ethnic Estonians. In the middle of the thirteenth century this was the border of Novgorod Territory with Denmark, then with the Livonian Order. In 1721, when Russia annexed Estland, the functions of this part of the border have changed: it became the border of Revel (since 1783 the Estland) province. The Russian-Latvian border has a similar history.

The Russian-Belarusian border is a relatively mature one, which for most of its length in the past represented the border of the Principality of Polotsk, and was then used as the Russian-Polish border. The border between Russia and Belarus in the Vitebsk region has a longer history. It goes back to the border of Novgorod and Pskov lands with the Principality of Polotsk, which later evolved into the Russian-Polish border, and lost its status as the state border in 1772. Thus, this border has a historical analog, which existed for at least five hundred years. From Orsha, and further south, in the Smolensk region, the Russian-Belarusian border existed as the Russian-Polish one between 1514–1618 and 1667–1772, i.e. in total for over two hundred years. The Bryansk section of the Russian-Belarusian border was the Russian-Polish border in 1503–1618 and 1667–1772, i.e. more than two hundred years.

The border of Russia in the Caucasus can be considered as historically mature, which for centuries divided the Georgian and Turkish states from the semi-independent state for-
mations of the North Caucasian highlanders. This border finally lost its status in the nineteenth century, when the entire Caucasus finally became part of Russia.

The border with Azerbaijan on the Samur has a low degree of maturity, being the state border of the Derbent and Quba Khanates for less than a hundred years in total, from 1747 to 1765, following which the Khanate of Derbent lost independence almost for 30 years, and then from 1791 to 1806, when the two Khanates were in fact annexed to Russia.\(^4\)

The Russian-Kazakh border is also characterized by a low degree of maturity; the historical analogs of this border only very roughly coincide with present borders. In the mid-eighteenth century, on the Orenburg and Chelyabinsk sections of the border, was created Cossack Orenburg-Uiskaya Line, and at the Chelyabinsk, Kurgan, Tyumen and Omsk sections, the Presnogorkovskaya Line. The last was fairly close to the current Russian-Kazakh border, but to consider it as a state border is not quite correct, because in those years the nomadic Kazakh tribes took Russian citizenship.

The Russian-Ukrainian border is characterized by varying degrees of maturity. Thus, its northern part was established a long time ago, as tends to the boundary between ancient historic-geographical areas, the "lands" within the principalities. This section of the border now almost exactly matches the ethnic boundary.

In contrast, the center and southern part of the Russian-Ukrainian borderland, formerly called the "Wild Field", were regularly devastated by nomads, and later by the Crimean Tatars, with the support of the Ottoman Empire. This area was populated by Ukrainian and Russian peasants only from the seventeenth century, after the Russian government ensured its security. In this historical region, called Slobozhanschina and now divided between Russia and Ukraine, administrative borders changed frequently. These changes took place within the same state and depended on the gravity of lands to the main cities, not on ethnic or linguistic boundaries. In addition, Russian and Ukrainian villages were often situated side by side with one another. There were no differences between the Russian and Ukrainian lands. Administrative borders generally followed lines of delineation between Cossack regiments in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the military-territorial units around the fortified cities that served as centers of administration and self-defense.

\(^4\) Legally, they were joined by the Gulistan Peace Treaty of October 12, 1813.
The southernmost part of the border area is the territory of a recent mass colonization. When passing through the border the share of Russians there is reduced only by a third, although the proportion of Ukrainians changes more significantly. This area covers part of the historical lands of the Don Army Region, now divided by the border. The most densely populated and urbanized area of the southern stretch of the Russian-Ukrainian border is the Donbas, the majority of which belongs to Ukraine, and the smaller, eastern part to Russia. In the course of industrialization, which began at the end of the nineteenth century, the Donbas was settled by immigrants from first Russian, and then the Ukrainian regions. Mixed marriages were common, and the division into "self" and "others" was mainly due to kinship and social, rather than ethnic differences.

**Mixed, uncertain and moving border identities.** Most of the 48 thousand km of new post-Soviet borders divides "states under construction." With the exception of Turkmenistan and the Baltic countries, all post-Soviet states are experiencing a crisis of identity, which can be defined as a period when ethnic or sub-ethnic groups hinder national integration and do not identify themselves with the national political community. For about twenty years, there have existed the partially recognized or unrecognized republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. Thus, significant parts of the populations of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova did not recognize the legitimacy of the borders of these countries.

The newly independent state inherited from the Soviet Union their borders, which were often arbitrarily drawn by Stalin's regime according to the state's geopolitical interests. The mosaic structure of settlement created by the various ethnic groups made it impossible to unite ethnic, political and administrative boundaries, although in some cases the Soviet ethnic policy sought to achieve such a goal.

In addition, post-Soviet ethnic diversity was increased in the Soviet period due to the industrialization of many regions attracting a multinational labor force. As a result, the identities of the population in many areas became mixed and complex, particularly in border territories. For example, the Ukrainian Donbas is a territory with a strong regional identity. Political geographers saw six superimposed identities here in the early 1990s, those of Soviet, Ukrainian national (political), ethnic Ukrainian, Russian national and eth-

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nic Russian. The Donbas regional identity was clearly manifested in the all-Ukrainian elections and was reflected in the negative reaction of many people to the coup in Kiev in February 2014 and proclamation of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republic (DPR and LPR).

Though in Soviet times the borders between the republics were completely transparent, they clearly had an important impact on the formation of identities. Ethnic boundaries are a manifestation of changing territorial identities, which are open to transformation, including under the influence of resettlement, the natural movements of population, and especially through processes of socialization largely determined by state policies in the sphere of education and the media. It is within the borders of Uzbekistan established in the Soviet era, for example, that a modern Uzbek ethnic identity was created. Over time, in areas with a culturally homogeneous population, ethnic boundaries gradually converge with those of the state.

Going back to the example of the Russian-Ukrainian border, the 1926 census registered in three districts of the former Kursk region, now bordering Ukraine, 1,268,000 Ukrainians, or from 26 to 55% of the population. However, by the 2000s their share did not exceed 5–10%. Neither minor corrections to the border on the eve of the Great Patriotic War nor migration can explain such changes. Naturally, the local Ukrainians did not disappear, but while keeping the memory of their Ukrainian culture, they now consider themselves Russians. In 1934, Stalin’s regime abolished the so-called national-cultural areas densely populated by ethnic minorities. Since that time, unlike the neighboring Ukrainian areas, education in the Russian border areas mostly populated by Ukrainians was conducted only in Russian, which was also the language of social advancement. As a result of the division of the once unified Slobozhanschina between Russia and Ukraine, the majority of the inhabitants have come to consider themselves as Russian and Ukrainians respectively.

Thus, the identity of the population in ethnically mixed areas is ambiguous, and the administrative borders rarely correspond to the ethnic. Perhaps the most striking example is in Central Asia, where political life before the delimitation of the existing borders by the Soviet authorities was predicated on cooperation and conflicts between sedentary farmers and nomadic herdsmen, and Turkic and Iranian-speaking tribes united by a common religion of Islam. Interactions between them were structured by loyalties to different khanates, whose borders did not coincide with linguistic boundaries. The Soviet regime broke apart this social system, and strengthened the unity of the region as the borders between the republics were transparent. The collapse of the Sovi-
et Union destroyed a unified system of infrastructure and settlement, reignited old debates regarding the allocation of scarce water and land resources, and generated a struggle for hegemony, not only between the newly-independent states, but also between the local clans within them. This gave rise to acute political crisis and even civil war in Tajikistan.

The instability and conflict in the border regions. A neighborhood of "states under construction" can result in permanent instability in border areas. Proximity to ethno-territorial conflicts and, in particular, to self-proclaimed states, is associated with the inevitable involvement in their struggle with metropolitan country. It is statistically proven that if a country is bordered by a belligerent neighbor, the probability of that country being drawn into a conflict is three times higher than for other countries. In other words, only borders with stable and peaceful countries are really reliable. The theory of "instrumentalism" explains the escalation of local conflicts through the use of them as bargaining chips by neighboring countries in the larger political game. The territorial factor is particularly important in the case of a neighborhood of interrelated areas with a complex mosaic structure of ethnicity, as in the Caucasus. The Caucasus represents a single ethnic and political system, so that both related, and identical ethnic groups live on both sides of the border between Russia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

The border with a country at war may be associated with risks such as the use of the territory of a neighbor as a base of supply for weapons or as a refuge for the rebels. Thus, Chechen separatists entered the Pankisi valley of Georgia populated by ethnic Chechens. At the beginning of the "second" Chechen war (1999), Russia demanded that the Georgian government allow Russian border troops control of the border not only from the Russian, but also from the Georgian side, as they had in the "first war" (1994–1996). When Georgia rejected this demand, the relationship between the two countries deteriorated sharply. In particular, this prompted the Russian government to establish a visa regime with Georgia.

The importance of a common border between Russia and Georgia is very different for each of them. For Russia, which has long been fighting against terrorism in the North Caucasus, security functions of the state border are much more important than its economic functions and symbolic role in national identity. On the contrary, for Georgia the border with Russia is a symbol of national sovereignty and the unresolved problem of the "occupied territories", as they call Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Thus, the formal status of many borders does not correspond to the factual situation.
Demarcation and delimitation of the post-Soviet borders: political problems and symbolic significance

For the "state under construction", the border’s function for national identity often plays a crucial role. The legitimacy of borders is grounded in a new interpretation of history, and the desire for "historically justified" borders often becomes a national idea and a cornerstone of political identity. The delimitation and the functions of borders in the past is transformed into an acute political problem, since issues such as external threats to national security, the choice of political allies and even the vision of the historical mission of the state and possible development model all stem from the question of the border. The border is the "skin" of the country, the most tangible, physically observable symbol of the state, evident to every citizen.

Therefore, battles for the adoption of a new identity based on a new interpretation of national history in the post-Soviet states have a direct impact on the legal status of their borders, their delimitation and demarcation and, consequently, the economic situation in the border areas. A significant part of post-Soviet borders, especially between "states under construction", are not yet fully sanctioned under international law, i.e. not delimited and demarcated.

The Russian border treaty with Estonia, prepared as long ago as 1997–1999, has not been ratified. At the beginning of the 1990s Estonia and Latvia initially insisted on a return to the borders of the Tartu Peace Treaty, signed in 1920 during the Civil War. This would have meant that Russia had to cede to Estonia part of the Kingisepp district of Leningrad region and Pechora district of Pskov region. Latvia demanded the return to her of the Pytalovsky district of the Pskov region. More than 90% of the current population of these territories is Russian. These areas were never included in the Baltic provinces before the 1917 revolution.

Later, Estonia and Latvia officially renounced these territorial claims in joining the EU and NATO, as such disputes are incompatible with membership of these organizations, although many non-governmental organizations in these countries continue to support them. But Russia has linked the border problem with the situation for Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia, many of whom have not received their citizenship. Russia hoped that joining the Western alliances would soften the position of the Baltic countries in relation to their Russian-speaking residents. However, the absence of a border treaty with Russia did not stop the entry of the Baltic states into NATO and the EU. Ultimately, the Estonian parliament ratified the border agreement in June 2005, but added to it a preamble, which was not discussed during negotiations and had not been agreed with the Russian side. This preamble asserted, firstly, that this document
was to be considered as temporary, assuming a new agreement in line with the Tartu treaty in the future and, secondly, potentially opening the way to possible requests for financial compensation by Estonia for its "occupation" by the Soviet Union. This would mean consent by the Russian side to an interpretation of Estonia’s entry into the USSR as being an annexation. Since this position is fundamentally unacceptable to Russia, the treaty was denounced.

Latvia for a long time showed no interest in legitimating the border. But, unlike with Estonia, the Russian-Latvian border treaty, which was also ready in 1997, was ratified in March 2007.

According to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which resulted in the accession of Lithuania to the Soviet Union, it had received considerable territory from Poland and therefore had an interest in preserving the legacy of these Soviet borders with Russia. However, the delimitation some sections of the border, especially over lakes and rivers, caused significant debate. The border treaty was prepared in 1997, ratified by the Lithuanian Parliament in 1999, and by the Russian State Duma only in 2003.

The agreement on the delimitation of more than two thousand kilometers of land border between Ukraine and Russia was signed and ratified in 2003. By 2010, its demarcation was completed. But the sea border in the Azov Sea has not been established. According to Russia’s position, in the maritime delimitation in the Azov Sea was necessary to apply the same principle as in the Caspian Sea: the bottom should be divided, and the waters remain in the joint use and have the status of inland waters of both countries. Ukraine has firmly insisted on the complete separation of the sea, which could make the Kerch Strait, that connects the Black and Azov seas, Ukrainian. The politicization of the issue of jurisdiction over Tuzla, which defines the regime in the Kerch Strait, provoked a serious crisis in Russian-Ukrainian relations in 2003, serving as a forerunner for the dramatic events of 2014–2015.

Kiev considered intransigence in the negotiations as a means of strengthening its political identity and assertion of statehood. The tighter border regime with Russia was interpreted by a significant part of the Ukrainian political elite as proof of the European choice of the country and its readiness for EU integration. This corresponded to the aspirations of the EU, seeking the layered strengthening of its eastern borders. From the first years of independence many Ukrainian politicians and experts believe that the border with Russia could not be "unprotected."

After the acute political crisis connected with the displacement in 2014 President Viktor Yanukovych, the configuration and regime of the Russian-Ukrainian border has
changed radically. Ukrainian authorities do not control sections of the borders between Russia, the DPR and LPR. In accordance with the Minsk Agreement, the conditions for the return of them to under Kiev’s control are the removal of heavy weapons from the line of contact between the Ukrainian army and the forces of the republics and determining the status of these territories of the Donbas as autonomous regions within Ukraine, to guarantee peace and conflict resolution in the south-east of the country. Transborder interaction is very difficult and cooperation has been minimized. The Ukrainian authorities have restricted freedom of movement for many categories of people, especially men under 60 years of age. To cross the border now requires an international passport. Along the entire borderline have been constructed physical barriers that play an important symbolic role. Following the annexation of Crimea to Russia, there emerged a new "blind" part of the border that is not recognized by Kiev. The Ukrainian authorities have almost completely blocked communications with Crimea from their own territory, stopping the flow of water to the peninsula through the North-Crimean channel. The prohibition of transit through Ukrainian territory made acute the need for the speedy construction of a bridge across the Kerch Strait between Krasnodar Region and the Crimea.

As a result of the sharp deterioration in relations between Russia and Ukraine has worsened the situation on the borders of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR). The Ukrainian political and military leadership sees the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria as a threat. Along the borders the Ukrainian authorities have built a moat. In the Odessa region on the border with Transnistria a brigade of the National Guard is deployed. Ukraine and Moldova, focused on EU integration, are united in seeking the support of the West to eliminate the Russian military presence in Transnistria. The unrecognized republic is actually blocked. Creating a free trade zone between Moldova and the EU, to which are now sent to about ¾ of the Transnistrian exports, may critically impair its economic situation. PMR objectively becomes increasingly dependent on Moldova and the EU. Economic realities may contribute to a change in its status, despite the cultural affinity with Russia.

The delimitation of the border with Kazakhstan, the longest land border in the world (more than 7000 km), was very important for Russia. The process began with the most acute problem, delimitation of the hydrocarbon-rich Caspian shelf (1998). The delimitation of the land border started in 1999. 18 disputed areas were found. In some cases, parts of single settlements or large industrial enterprises were placed on opposite sides of the border. The border also
crosses nature reserves and dams. Discussion of these areas caused emotional debates at meetings of bilateral commissions. However, the problems were not politicized and successfully resolved at the expert level. The two sides exchanged the equivalent sections or reached a compromise. The two presidents signed an agreement on the delimitation of the border in January 2005.

In Central Asia, political instability and the use of border problems by political elites in the struggle for power hinder border delimitation. The delimitation between the newly independent states of the region is greatly complicated by serious threats to their security related to the activities of Islamic fundamentalists, the Taliban that appeared at the southern borders of the CIS in 1997 and the sharp increase in activity of Uzbek radicals in 1999–2000, committing incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Another threat is the drug traffic from Afghanistan, one of the world’s major producers of narcotics.

The borders of Turkmenistan were the only ones delimited quickly in their entirety, with border treaties signed with Uzbekistan (2000) and Kazakhstan (2001). Delimitation between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also preceded fairly rapidly. By 2001, agreement was reached on 96% of total length of Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan border, and a year later the parties reached a compromise on the remaining disputed areas. The border agreements between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were prepared in 1999, and signed by the two heads of state in 2001. However, due to resistance from the opposition, the Kyrgyz parliament ratified it only in 2008.

The demarcation and delimitation of the fertile and densely populated Ferghana Valley, now divided between the state borders of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, is especially difficult, although the irrigation system and the transport network remain integrated. In each of these countries there are large minorities forming the titular nation in a neighboring country. Central Asia is also one of the few regions of the world where there are exclaves, areas separated from the rest of the country by the territory of another state.

In the Ferghana Valley are eight exclaves, one of which belongs to Kyrgyzstan, four to Uzbekistan and three to Tajikistan. Their total number of inhabitants is approximately eighty-thousand. One of the most problematic is the border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, where various incidents, including fatalities, constantly occur. The most famous Uzbek exclaves are those of Sokh and Shahimardan in Kyrgyzstan. Unresolved issues regarding their communications with the main territory of Uzbekistan contributed to a deterioration of relations between the two countries. Uzbekistan has even used border and assault troops to "protect" these exclaves. In 2001, Uzbekistan tried to put pressure on
Kyrgyzstan, cutting off the transit road that connects the north and south of the country. The aim was to impose on Kyrgyzstan the Uzbek proposals for delimitation and, in particular, to connect the Ferghana region with Sokh through a transport corridor. At present, although roads crossing the borders between the two countries have been opened, bribes to customs and long waiting times at the border significantly increase operating costs. To date, about a quarter of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border has not yet been delimited. Kyrgyz authorities pay "lifting" for the resettling inhabitants of the Kyrgyz exclave Barak, located just a mile from the "main" border.

The delimitation of the border between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where a lot of incidents have also occurred that have led to a sharp deterioration of relations between the two countries, has been halted for a long time, and resumed only in 2008. About 14% of the border remains to be delimited, mainly in Sughd province. On the border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are several dozen contentious sites located in Osh and Batken provinces (Kyrgyzstan), and in Isfara district of Khujand province and Dzhergetal district (Tajikistan).

Border policy and border regime

Border security is an important social and psychological need of man. Public opinion tends to irrationally perceive national borders as the main barriers to any undue influence of the outside world. Globalization, economic instability and the increasing pace of social reform put issues of border security and migration control at the center of public debate in most of the countries.

As noted in Chapter 1.2, new approaches to border security are based on greater transparency of borders. The work of the so-called Copenhagen school, especially that of Finnish researchers, have shown that successful transborder interactions are possible only in cases that do not fixate upon territorial claims and conflict in their interpretation of the past. Dialogue should be focused not on the restoration of "historical justice" and recriminations, but on common interests, in particular related to "soft" security. According to the Copenhagen school, experiences of cooperation at the local level and the compromises reached will in the end be reproduced at the national and macro-regional levels and strengthen international security in general.

The paramount importance of traditional approaches to border security is clearly evident in the perception of the border with Russia held by many neighboring countries of the EU. If someone cannot get rid of an unwanted or dangerous neighbor, through subduing, controlling or moving them,
then there is a desire to dissociate from such a neighbor by means of a high fence. As a rule, the richer side fears its poorer neighbor. The main risks are seen as being possible influx of economic refugees and cheap labor, which could undermine the labor market and impact negatively on national identity.

Unlike most Western countries, which primarily border one another, the neighbors of Russia are both "sovereign", and "under construction" states. The borders with the "states under construction" can be both "old", established during the Soviet period, and "new", those that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In its northwest, Russia borders with "sovereign states". All of them, except Norway, are now members of the EU. Their combined gross domestic product (GDP) at purchasing power parity is about 44% of Russia’s, but GDP per capita is significantly higher or approximately equal to Russia (Table 1). Public opinion in these countries as a whole is in favor of retaining the visa regime with Russia. Getting information mainly from television programs and other media, citizens of these countries typically assess the economic and social situation in Russia as being much worse than it really is. The collective historical memory of the citizens of the neighboring countries of the EU is burdened with events from the Soviet and / or pre-revolutionary past. Although residents of the EU border areas with Russia tend to be more benevolent in their assessments, there are negative stereotypes that are still strong. For example, a survey of 675 students at the Baltic Federal (Kaliningrad), Gdansk (Poland) and Klaipeda (Lithuania) Universities showed that despite the introduction in 2012 of a regime of local border traffic (LBT), which greatly facilitates mutual visits, 88% and 68% of Lithuanian and Polish students have never been to Russia, while the vast majority of their Russian peers at least once visited the neighboring countries. For 28% of Polish students Kaliningrad is associated with "poverty," "low-life", "shadow economy", "smuggling", "war", "vodka", "alcoholism", "AIDS", "Stalin", "cold", "lack of freedom", "USSR", "Mafia", "labor camps," etc. (68% of respondents have neutral associations and only 5% - positive). Most of the inhabitants of the EU countries neighboring Russia are in favor of the preservation of the visa regime, fearing an influx of economic migrants and refugees and the growth of transborder crime.

In turn, many Russian citizens support the introduction of stricter controls on migration from the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The newly-independent states on the south-eastern borders of Russia can be considered as "states under construction", whose per capita GDP is much less than in Russia. Lower it is in China – the economic and demographic giant, developing in recent decades at an im-

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Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP at PPP (as % of Russia)</th>
<th>GDP per Capita (Russia)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Members</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. Gross domestic product in Russia and neighboring countries, based on purchasing power parity, in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries neighboring Russia *</th>
<th>GDP based on purchasing power parity, 2014</th>
<th>Comparison of prices, US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bln. dollars. US</td>
<td>% of the Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>333.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>217.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>945.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>172.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>370.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>167.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>418.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>18,030.9</td>
<td>481.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3,745.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia do not participate in programs of international comparisons of GDP.

Source: Calculated according to the World Bank, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund
pressive pace. Higher incomes and wages make Russia attractive for its south-eastern neighbors.

In general, the border policy of post-Soviet countries is determined by the strategy of "fencing". Its most obvious manifestation is the visa regime. In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, most former Soviet republics agreed to maintain freedom of movement across the borders between them. The Baltic countries, having declared their independence earlier, from the very beginning did not support this principle, and in the summer of 1992 unilaterally established a visa regime with all CIS countries. A few years later, they made this stricter and began to apply Schengen rules well before their accession to the EU and the Schengen Agreement.

The great achievement recently has been the signing of agreements on local border traffic with separate Schengen countries (Poland, Norway, Latvia), which made possible the mutual visits of residents of the border areas to the contiguous territories of the neighboring state. The average "depth" of these agreements is usually fifty kilometers from the border. At the same time, the general policy of the Schengen countries in the area of security is aimed at increasing protection of external borders and strengthening barrier functions.

The fundamental contradiction between an increase in security and an increase in transborder contacts is typical for other post-Soviet borders also. Turkmenistan since the mid-1990s closed its border through a visa regime. As earlier in the Soviet Union, citizens of Turkmenistan required an exit visa until 2004. Uzbekistan established a strict visa regime with its neighbors in 2001, trying to prevent external support for Islamic fundamentalists and their use of bases abroad, especially in the Fergana Valley. From time to time, such as during the fall of 2007, Uzbekistan completely closed its borders to individuals. Currently, visas are needed only by citizens of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.

A separate problem is the mining of some parts of the Uzbekistan border with Tajikistan and in some disputed areas with Kyrgyzstan. In 1999, Uzbekistan established minefields around the Sokh district – one of three exclaves surrounded by Kyrgyz territory. Some mines were placed on Kyrgyz territory. Notwithstanding the requirement of the OSCE, Uzbekistan refused to provide Kyrgyzstan with maps of these minefields. Only in 2007 did Uzbekistan agree to remove mines along the border.

In the Caucasus, the perception of border security has changed dramatically: earlier the single border of the USSR played a global role, as the outer protective line of a superpower. Nowadays it is the intra-Caucasian borders that are crucial to the security of the newly independent states. Their
main functions are protection against the possible movements of armed groups between ethnically-related territories, illegal migration, arms and drug trafficking, and financial machinations. This changed the "scale" and the nature of the defensive functions of the borders, from global to local. The task now is not to protect the state territory from missiles and long-range aircraft, but to monitor the mountain passes that can be used for the transport of explosives, light weapons or the injured. Russia imposed in 2001 a visa regime with Georgia when the latter refused to take action against the use of bases on its territory by Chechen separatists.

For Russia the dilemma of "interaction or security" is very significant. Attitudes to border issues are determined by attempts to strike a balance between the need to regulate migration flows and the need for foreign labor, the variety of natural and social conditions in border areas and the application of a single and underdeveloped law to all situations.

On the one hand, there is an understanding that security has an important regional dimension, and that threats to border security relate not only to illegal and unregulated flows of people and goods, but also to unfavorable socio-economic situations in the border areas. If the standard of living in border areas is low, people are more likely to engage in illegal activities.

On the other hand, the geopolitical culture and assessments of the current geopolitical position of the country leave no doubt that traditional approaches to border security remain dominant. The policy of centralization is hardly compatible with the division of competences between different levels of government, which is critical to transborder cooperation. Amendments to the law on state borders, adopted by the State Duma in 2005, revived Soviet restrictions on mobility and economic activity in the border areas. Within this border zone were included territories along the coast, including in sparsely populated areas along the Pacific and Arctic oceans. In Chukotka and Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District within its boundaries are the administrative centers of these regions. However, from 2013 in connection with the entry into force of the Order of the Federal Security Service N512 from October 15, 2012 Russian citizens need a pass only to visit the five-kilometer border zone, and to enter (pass) to the rest of the border zone requires only a passport. For foreign citizens the rules of receiving the passes remained the same for all the "depth" of border zone.

The traditional, "power"-centered understanding of security is not only a Soviet feature. It is also common in the US, Europe and other parts of the world. This is driven by events like September 11, 2001, or the Beslan siege in Russia. However, it rapidly descends into a spiral of "securitization".
The dominance of the traditional approach to border security has many consequences. Inadequate numbers of border posts with an insufficient capacity and especially the length of customs procedures is one of the main obstacles to the intensification of transborder communications and transborder cooperation. Although the turnover of Russian ports has increased significantly, they could be more competitive with the ports of Finland and the Baltic countries, especially in the processing of goods with high added value.

It has been proved that many of the dangers are exaggerated: the majority of migrant workers enter Russian territory legally, and the number of violations of Russia’s borders are no greater than those of the EU. Terrorism is mainly an internal Russian problem. Smuggling is partly due to the excessive strengthening of the border regime and a lack of crossing points. Even ideal border protection is no substitute for an effective regional policy and the benefits of transborder cooperation. Traditional approaches cannot be fully applied to all land borders of Russia, and, in addition, these approaches are sometimes useless in the face of new threats. Paradoxically, Russia’s western neighbors – Norway, Finland, the Baltic countries and Ukraine – perceive their eastern border as the most threatening, while Russia believes these same borders are relatively safe.

Traditional thinking is related to the instability of transborder cooperation, which is still highly dependent on the ups and downs of bilateral relations, the goodwill of national leaders, and the interests and sympathies of governors and mayors. A strict border regime is not really compatible with co-operation between small and medium business across borders, which is one of the driving forces behind transborder cooperation. The number of joint ventures is limited and they are specialized mainly in trading rather than production.

Transborder and cross-border relations

Transborder cooperation can be divided into three components. The first relates to decisions on purely local issues – ensuring social and cultural ties between the populations of the border regions, the development of cross-border trade, decisions on municipal and environmental issues, and the provision of medical, educational and cultural services. The second component is determined by the cooperation of border areas in the implementation of nation-wide functions – transportation, border guards and protection of the national economic space, prevention of natural disasters, and so on. The third is related to the economic development of border regions and their foreign trade activities. Its volume depends on their economic potential, the structure of the economy,
and the development of international transport infrastructure. Implementing national and local functions, border regions serve as one of the natural foundations for the integration of national economies.

Transborder interactions and cross-border cooperation are highly dependent on geopolitical factors. In the post-Soviet space, they reflect changes in national economies under the influence of, on the one hand, trade liberalization resulting from the entry of Russia and other countries into the WTO and the activities of the Eurasian Economic Union, and on the other, the Ukrainian, Moldovan and Georgian policy of integration into the EU. The national policies of import substitution in the interests of the security of nations and their trade associations, the balance of payments, employment, as well as fluctuations in bilateral relations are very important.

For transborder cooperation between the countries of the newly formed Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), work will be required on the harmonization of national tax legislation, the equalization of prices, and solving organizational problems. It is necessary to avoid further deepening socio-economic contrasts between the neighboring regions of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and within the borderlands of each of these countries, before seeking to reduce them. Experience shows that the mere opening of borders is not enough to activate daily interaction. Moreover, the removal of barriers could lead to new forms of asymmetry in interactions.

Changes in prices immediately change the direction of cross-border travel. So, before the fall of the ruble in late 2014, Russians traveled for cheap food and other consumer goods (fruit, vegetables, alcohol and gasoline) to neighboring cities in Kazakhstan. In the absence of customs controls within conditions of Eurasian integration the shady export of cheap alcoholic beverages and confectionery products from Kazakhstan undermined the economy of similar enterprises in the neighboring regions of Russia, and damaged the retail trade. In contrast to the borderland with the European Union and China, trips for services (primarily health and education) are mainly towards the Russian side. At the same time the intensity of daily cross-border interaction on the Russian-Kazakh border is much lower than that between the Kaliningrad region and Poland or on the Russian-Chinese border. Despite the active development of new and restoration of old, Soviet-era, productive-marketing relations, a breakthrough in cross-border cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan has not yet occurred.

It is necessary to make greater use of the potential of small and medium businesses to create conditions for the spread of growth from the commodity sector to industry, creating higher added value. The main requirements for busi-
ness are building trade and industrial relations in the borderlands in order to increase export potential and diversification through commodity composition and geographical distribution.

"Sanctions wars" and geopolitical conflicts will weaken the European vector and strengthen Eastern and Eurasian vectors. In connection with this the territorial basis of complementarity between the economies of Russia and the EEU, Asian CIS countries, and countries of East Asia will expand. This integration can amplify the pulses from the areas, that directly "crosslink" common economic space, and at the same time the diversification of spatial integration processes. This, however, may worsen the geo-economic position of Russian regions bordering with Ukraine.

Based on conditions of development and features, Vardomskii (2009) identified three types of transborder cooperation on post-Soviet and especially Russian borders. Of course, in reality, transborder interactions combine these types.

The post-Soviet type began to take shape after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It became the basis of "grass-roots" transborder cooperation, the "shuttle" business, or small-scale border trade, including the use of barter and "gray" schemes. In the first years after the collapse of the USSR, regional authorities tried to compensate for the negative aspects of the emergence of new transborder barriers. These interactions were based on long-established social ties, including kinship, which today also remain an important driver and capital of development for cross-border cooperation.

The Chinese type is characterized by an increased role for the economic and especially the trade component. Differences in costs of factors of production and consequently in the price level have led to the border regions of the Far East acting as net importers of Chinese consumer goods today, exporting mainly raw materials and primary processing products. China’s share of foreign trade turnover in the border regions of the Far East ranges from 50% (Khabarovsk region) to 90% or more (Jewish Autonomous Area). Such a high share is explained not only by the fact that the regions of the Far East are a kind of "gateway" for Chinese goods to Russia, but also because China has managed to create among the inhabitants of these border regions a culture of consuming its products. Huge shopping zones, built in the early 2000s in the border cities of Heihe and Suyunhe in Heilongjiang province and Hunchun in Jilin province through tax incentives, visa facilitation and easy communications, have come

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to attract hundreds of thousands of Russians who come for goods and services. In turn, millions of Chinese tourists visiting these areas get acquainted with Russian culture. The devaluation of the ruble and the yuan revaluation in 2013–2015 have led to a drop in Russians visiting neighboring Chinese provinces.

The European type is characterized by a wide development of the cooperative institutions, in which are actively involved regional and municipal authorities, civil society representatives, and business structures. Transborder cooperation has there a multi-level character. The focusing on active transborder cooperation corresponds to the aspirations of the inhabitants of the North-West: according to opinion polls, 75–80% of respondents in the Pskov and Kaliningrad regions support the active development of relations with neighboring European countries and the EU as a whole. It is in this borderland with the EU during the second half of the 1990s that the Euroregions emerged with Russian participation. Five Euroregions were formed with the participation of the Kaliningrad region: "Neman" (founded in 1997), "Baltika" (1998), "Saule" (1999), "Sesupe" (2003) and "Lyna-Lava" (2003). In 2000, the Republic of Karelia and a number of neighboring Finnish provinces established "Karelia" Euroregion, while the Pskov region founded the "Pskov-Livonia" Euroregion with neighboring areas in Estonia and Latvia. Since 2003, four Euroregions were formed on this model at the Russian-Ukrainian border.

However, for various reasons, primarily due to the lack of sufficient funding from both the EU and Russia, these Euroregions have basically turned into discussion platforms. Projects of cooperation began to be primarily implemented with other tools, such as special programs of cross-border cooperation.

Until 2007, these were funded through the programs IN TTERREG I-III and TACIS. The bulk of the projects selected under these programs focused on cooperation in the field of environmental protection, the development of civil society, and cultural and scientific exchanges. The implemented programs have been criticized by the expert community. Experts noted that the projects have a clear asymmetrical character: much of the money is spent on the territory of the EU to solve local problems, without causing a significant impact on the socio-economic situation in neighboring regions included in the program. Financing of first programs of cross-border cooperation was implemented by the EU, while co-executors in Russia and other CIS countries had the status of partners without any financial contribution, and therefore could not lobby for their interests. In addition, the decision-making centers on the distribution of grants and project management were also in the EU. A further issue was prob-
lems common to the entirety of post-Soviet space: the lack of development of civil society, lack of professionals able to lead international projects and function in English, and the low level of legal literacy.

With the beginning of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2007, new approaches to funding and managing cross-border cooperation programs were introduced. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) suggested co-financing projects by both the federal government and beneficiaries (regional and municipal authorities, non-profit organizations and others). There were other significant differences. First, in ENPI the asymmetry of cross-border cooperation has become less visible due to the experience accumulated by local actors in international projects and active lobbying, and the significant financial contribution of the Russian side to the total budget of the programs. Second, cross-border cooperation had become more "cross-border": to a greater extent than before new programs directly impacted upon border areas. Until recently, especially in the Kaliningrad region, the majority of projects were implemented solely in the regional capital, and one or two major cities.

Thirdly, in cooperation programs, relatively small-scale "soft" projects’ are increasingly complemented by large-scale projects aimed at upgrading or creating a modern infrastructure, such as the construction and reconstruction of roads, drainage systems and sanitation, or the modernization of checkpoints across the state border.

In the years 2007–2013 Russia took part in the five cross-border cooperation programs with the European Union, with a total budget of 268 million Euro. In spite of different sets of priorities, all were aimed at supporting economic and social development, including developing the tourist industry and improving overall conditions of competition for business, protecting the environment, improving the contact functions of borders, supporting cooperation between representatives of civil society, and informal networks and exchanges in education and culture (people-to-people cooperation).

In 2013 preparations began on seven new cross-border cooperation program for the period up to 2020, in which Russia is planning to participate. Funding for these programs is carried out through the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), which replaced ENPI. The main difference of the new programming period will be the exclusively bilateral format of cooperation.

7 "Soft" projects usually include a variety of cultural, scientific and educational exchanges, forums, round tables, performances of creative groups and so forth.
Russian regions are also involved in projects of the Council of Baltic Sea States, the Council of the Barents / Euro-Arctic Region, and the EU initiative "Northern Dimension".

Events of 2014–2015 will certainly slow down significantly the process of regional integration and the overall development of cross-border interaction between Russia, the EU and Norway. Mutual sanctions are incompatible with the expansion of the powers of local authorities in the sphere of international contacts, development of new programs of cooperation, and so on. Western partners have halted sluggish negotiations on visa facilitation with Russia, which remains in many cases a significant border barrier. The remilitarization of the border zone is clearly another issue. The model of transborder interactions based solely on the use of positional (border) rent is unstable. Obviously, their stability depends on deeper motivations and institutions of cooperation.

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Analysis of the situation of state borders in post-Soviet space has led to the conclusion that their legitimacy, functions and regime are deeply influenced by the coincidence in time and space the processes of state and nation building, reflected in a complex hierarchy of territorial identities. A large part of the population of post-Soviet countries, especially in certain regions, have not associated themselves with a single political nation, which assumes the values of common citizenship for all social, ethnic and regional groups. Almost a quarter of a century after the fall of the Soviet Union, many of the borders remain to be delimited and demarcated. Their military, defensive and symbolic functions remain dominant over the economic. The interests of the border regions are often sacrificed in favor of "high geopolitics."

The character of the neighborhood of post-Soviet countries, including Russia, is not favorable for transborder cooperation. Many border administrative districts and entire regions are among the peripheral and depressed, their economic development is low, and they are losing population. The unfavorable demographic situation could lead to a gradual reduction of the social capital of cooperation, inherited from the Soviet period, especially at local level. However, in many areas there are cities located close to the border, which can serve as natural centers of border interaction. The highest potential for regional integration is in relatively densely-populated areas, led by large and medium-sized cities, located on polymagistrals linking capitals and other more developed regions of neighboring countries.

In the current geopolitical situation, Russia is on the threshold of a new transformation of its spaces, due to a gradual reduction in the Eurocentrism of its foreign economic relations. These processes are in the same direction as the
long-term priorities of Russian regional policy to accelerate
the development of the Far Eastern and East Siberian re-
gions. The prospect exists for the formation of free trade ar-
eas between the EEU and ASEAN in the east, and chains of
consistently integrating border regions with the border areas
of neighboring countries.

An important factor in the development of cross-bor-
der cooperation would be a further reduction of transaction
costs – through more checkpoints, transborder highways
and, most importantly, reducing the time associated with
the movement of peoples and goods over the border. Trans-
port, including transit, and environmental protection are pri-
orities for cross-border cooperation. Success in their devel-
opment is a condition for the further promotion of regional
integration and the creation of a common cross-border mar-
et in labor, goods and services, and the move from coopera-
tion based on the obvious needs for joint action to coopera-
tion based on dialogue and the use of program principle. The
problem is, in particular, the selection of instruments to pro-
mote regional integration, whether they are appropriate to
geographic and other conditions, and the use of development
opportunities provided by the environment, in investments,
economic and socio-cultural innovations, and so on. Such in-
struments may be transborder economic zones, industrial
parks, zones of technological development, "technology vil-
lages" and the like.

In the current situation of deep political crisis, san-
tions and mutual accusations, the barrier functions of Rus-
ia's borders with the EU have increased slightly. However,
the ties of Russian municipalities with their neighbors are
not fully determined by foreign policy. EU sanctions against
Russia have had no impact on cross-border cooperation and
programs of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI).
The driving force of cross-border cooperation is pragmatism,
allowing border areas to receive additional resources to solve
local problems.
Recommended reading:


Chapter 3.2 State borders in the post-Soviet space


Introduction

This chapter shall seek to provide a brief overview of state borders in Asia. Its first task is therefore to define what it considers the borders of Asia to be, as its position as Europe's other is frequently taken for granted. The terms originate in Ancient Greece, referring to the two shores of the waterways connecting Marmara with the Bosphorus, Black Sea and Azov, and as Toynbee noted "the geographer's error here lay in attempting to translate a serviceable piece of navigational nomenclature into political and cultural terms". The arguments of nineteenth century geographers like Alexander von Humboldt and Oscar Peschel that Europe was merely an extension of Asia point to the fact that this division is an arbitrary one, but naturalized through repeated use. It was through this process of naturalization that Europe largely replaced 'Christendom' as a "coherent cultural region".

Europe's construction has frequently, as work associated with Edward Said has shown, occurred in opposition to an

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1 Arnold Toynbee, "'Asia' and 'Europe': Facts and Fantasies", in vol. 8 of A Study of History (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 713.
imagined ‘Orient’. The political and cultural dichotomy inherent in the opposition of Europe to Asia explains the eagerness with which eighteenth century Russians adopted Strahlenberg’s new definition of the boundary of Europe and Asia as existing along the Ural Mountains rather than the Don River, bringing as it did the core of the Russian state firmly within Europe (an civilization). As with later currents of ‘Eurasianism’, situating Russia between Europe and Asia as a superior synthesis of the two, such geographical perceptions reflected wider political and cultural trends. The contradictions engendered by the efforts of Asian states to ‘modernize’ are shown most starkly by Japan’s initial desire to "leave Asia" transmuting into an avowal of Pan-Asian friendship between peoples under Japanese ‘guidance’. Yet such trends were reflected in the thinking of numerous individuals ranging from Rabindranath Tagore in 1930s India to Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew in the 1990s, all of whom invoked an Asian unity that was embodied by, and dependent on, national primacy.

These utopian dreams of Asian unity partly reflect a European tendency to contrast its own coherence with Asia’s dissonance, serving as yet another means of asserting the superiority of its own civilization. Yet to assume all state borders are the results of an arbitrary imposition of a European state order is a gross simplification, as the peoples of Asia obviously concerned themselves with questions of territorial order long before they were homogenized under the label of Asian by the self-identified representatives of European civilization. Such territorial orders have frequently been contrasted with those of a European spatial order held to have replaced them, with the diffused zones of transition characteristic of the Chinese tributary system or the Manda states of southeast Asia being replaced in the modern era with the hard boundaries characteristic of Westphalian sovereignty. Yet the potential universalism inherent in the ordering practices of such states has always run up against the reality of the world beyond its borders; contemporary Europe’s desperate efforts to banish flows of migrants from the Schengen zone of free movement is no different in that regard. In Asia as in Europe, the border serves as a means of attempting to bring order to the world as a whole.

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The development of borders within Asia: periods, factors and types

Recent work in the field of border studies has stressed how borders function throughout the territory of the state rather than solely at its edge, and how they have come to be projected beyond its boundaries, at airports or through legal regimes, for example. The material manifestations of borders are both shaped by and influence the presence of the border in the mind, how the border is experienced, and the meaning ascribed to it among the population. While this chapter shall primarily concern itself with how to understand the borders of Asia in the present, it needs to be emphasized that contemporary understandings of borders are never able to be divorced from either the context out of which they emerge and the one within which they are interpreted. Such notions are never static, being constantly open to both gradual and sudden shifts stemming from either a change in conceptions or in the reality atop which such conceptions are based.

In order to deal with Asian borders in their geographical regions, this chapter shall set out a brief typology of borders. Such a typology offers no claim to exclusivity, but provides one means through which the borders of a given region are able to be comprehended. At the same time, these different typologies provide both a means of comparing borders across different regions while offering different lenses through which the borders of Asia and its regions can be understood.

Here, borders are defined as resulting from "interstate rivalries", "postcolonial space", or "rediscovered spaces". While the emergence of each of these types of borders can be associated with different periods of time, of more interest here are the factors which resulted in particular borders taking on their significance. It is the relevance of such factors in the present that account for how a particular border is to be understood.

Interstate rivalries. It is often maintained that borders within Asia prior to the arrival of Europeans were characterized by an inability to conceptualize the notion of a linear boundary. As a result, Asian states did not conceive of themselves as being bounded in any sense; rather, the area under the state’s control slowly petered out. However, such an understanding appears to confuse the imagining of a border with its materialization. That the borders of Asian states were often materialized on the ground as ill-defined and irregular spaces does not preclude an understanding of them as a boundary line. In Europe too, as Peter Sahlins’ classic work on the Franco-Catalan border detailed, effort was necessary to bring the materialization of the boundary at the edge of the state’s territory into line with understandings of
the border held by the center\textsuperscript{5}. Traditions of Asian bureaucracy and mapping suggest that it is unlikely that the notion of a linear boundary itself was unknown to states in the region, as China’s seventeenth century treaty with Russia shows. Obviously, of course, the presence of natural features that could serve as the borders of such states aided continuity: the notion of the strait between Tsushima and Korea as marking the border between the latter and Japan has effectively defined the two states for well over a millennia. Such borders have been characterized as emerging through a process of disputes and negotiations with the state on the opposite side of the boundary, and analysis in this vein reflects such a process.

\textit{Postcolonial space.} These refer to borders that came into existence through a changes in empires, and in particular the withdrawal of European imperial states from the region. These include most obviously the British from South Asia, the French and Dutch from Southeast Asia, and most recently the Russians from Central Asia. East Asia borders were primarily affected by the expansion and contraction of Japan and, arguably, China. The result has been numerous border disputes between territories that were formerly under the control of one imperial power (Kashmir or the Fergana Valley, for example) or that had been under the loose control of two imperial powers (between Malaysia and Indonesia on Borneo, or Arunachal Pradesh between China and India). In the main, however, the borders left to imperial successor states have remained largely intact, while the adoption of the political language of empire by the region’s nation-states has frequently found itself in opposition to the fluidity and mobility that characterized these interstitial spaces, necessitating a more anthropological approach to the question of borders in such spaces.

\textit{Rediscovered space.} This is utilized to refer to borders in spaces that are rediscovered, or perhaps remobilized, by the state due to changing geopolitical circumstances. The most obvious example today concerns maritime issues within the East and Southeast Asian seas, which has been reshaped by the adoption since the 1990s of UNCLOS and its EEZ provisions. What has resulted have been determined efforts to put forward and cement (often literally) claims to formerly insignificant patches of land emerging from the ocean. Recent years have seen increasingly tense standoffs over both possession of these islands, themselves often the products of postcolonial space, and demarcation of EEZs when they run up against one another. Such disputes have also developed volume, as shown recently by China’s expansion of the area

\textsuperscript{5} Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: the making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
claimed by its Air Defense Identification Zone. That the border questions may be considered to have been ‘rediscovered’ does not prevent them being fully historicized and presented as being vital indicators of national strength and/or survival.

Asian borders by region: formation, connections and contestation

Broadly adopting the typology set out above, this chapter shall provide an overview of some of the most important trends for the borders of four Asian regions. It shall only be possible to briefly summarize significant issues regarding borders in Asia in this short chapter. We shall begin in Continental East Asia, and work our way roughly anticlockwise through South and Southeast Asia before concluding with Maritime East Asia. While the borders of Russia, historically straddling the divide between Europe and Asia, shall be examined, therefore, those of the Middle East and Caucasus are understood as something of a frontier region lying between the two; these necessitate separate study both because of their traditionally closer ties to Europe and Africa and the recent, violent reordering of borders in that region.

Continental East Asia. Continental Asia in this context refers to the borders of Central Asia and the Russian Far East. Both of these have resulted from interstate rivalries, between the Russians, Qing Dynasty and British in Central Asia and Russia and China in the Far East. In Central Asia, after the establishment of Afghanistan as a buffer state between Russia and British India in the course of the Great Game, the borders between Russia and the Qing were demarcated in successive treaties (Tarbagatai of 1864, Ili of 1881 and the Pamir concession of 1884) considered by China to be "unequal" and "unlawful" and resulting in her loss of half a million square kilometers of territory. Similarly in the Far East, although not the official position of the government, China resents the fact that one million square kilometer territories along the Amur and Ussuri rivers was ceded to Russia by the treaties of Aigun (1856) and Peking (1860). In both regions, borders were demarcated by the two states, with little consideration for the interests of those actually living within these borderlands, incorporating a diverse variety of ethnic groups not associated with the titular nationalities of the states in question. While in the Far East with the exception of the Mongols these populations proved small enough to be swallowed into the either the Russian or Chinese states and defined by their borders, in Central Asia,

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a number of nomadic and sedentary groups became titular nations under Soviet nationalities policy. Mongolia came to serve as a buffer or borderland between Russia and China when it declared independence in 1911, with "outer" Mongolia being ultimately recognized by the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a Soviet-backed nation state after WWII, while "inner" Mongolia remained within the PRC.

Although the borders between Russia and China appear to largely stem from the nineteenth century, however, they have been far from static, and the region was brought into the orbit of 'high-imperialism' in the last-nineteenth century. Competition with first the Qing and then Russia saw Japan occupy Korea, before investing Manchuria and invading China proper. Nevertheless, with the ending of World War II, the geopolitical border setting in Central Asia and the Far East was once again driven by the two powers of Russia and China. Soviet-PRC borders effectively inherited Russian-Qing boundary disputes, with Mao Zedong and the Chinese communist leaders initially conciliatory while continuing to think of China as having had huge territories stolen by Russia. By the 1960s, PRC demands were limited to the equitable demarcation of the rivers that marked their borders as being along the "thalweg", or center of the principle navigational channel, as Russia occupied hundreds of islands in the Amur and Ussuri rivers close to the Chinese bank. In the west, China's stance was tougher, requiring the "return" 20,000 square kilometers of Tajikistan which they thought ceded without any lawful arrangement.

In the early 1960s, Nikita Khrushchev agreed in principal to Mao's claim that the rivers should be divided by the "thalweg", but with one exception: that Bolshoi Ussuriiskii (Heixiazi) should remain in Soviet hands. China rejected the proposal, and the border remained undemarcated along the entirety of its 7000 kilometers. In the late 1960s, Mao cautiously planned a "sneak" attack on a one kilometer square island in the Ussuri River, bypassing the larger island of Kirkinskii (Qiliqin) where the Soviet had anticipated an assault. This smaller island, Damanskii (Zhenbao), became famous for the Sino-Soviet confrontation of March 1, 1969. The terrain favored China, with the island closer to their bank and overlooked by a hill, and Russian soldiers struggled to regain control of the island. Following further clashes in Xinjiang in August, the respective Prime Ministers Andrei Kosygin and Zhou Enlai met at Beijing Airport on September 11, 1969, and agreed to begin border negotiations. On the eve of this meeting, China had successfully occupied the island as the Russian's ceased returning fire, and the island remained in Chinese hands. The conflict was the closest the two nuclear-armed states came to a full-scale war. Following Gorbachev's perestroika, reconciliation between China and
the Soviet Union saw border negotiations resuming in the late 1980s. Again, Bolshoi Ussuriiskii appeared as an obstacle to any deal but both parties put the issue to one side and signed an eastern border agreement in 1991. This finalized the status of 98% of the eastern boundary between the two states. Subsequently, a "fifty-fifty" solution to Bolshoi Ussuriiskii Island was agreed in 2004, with demarcation work concluding in 2008. The island is intended as a peace tourism site for both nations.

Within Soviet Central Asia, Stalin arbitrarily adjusted each republic's borders in order to maintain their dependence on Moscow\(^7\). With the Union's dissolution, the area became a post-colonial space, and while the principle of *uti pos sidetis* ensured the continuity of Soviet period administrative boundaries, the five newly-independent countries struggled with their newly sovereign borders. Soviet-Chinese border negotiations were complicated by the entrance of three new actors into the equation. The concerned parties initially refused to negotiate with China, but a "four + one" framework was drawn up by Moscow, and under the "Shanghai Five" umbrella, the border was demarcated between Kazakhstan and China in 1996 and Kyrgyzstan and China in 1999. The final agreement, with Tajikistan in 2002, saw China receive 1,000 square kilometers of territory as a condition for surrendering their extensive 20,000 square kilometer claim\(^8\).

As this last example suggests, there is not necessarily a clear distinction between the categories of interstate rivalries and postcolonial space, and the terms are invoked here as indications of the nature of the analysis offered, rather than any absolute description. The borders of both South and Southeast Asia shall be considered more from the perspective of being postcolonial spaces, but it is worth bearing in mind that an interstate analysis similar to that above would be perfectly possible.

**South Asia.** Following the deaths of at least 18 Indian Army personnel on 4 June 2015 during an ambush in the state of Manipur on soldiers returning home from a tour of duty, the Indian Army conducted raids on two separate groups of insurgents and inflicted "significant" casualties on

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\(^7\) M.B. Olkott and A. Malashenko, eds., *Mnogomernyye granitsy Tsentral'noy Azii* [Central Asia's Multidimensional Borders] (Moscow: Gendalf, 2000).

\(^8\) Akihiro Iwashita, *A 4,000 kilometer journey along the Sino-Russian border* (No. 3, Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2004).
9 June\(^9\). These raids "crossed over to Myanmar territory"\(^10\), according to a junior government minister, and were celebrated in India as demonstrating a newfound willingness to pursue those targeting the state beyond the borders of India itself. However, while initially reported by the Wall Street Journal as concurring that the operation had been carried out on Myanmarese soil, the office of the Myanmarese President subsequently posted on Facebook that "we have learned that the military operation was performed on the Indian side at India-Myanmar border"\(^11\). The Indian military itself ambiguously reported the raids as being on "two separate groups of insurgents along the Indo-Myanmar border at two locations, along the Nagaland and Manipur borders"\(^12\). New Delhi remained sanguine regarding Myanmar’s denials, with an official noting that extending tacit support to the operation would have been tantamount to accepting not only that it had allowed troops of another country to cross the border, but also that militant outfits of a neighbouring nation had set up camps in its territory\(^13\).

In a much-cited 1994 article, Sankaran Krishna pointed to the "Cartographic anxiety" of the Indian state\(^14\), but the persistent insecurity and neuroses he diagnosed as characterizing the demarcation of India’s borders applies to much of the subcontinent. The determination of Myanmar to deny the operations of either foreign militants or the armed forces of another state on its soil, even on territory that is barely under the control of the state, is representative of this anxiety. Sovereign borders remain sacrosanct, imbued with the ‘Wagah syndrome’\(^15\), with the performance of an aggressive


\(^15\) Willem van Schendel, "The Wagah Syndrome: Territorial Roots of Contemporary Violence in South Asia," in *Violence and democracy in India*, 233
territoriality utilized to compensate for the uncertain sovereignty of the state (Wagah is the border crossing between Pakistan and India in the Punjab that plays daily host to the choreographed changing of the guard). This performance manifests itself in a number of ways, most notably recently in the extensive militarization of the borderline itself. India has constructed extensive border fences with both Pakistan and Bangladesh, while military dominance of the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan’s North West Frontier has allegedly remained an (entirely unrealizable) political goal espoused by Pakistan, under Western pressure, since 2001. Such a militarization remains most visible, and most dangerous, in areas of continuing conflict over border demarcation, as with the border between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, while agreements signed in the 1990s between India and China to respect the Line of Actual Control in the areas disputed between them, Aksai Chin in the west and Arunachal Pradesh in the east, appear, particularly in the latter instance, to be becoming increasingly frayed in recent years.\(^\text{16}\)

The desire to simplify the border, to achieve clarity regarding the limits of the nation that such disputes and enforcement represent, embodies the high-modernist tragedy detailed by James Scott in his book *Seeing Like a State*\(^\text{17}\). The clean boundary lines "geo-coded" on political maps conceal the brutality of what this means on the ground\(^\text{18}\). While relations between the states of India and Bangladesh remain generally good, for example, the recent recovery by Malini Sur of the story of Felani Khatun, a fifteen-year-old girl shot and left to hang from the border fence between the two nations reveals the aptness of van Schendel’s description of this as a "killer border" due to the disproportionate use of force by, particularly, border troops on the Indian side\(^\text{19}\). This reflects ongoing anxieties regarding the migration of Bangladeshis into India, which are bound up in complicated ways in the attitude of the state towards issues of citizenship and minorities, of how to demarcate its insiders from its outsiders. Here, the aggressive territoriality noted by van Schendel manifests itself in an equally aggressive desire to achieve a

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clear distinction between the two by drawing upon resources only available to those clearly labelled as being ‘us’. The resulting marginalization of those not considered as being clearly ‘inside’ is a phenomenon visible throughout South Asia, from the Tamils in Sri Lanka, Muslims in India, Nepalis (Lhotshampas) in Bhutan, or a multitude of ethnic and religious groups (Rohingya, Karen, Shan, etc.) in Myanmar.

This desire for clarity and security can on occasion even override the sovereign territorial imperative, the requirement that the state maintain the ‘body’ of the nation. In early May 2015, a constitutional amendment bill from 2013 finally passed the Rakya Sabha (the Upper House of the Parliament of India), allowing for the operationalization of a Land Boundary Agreement between India and Bangladesh that was drawn up in 2011, although essentially agreed upon 40 years before. The issue is a post-colonial legacy of almost 200 border enclaves and counter-enclaves, as well as a solitary counter-counter-enclave (a piece of Bangladeshi territory surrounded by India, itself within a Bangladeshi enclave in India) on either side of the India-Bangladesh border. The Agreement will see 111 Indian enclaves transferred to Bangladesh, with 51 Bangladeshi enclaves going in the opposite direction, with a net loss to India of about 40 square kilometres. This loss had long proved a stumbling block to any deal, and indeed the current BJP government was opposed to the Agreement while in opposition in 2013, arguing that the territory of India was itself the constitution of the country, not amenable to amendment. However, the BJP’s Prime Minister Modi has successfully pushed through the bill on the grounds that enforcement of the agreement enhance security and end migration from Bangladesh into India. The desire to clarify the extent of the border, to secure the body of the nation, has provided justification for its partial amputation.

Yet this seeming move toward simplification has encompassed contradictory directions for India, with the demarcation of insiders and outsiders moving beyond the borders of

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the state itself with the creation in the early 2000s of Overseas Citizenship of India, granting its holders most rights associated with citizenship apart from those involving electoral office. The increasing trend towards *jus sanguinis* as the basis of citizenship has parallels elsewhere (in South Korea in particular), and as in other cases relies on the territorial demarcation of the state at a particular moment in time (in the case of India, the introduction of the Constitution in 1950, and thus the exclusion of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis). The increasingly institutionalized nature of India's relation with its diaspora seeks to extend the borders of the state out beyond its territory, a qualitative difference noted by Rahul Rao as representing the fact that Krishna's "neurosis of the not-yet-nation has become that of a not-yet-superpower"\(^{24}\).

The bombastic celebrations in India of its striking against militants in Myanmar, and the parallels drawn with *Operation Geronimo* in which the United States killed Osama bin Laden, also speak to this longing for superpower status, one secure behind its border walls at home while able to strike beyond them at will. The constant ratcheting up of Homeland (in)security within the United States suggest that such a future may well prove equally illusory in a South Asian context.

**Southeast Asia.** In a similar vein to the borders of South Asia noted above, many state boundaries and borderlands throughout Southeast Asia, such as those of Myanmar, southern Thailand, New Guinea, East Timor, and the southern Philippines, to offer some of the more obvious examples, are characterized by the most shocking violence, as local populations find themselves squeezed between state and paramilitary forces, on the one hand, and heavily armed guerrilla forces on the other. It is tempting to ascribe the brutality of such efforts to bring state, sovereignty and territory into line as stemming from their postcolonial condition, with the nation-states that succeeded European empires adopting the latter's alien, Westphalian-state based ordering practices imported by the colonial state and applying them in a newly nationalized context, sundering societies previously characterized by intermixture and territorial indeterminacy. Tempting, but somewhat trite; as such conflicts are frequently driven by a confused overlap of ethnic or religious differentiation with more material issues of resource competition, the vast stakes of which swell the violence occurring far from the "civilized center" of such states.

Again as with South Asia, the presence of such violence has little impact on the representation of the border itself. The actual "geo-coded" lines of the state tends towards secure institutionalization whilst concealing a flurry of movement across them. Longstanding economic and structural imbalances, maintained despite the growing calls for regional integration within ASEAN, guarantees the profitable exploitation of migrant labor and a competitive cross-border pressure on wages. This is all predicated upon the maintenance of borders between distinct national economic units, creating a hierarchy of value. The economic center of the region, Singapore, has long used the adjacent borderlands of neighboring Malaysia and Indonesia, in particular, as zones in which illegal businesses not tolerated within the city-state itself have been able to flourish. Environmentally-destructive processes are similarly able to be 'exported' across borders, such as the logging of Borneo by Malaysian firms or the mining of gems in Myanmar to fuel the Thai jewelry trade. Borders provide the structural conditions that drive the regions inherently inequitable economic development.

This is not to claim that their postcolonial status renders such borders immutable. The March 2013 standoff at Lahad Datu in Sabah, East Malaysia between Malaysian security forces and militants associated with the Philippine Sultanate of Sulu, which claims eastern Sabah, illustrates that there remains the potential for such territorial issues to be mobilized. Such security incidents tend to only strengthen the enforcement of existing border regimes, with the victims being the over 25,000 Filipinos expelled from Sabah over the subsequent year for residing their illegally, many of whom had lived there for decades.

However, undoubtedly the most serious issue in this region over the past decade has little relation to populations at all, centering as it does on the South China Sea, and legitimized by possession over the scattering of islands within it. Arguably, this issue remains the most intractable precisely because it was not incorporated by Europeans into their legal-territorial framework, and consequently the islands and there surrounding seas are even more open to the


claims of nationalized historical narratives. The combination of uninhabited scraps of land and potential resources has been driving an increasingly acrimonious dispute. Overlapping portions of the region have been claimed by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines. However, both the PRC and Taiwan lay claim to essentially the entire area on the basis of an eleven-dashed line put forth in 1947 and later revised in the 1950s by the PRC to a nine-dash one as a friendly gesture to Vietnam. However, as was noted in the introduction, in many respects the disputed area represents a ‘rediscovered space’, the possession of which has been granted renewed significance in recent years through the changing parameters of the global maritime territorial regime. The initial flaring of the dispute in the early 1990s appeared to have been ameliorated through confidence-building measures between China and ASEAN, in particular, which culminated in 2002’s Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) containing a clause that stated that countries should refrain from taking action "that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including . . . refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features". China’s recent determination to construct what the American Admiral, Harry Harris, called a Great Wall of Sand, dredging the ocean floor to transform reefs and rocks into manmade islands, appears to represent both a shelving of this agreement and a determination to assert sovereignty over the Sea.

Both Chinas wish to claim the entire South China Sea by historical precedent, before then incorporating it into their maritime territory, although neither has set forth what exactly the nine-dash line, the basis of their claim, specifically represents. The manner in which the PRC is creating land out of the ocean seems to break down the border between continental and maritime territory, as China seeks to create facts on the ground in order to render its claim unassailable. It has rejected Philippines 2013 request for arbitration on the grounds that UNCLOS has no bearing on territorial sovereignty. The other claimants as well as ASEAN as a whole have protested China’s actions, but to no avail. This gives rise to further worries, about whether China will also claim an Air Defense Identification Zone over the Paracels and Spratleys, as it recently did over the Diaoyu (Sen-
kaku) Islands, and further extend its territorial borders into the atmosphere. The sudden upsurge in maritime border issues represented by the South China Sea dispute also finds reflection in East Asia, where one of the main participants is, once again, a seemingly revisionist China. We shall turn to this region next.

**Maritime East Asia.** On July 17, 2015, a Japanese fishing boat and its 11-man crew was seized by the Russian border patrol in Russia’s EEZ south of Habomai, for exceeding its fishing quota. This was the first such seizure of a Japanese vessel since 2007, and followed in the footsteps of Russia’s decision to ban from 2016 the taking of salmon and trout with drift nets in Russian waters to protect marine resources.\(^\text{30}\) One week later, Prime Minister Medvedev announced his attention to visit Etorofu in August, with the Japanese government responding that such a trip to what it considers the Northern Territories would be considered "unacceptable".\(^\text{31}\) In Japan, the suspicion is that such actions amount to a belated response to Japan’s signing up to the sanctions regime of the EU and US over alleged Russian interference in Ukraine, and such a ratcheting up of pressure indicates how events at one border can have affect another thousands of miles away.

This maritime border is one of three currently disputed by Japan with its neighbors, but in some senses is of a different character to other Asian maritime disputes. One difference is the existence of a history of agreements relating to these islands. The 1855 Russo-Japan Treaty established the border between the two empires as being between the islands of Etorofu and Urup, signing into law a de facto border that had existed since 1807. In 1875 Japan gave up its rights on Sakhalin in return for the entirety of the Kuril chain, and took control of the southern half of Sakhalin (Karafuto) as a spoil of the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, before losing all of these islands to the Soviet Union after WWII. Japan has never recognized the Soviet occupation of the islands between Etorofu and Hokkaido, which is why there is still no peace treaty between the two states. This leads to the second difference, which is that this particular issue has been continuously discussed since the 1950s, although its maritime character is a more recent development, stemming from...


the late-1970s and the initial declaration of a Soviet EEZ. However, these differences, an extensive juridical framework for discussion and longstanding negotiations, have failed to make the issue any more tractable than other maritime disputes in Asia, and ultimately both sides continue to appeal to history to justify their claims.

In that the maritime border in the region affects the lives of those at the borderland, this southern Kurils/Northern Territories dispute can be considered a manifestation of postcolonial space. Similarly, it is impossible to analyze the Dokdo/Takeshima issue without acknowledging it to be intimately bound up with Japan’s colonization of Korea. South Korea is currently in control of the islands, Japan disputes this and claims rights of prior occupation. Japanese authority over the islands until the end of WWII is viewed in Korea as being the first step in Japan’s colonization of Korea (having been incorporated in Shimane Prefecture a few months before the establishment of Japan’s Protectorate of Korea in 1905). In reality, the islands had long been uninhabited and utilized by a variety of people from Jeju, Chonglanam-do, Iwami and Oki, and once again it is these people who suffer from the imposition of a maritime border regime within a disputed seascape. The dispute was largely swept under the carpet in the 1960s when Japan and South Korea resumed ties at the urging of the US, but has reemerged in recent years, partly due to the change in maritime border regimes triggered by UNCLOS, as well as domestic factors promoting nationalism in both Korea and Japan.

The most recent of the disputes is that over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, under Japanese jurisdiction but claimed by both China and Taiwan. The islands were governed by the US as part of Okinawa and reverted back to Japan with the latter in 1972, having initially been claimed by Japan in 1895, the year it also took possession of Taiwan as a colony. Both China’s therefore argue that the islands form part of the territory Japan should have surrendered at the end of WWII. An initial dispute between Japan and the PRC when Okinawa reverted to the former, and following the discovery of extensive oil and gas deposits around the islands, was shelved for a time, but the issue was rediscovered in the 1990s under the impact of the changed maritime order. China’s actions here are also interpreted as impacting on its strategy regarding the South China Sea, while Japanese obstinacy is similarly read into its other border disputes; however, it remains unclear to what extent either nation has a

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Chapter 3.3 State borders in Asia

genuinely comprehensive, joined-up approach to its maritime borders and border issues, although Japan is seemingly seeking to develop one under the mantra of ‘inherent territory’.

Finally, there exist a couple of what might be termed potential border issues between China and South Korea. The issue over Socotra rock (Suyan, Ieodo) has recently promised to develop into a thorn in China-South Korean relations, while North Korea’s agreement with China over the demarcation of their boundary, particularly around the sacred mountain of Paektu, is not recognized by the South and is likely to be disputed in the event of reunification. Unfortunately, the overcoming of that border, too, appears a distant prospect at present.

Asian borders in motion: cross-border processes and trans-border cooperation

The determination of Asian states to ‘secure’ their borders, through their revision, clarification and militarization, is obvious across the region, and has largely proved the focus of this chapter. Simultaneously, however, these states also remain subject to contradictory pressures, of opening their borders in order to gain access to the flows of people and, particularly, material flowing across such political terrain. Along with issues of security, therefore, we must make mention of those of economy, where borders have as frequently come to be sites of cooperation as of contestation, giving rise to variety of interstate associations. These range from tightly circumscribed bilateral agreements, such as North Korea’s proposed ‘Special economic zones’ on its northern and southern borders created by agreement with Russia and South Korea that remain hamstrung by the DPRK’s distrust of global capitalism and policy flip-flopping, to extensive multilateral agreements like ASEAN, which until recently appeared to be seeking to become a European Union in Asia.

The presence of such multilateral agreements is clearly significant as a precondition for the opening of borders; the current efforts of the United States to push through Trans-Pacific Partnership, even in the face of domestic opposition, speaks to the perceived importance of the opening of these barriers to entry. At the same time, however, the much greater degree of economic cooperation occurring between the members of ASEAN, as opposed to the states of South or East Asia, is neither indicative of the decline in the significance of the borders of its members, nor of the disappearance of border disputes. Around two decades ago, as the Berlin Wall came down and the global march of liberal capitalism appeared unstoppable, it was occasionally posited that the borders of the state, and consequently its sovereignty itself,
was on the verge of being overwhelmed by this phenomenon. The resilience of state borders today demonstrates instead how, rather than the hard outer surfaces of the nation-state, borders instead possess a clear filtering function, serving the distinct needs of the state at different times.

As indicated by structure of this chapter, to a large extent this economic movement across borders in contemporary Asia pivots around China. The settlement of border disputes with Russia and the Central Asian states has presaged a massive expansion in trade flows, with the latter forming one component of China’s new Silk Road development programs (“one belt, one ring”) that seeks to link its economy with that of the rest of the globe. Yet the seemingly conciliatory attitude adopted to such disputes has not been replicated elsewhere; China remains bullish in both the South China Sea (the first stage in its ‘Maritime Silk Road’) and with India over Arunachal Pradesh, despite talk of developing the “Southern Silk Road” between the BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar) states. Similarly, its enormous interest and infrastructural development in the region, as well as Yunnan’s membership of the GMS (Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Program), does not translate into Chinese membership of the MRC (Mekong River Commission) that seeks to encourage development and environmental cooperation among the riparian nations.

In one reading, China wants to secure its own borders and open up trade beyond them, in a manner analogous to any "rising power" or potential superpower. That cross-border developments in Asia appear to increasingly ‘pivot’ around China serves as the background for the "pivot to Asia" announced by the United States. And yet China’s attitude to its borders is frequently contradictory; having spent the best part of a decade building trust mechanisms with ASEAN, it has appeared determined in the past three years to squander those benefits away.

The answer may lie in Yunnan’s membership of the GMS; that we grant too much credence to China as a unitary actor and insufficient attention to the borders with which the state is riven. Arunachal Pradesh-bordering Tibet has little interest in Yunnan’s Southern Silk Road project, while Hainan’s extensive fishing industry and lack of an industrial base makes it an unlikely beneficiary of the Maritime Silk Road, but a very real one of a Chinese EEZ being declared over the South China Sea. Clearly, such a perspective does not solely apply to China, although the well-documented competition fostered by the CCP amongst the provinces does make it particularly stark. Our efforts to understand the filtering functions of state borders must therefore encompass not only those at the edge of the state’s territory, but the manner in which they affect the internal coherence or otherwise of the state.
Recommended reading:


Bourdier, Frédéric, Maxime Boutry, Jacques Ivanoff, and Olivier Ferrari. *From padi states to commercial states: reflections on identity and the social construction of space in the Borderlands of Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand and Myanmar*. Amsterdam University Press, 2015.


**Internet resources:**


In North America, border studies generally focus on two land boundaries, the Canada-US and the US-Mexico borderlands. Yet, maritime borders become increasingly relevant, notably in the Arctic, since using the Northwest passage and exploiting raw materials in Northern polar regions may be soon possible, due to climate change, which incidentally triggers border security issues. Still, the core of border studies in North America can undoubtedly be found on the US-Mexico border. This borderland has contributed to forge an interdisciplinary research cluster that has been institutionalized in numerous academic departments. Also, the US-Mexico borderland has lead to the emergence of a solid interdisciplinary research network, the Association for Borderlands Studies (ABS), born in April 1976 in Tempe, Arizona. The ABS is now a stimulating research venue for North-American and international scholars alike that welcomes varying theoretical and methodological approaches to border studies.

Those multiple border perspectives in social sciences are scrutinized by Michèle Lamont and Virga Molnar. They examine four main transversal research agendas: social and collective identity; class, racial and gender inequality; professions, knowledge and science; and communities, national identities and spatial boundaries. The literature on borders and border regions in North America reveals that border regions are zones of transition, that range from fully integrated borderlands to sharply divided border territories, with varying socio-economic landscapes. On the Canada-US border, smart borders are increasingly tested and implemented, so that border security measures do not disrupt the flows of people and goods. The construction of (less smart) border security apparatus, such as border walls and fences in US-Mexico border regions, can regenerate cultural production and interactions. The criminalization of migrations in North America is also an acute research object. Other border policy issues, such as the environment, living standards and human development, are also scrutinized by border scholars.

In this succinct chapter, we will focus on four main sections: first, the history of borders, followed by border conflicts; third, the development of transborder relations and regions; and finally, border and transborder policies.

History of borders in North America

To understand how contemporary borders have been drawn in North America, it is necessary to look back and examine two major historical processes: first, how colonial territories belonging to major European powers have been drawn between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, and then restructured in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; second, how those colonial territories have been divided and redistributed through violent and non-violent means during the formation of nation-states, Mexico, the United States and Canada, considering that the territorial for-

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Information of the United States has had a lasting impact on its neighbours.

In the sixteenth century, when Europeans walk upon the American continent, a population of at least four to seven million Indigenous people lives there. Mainly due to slaughters and epidemics, this population decreases to a few hundreds of thousands in the early twentieth century. The relations between European settlers and Aboriginal communities differ greatly across space and time, oscillating between support from Aboriginal communities, peaceful relations, trade, marriages, war alliances on one hand, and discrimination, exclusion, forced assimilation, and wars on the other. However, a shared European objective of colonization transpires, as lands of the New World are perceived by the British, French and Spanish crowns as untouched territories, free to be taken over, based on the emerging (and Christian) law of nations.\(^9\)

The colonization of the continent starts from the South, in the early sixteenth century, as it is possible to witness in Santa Fe, New Mexico, where the oldest European buildings in North America can be seen. Moreover, geographic names remind this early Spanish presence in North America, not only in current Southern US states, e.g., California, Colorado, Florida, but also along the West coast, e.g., the strait of Juan de Fuca that currently delimits Canada and the US. Nonetheless, the presence of English and Russian posts and communities on the West coast of North America is also documented in the eighteenth century, which shows that European powers, Portugal, Spain, France, and later England and Russia, seek to exploit or occupy North America with varying means and degrees of success. In 1588, England defeats Spain, which allows England to exclude Spain from the Northern part of the continent. English settlements start in Virginia in 1607. From the mid sixteenth to the mid eighteenth century, the French Crown’s colonization policy materializes in New France. Political and military confrontations follow, which crystallize the relations between French and British colonial empires in North America. British colonies are established on the East coast from the early seventeenth to the eighteenth century, and soon welcome more settlers than in New France, despite immigration and demographic policies encouraging settlements to New France, e.g., King’s Daughters in the mid seventeenth century. The French Crown expands its territory from the north-eastern part to the south and west, in the late seventeenth century, west of the British colonies. In 1713, the Treaty of Utrecht, signed by European powers, has implications in North Amer-

ica: France gives up its claims to the territories bordering the Hudson Bay (Rupert’s Land) and to Newfoundland, and also cedes Nova Scotia to Great Britain (*Map 1*).

Around the mid eighteenth century, French, English and Spanish powers occupy a good half of the North American continent, with vague boundary zones. Yet, it becomes obvious that New France, with limited civil and military presence, cannot be controlled easily, in spite of alliances with Indigenous populations. In the mid-eighteenth century, French and British colonies enter in war, known as the *French and Indian War* (the conflict is part of the Seven Years’ War that takes place in Europe and the colonies of the European powers). In 1762, France secretly cedes Louisiana to Spain. The French, outnumbered, lose some of its territories to Great Britain, in the Treaty of Paris (1763), which end up being split between Great Britain and Spain. The demographic composition of the American colonies is increasingly European, though. Besides, despite the political umbilical cord between the New World and Great Britain that is personified by a governor in each colony, many legal and fiscal decisions are taken locally. Moreover, Enlightenment philosophers influence the elite that increasingly disagrees with Great Britain over a series of policy issues: the lack of political representation in London; taxation efforts, required to cover the cost of the Seven Year’s War; the limitations to colonization beyond the Appalachian Mountains, in order to avoid conflicts with Indigenous people. New import duties and fear of breaching free competition principles lead to growing tensions in the 1770s, illustrated by the Boston Tea Party, and to the First Continental Congress in October of 1774. The American Revolution is on its way: in 1776, the Declaration of Independence seals the creation of the United States of America, leading to the Independence War, during which the French crown supports the United States. In 1783, in the Treaty of Versailles that also involves Spain, France and the Netherlands, the sovereignty of the United States is recognized by London; in addition, the acquisition by the United States of the territory between the Appalachian and the Mississippi river; the border between the colony of Québec and the United States is redrawn and bisects the Great Lakes, which is concomitant with the recognition by the United States of British colonies in the North; finally, London loses Florida to Spain that becomes the Western neighbour of the United States. This treaty sets the foundations of two future states in North America, Canada and the United States. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth

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centuries, the border around the Detroit River is permeable, and allows border communities to have local and varied exchanges.\textsuperscript{11} Thus, instead of seeing the border as a line, it is best to examine it as a constant social construct, certainly influenced by its international component, but firmly anchored locally and regionally.

Following the independence of the United States, new geopolitical dynamics shape North America: in 1800, Spain cedes Louisiana to France, but three years later, due to the Napoleonic wars, France abandons its colonial ambitions and sells this territory to strengthen the United States. Between 1810 and 1819, Florida shifts slowly to US sovereignty, due to private military and settlers’ incursions and to diplomatic efforts. The Gulf of Mexico, and especially New Orleans, is therefore entirely open to US trade. Meanwhile, the French occupation of Spain in 1808 precipitates the fall of the Spanish Empire, as tensions between people from Spain and the colonies increase: after years of civil war, Spanish troops are defeated in 1821. The viceroyalty of New Spain becomes the First Mexican Empire, under Agustín de Iturbide’s brief leadership, and then a Federal Republic in 1824. Between the 1820s and the 1870s, a period of political and territorial instability shakes the post-colonial foundations of Mexico: political instability stems from the fierce debates surrounding the type of regime that is envisioned, either federal republic or centralized republic; territorial fragmentation occurs in the 1820s, with the secession, after Iturbide’s fall, of southern provinces, which generates the creation in 1823 of the United Provinces of Central America that lasts only until 1840, when it is dissolved to establish new states, notably Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The United States will use this period of Mexican instability in order to gain territories from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Coast.

In 1842, the United States and the Hudson Bay Company seek to expand their influence to the plains and further West. They reach an agreement in 1842 to share territories along the 49\textsuperscript{th} parallel. Besides, between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific Ocean extends a vast territory, Oregon, used by fur traders along the Columbia river, between Mexico and Alaska (still Russian). The United States want to gain influence along the Pacific coast toward the North, up to the 54\textsuperscript{th} parallel. After prolonged talks with Great Britain that protects the interests of British private interests, the United States concede to purchase of half of the territory in 1846, until the 49\textsuperscript{th} parallel. The United States reach

the Pacific Ocean in just seven decades after their creation, which settles boundary claims with Great Britain. Nonetheless, to confront the growing influence of the United States, Great Britain establishes a Canadian Confederation in 1867, initially with four Eastern provinces, then joined a few years later by Manitoba and British Columbia. But another contributing factor to the unification of the territory is the construction of Canada’s transcontinental railway, at the end of the nineteenth century: it is an engine of economic development, supported by wheat exports. In early twentieth century, Alberta and Saskatchewan join Canada. Canada becomes gradually independent with the Statutes of Westminster, in 1931. Provinces expand toward the North, and eventually welcome Newfoundland and Labrador in 1949.\footnote{Margaret Conrad, A Concise History of Canada, Cambridge Concise Histories (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).}

After 1846, the United States look to the South and their new independent neighbour. The Republic of Texas, created in 1836 by American settlers in reaction to economic and policy issues with Mexican authorities, seek to claim first Mexican territories until the Pacific coast, but revisits it in order to claim that the boundary with Mexico be on the Rio Grande river. Those boundary issues lead to a moving closer between Texas and the United States, which concludes with the annexation of Texas by the United States in 1845, and the war between the United States and Mexico. In 1848, the United States win the war and can negotiate in a position of strength the acquisition of Mexican territories stretching from Texas to the Pacific coast. Twenty-seven years after its independence, Mexico loses 40 percent of its territory. In 1853, the United States purchase the Gadsden strip to Mexico, in order to build a railway. The Mexico-US border area becomes a zone of licit and illicit trade.\footnote{Peter Andreas, Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).} Between 1861 and 1865, the Union is dissolved due to the Civil War, whose outcome could have been slightly different and led to the creation of additional boundaries in North America, with a protectionist and abolitionist in the North, and free trade and pro-slavery in the South. In 1867, Saint-Petersburg seeks to sell Alaska to the United States, which is done opportunistically. Canada and the United States work between 1903 and 1913 to draw the boundary line of Alaska. An International Boundary Commission is subsequently created in 1925 to maintain the border infrastructure.\footnote{Victor A. Konrad and Heather N. Nicol, Beyond Walls: Re-Inventing the Canada-United States Borderlands, Border Regions Series (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008).}
Gaining undisputed boundaries from European powers, which is expressed in the Monroe Doctrine, is only one external aspect of territorial formation and post-colonization efforts in North America. Especially in Canada and the United States, the other task of nation-state building is domestic, and related to Indigenous people: how to subjugate Native people to the new nation-state order? In Mexico, the early role of the Catholic Church is fundamental to subject Indigenous people in order to open up the way to Spanish colonization. After the independence of Mexico, nation-state building follows the same ethnoracial structure with Indigenous people at the very bottom, but under a thin statistic-administrative veil or "categorization"\textsuperscript{15} that suggests that the vast majority of Mexicans is ‘mestizo’. In the United States and Canada, the relations with Indigenous people rarely involve religious institutions, but generally follow the same objective, i.e., European interests first, with or without Native people. For instance, when the fur trade is a lucrative business for the Hudson Bay Company, Indigenous people are an asset; when wars oppose France and Great Britain in the New World, some Native nations may support one European power, but they may also remain neutral; finally, the need for lands, for colonization, industrialization, or mining is contributing to displace and contain Indigenous people, depriving them from their land and sociopolitical rights, which generates undemocratic and byzantine administrative boundaries. For instance, to finalize colonization efforts and nation-state building, treaties settle European-Indigenous relations, e.g., in Canada, Numbered Treaties (1871–1921) are signed between the British Crown and Indigenous people to speed up white settlements, railway construction and industrialization. However, colonization in British Columbia occurs without treaties. Other public policies are more blatantly racist. The 1876 Canada Indian Act (and its subsequent versions) serves as a blueprint for oppressing Native groups in democratic regimes and less democratic regimes, like South African apartheid. The Canadian Indian residential school system is an example of a decades-long genocide in Canada: Indigenous children are forcibly taken from their family, sent to residential schools miles away where many suffer mental and physical abuse, subjugated to forced labour and education meant to eradicate their civilization and culture. The "Canada Scoops" (or "Sixties Scoop", which was the Canadian policy from the 1960s to the 1980s of removing Aboriginal children from their families in order to place them in foster home for adoption, in Canada and abroad) also shows how Indigenous children are forcibly tak-

\textsuperscript{15} Luc Boltanski, \textit{Les cadres. La formation d’un groupe social} (Paris: Ed. de Minuit, 1982).
en from their families and sent either to residential schools, or placed in foster care or adoption, domestically and overseas. The present overrepresentation of Indigenous people in child welfare and penal institutions illustrates the continuity of this policy against Indigenous people, in spite of symbolic gestures, such as the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2008–2015), whose mandate is "to contribute to truth, healing and reconciliation" with regard to the legacy of the Indian Residential School system, which was meant to "take the Indian out of the child". The relations with Indigenous people are reminiscent of the emergence of autonomous or independent borders with European powers, but international public law in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is still a Christian law that excludes internal groups and certain undesired foreign countries.

Finally, two inter-related issues regarding the establishment of new borders in North America are central in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, namely the granting of citizenship and the control of people’s movements. With the growing autonomy of colonies, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand or the Union of South Africa, and the independence of the United States, nationality and migrations need to be clarified. Between the United States and Great Britain, negotiations will take decades to solve acute problems, such as the fulfilment of military obligations by British Empire subjects who have become citizens of the United States. In the British Empire, migrations generate several imperial conferences. During one of them, in 1907, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Sir Joseph Ward, delivered a speech in which he claimed that "‘New Zealand is ‘a white man’s country, and intends to remain a white man’s country’ and ‘[w]e intend to keep our country for white men by every effort in our power’." In conjunction with the efforts of London that wants to impose the notion ‘British subjecthood’ as an imperial concept of membership, and at the same time seeks timorously to avoid an obvious discriminatory sealing of British Empire borders, several dominions, including Canada, pass local immigration legislation that has indirect discriminatory purposes, for instance through the Chinese head tax, language tests, and higher poll tax for Asian immigrants. This way, similar rights exist in the British Empire, but mobility is racially limited by local norms. It is only in the 1960s that those discriminatory measures will be ques-


tioned and toned down to welcome non-European migrants in North America.

**Border strains**

As we have seen in the previous section, the latest border conflicts in North America occur essentially in the nineteenth century. But what about the twentieth and twenty-first centuries? North America is then relatively immune to border conflicts, as borders are undisputed. The only notable exception is related to the Gulf of Maine, where an extension of the maritime boundary and the creation exclusive offshore resource zones are sought; in 1984, the International Court of Justice contributes to solve this dispute between the United States and Canada. Yet, North American border areas are not totally quiet, as the asymmetry between the United States and its neighbours is flagrant. Besides, changing perspectives allows us to consider that US borders could also be more broadly defined.

Focusing strictly on North America, controlling massive and porous border areas is quite a titanic task, which is conducive to strains between states when specific policy issues are on the neighbour’s policy agenda. For instance, alcohol prohibition in the United States, in the 1920s and 1930s, leads to an acute border activity, as alcohol drinks are not illegal in Canada, Mexico and the Caribbean, which is translated into two practices: on one hand, Americans visit neighbouring countries to consume alcohol, which contributes to the flourishing of bars in many border areas; on the other, alcohol is smuggled to the United States, which cannot be controlled due to the land mass and the limited resources of US prohibition agents. The absence of strictly speaking border conflicts in North America is also supported by the Cold War, with perhaps one exception that might be the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, although it is not per se an example of border conflict, but rather a complex US-Cuban affairs and Cold War issue that is framed by Kennedy’s administration as a direct threat to US national security and world peace. This crisis impacts Cuba for decades, with a US trade embargo that constrains the growth of its economy, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. In 2015, the restoration of US-Cuban diplomatic ties seems to close this anachronistic parenthesis.

Nonetheless, the US military is regularly active in the Caribbean and in Central America to maintain US hegemony in the region. In this geopolitical context, it may be suggested that US borders do not stop at US national bounda-

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18 Konrad and Nicol, *Beyond Walls.*
ries, but go further to include a wide area of influence that extends to Latin America. For instance, in 1898, in response to the mysterious explosion that causes the destruction of the battleship Maine in the harbour of Havana, the United States declare war on Spain, and occupy Cuba - the last Spanish colony - and Puerto Rico. Before the withdrawal of US troops from Cuba, the Cuban constitution is amended and the 1903 Cuban-American Treaty of Relations is signed so that "the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of the Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty [...]". This interventionist policy is also illustrated by the training of national guards in Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the 1930s, and the creation in 1946 of the School of Americas, in Panama, where famous Latin American dictators are trained until 1984, so that the same US 'national security' analytical lenses are adopted by all hemispheric armed forces. For instance, in the 1980s, the direct and indirect US interventions in Nicaragua reveal that supporting the Contras includes turning a blind eye on the Contras’ drug trafficking business that feeds the North-American market through the US-Mexico border and the Caribbean. The School of Americas is then relocated to Fort Benning, Georgia, with a new name, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, but with very similar hegemonic objectives.

The most radical policy changes relating to border security come after the 9/11 attacks, in 2001. The perception that porous borders are a national security threat leads to a drastic securitization of the US borders, which are felt significantly at the two main land borders of the United States. Nonetheless, the securitization of the border is also a heightened concern in the 1990s, when anti-immigration sentiments converge with political and bureaucratic interests, and produce focused border policy campaigns that are designed to have a national resonance, e.g., Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego, and Operation Hold the Line in El Paso. Resources and powers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) considerably increase in the 1990s. In addition, the "war on drugs" mobilize military personnel along the US-Mexico border, which leads Payan to show how three wars (drug, immigration and homeland security) crip-

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ple US-Mexico borderlands. However, this perception of fear in border areas is not necessarily what inhabitants live; instead, this fear may be instrumentalized by local elites to reinforce the status quo and stifle civic mobilizations. Finally, the challenge is to make this border compatible with NAFTA provisions and stress-free for the business sector.

Finally, the North Pole is an ongoing disputed frontier for Arctic countries, for instance with the US-Russian dispute in the Bering Sea, whose origins are threefold: the Bering Sea is geopolitically a key maritime transit zone for both nations; it is also significant for both nations’ fishing sectors; finally, the prospects of oil and gas exploitation in the area contribute to fuel this dispute.

Development of transborder relations and regions

The development of transborder relations and regions is, as we have seen in the previous sections, a lengthy socio-political construction that spans several centuries in distinct border spaces. Alper and Loucky compare the Northern and the Southern US Pacific border corridors, in particular the Seattle-Vancouver corridor and the San Diego-Tijuana corridor, and emphasize profound economic and environmental differences, coupled with variations in respect to the autonomy of subnational entities. Differences also relate to population density that can be a condition of the development of transborder relations.

Canada-US border regions have long and distinct histories. Socio-economic practices, such as trade, regional migrations and cultural practices, constructed local and regional border areas, even before the efforts of delimitation. Because border regions have a specific genealogy, it seems incorrect to describe them as ‘emerging’, as seen in border studies in the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, analyzing them as ‘evolving’ ones seems more pertinent. Nonetheless, the literature

on the ‘emergence’ of border regions can be explained by their sudden visibility after the signing of free trade agreements, and their impact in border regions that are become more than ever border corridors for people, goods and contaminants.

After the Second World War, bilateral trade grows significantly, and the need for institutionalized border relations is perceived by the different levels of government, federal and subnational ones. Foundational agreements refer to nearly 200 bilateral treaties that establish the border and its management. For instance, Konrad and Nicol note that 10 of them are related to boundaries, and more than 20 to boundary waters. The other agreements emerge after 1945, and focus on diverse policy issues, e.g., trade, transportation, communication, labour, standards. In addition to these international treaties, agreements between subnational entities, for instance between states and provinces, or between municipal entities, are an integral part of the evolution of border relations and regions after World War II. For example, the New England Governors-Atlantic Premiers annual conference is formalized in 1973, and focuses on environmental, energy, trade and demographic issues. The Pacific NorthWest Economic Region (PNWER), created in 1991 by US states and Canadian provinces, aims to bring public and private leaders together. The final report of the Policy Research Initiative on US-Canadian cross-border regions identifies a typology of five macro-border regions on the US-Canada borders - the Rocky Mountains, the Pacific Coast, the Great Plains, the Great Lakes and the Atlantic Coast - based on several factors, the economy, socio-cultural values and cross-border regional networks and organizations. The fact that Canadian provinces are fairly decentralized entities tends to support their capacity to design and develop border relations.

Conversely, Mexican states are more centralized, which may be an inhibitor to the development of border relations with the United States. Yet, border ties and regions develop on the US-Mexico border, in particular in the manufacturing sector. After attempting an import substitution industrialization (ISI) policy between the 1940 and the 1960s, the Mexican government shifts to a free trade strategy and industrialization toward exports, supported by foreign investments. This is especially the case in border regions, where

26 Konrad and Nicol, *Beyond Walls*.
27 Alper, Loucky, and Day, *Transboundary Policy Challenges*.
ISI has little impact, due to border areas suffering from being fairly remote from the Mexican market. The US cancellation of the Bracero program in 1964 leads to a rise of unemployment in border cities (nearly 50 percent in Ciudad Juárez, Tijuana and Mexicali), and accelerates the shift to a free trade and export-driven economy. In 1965, the Border Industrialization Program (BIP) supports the industrialization toward exports of northern Mexican border regions. The BIP marks the emergence of the maquiladora industry, made attractive for several reasons: first, importing duty-free US components, and exporting duty-free final-ized goods support the US industry; second, labour wages in Mexico are low and attractive; third, the proximity of maquiladoras from the US market limits transportation costs. On the other side, the Mexican government expects several benefits from this BIP for its border areas: employment, consumption, modern production technologies, which will prove partly incorrect. The number of plants reaches 455 in 1974, but the maquila industry is hit by the recession in the US. During the 1970s and 1980s, through a competitive labour policy, the Mexican government seeks to preserve the industrial sector of the northern Mexican borderland, which leads to devaluate the peso numerous times to achieve this objective.\(^{29}\) The deepening of the liberalization of the economy, following free trade agreements and especially the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), along with other factors, destabilizes the Mexican economy in such a way that job losses raise faster than job creations. Mexican immigration to the United States starts to increase in the 1970s and grows at a faster rate in the 1990s and 2000s. Legal and illegal migrants take part in a vast and unregulated US labour market that maintains low-skilled job wages to a minimum. However, US immigration policies criminalize undocumented migrants, which leads to forced deportations and the separation of parents from their children.\(^{30}\)

In this context of differing development of border regions, border and transborder policies can be examined now.

Border and transborder policies

Two preliminary comments should be noted, before providing an overview of border and transborder policies in North America. First, as opposed to the European Union, where cross-border cooperation is supported by all levels of


government, including the European Commission, due to the community regional cohesion policy, nothing similar exists in North America, where border territories are meant to be economic variables in a continental free market. How to explain this difference? Foucault suggests, in one of his last lectures at the Collège de France, that the United States and Europe have two opposing models of neoliberalism: the United States have a form of 'anarcho-liberalism', whereas Germany has a type of 'ordoliberalism'. One of Foucault’s points is that the European version of neoliberalism entails "a Gesellschaftspolitik, as it was called, that is to say, a policy of society and a social interventionism that is at the same time active, multiple, vigilant, and omnipresent. So, on the one hand there is a market economy, and on the other an active, intense, and interventionist social policy." This German view of neoliberalism may be one of the basic strata that explains the necessity to support a European regional cohesion policy, including cross-border cooperation programs. Conversely, the other version of neoliberalism in the United States clearly excludes this type of interventionism in border regions. Secondly, what is striking in current border and transborder policies is the dramatic shift of multilevel governance power structure before and after 2001: after 2001, the federal government is even more heavily present on the US-Mexico border (and a bit more visible on the US-Canada border), due to the continuing war on drugs and immigration policies, as well as the new counter-terrorism measures. This border security shift generally suffocates subnational, civic and private cross-border initiatives, unless they are especially well organized and powerful.

Although federal governments set the tone in border regions with drastic border security policies, they are also present to euphemize them. Border and transborder policies often reveal an unbalanced interdependence of Mexico and Canada with the United States: convergence with US border policies is an enduring pattern of North-American relations; but border policy seems to be diffused asynchronously, generally starting with Canada-US initiatives, and later transposed to the US-Mexico border. However, notable exceptions should be mentioned, for example the ‘frequent / trusted traveler programs’ that are unevenly designed and implemented in North America: on the US-Canada border, the alignment of the Canadian administration on the US one has

32 Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*.
made the NEXUS program fairly accessible to middle and upper-class people who need to cross the border frequently, in spite of valid criticism; however, the SENTRI program on the US-Mexico border is only accepted by US authorities and designed exclusively for US citizens in approved vehicles. How do subnational governments and civic organizations react from a policy perspective to these border security measures?

Corridors take a greater importance in North America. In Canada-US border regions, mainly in the Great Lakes, St. Lawrence, Pacific and Western Interior, where they are not merely checkpoints, but also gateways for multiple purposes. These corridors contribute to define some border policies. For instance, the International Mobility and Trade Corridor Program (IMTC), in the Pacific Northwest, gathers public and private organizations in order to discuss cross-border transportation and related issues, coordinate planning of the Cascade Gateway, and improve traffic data and infrastructure (IMTC 2015). Besides, regional, local governments and civic organizations play a role in including many additional issues to border policies, as it is the case with PENWR, with 20 working groups in 2015. Finally, PENWR promotes binational tourism with the notion of a "Two Nation Vacation". Obviously, in US-Mexico border regions, corridors are also crucial to allow the circulation of people and goods. But what emerges in the early 2000s is the need of strengthening the continental transportation system.

In addition, civic organizations play a modest but crucial role. For example, environmental organizations are present on both borders that are far from being homogeneous. In this perspective, Coronado shows that several environmental organizations that are locally or regionally based, as opposed to national or international environmental organizations, have a hard time advancing local and regional environmental issues on the policy agenda.

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35 Konrad and Nicol, Beyond Walls
37 Alper, Loucky, and Day, Transboundary Policy Challenges.
Andreas and Biersteker consider that it is paradoxical to securitize the border and make it business-friendly at the same time, which is presently one of the main challenges of border regions in North America. However, solving this paradox is possible if we start taking into consideration Wacquant’s sociology of the neoliberal state that reveals three facets: the first one contends that neoliberalism, far from being an economic project, is a political one that is implemented, not by shortening sail, but by "reengineering the state". The second refers to the argument that neoliberalism shifts the "bureaucratic field" — generally fitted with two wings, one that is both economic and penal, and one that is essentially social and protective, that struggle over the definition and distribution of public goods — toward the economic and penal one. This shift contributes to structure the state around two sets of policies, the first one analyzed as "workfare" policies by Peck, the second that builds on this work by proposing the related notion of "prisonfare". The third dimension refers to the expansion and praise of the penal wing of the state. Wacquant suggests that the penal apparatus is one of the core features of the neoliberal state, as the neoliberal state must deal with the consequences of neoliberal policies that generate social inequality, work instability and ethno-racial anxiety. Using the metaphor of the Centaur-state, Wacquant shows that it is very liberal, laissez-faire and laissez-passer at the top of the social hierarchy, and is conversely paternalistic, restrictive and rude with those who are at the bottom.

Wacquant’s model can be tweaked to analyze North American borders, with the addition of the notion of "borderfare", which refers to the multilevel policy regime that addresses border and migration control problems by deploying militarized border patrols, offshore and domestic detention centres, domestic police forces and specialized courts, bilateral labour migration channels, along with their appendices. North American borders fall into this analytical triptyque

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41 Andreas and Biersteker, *The Rebordering of North America*.
‘workfare-prisonfare-borderfare’ that makes sense of the apparent paradox between a sharp border securitization and a sustained growth of border trade flows: in response to domestic socio-economic problems caused by liberalization and globalization policies, border security policies not only offer simplistic and unrealistic solutions, but also frame these problems as being caused by non-domestic factors, i.e., drug war, illegal immigration control, war against terror. When sovereign states deregulate and open their economies, they manifest themselves voyeuristically, especially in border areas that have strong socio-economic and ethnocultural differences.
Recommended reading:


**Internet resources**


Introduction

The territory now known as South America was conquered and then colonized by the kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula, Portugal and Spain, in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. The first division between the possessions of the two Crowns was established by the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), in which the lands already or to be discovered in the New World were split between Portugal and Castile. The treaty establishes the 370th meridian to the West of the Azores as the limit between future possessions of Portugal (to the East of the line) and Spain (to its West) (Map 8).

The exploitation of these possessions ended after four centuries. Nowadays, there are twelve countries in South America, although colonies and other dependencies are still to be found in the continent.

The colonization was based on the extraction of precious metals and in plantations, whose production was sent mainly to the metropolitan markets. Among the characteristics of the colonization of South America stands the decimation of indigenous people. Another important feature was the profitable slave trade, which connected Europe, Africa, and America via Atlantic Ocean.

Many borders between the Iberian Crowns and later between the independent countries were built following the Iberian/Moorish experience. In the Late Middle Ages (1250–
1500) the term *frontera* (border, in Portuguese) was already widely known: exchange practices and alliances merged with offensive and defensive actions were constitutive of relations between the Christian and Muslim kingdoms.¹ In South America, as well as in the Iberian Peninsula, the border towns often acted as small forts, being in its origin a front line and, today, the many twin cities.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century a first wave of independence movements took place. It sought the formation of republican confederations. The confederation project did not succeed, giving rise to a fragmentation of the territory under Hispanic colonization, especially when compared to the unit of the Brazilian Empire.

Delimitation and demarcation of the newly formed states was the main source of international conflicts in the nineteenth century. After the independence processes, both territorial issues and border disputes have been essential in building distinct national identities for each state. At the same time, the political centers of each state mobilized to conquer lands not yet incorporated under state domain, in what is known as the Conquest of the Desert (in Argentina), as Chileanization (in Chile, obviously), or as the advance of the frontier (in Brazil and other countries).

The image of empty land or void space is evoked to date, with different purposes: relieving pressures for agrarian reform, expanding the areas of agribusiness and mega-scale mining, creating national cohesion in the face of alleged foreign threats, justifying securitization of borders depicted as no-man’s land etc. These processes can be summarized under the concept of frontier, coined in the century of the Latin American Wars of Independence, associated with empty space, the future, the virgin and fertile land inside a modern territorial state under construction. Thus, the American frontier is a movement depicted as the expansion of civilization, the conquest of the unknown, the free creation of space. Of course, there were no empty spaces in South America, it is the work of the colonial imagination to disregard indigenous people. In this sense, frontiers are very different from European *grenzen* (border, in German) and *frontiers* (also border, in French), in which one is face to face with the enemy in a dialogue of forces.²

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² Adriana Dorfman, "A condição fronteiriça diante da securitização das fronteiras do Brasil [Border Condition in face of Securitization of Brazilian Borders]," in *Fronteiras em perspectiva comparada e temas de defesa da...*
Nationalist leaders and dictatorships marked the twentieth century in the majority of the subcontinent. Authoritarian governments, among other things, were justified by bipolar world order. Thus, in many countries, special status as national security strategic areas was imparted on borderlands: its administration was a prerogative of centralized government, elections were suppressed, and media and political parties were silenced based on allegations of subversion of social order and leftist influences. In practice, during this period the concept of ideological boundaries also prevailed, opposing capitalist West against communism, and allowed the repression of the national population and the action of police of the neighboring countries across borders whenever justified by the fight against insurgency and communism.3

Economic integration initiatives were present since the end of World War II, but they become more relevant after the democratization of many countries in the 1980s. Mercosur (Common Market of the South) represents an attempt to diminish North American political and economic influence – sometimes labeled as imperialism – over the continent. These unions have economic motives and impact on the management of borderlands, materialized as unified border structures to enhance and speed border transits.

Today, occasional conflicts such as Malvinas-Falklands or the Argentine and Chilean expectations for Antarctica are present in the South American scenario. However, the main contemporary warfare in South America is driven by the "war against drugs." Frontiers and borders superimpose in the geographical expansion of mega-mining transnational projects. Buffer zones are also present in the form of environment preservation initiatives in transborder natural parks.

Historical process

The conquest of America from the sixteenth century on is part of a process known as European Maritime Expansion, which had among its main causes the attempt to break the Italian monopoly in the trade of sugar, precious metals and stones, spices, among many other Eastern goods. New continents gradually entered the trade route, which had its axis

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offset, at that time, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean.

The expansion of the Christian faith, especially in light of the Crusades and the Reconquista ("Reconquest", in Portuguese) of the Iberian Peninsula from the Moors in the fifteenth century is one of the motives of this process. It culminated in the conquest of several territories on the African coast and in the arrival of the Spaniards in 1492 to the West Indies led by the Genoese navigator Christopher Columbus. Portuguese Pedro Álvares Cabral arrived in 1500 to present Brazilian territory. In the following decades, the European conquerors penetrated and settled in the New World.

**Conquest and colonization of the New World by the Iberian kingdoms.** The process of conquest and colonization of the Americas by the Spaniards and Portuguese stretched from the end of the fifteenth to early nineteenth century. The advance of Iberian colonization in the New World took place largely at the expense of native populations. Groups from different linguistic trunks and distinct cultural traits populated the current South America. The Spaniards met very complex and organized societies, or remnants thereof, as was the case of the Inca (twelve million people was the estimated population at the time of contact), Maya, and Aztec Empires. The Portuguese also contacted a mosaic of groups, which numbered five to ten million people. In many cases, there were relations of domination between different peoples and European arrival represented a transfer of domination.

Spaniards and Portuguese structured different administrative systems in their colonies. In general, the Hispanic America was gradually divided into four major viceroyalties, namely, River Plate, Peru, New Granada, and New Spain, in addition to some captaincies. The viceroys and general captains were subordinate to the Royal and Supreme Council of the Indies.

The Catholic Church was instrumental in cementing and making sense of these fragments. The colonial elite was formed by peninsular administrators and also by the Creoles, descendants of Spaniards born in South America, who devoted themselves to agriculture and colonial trade, among other activities. Mestizos, Indians, and enslaved Africans were at the base of the Spanish colonial society. Indigenous labor was responsible for much of the labor force in the Spanish colonies.

In Portuguese America exploitation activities in the first decades of the sixteenth century were limited basically to brazierwood extraction in coastal regions by indigenous barter, because precious metals were only discovered two centuries later.

The Iberian dominance in South America was threatened by colonizing expeditions of French and Dutch. Thus, in
the second quarter of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese colonial enterprise devised a system of territory consignation, known as the captaincies (Map 8). Given the failure of the administration of almost all the captaincies - adversity in transport and agricultural activities, resistance from native population, absence of precious metals - a new, centralized administrative system was devised, centered in a General Government, initially located in Salvador, Bahia, and then in Rio de Janeiro. Primary products for foreign markets were at the heart of the colonial enterprise in slave estates (plantations). Slave trade was one of the most profitable activities in this period, linking Europe, Africa, and the Americas across the Atlantic, according to Luiz Felipe de Alencastro (2000).

After expeditions, precious metals were discovered inside the territory, incorporating other regions to Portuguese rule and to the dynamics of colonization. Thus, in the eighteenth century there was a peak in mining production. Moreover, according to John Manuel Monteiro (1999), the explorers were responsible for the massive confinement of Indians to work in the captaincy of São Vicente (presently São Paulo). It is necessary to highlight frequent episodes of resistance to exploitation of indigenous peoples and Africans.

The New World conquest was concomitant with the expansion of Christianity. In the South American heart the Society of Jesus missionary project was under its way, led by Ignatius of Loyola. The missions catechized indigenous peoples in the basins of the Parana River, Uruguay River, and Paraguay River. These watercourses were the backbone of the Jesuit Mission territory, today, they mark the borders of the states. The Jesuits were also present in Peru and New France, and settled in the current territory of Mexico and the United States. From 1750 on, the Iberian Crowns expelled the Jesuits from America on allegations of non-collaboration with demarcation expeditions and disrespect to the Crown representatives, in short, of irredentist projects.

**Process of independence and formation of South American states.** In the early nineteenth century, several states became independent. In South America, the internal development of the colonies replaced imports of certain products from the Iberian metropolises. Moreover, treaties signed in Europe led to the opening of South American ports to the English, which added to robust smuggling. Economic chang-

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es, along with Enlightenment and the Napoleonic invasion of Spain, contributed to the process initiated from the 1810s in America: the wars of independence.

The Spanish America independence process was led by the Creoles and spanned through the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Other populations, such as indigenous and mestizos (half-breed), fought both on the Spanish side and on the Creole's. The two older Viceroyalties, New Spain and Peru, were more conservative and faithful to the Spanish Empire. This partly explains why those were the last regions to become independent. In turn, The Viceroyalty of River Plate and New Granada, created during the eighteenth century, spurred the process of independence.

Roughly speaking, the process of independence of Hispanic America can be divided in two different stages: the first, from 1808 to 1814, during the Spanish War of Independence; the second, from 1814 to 1824, initiated by the absolutist government of Ferdinand VII.

The first stage comprises a period in which the Popular Juntas were created in South American cities, like the Spanish Local Juntas, which ruled their territories, at a time when the sovereign was in prison during the war of independence against Napoleon. At the New World several areas proclaimed their independence:

- Venezuela (1811) – created the first Republic of Venezuela;
- Paraguay (1811) – declared itself independent;
- United Provinces of the River Plate (presently Argentina, 1813) – proclaimed itself independent and came to create the United Provinces of South America, through the conquest of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Upper Peru;
- Chile (1810–1814) – declared itself independent;
- New Granada (1811) – was divided into several states: New Granada, Quito, and Cundinamarca.

Once the War of Independence was over, Ferdinand VII sent troops to South America to restore colonial rule, imprisoning and exiling leaders. Only Paraguay and the United Provinces of the River Plate remained independent. However, the independence movement was quick to restart, counting on strong support from the United Kingdom and the United States.

The independence wars began from the South, from the independent provinces, and lasted nearly a decade. Among the main protagonists emerged José de San Martin and Simón Bolívar. Among the remarkable facts are: the independence of Chile in 1818; Peru in 1821; Colombia (New Granada) in 1819; Venezuela in 1821; Ecuador in 1822, which together with the former and the latter, with the name of Quito, formed the Republic of Gran Colombia until 1830. The
The final liberation of Peru and Bolivia in 1824 ended definitively Spanish rule in South America.

The Banda Oriental – presently the Eastern Republic of Uruguay – saw numerous disputes involving Portugal and Spain, as well as expansionist claims of Argentina on the one hand, and of Brazil on the other. Only in 1828 it became an independent state (Map 9).

In the first decades after the independence process, it was already possible to detect common traits in Hispanic America: failure of the unitary claims; prevalence of caudillos; maintenance of unequal economic and social structures.

The independence of the South American possessions of Portugal was also influenced by the above factors. The Minister of State Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, the Marquis of Pombal, followed Enlightenment orientation and centralized the colonial system, raising tariffs on mining. Protest movements influenced by the ideals of the American Revolution and French Revolution hatched throughout the colony, and were repressed by the Crown.

In 1808 the Portuguese Court moved to Rio de Janeiro as a result of the Napoleonic invasion in the Iberian Peninsula. This unusual situation, where the colony became the general government headquarters, stirred the metropolis-colony relationship. This was also the occasion for the opening of Brazilian ports to other nations, breaking the metropolitan monopoly. As a result, many authors tend to consider 1808 as the year of the independence of Brazil.

Conflicts broke in 1822 as consequence of attempts by Portugal to reestablish Brazilian colonial status. Peter I, Prince Regent and heir to the Portuguese throne, decided to remain in Brazil, contrary to metropolitan guidelines, and the country turned independent almost without bloodshed. The slave structure and Empire remained, in contrast to the neighboring abolitionist republics. The centralized and conservative independence process contributed to the maintenance of the unity of Brazilian territory.

Throughout the nineteenth century the political life of South America was traversed by political instability. National ideology expressed in literature, history, and geography cemented the groups in the recently formed States.

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Consolidation of the South American borders

The independence of South American countries did not represent the crystallization of its borders. Throughout the nineteenth century a series of armed conflicts involving the new nations took place. The political instability began in 1816, when the Brazilian Empire annexed the Banda Orien
tal (presently the Eastern Republic of Uruguay), and ended only in 1870, after the Triple Alliance War. In parallel, towards the north of the region, the movement now called Bolivarianism militated by the unity of Spanish America.

**Brazilian expansionism and its consequences.** Brazilian project of controlling of the River Plate Basin in the areas now equivalent to Paraguay and Uruguay is evident since the consolidation of the Empire. This movement has always been contained by Argentina.

The Platine Wars were armed conflict arising from this expansionism. The main conflicts are the Cisplatine War (1825–1828), Guerra Grande (1839–1851), Uruguayan War (1864–1865) and the last and most profound, the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–1870).

Despite the image of international peaceful relations in South America, given the few armed conflict in the twentieth century, the War of the Triple Alliance, or Paraguayan War, brought death to more than 350,000 people, and destroyed Paraguayan economy and society.

On the one hand these conflicts represent further fragmentation in Spanish America, whilst on the other hand it also represents the strengthening of the unity of the Brazilian Empire.

**Simon Bolivar and the Latin American integration.** Simultaneously to the expansionist movement of Brazil, there is a strong drive towards the union of republics originating from Spanish America, especially from northern South America to Mexico (which at that time still had the territories now known as Texas, USA). This movement was largely centered on the figure of Simon Bolivar, president of Gran Colombia in the 20s of nineteenth century.

Reacting to the influence of Spain and of the United States over the new republics, the Latin territorial unit project reaches its peak in 1826, on the occasion of the Congress of Panama. But the Creole elites and regional caudillos, who controlled smaller political divisions, sought to ensure their administrative and economic power and worked for the fragmentation of states. In 1865, the Bolivarian initiatives were stalled.
Contemporary borders and conflicts

Borders are never definitive, but little has changed in the design of the boundaries of South America since the early twentieth century. Table 1 shows the countries of the continent and the extent of its borders in 2015.

In South America, natural resources are a prominent issue that, in border areas, translates frequently in border parks. According to Rebeca Steiman (2015), most of the conservation parks in Amazonian countries are placed at the border: Bolivia has more than half of its national parks at the border zone; Peru and Brazil have a quarter of its protection units at the limits; Colombia and Venezuela also place many of its reservations at borderlands; Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana have only one natural park each – but all are at the border.

Still according to the same author, remoteness was a key reason for the conservation of these ecosystems, also allowing for low costs of land expropriation. She points, finally, that the conservation policies have prevailed over fortification, despite geopolitical reasoning, since these areas combine factors such as "a) the presence of natural resources close to the border, exploited or not; b) the existence of military tensions; c) recognition of the occupation of the land by indigenous peoples, whose cross-border mobility is intense and longstanding".

Border conflicts. According to the Encyclopedia of Border Disputes, there are nine contemporary border disputes in South America: Bolivia-Chile-Peru argue over access to the Pacific Ocean; Colombia and Venezuela have claims on Coquivacoa; icefields are demanded by Argentina and Chile; Suarez Islands are under discussion between Bolivia and Brazil; stretches of the border are claimed by Uruguay from Brazil; the limit between Peru and Equador still has indefinities; the same goes for the Pando region between Bolivia and Brazil; for land and water use between Brazil and Paraguay and for the Malvinas/Falklands between Argentina and UK. We will explore only four of these, and make some remarks on the similarity between these processes and the other five cases.

Border disputes between Brazil and Uruguay. The boundary between Brazil and Uruguay was defined in 1851,
Table 1. The countries of South America and the extent of their borders in 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Border extension</th>
<th>Bordering countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>11,968 km</td>
<td>Bolivia 942 km, Brazil 1,263 km, Chile 6,691 km, Paraguay 2,531 km, Uruguay 541 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>7,252 km</td>
<td>Argentina 942 km, Brazil 3,403 km, Chile 942 km, Paraguay 753 km, Peru 1,212 km</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>16,145 km</td>
<td>Argentina 1,263 km, Bolivia 3,403 km, Colombia 1,790 km, French Guiana 649 km, Guyana 1,308 km, Paraguay 1,371 km, Peru 2,659 km, Suriname 515 km, Uruguay 1,050 km, Venezuela 2,137 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>7,801 km</td>
<td>Argentina 6,691 km, Bolivia 942 km, Peru 168 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>6,672 km</td>
<td>Brazil 1,790 km, Ecuador 708 km, Panama 339 km, Peru 1,494 km, Venezuela 2,341 km</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2,237 km</td>
<td>Colombia 708 km, Peru 1,529 km</td>
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<tr>
<td>French Guyana*</td>
<td>1,205 km</td>
<td>Brazil 649 km, Suriname 556 km</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>2,933 km</td>
<td>Brazil 1,308 km, Suriname 836 km, Venezuela 789 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>4,655 km</td>
<td>Argentina 2,531 km, Bolivia 753 km, Brazil 1,371 km</td>
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demarcated between 1852 and 1862, and characterized from 1920 onwards. Today, stretches of these lines are under dispute in International Court: the Brazilian Island (Ilha Brasileira or Isla Brasilera) and the area of Masoller (or Contestado). The use of resources in the Mirim Lagoon is being negotiated. The contestation is pushed by Uruguay, relying on the need to clarify imprecisions in the demarcation, involving interpretations of toponymy and hydrography. Uruguayan ask for revision of the 1851 Treaty of Limits (known in Uruguay as the Lamas Treaty), perceived as favorable to Brazil.\footnote{Adriana Dorfman and Marla Assumpção, "Uruguay-Brazil: Brazilian Island," in \textit{Border Disputes: A Global Encyclopedia}, ed. Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2015).}

Territorial demarcation by the newly independent states in the second half of nineteenth century resorted to urban settlement. Many cities were built along both sides of the line. In the border strips, land was bestowed to military veterans who could farm their properties and, at the same time, defend the territories. The border region was peopled and its urban centers became a distinct feature in the area and a textbook example of twin-cities.

Three points remain under discussion at the present. The first issue is the Brazilian Island on the triple border be-

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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guyana 789 km</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38,348 km</td>
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* A department of France

tween Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Differing criteria are used to draw the river limits between each of the dyads, and they conflict at this point. The two-kilometer long, 0.5-kilometer wide islet is presently Brazilian but is claimed by Uruguay. Brazilian diplomacy dismisses this dispute, stating that this limit has consolidated historical bases.

The second border contestation is the 220 km², triangle-shaped area known as Masoller or Rincón de Artigas in Uruguay and as Contestado or Villa Albornoz in Brazil. Different rivers can be identified, as the La Invernada River, mentioned in the 1851 Treaty of Limits. The Uruguayan claim dates from 1934 and since 1974 Uruguayan official maps depict it as "disputed border." In 1985, Vila Tomás Albornoz was founded with the support of the Brazilian Army - this was interpreted by Uruguayans as an uti possidetis move (Latin for "he who uses, owns", in other words: sovereignty is supported by de facto occupation).

The third point of dispute is the Mirim or Merín Lagoon. Its history can be traced to the last quarter of the eighteenth century. In this period, the Iberian Crowns established Neutral Fields in the area - due to lack of technical means, human resources, or political dominance to draw the border as a line, Spain and Portugal settled a triangular tampon zone. Many treaties dealing with the drawing of the line and the sharing of natural water, fishing, and navigation resources followed, some of them very favorable to Brazil.

Today, the lagoon is a laboratory for transnational environmental conservation, as it holds the Pilot Project for Integrated and Sustainable Management of Water and Environment in the Transborder Basin of Mirim Lagoon and Quaraí River, still another example of conservation solutions at South American border areas.

Brazil and Paraguay land use and hydroelectric resources. Since mid-twentieth century, Brazilian farmers have been moving westwards and across the border and into Paraguayan territory. Today, some estimates place the number of Brasiguaios - or Brazilian-related population living in Paraguay - around 500,000 people in a population of less than seven million, and up to 60% of the inhabitants in bordering departments.

The impact of this migration is felt mostly in agriculture, since the migrants who left Brazil purchased land and introduced soybean cultivation for export. From this, two

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clear traits arose: land became very concentrated, expelling traditional populations who could not adapt to intensive landfarming and Paraguay rose as one of the major soybean exporters, resourcing to seaports in Brazil.

Paraguay ranks sixth in production of soybean and is the fourth exporter worldwide. According to the Department of Statistics, Surveys and Censuses (DGEEC) of that country the extreme poverty in the countryside was 24.4% in 2007. This social crease brings much tension to local politics, which frequently dissociates from economic analysis and embraces xenophobic argumentation.

In 2014, Fernando Lugo, then president of Paraguay, was overthrown in a crisis related to his attempts to control land tenure by foreigners (especially Brazilian and Argentine), and after a clash between the police and landless rioters, he was forced to step down the presidency, reenacting authoritarian episodes believed to be past in South America.

The integration between Brazil and Paraguay is also present in the joint exploitation of hydropower resources in the binational Paraná River Itaipu plant, built in the late 1970s. This project involved thousands of workers, who came from different parts of the continent and stayed in the region when the construction fields closed. This led to a 10-fold population growth (in 40 years) in the cities of Foz do Iguacu (BR) and their neighbors Puerto Iguazu (AR) and Ciudad del Este (PY) (formerly known as Puerto Stroessner, in reference to the Paraguayan dictator).

The triple border is a very cosmopolitan hub of global trade in the region. Although sensationalist press and North American intelligence depicts the Triple border between Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina as a "safe haven" for international terrorism, there is no evidence of such links.

Malvinas or Falkland Islands dispute between Argentina and United Kingdom. Falkland Islands, or Islas Malvinas, are a group of Islands located 460 kilometers off the coast of Argentina, in Southern Atlantic. The sovereignty over these rocky islands has been directly contested since 1833, when Great Britain re-established her control. In 1982, Argentina and Great Britain engaged in war over the domain.


of the archipelago. Although defeated, Argentina keeps contesting British sovereignty on that territory. The islands are strategic due to its position on main navigation routes across South Atlantic and also due to oil and mineral resources.

Historically, British sailors took possession of West Falkland Island, establishing Port Egmont, in 1765. In 1770, due British and Spain war, several ships were sent to Buenos Aires and South Atlantic, causing the surrender of Great Britain. Britain continued, however, to claim the islands over the years. In 1816, Argentina became independent and in 1820 began claiming sovereignty, establishing missions on the islands. Towards the end of 1832, London and Buenos Aires sent warships to Malvinas, and Britain regained control over the islands during the following year.

Since then, tensions between Argentina and Britain did not disappear. In 1982, Argentina invaded the islands and, for two months, the ‘Falklands War’ took place. Frequently, this movement by Argentina is seen more as internally motivated, as a way to unite public opinion in favor of the Junta, the military dictatorship, at that time ruled by Galtieri. The war would not only create an enemy and a goal, but also would create a smoke curtain hiding serious internal social and economic problems.

The invasion started on April 3, 1982, and Argentina surrendered on June 14, 1982; over 900 soldiers were killed, and over 2,500 were wounded. On June 15, the day after the surrender, Galtieri announced his resignation and the dictatorship was over; Thatcher was re-elected in 1983, profiting from the nationalistic post-war wave.

The conflict represented a North-South division of the world, the axis that gradually substituted the East-West one; USA supported Britain, which also had the help of all Europe, specially France and Norway; Argentina, on the other hand, was backed by its Latin American partners and members of Non-Allies Movement. Chile, as an exception, stood by the British side, especially due to its interest in Patagonia. Argentina still claims Malvinas as part of its territory.14

Similar issues can be found in the case of the South Sandwich Islands and South Georgia Islands, which involve the same contenders, but without actual confrontation.

Bolivia–Chile–Peru disputes over access to the Pacific Ocean. After the War of the Pacific (1879–1883) Chile gained the territories of Antofagasta and of Tarapacá from Bolivia and Peru, respectively. These lands lay between the crest of the Andes and the Pacific Ocean. The claims are more impor-

tant for Bolivia, because the losses took away its only exit to the sea. Since then and until today, tension and distension followed, but relations were never pacified between Chile and its two neighbors and the case was repeatedly evoked to forge national consensus. In 2013, landlocked Bolivia presented a new case to the International Court of Justice, asking for negotiation on its exit to the Pacific Ocean. In 2015, the Court accepted this demand.

The War of the Pacific was not a colonial episode, but one between independent countries in South America. This means it was not waged to establish uncertain colonial borders, but to define the rights of exploitation and the means of exportation of natural resources (originally saltpetre). This war began with Bolivia and Peru charging duties on Chilean company exports. Combats between Chile and Peru led to the advance of Chilean troops and the occupation of Lima (capital city of Peru) between the years of 1881 and 1883. The Friendship Treaty of 1904 defined the territory as Chilean, and established compensation to Bolivia in the form of the building and conceding of a 440-kilometer railway linking Bolivian capital of La Paz to the Chilean port of Arica, in former Peruvian territory. 15 The same applies to the Peruvian city of Tacna, linked to Arica by a 62-kilometer long railroad. The first railway is now replaced by a highway and the second one is now a tourist attraction.

Beyond the nationalist content of these disputes, the presence of non-state actors should be noted. These borders can be depicted as permeable to the movements of the indigenous Aymaras. Seen by Chile as a natural border, it is the thriving territory of this group of over two million people, mostly dwelling in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, and also in the Republic of Chile, Republic of Peru, and Argentine Republic. 16 Many problems arose in the last decade in the Tarapacá Andes, due to mega-mining projects and their exclusive and predatory use of the resources. Affected also by border control under Chilean Plan Frontera Norte (North Border Plan), aimed at repressing smuggling and drug traffic, workers now face difficulties to cross.

The main beneficiaries of the exploitation of natural resources are transnational corporations. For these actors, the peripheral location of resources does not represent bigger problems than those relating to border crossing of goods. Me-

16 Alfonso Hinojosa, Idas y venidas: Campesinos tarijenses en el norte argentino [Coming and Going: Peasants from Tarija in Northern Argentina] (La Paz: Fundación PIEB, 2000).
ga-mining projects benefit from the process of regional integration in the 1990s and from the contemporary acceleration of exploitation and exportation under Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America, also known as IIRSA.¹⁷

**Contemporary integration efforts**

From a balance between historical attempts to build a confederation in the nineteenth century, Brazilian and Argentine expansionism, and the contemporary global trade liberalization, two big blocks were born in the region, *Mercosur* (Common Market of the South) and the *Comunidad Andina* (Andean Community of Nations).

Coinciding with the political opening of many South American countries after closed military regimes for decades, these initiatives can be seen as responsive to the global situation – decentralization, regionalization, liberalization, emergence of new international actors – and as resumption of the old integration projects of the nineteenth century. Mercosur and the Andean Community represent the formation of new networks and are the reconstruction of old projects for territorial integration.

The Common Market of the South, or *Mercado Común del Sur* (MERCOSUR), was established in 1991 and comprises Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, and the associated states of Chile and Peru (since 2003), Ecuador and Colombia (since 2004), Guyana and Suriname (since 2013). Its goals are: 1) Free circulation of goods, services, and production factors; 2) Elimination of customs taxes and other restrictions among members; 3) Establishment of common external tariffs and policies towards third states and the coordination of members positions in international economic fora; 4) Coordination of macroeconomic and sector policies in areas such as external trade, agriculture, industry, tariffs, economy, services, transportation, communication etc. in order to ensure proper competition between the parties; and finally, 5) Compromise to work towards adjustments of legislation to strengthen the integration process.¹⁸

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¹⁷ Alejandro Schweitzer, "Fronteras internacionales, recursos naturales e integración regional en el Cono Sur de America del Sur [International Borders, Natural Resources and Regional Integration in Southern Cone of South America]," *Para Onde?* 5 (2) (2011).

In the same way that these projects can be viewed as resumption, their motives can also be seen as recurring, since much of Mercosur and the Andean Community is a response to the US expansionism, especially in initiatives such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas – FTAA. Resistance to the FTAA, especially on the Brazilian side, also represented resistance to asymmetric negotiations.

Gradually there is a convergence between the Andean Community and Mercosur, along with the desire to expand markets and economies of scale. So, negotiations for a South American economic space started, initially manifested in the intentions of creation of the South American Free Trade Area – ALCSA – in 1993. In practice, however, it is in 2000, with the IIRSA that these negotiations reach the territory.

IIRSA focuses on transport, energy, and telecommunications networks, more than economic networks and tariff reforms. Structured on axes, IIRSA seeks to connect the production centers to markets in and outside the continent. This is made through the building of infrastructure connecting the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of South America, responding to historical deficiencies in interior lands. Several IIRSA projects are already in progress or completed, including pipelines, railways, waterways, and electricity conduction structures.

In 2004, the Mercosur-CAN convergence moves further ahead and CASA (South American Community of Nations) is formed, later renamed UNASUR (or UNASUL). UNASUR not only encompasses all nations in the region, but differs essentially by its political nature, not economic. Seen as the space of the Brazilian power exercise, UNASUR in fact represents regionalization that seeks to close the securitarian issues of the subcontinent within the subcontinent, as well as projects such as the construction of a common citizenship and deepening of integration (IIRSA today is integrated into UNASUR).

UNASUR acts also in trying to revert the war on drugs waged by USA in Colombia, Venezuela and other countries of the region, which huge human losses. It recently proposed a new view on the drug problem, leaving mere punishment and centering in human beings and their health.19

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Recommended reading:


Red por una América Libre de Transgénicos, Alianza Biodiversidad. "Informe de la gira de verificación sobre los impactos de la soja transgénica en Paraguay [Report from the Round of Inspection of Transgenic Soybean Impacts in Paraguay]." Biodiversidad:
Chapter 3.5 State borders in South America


Schweitzer, Alejandro. "Fronteras internacionales, recursos naturales e integración regional en el Cono Sur de America del Sur [International Borders, Natural Resources and Regional Integration in Southern Cone of South America]." Para Onde?! 5 (2) (2011).


Internet resources:

Charlone, César and Enrique Fernández. El baño del Papa. [The Pope’s Toilet]. Uruguay/Brazil/ France, color, 97 min. 2007. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1VCWpMJUWsA

Grupo Retis. Available at http://www.retis.igeo.ufrj.br/


Nodal. Available at http://www.nodal.am/


Unbral Fronteiras. Available at http://unbral.nuvem.ufrgs.br/site/
Background to borders and borderlands in Africa

This chapter on African state borders and the borderlands encompassing them builds upon two important assumptions. The first is that African borderlands are not marginal or peripheral areas. While geographically they may be located far from the state centre or metropole, they are not blank slates void of politics. Yet, this has conventionally been the opinion of political scientists. Stephen Jackson captures the essence of this sentiment in the following quotation: "A lingering romance still clings to borderlands. Marked by a frontier mentality, usually far flung from national capitals (the distance from Kinshasa to Goma, North Kivu, for example, is that from London to Sarajevo), they often have a reputation as either an anachronistic backwater or an anarchic hinterland compared to the metropole".¹

Traditionally, the study of borders and the wider area around them has been concerned with straightforward legal, geographical, or geopolitical questions. The borderland was understood to be peripheral to state dynamics, and the border was generally perceived in terms of constraints. Timothy Raeymaekers, et al explain the source of this mindset

about borderlands: "Conventional wisdom has it that states are built from the political centre, and then gradually expand their power and knowledge over the periphery. The borderland is consequently treated as a margin, rather than an analytical unit that can be studied in its own right [...] This has contributed to a deep misunderstanding of borderlands as marginal spaces, fraught with avoidance, savagery and rebellion." There is increasing recognition among political scientists, however, that African borderlands constitute zones of highly dynamic interactions, and borders represent socio-political constructs and productive sites, rather than mere state boundaries.

That African state borders and borderlands experience specific types of conflict, is the second assumption that this chapter builds upon. A large part of the scholarship on African borders / borderlands and conflict, however, has tended to be of an entirely different nature to that which will be discussed in this chapter. It concerns a widespread, and arguably sometimes misleading, perception of Africa’s borders. Too often its popular currency clouds awareness of the workings of violence and warfare in African borderlands, and therefore needs to be addressed before moving on. It concerns the artificiality, unjustness, imposed nature, and – as a result – supposedly conflict-prone character of African borders.

As Paul Nugent explains, "African boundaries have suffered a consistently poor reputation. As ‘arbitrary’ and ‘artificial’ colonial constructs, conventional wisdom has it that they were imposed upon unwilling Africans who, according to two recurrent images, have either suffered dearly from their consequences or merrily continued with life as if they did not exist.' Many scholars argue that the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 – where the European colonial powers portioned the continent into states – fatally spliced apart ethnic and social groups, disrupted regionally-integrated economic systems, and even destroyed natural ecosystems (Map 11 is a map of Africa in 1882, immediately prior to the Berlin Conference, while Map 12 – a map of Africa in 1914 – demonstrates the results of the ‘Scramble for Africa’). But perhaps the most influential argument has been with regards to border artificiality and conflict. It is purported that the cumulative results of Berlin were an effective Balkanization of the continent: a division of Africa into politically, socially, and

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economically non-viable micro-states, where wars were later (and continue to be) fought over the inexact character of the borders.

There is no denying that European colonialism had an enormous impact on the cartography of Africa. Nevertheless, it is important to move beyond this conceptualisation of borders and their legacy. For one thing, "most African wars do not have their immediate point of origin in border disputes resulting from colonial divisions", as Achille Mbembe points out.\(^4\) Many wars in Africa have indeed had a border dimension to them (to do with various consequences of the border), however these have not usually been with regards to the actual location of the boundary. Furthermore, to say that they are arbitrary is somewhat of a moot point. There is no such thing as a natural border anywhere: all are subjective, political constructs to some degree. As Nugent and Anthony I. Asiwaju point out, "However artificial they might once have been, there is a sense in which many African boundaries do now demarcate mental space".\(^5\) In a similar vein, Christopher Clapham notes, "the demarcations between peoples left in the wake of colonialism are no longer altogether artificial. Ghanaians and Ivorians are distinguished not simply by the side of a colonially created dividing line on which they happen to find themselves, but by differences of historical experience and personal identity which may well deepen as they are transmitted to subsequent generations".\(^6\)

In fact, in the post-colonial period such boundaries have largely been accepted by the populace, not to mention upheld at significant cost on occasion. Compared with other areas of the world such as Europe, there have been very few secessionist attempts in Africa. Some successful cases include Eritrea and South Sudan; the most notable unsuccessful examples include Mali’s Azawad, Morocco’s Western Sahara, Congo’s Katanga, Nigeria’s Biafra, Senegal’s Casamance, and Somalia’s Somaliland (which interestingly represents an attempt to return to colonial boundaries). In fact, rather than a change of boundary due to a dispute over the line, Malcolm Anderson argues, "Disintegration of states in Africa, since independence, seemed a more likely cause of

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frontier revision". Even more noteworthy, perhaps, is that numerous guerrilla movements – Angola’s UNITA, Mozambique’s RENAMO, and Liberia’s NPFL, for example – have demonstrated little interest in altering state boundaries, and instead have fought for control of the state within its prevailing borders. Indeed, it frequently gets forgotten in the debate that the borders are often viewed in a positive light by those living in their midst.

Africa’s borders and borderlands

The political dimension. The rest of this chapter will look more closely at the internal workings of Africa’s borders and borderlands by considering their political, social, and economic dimensions. Before delving into the politics that tend to characterise borderlands, however, it is worth briefly discussing the nature of the state in these African cross-border micro-regions. To do so, one needs to refer to the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. Perhaps the event’s most lasting impact lies with the metropole-periphery relationship that it helped to instigate. As James L. Hentz explains,

> It [the Berlin Conference] certified a state system where the political authority situated in the capital had legal suzerainty over a geographically defined space, but lacked political authority over all the people that lived within that space, particularly the farther you travelled from the capital [...] The more important legacy of Berlin for the trajectory of the post-colonial state is that the African colonial state consisted of either a small trading outpost and/or of a capital. There was little effort to project authority into the hinterland. Colonial powers were more interested in connecting their colonies to the metropole than in connecting them to their hinterlands.⁸

After gaining independence in the mid-twentieth century, there were few attempts by post-colonial African states to rectify these practices of extraversion. In fact, the national state has consistently regarded these spaces as marginal, and the urban bias has continued to be ever-present. While of course there is variation amongst African states, on the whole it can be generalized that capitals have tended to look down upon such zones as the following: poor, weak, dependent, backwards, provincial, deprived, even pre-modern, but

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above all else, inferior. It is important to note that the international community – including global actors such as the United Nations, and regional actors such as the African Union (and its predecessor the Organization of African Unity) – have supported this trend and development, through their recognition of (and provision of legitimacy to) what have been in essence quasi-states.

However, Africa’s central governments often do more than simply harbour a negative attitude towards their so-called peripheries: they practice one as well. Perhaps at the most rudimentary level, this is seen in the performance of central nation-building, where inclusion of the border zones is at best a secondary concern. This is evident in the simplest of practices, such as the delivery of state services. A large part of this has to do with the wider issue of the design of government in many (though of course not all) borderlands; namely, a lack of symmetry between the needs of borderland residents, and the state services provided. Indeed, local government structures in borderlands tend to be based on the political wants of the centre, and thus designed according to national templates. For example, Melissa Parker, et al have argued that such a situation characterises the plight of Ugandan ‘fisherfolk’ working in various shoreline peripheries of the country. They are more prone to the water-borne disease schistosomiasis than nearly any other population, and yet their peripheral status means that they are the least likely to receive necessary social services for their care. This stems, argues Parker, et al, from the government’s "tendency to treat them as ‘feckless’ and ‘ungovernable’" owing to "the fact that so many fisherfolk live and work in places located at the country’s international borders" and the "view expressed by many officials that border people are mostly migrants and that many are not proper citizens at all".

This lack of congruence between state services and a periphery’s needs is made even more acute by the unique circumstances of borderland communities, such as those described above. Their orientation towards the other side of the border, as opposed to the metropole, means that education,

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trade-related, and police services, should arguably be designed in consultation with those working in municipalities across the state line. However, as Tara Polzer Ngwato and Jacob Akech found in their work on the South Africa-Mozambique border, "Local government officials were clearly oriented towards their respective capital cities, even when there is more commonality and everyday interaction across the border than with the capital". Besides the obvious inefficiency issues, this situation tends to breed corruption and embezzlement by the local government ministers due to the lack of accountability towards the locals.

In many of Africa's border zones, it can often appear as though the state is absent. Indeed, at many African borders an official state presence, both in an administrative, but also in a visible sense, is patchy, at best. Of course this is not the case for all African state borders, as some governments make attempts to noticeably and physically project claims to 'state-ness'. Alice Bellagamba and George Klute's description of the North African borderland town of Kidal in Mali, reminds us that the state's presence can vary in form: "In Kidal the state may be weak or even absent insofar as guaranteeing services and economic rights to its citizens is concerned, but it is dramatically present with its military and coercive apparatus, made of soldiers, trucks and weapons". And lastly, it is worth remembering that even if the state is absent in all of the above-mentioned fields, it may still attempt to give the appearance of being present. "At borders, states take great trouble to highlight their territorial sovereignty. Demarcation by means of highly visible symbols such as pillars, flags, fences, and signboards is commonplace", Willem Van Schendel explains.

Perhaps one of the areas of Africa where state presence is most absent today, is Libya's sea border with the Mediterranean (and thus various European states). Essentially a collapsed state since the fall of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2011, Libya's ports have come to constitute a porous migration point into Europe for thousands of Africans (some asylum seekers, others economic migrants) seeking to leave the continent to find better opportunities elsewhere. Other

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13 Ngwato and Akech, "Between State and Society," 12.
North African coastal points – including in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt – are also important in this regard, as the following illustration highlights.

**The social dimension.** Borders are also characterised by dynamic cross-border social networks. Borderlands are areas where social identities can converge, coexist, or conflict. While the conflicting aspect will be discussed later in this chapter, it is important here to recognise the converging and coexisting practices of the populations on either side of the border. Often the border itself can help to maintain such a population’s cross-border ties. Yet until relatively recently, the myth of border artificiality skewed perceptions of African border culture. It was assumed that due to the apparent arbitrary nature of the borders, identities would be predominantly characterised by ambiguity and confusion, even when on either side of the border there existed individuals of the same identity group. However, for many African borderlands it is precisely the opposite that has transpired, as researchers like Donna K. Flynn have discovered. In her research on the Shabe residents of the Benin-Nigeria border, Flynn found that a powerful ‘border identity’ had taken hold. She explains it in the following way: “The ‘border’ is not merely an arbitrary line dividing two nations; it is a social grouping based on historical, residential claims to the Okpara region”. The Shabe identity had developed not only out of a long history with this transnational space, but also from an attitude that professed it was the Shabe’s right to be the main participants in, and profiteers from, the borderland’s cross-border trade. The Shabe in fact proclaim, ‘we are the border’, denoting the degree to which a so-called arbitrary border can become embedded and entrenched into the very psyche of a group. To quote Flynn, “in the case of the Shabe, it is a local sense of deep placement instead of displacement, deep territorialisation instead of deterriorialisation, which forges strong feelings of rootedness in the borderland itself and creates a border identity”.

Of course, it is significant as to whether the cross-border population existed as one community prior to the imposition of the border. For those groups where such a situation is the case, their border identity tends to be much stronger owing to its historical embeddedness. The following comment from Gérard Prunier very much applies in this scenario: "we must remember that borders mean very little in such a situ-

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17 Flynn, “‘We are the Border,’” 319.

18 Flynn, “‘We are the Border,’” 312.
ation. Not only are they often porous (the case of Zaire/Congo being extreme), but ethnic solidarities existing across them are much more powerful than the formal citizenships people happen to carry. A Ngbaka is a Ngbaka before being either ‘Congolese’ or ‘Centrafrican’, a Kakwa is a Kakwa before being ‘Sudanese’, ‘Ugandan’ or ‘Congolese’.

Indeed, borderlanders’ national identity is oftentimes diluted. This is for a number of reasons, the most influential being physical remoteness from the seat of power; a perceived sense of political isolation, marginality, or subordination; and constant exposure to, and interaction with, another nationality across the border. Due to these factors, cross-border relationships often come to trump those of national ones. In the Ilemi Triangle, for instance, neglect on the part of national authorities towards borderland development, has translated into increased dependency among the borderlanders on their kin across the border.

Likewise for the borders between South Africa, Mozambique, and Swaziland, where the transnational relationships have become cohesive and dominant to a degree that many borderland residents define identity in terms of length of residency in the border area, as opposed to national origin. It is even the case that traditional South African authorities will recognize Mozambican and Swazi nationals as members of their borderland village, when national law has not confirmed their legal right to reside in the country.

These kinds of cultural values and affinities can have very tangible implications: it often leads to independent and self-reliant economic practices (as will be discussed in the next section), attitudes of resistance and self-assertiveness towards norms and laws imposed by the centre, and in more extreme cases, subversive interests or even secessionist sentiments. However, these factors should not be interpreted in a negative light. On the contrary, tending to perceive state authority as a largely oppressive force, many borderlanders value the distance from the core, and the societal (as well as political and economic) independence and freedom that comes with that. It must also be remembered that despite

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the deep rootedness in the border, not all other sources of identity necessarily become extinguished. On the Niger-Nigerian border, for example, Hausa and Muslim identities are still alive and well, despite an entrenched sense of "shared borderlandness". In other words, identity in the borderland does not have to be a zero-sum game.

The economic dimension. Borderlanders often see the border zone as one economically marginalised by central authority. Flynn's description of the Shabe's attitude towards the Beninois and Nigerian governments is typical of borderland sentiments: "From the point of view of border residents, the government has imposed only economic hardship on them and has done nothing to help them develop, while customs guards, as arms of the government, are only out to rob them." It is not only distrust and suspicion of government border officials (and the policies behind them) that characterises the borderlanders' attitude, but it is often conceived around a sense of injustice.

This attitude translates into interesting practices. As described in the previous section, perceived inequality has led borderlanders in places like the Beninois-Nigerian border to actively strengthen border solidarity and interdependence, in order to appropriate what they see as their natural rights to the lucrative transborder trade. If they perceive their economic autonomy as being compromised, they often have no hesitation in responding with evasion or resistance. This is part of a wider phenomenon, namely the economic independence and self-assertiveness which tends to arise out of these spaces. Not only does this result in economic activity being directed outwards and over the border, but it also emboldens an attitude of ambivalence with regards to cooperating with national customs and trade regulations. Thus, when state practices around the border become too parasitic and a nuisance for the inhabitants, or more seriously, when they start to restrict their abilities to make an economic living, the residents can often have no qualms about circumventing the state (or bribing state officials in order to have their way).

The government's economic disregard of the borderlands can also be a significant advantage for residents, however. As Lee Cassanelli states with reference to the Horn of Africa, "By essentially neglecting the frontier districts, colonial bureaucrats and their African successors in both Kenya and Somalia afforded borderlanders the economic space to devel-

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24 Flynn, "We are the Border," 318.
to more extensive supply and market networks". Their remoteness in this case meant that, despite "administrative maps and official ordinances [suggesting] that the states exercised sovereignty along the frontiers", they were simply too far removed from the political and economic centre to be subjected to thorough enforcement.

Borderlanders in numerous African regions have long been practising illicit economic activities such as smuggling. It is at borders where the value of an item increases or decreases, and hence they can be dynamic, active sites of economic exchange. And it is borderlanders, especially those part of a socio-identity group straddled across a border, that arguably understand more than anyone else how best to work this ‘potential difference’ and its attendant opportunities. In fact, their skill in this arena goes back centuries in some places. Discussing borderland traders in eastern Africa, Cassanelli explains,

After the establishment of colonial rule, these experienced traders were well-positioned to circumvent colonial attempts to restrict or divert their commerce within the new, artificially constructed boundaries [...] the borderland traders relied on cross-territorial mobility to evade government taxation, registration and quarantines, and to move their animals and other assets to the most advantageous markets on either side of the border.

It is interesting to think that while national efforts at achieving regional economic integration in Africa have on the whole been quite dismal, illicit and unrecorded trade practiced by borderlanders has helped to achieve quite remarkable levels of unofficial integration in many borderland spaces – and beyond. Indeed, many African borderland economic practices are tapped into wider regional (even global) economic systems to do with trade, smuggling, migrant trafficking, and so on. After the Tuarag rebellion in the Malian-Algerian borderland ended in 1996, for example, a borderland that had once served as a refuge for fighters, was transformed into a transnational economic hub, involved in various regional and international economic practices. Thus, as Thomas Husken and Georg Klute note with regards to the Egyptian-Libyan border (but which can apply to numerous African borderlands), "The image of a periph-

26 Cassanelli, "The Opportunistic Economics," 146.
27 Cassanelli, "The Opportunistic Economics," 146.
ery without connection to national and global developments is inappropriate”.  

The contested nature of Africa’s borders and borderlands

The political dimension. The remaining sections of this chapter will explore how these insights are important in shaping the kind of conflict that arises in violence-prone African borders and borderlands. In numerous African borderlands throughout the continent there are often references to discourses of marginalisation, hidden transcripts of discontent, and unresolved political issues. In discussing the conflict in Northern Uganda, Tehri Lehtinen notes, “There are several layers of grievances, symbolic representations and multiple co-existing conflicts which all converge in the narratives about Northern Uganda”. Borderlanders complain of a range of infringements and injustices inflicted upon them by the capital, ranging from objections of too much state (hence the frequency of refusals to pay taxes), to protests of too little state (for example, claims to suffer from inferior quality schools, health services, and so on).

Meta-narratives reflecting the unique lived experiences of African borderlanders are not the only conflict-related political dynamics to arise out of this arena, however. The varying quality and quantity of African state control also means that borderlands are simply more conducive spaces from which ‘men of prowess’ or ‘men of violence’ can find openings to operate. Thus, in addition to legal state authorities, there are often a multitude of actors attempting to exercise power in the borderland and these can include armed bandits, rural militias, transnational companies, and even NGOs. It is important to recognise, however, that this distinction between state and non-state actors in the borderland is somewhat of an artificial and ideal one, as can be seen from the frequency of ‘sobels’ in numerous African conflicts, state officials acting as smugglers on the side, and so on.

The particular political climate of borderlands also generates lucrative conflict opportunities of a much more practical nature for non-state actors. The lack of road infrastructure in so many of Africa’s border zones, for example, means


30 ‘Sobels’ refers to those who are ‘soldier by day, rebel by night’.
that these spaces are often difficult for government forces to traverse, if not being completely out of their reach. For example, the Malian-Algerian borderland has frequently been used by Tuarag rebels "to withdraw from the fighting and by the civilian population as refuge and shelter. The rebels also used it to recharge arms and supplies". And more recently, Islamist rebels in North Africa have used the vast and remote desert borderlands of northern Mali, Mauritania, and southern Algeria, to hide from state forces. Indeed, often combined with the military’s unfamiliarity with the local conditions of the area, and commonly a lack of support from the populace towards the state, rebels (would-be or actual) can find themselves with ample space from which to mobilise, organise, gain bargaining power, and implement their agendas. Lars-Erik Cederman, Luc Girardin, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch draw attention to the impact distance and terrain can have on rebel groups: "ethnic groups that are far removed from the political centre and live in inaccessible territories hold, on average, more hostile attitudes toward central rule than those that have been more thoroughly socialised to tolerate central control. In this regard, distance and remoteness can be thought of as indicators that cultural penetration by the central state is lacking".

Yet, it is not just violent internal actors who find Africa’s border zones to be political arenas of easy operability. Agents originating from outside of the borderland are also attracted to these cross-border micro-regions. As borderlands are often strategically situated within wider spheres of regional political and military state dynamics, they can provide opportunities for neighbouring states to further certain political agendas. At a very basic level, this includes governments acting according to different standards and practices in neighbouring borderlands than their own, as well as often not hesitating to intervene in such zones to secure their own borders. Indeed, the borderland represents a space where outside states can fund, strategically support, or even create, non-state proxies to act on their behalf, carrying-out activities that would be deemed unpalatable and unacceptable by their own population or wider international community.

Africa’s borderlands, then, are often not isolated peripheries, but rather part of wider interconnected political systems. An extremely timely example is North Africa’s coastal borderland – and in particular certain ports on the Libyan-Mediterranean border, and Tunisian-Mediterranean border,
for example. This coastal borderland is part of a wider politically interconnected migration system that involves various sub-Saharan states (notably Nigeria, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia), North African states (notably Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt), the Mediterranean Sea, and numerous southern European states (notably Spain, Malta, and Italy). Fuelled by harsh living conditions, persecution, and the attraction of opportunities in Europe, thousands of African migrants are increasingly attempting to make the perilous journey from North African points of exit to southern European points of entry. Usually travelling in extremely perilous conditions, this borderland migration route has made the Mediterranean Sea "the world's most dangerous border crossing". In just the first five months of 2015, a minimum of 1,750 migrants had died in the Mediterranean trying to reach Europe.

**The social dimension.** The cultural heterogeneity of these micro-regions, the constant flux of groups migrating in and out of them, and the often tense ethnic environment, can all abet violence under the right conditions. These situations tend to be exacerbated by the lack of security measures and personnel at African borders. There is often a severe weakness – if not absence – of policing on many African state boundaries, thereby at times, for example, allowing for a sudden and uncontrolled movement of volatile populations across borders. As Anderson says, "African states lack the trained personnel, the technology and the financial resources to prevent the unauthorised movement of persons and goods across their frontiers. Movements from one state to another of starving people, ethnic groups threatened with massacre, migrant workers, guerrilla fighters, diamond smugglers, drugs and weapons dealers can threaten the interests of a neighbouring state. International tension results if the conviction grows that more could be done by the 'exporting' state to control the problem, and that this neglect is wilful".

Particularly common flashpoints include tensions between the professed autochthonous population and liminal transborder minority groups such as nomads, economic migrants, religious minorities, and refugees. Borderlands also tend to draw ex-militants, both those that have been demobilised and those that have not. A common occurrence amongst

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these former combatants is a social identity dependent on their status as fighters. In essence, their loyalties are fluid and liminal, and as such, they represent an easy and cheap mobilisation force for rebel groups. This is even more so the case because of their long-standing horizontal ties with ‘fellow men in arms’.36 Marielle Debos argues that these pools of fighters have to be understood in light of situations of ‘no war, no peace’. "Between two wars, combatants may transform into road bandits or, more often, live as farmers or cattle herders with relatives or kinsmen – especially if they belong to an ethnic group which straddles the border".37 But when the continuum shifts more towards the violent end of the spectrum in the borderland, they can be relatively easily lured into rebellion. Such transnational fighters have been a common phenomena in many of Africa’s most violent and ungoverned borderlands, and as such have had a significant impact on the connected conflicts in North African regions such as Mali-Algeria-Niger (where violent groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb operate), and sub-Saharan regions such as the Mano River basin of Guinea-Sierra Leone-Liberia.

Additionally, it is often the case that borderland societies have to take the law into their own hands, owing to the lack of state judicial services and absence of official routes through which to pursue justice. Crimes of revenge in South Africa, for example, are disproportionately found in the country’s margins, where effective state justice channels are lacking.38 According to Holly E. Porter, writing on the marginalised northern Ugandan area, "On the periphery, social harmony is not protected and ensured by an efficient formal judicial system with moral authority. In some cases, the pursuit of social harmony manifests as mob violence, organised revenge, collective killing, or summary execution".39 However it is not merely the absence of an effective state justice system, but also a distrust of state officials that encourages borderlanders to operate outside of official channels. As expanded upon by Porter, "Because central state authority in northern Uganda has been relatively weak, broadly distrust-

38 Mario Kramer, "Dynamics of Violence in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa: Relations Between Centre and Periphery" (paper presented at the Annual Graduate Student Conference on Order, Conflict and Violence, New Haven, 2006), 19.
ed and service provision low, it is not surprising that local solutions would be used if not preferred to other more formal systems of justice". In essence, the specific social characteristics of borderlands – the often-times volatile interethnic relationships, malleable identities, residents capable of strategically adjusting their personas to different political and economic contexts – helps to shape the nature of conflict in these zones.

**The economic dimension.** Not only can borderlands be sites of interesting political and cultural conflict dynamics, but they can also serve as the space in which transborder trading practices become oriented towards the war economies that sustain insurgencies. Indeed, the powder keg tendency of some borderlands has a strong economic dimension, and it could perhaps be said that this starts with the distinctive profit opportunities available to borderlanders.

Due to issues of proximity to the border and connections to those on the other side, borderlanders tend to have a closer relationship with transnational commerce than heartlanders. The Mandingo community of West Africa, for instance, is an example of a group that fundamentally revolves around participation in regional, if not international, trade. Their position is greatly aided by the trump card held in local knowledge of the area in and around the state line, allowing them to economically navigate the cross-border micro-region to a degree unmatched by others.

This strong investment in the economic life of the borderland makes state endeavours at interference – such as attempts at clamping-down on border crossings, monitoring border markets and their customers, or even pursuing transnational crime lords – that much more impracticable. As Gregor Dobler and Wolfgang Zeller note, "state interventions in borderlands are often not very successful. Smugglers look for different routes; traders integrate customs’ officials into their patronage networks; activities are relocated". A large part of the impenetrability of the borderland economy relates to issues of social justice, and the fact that an intrusion into this economic system can represent far more than merely a disruption of business activity, but an interference into the borderlanders’ way of life. As David Coplan explains, "smuggling, which often enough takes on an open and festive atmosphere at African borders, is after all only a crime against

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40 Porter, "Justice and Rape on the Periphery," 86.
the state, and a response to taxation for which no services are provided in return".  

This attitude consequently facilitates risky and daring economic ventures. Parallel to how the specific social environment of borderlands can be luring for violent-prone actors, the economic environment can be attractive to commercial actors who prefer relatively ungoverned and lawless operating environments. One part of their enticing nature are what are called ‘edge effects’, namely "the radical contrasts and discontinuities experienced by citizens on either side of a border". Common examples include official development assistance (when aid is delivered to only one side of the border), legal frameworks (differing licenses between the two states of the borderland, pertaining to commerce, for example), and international intervention (variations in DDR payments, creating incentives for soldiers to demobilise on whichever side of the border is more profitable).

Conflict entrepreneurs in borderlands are skilled at spotting such edge effects and adjusting their activities so as to best extrapolate the benefits. And they have been helped along in this regard by inadequate responses by national and international actors. The UN’s involvement in the regional conflict in West Africa was particularly illustrative in this respect. Due to different levels of cash payments offered to ex-combatants in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, the UN effectively created an incentive scheme for fighters to attempt demobilisation in both states. When a domestic certification scheme for diamonds was introduced into Sierra Leone, the result was simply a reversal of the direction of diamond flows to Liberia.

Due to all of the above factors, then, borderlands can be ideal spaces for war economies to flourish. The militarisation of their cross-border trade systems can provide the funding and sustenance for military activities. The slide from peaceful transnational financial practices, to full-fledged war economy, is quite a slippery one in numerous African borderlands. It is easy for these economies to become involved in organised crime, terrorist systems, and of course rebel activities. A large part of the reason for this is the degree to which civilian economies can become fundamentally intertwined with war economies in a borderland, as explained by Zeller: "In a zone of protracted conflict like Sugango [the bor-

derland of Sudan, Uganda, and Congo], this war economy is not insulated or separate from the wider ‘civilian’ economy. Resources not only move among an inner core of active members of armed groups, but also along transnational networks of trade and trafficking that reach around the globe.45 When this happens, the border can come to represent a strategic resource in itself, where conflict entrepreneurs vie with others to have a stake in the opportunities it offers. Diana Klein explains this development in the following:

Cross-border licit or illicit trade can resource warring parties, in particular if one party controls parts of it. If the border crossing generates a separate income and the ‘border’ element of the trade becomes an economic activity in itself, whether smuggling, customs levied by armed border guards, employing additional security, drivers, or porters; this can feed into a cycle of usually low level, but persistent violence: enough to maintain the conflict status quo and the nature of border crossing, but not to disrupt the trade.46

It is important to recognise that the type of economic activity – informal, hidden, parallel, underground, and so on – that can transpire in such environments is not necessarily done clandestinely, but rather usually in connivance with particular state agents in the borderland. It is often local borderlanders who are vital to conflict entrepreneurs in this respect: they can provide them with the ‘overworld’ contacts that are necessary to gain access to operating in the transnational economic ‘underworld’.47 Understanding the economic dynamics of borderlands undoubtedly can tell us a great deal about how conflicts in these zones are sustained.

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While African borders and borderlands may be peripheral if understood in a state-centric spatial sense, they are by no means marginal zones in terms of consisting of powerful and influential political, social, and economic networks. A significant number of border zones throughout the continent also have a serious conflict element to them – and thus far conflict responses have tended to be lacklustre, to say the
least. What clearly needs to be addressed in all too many cases are the deeper structural problems of the borderland: the governance shortfalls and political marginalisation; the societal networks of unemployed young men or non-demobilised/non-reintegrated former combatants; and the economic cross-border systems that have come to revolve around war economies. The networks of the borderland need to be reclaimed and ultimately reoriented towards more peaceful purposes. Borders and the borderlands around them have to be transformed from sources of insecurity to spaces of security.

There are some emerging examples of this being done. The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, for example, initiated a ‘Trading for Peace’ scheme at several borderland points along the Congo–Uganda border, with the aim of encouraging more benign cross-border trade practices. Of course, some might argue that borderlanders will inherently resist such approaches, given their tendency to pursue state-evading practices. But a reduction in the militarisation of the borderland does not have to equate to an increased state presence. Rather, a reorientation of the borderland towards the more peaceful end of the spectrum should simply coincide with a better state presence.
Recommended reading:


Simala, Kenneth I., and Maurice Amutabi. "Small Arms, Cattle Raiding, and Borderlands: The Ilemi Triangle." In Illicit Flows


Internet resources


Formation and development of state borders in the region: factors and periods

State borders in Australia and Oceania have a pronounced specificity that is basically a reflection of the natural and historic features of the region. The most important of these features is the highly differentiated island structure of the region. Most of its area is the sea and ocean waters around mainland Australia and the more than ten thousand islands of Oceania.\(^1\) Isolation from other parts of the world and the adverse environmental conditions for human of a large proportion of territory in the region (the desert and semi-desert landscapes of central Australia, the poor soil of coral islands and a high risk for them tsunami and typhoons) are the reasons for its relatively late settlement. Begun around forty thousand years ago, this process was primarily completed (although many islands remained uninhabited) only around 1200 AD.

This comparatively late human exploration of Australia and Oceania led to the delay of the emergence of political processes in the region. Pre-state political entities (complex chiefdoms) began to emerge in the region no earlier than the

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\(^1\) The total land area of the region – nearly 9 million sq. km.
As for the states, their existence in Australia and Oceania can only be argued for at the end of the eighteenth century. The formation of the first states was closely associated with the arrival of Europeans to the region.

The migrations of Europeans and their economic, cultural, religious, military and political activity influenced the development of regional states in two main ways. First, a characteristic of the settlement colonies (Australia, New Zealand, and a number of other territories), was the direct transfer of social and political (including government) institutions, norms and values of the metropolitan powers (England, France, and USA). Second, most countries in Oceania experienced, the transformation of local pre-state (or early-state) institutions and traditions into political systems and cultures of a mixed type, combining varying proportions of indigenous and western elements. At the same time, regardless of the way of the European (and, more widely, Western) influence, this was accompanied by the establishment of the political dependence of these territories in the region on the extra-regional powers.

The colonial period in the history of Australia and Oceania generally lasted from the end of eighteenth to the middle of the twentieth century. Prior to the beginning of the twentieth century the most potent and the largest of the powers in the region was Great Britain, whose colonies included those of Australia and New Zealand. In the second half of the nineteenth century colonies in the region were also established by France and Germany. In the first half of the twentieth century large areas in the region of Australia and Oceania came under the control of new colonial powers like Japan and especially the United States. It was in the period from the end of eighteenth to the middle of the twentieth century when, under the influence of the colonial policy by these imperial powers towards their possessions as well as through their mutual relations and conflicts, the general outlines of state borders in the region developed, and persisted largely into the present.

The key factors determining the specific configurations of borders in this period were the physical-geographical differentiation of the region and the military-political interests of the powers. In order to ensure the ease of governance and defense, metropolitan powers sought to control the "natural borders" of their possessions – the coastlines. The greatest difficulty was presented by the Australian continent and the largest islands in the region, New Guinea and the South and

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2 The first complex chiefdoms arose in the Tonga Islands (X – XI centuries), and Hawaii (XIV century). Some researchers consider it possible to carry them to early states.
North Islands of New Zealand. If Australia and New Zealand in the second half of the nineteenth century were put under the exclusive authority of Great Britain, the territory of New Guinea, which had the more inhospitable terrain and climate preventing the "white" development, was in 1884 divided between the three states of the Netherlands, Britain and Germany. The marine borders of colonial possessions remained legally undefined for a long time, with the form of the broad zones of military-political influence and economic use (analogous to terrestrial limes borders) separated by even more extensive inter-imperial limitrophes.

An important milestone in the development of state borders in the region was the First World War, with the multilateral treaties that signaled its cessation laying the foundations for the Versailles-Washington system of international relations. One result of these agreements was the division of the former German possessions, transferred under a League of Nations mandate to Japan (the Caroline, Marianas and Marshall Islands), and to the then British dominions of Australia (German New Guinea and part of the Solomon Islands), and New Zealand (the Nauru Islands and the West Samoa). Another consequence was the delimitation of the maritime borders of many of these colonial possessions and mandated territories. This delimitation was based on both the actual control and previous experience of colonial divisions, leading to the emergence of many astronomical and geometric borders. Finally, in the context of a package of measures to contain the further militarization of the Pacific Ocean and prevent possible military conflicts in the region, the Washington Conference of 1921–1922 asserted the principle of the inviolability of existing borders.

The end of the Second World War led to a new wave of redistribution in colonial possessions. In the second half of the 1940s, under the framework of the newly established UN trusteeship system, the former Japanese mandated territories (the Caroline, Marianas and Marshall Islands) were placed under the control of the United States. Western Samoa came under the trusteeship of New Zealand, Papua and New Guinea (a single administrative unit since 1949) under that of Australia, while Nauru was shared between Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. This change in the states with authority over these island possessions were in some cases accompanied by changes in their maritime borders.

Despite the fact that throughout the colonial period the interests of extra-regional powers were a major factor in the formation and development of Australian and Oceanian borders, this does not mean that non-governmental or public processes in the region had no influence upon them. Officials and diplomats of the metropolitan powers did not ig-
nore the results of the territorial settlement undertaken by the indigenous population, who prior to the arrival of the colonizers had established numerous boundaries delimiting the extents of clan communities, tribes, and especially super-tribal (pre-state) unions, although the latter were generally taken into account in not external, but internal, administrative borders. The most significant role in the genesis of some administrative and national boundaries is the role played by the socio-demographic process that saw the settlement colonies such as Australia and New Zealand. In the nineteenth century, the massive influx of immigrants to these countries from Europe, the gradual, but increasingly rapid and intense, agricultural (primarily sheep breeding) development of new lands, together with the displacement of the native population led to the emergence there the boundaries of frontier type, similar to those in North America during this period. The changing contours of Australian and New Zealand frontiers were reflected not only in the subsequent administrative-territorial division of these countries. For a long time public frontier boundaries largely coincided with the actual limits on the spread of colonial (state) governance in the dominions of Australia and New Zealand by Great Britain.

The beginning of the period of decolonization in the region, which continues into the present, is widely considered to have been in the 1960s. However, for the two leading states of Australia and New Zealand, this process began much earlier. An important step towards this was the getting by these British colonies a dominion status: as the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, and the Dominion of New Zealand in 1907. In 1931, the metropolis provided both dominions with full political independence in internal and external affairs. The early attainment of independence has allowed Australia and New Zealand to become models of state-building for their neighbors in the region and achieve a high degree of direct and indirect influence on their policies and systems of government (including in the border and transborder sphere). This was aided by the gradual transfer of the authority to manage a number of Pacific island territories by Britain to its two former colonies.

For the remaining colonies in the region, the processes of decolonization has largely occurred since 1962. From that year until the beginning of the twenty-first century, the number of independent states in this part of the world has increased by 16. Thus, about 14 territories in the region still have the status of dependencies or colonies (with some form of self-government), demonstrating the extra-regional powers’ preservation of opportunities to influence the regional
border situation. Despite the fact that many of these newly independent states have a very low level of socio-economic development and inefficient state institutions, their appearance contributed to the formation of an intra-regional system of international relations.

One of the issues particularly taken up within this regional system was discussions over the location of state borders, which had not previously been satisfactorily demarcated. Since the 1970s, the new states within the region have managed to conclude with both each other and with adjacent countries a few dozen delimitation agreements. Because of the marine nature of borders in Australia and Oceania (with the exception of the border between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia), the adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 was of great importance for regional limogenesis (Figure 1). This convention of 1982 created a common international legal framework for the completion of the delimitation and demarcation of state borders in the region. However, far from resolving all the issues, it has necessitated further bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts by national governments.

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3 Currently in the region there are colonies and dependent territories of France, the USA and the UK.
The process of officially delineating borders in Australia and Oceania through international agreements is far from complete. The reasons for this are the immaturity and weakness, both in political-administrative and economic terms, of many states in the region, and a lack of interest in the regulation of borders and in stabilizing intra-regional sovereignty among the major external players. Today, national borders in the region retain a largely postcolonial, arbitrary and "superimposed" character, remain incomplete in terms of international and national legal registration. Their discrepancies in many cases to typological features of linear border create the basis for present and, even more, the future disputes and conflicts.

Border disputes and conflicts

During the colonial period, the Australia and Oceania region was the scene of a series of military conflicts, the most important of which, in both scale and duration, was the Pacific War of 1941–1945 between Japan and the Allied Powers. These conflicts affected certain alterations to the geography of borders and especially transborder relations in the region, but intra-regional border contradictions in general played a very minor role in this. The main objects of disagreements between the parties in these conflicts as a rule were located far from the sea and land theaters in which the fighting unfolded. The only genuine border conflicts of the period can be said to be the localized armed clashes between European settlers and indigenous communities over the ownership of territories (especially in Australia and New Zealand). Those lasting from 1843–1872 in New Zealand demanded the extensive deployment of regular British troops and reached such a scale that they are referred to as the two Maori wars.

In the post-colonial era, there has been a steady growth in international disputes over the location and functions of borders in the region. This is not only a natural consequence of the construction of these newly independent states, seeking the clarification and possible expansion of their sovereign rights. An increasingly important factor in the increase in border disputes in Australia and Oceania is the escalating struggle for the biological (fish and seafood) and mineral (hydrocarbons and metal nodules) resources of aquatories and shelves of the region.

Australia, having the longest border in the region, is involved in the largest number of border disputes. So, in 2005, Australia and East Timor agreed to defer for 50 years the question of a disputed section of the border between them in the Timor Sea. There remain outstanding issues with respect to the location of Australian-Indonesian maritime bor-
der that serve as obstacles to the ratification by Indonesia of a border treaty with Australia that was signed in 1997. There is also a further dispute between Indonesia and Australia regarding the maritime area in the vicinity of the Ashmore Reef. In 2004, Australia officially submitted its claim to expand the limits of the continental shelf. According to the submission, filed with the relevant commission of the United Nations, the continental shelf area should be expanded to reach 3.37 million sq. km., which is 30 percent larger than the area within Australia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

The Micronesian state of Palau has engaged in long and as yet inconclusive negotiations on delineation issues with its neighbors, the Philippines and Indonesia. The Marshall Islands and Tokelau both have claims to unincorporated territories of the United States: the first of these claims United States Minor Outlying Island of Wake Island, and the second, Swains Island, which is part of American Samoa. The state of Vanuatu is in dispute with France (or more precisely, with French New Caledonia) regarding Matthew and Hunter Islands. The objects of a dispute between Fiji and Tonga are the Minerva Reefs, and Fijian dissatisfaction having less to do with the claims of Tonga to the reefs themselves, as with Tonga’s efforts to use them as a baseline for the proclamation of Tonga’s EEZ.5

Border disputes in Australia and Oceania are motivated not only by the struggle for the living and non-living resources of the Pacific Ocean, interests in transport corridors, or imputed military-strategic imperatives (military bases, landfills, etc.). There are historical, ethnic, cultural and religious contradictions that also play certain role. Societies in the region are for the most part highly heterogeneous and among the Western, Asian and indigenous parts of the population can exist tensions that come to be expressed, in some cases, in territorial claims. If in Australia and New Zealand the demands of indigenous people for the restoration of their rights to parts of the territory of the country are predominantly implemented through legal mechanisms, for a number of states in the region (the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Papua New Guinea) these ethno-territorial conflicts take the forms of violent and even armed confrontation. Therefore we cannot exclude the possibility that in future the border situation in the region will be complicated by the actions of secessionist movements.

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One particular special kind of border dispute in Australia and Oceania that also possesses the potential to develop into open conflict is disputes over the functioning of borders. The main issue here is the inability (or unwillingness) of the authorities of some countries in the region, as well as extra-regional countries such as Indonesia, to manage migration flows across their borders, which are generally heading in the direction of Australia and New Zealand. This issue, which is closely associated with a number of so-called non-traditional security threats (smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking, terrorism), is particularly acute for Australia, pushing its government to not only to tighten its border policy, but also to apply various pressures on some of the source countries for this migration. In turn, barrierisation of borders of the leading countries in the region and their accompanying transborder policy are causing growing discontent among the populations and political elites of its more underdeveloped neighbors.

The development of transborder relations in the region

The vast sea spaces have long served as the most significant and formidable obstacles to any kind of contact of residents of Australia and Oceania. Apart from rare episodes of mass resettlement, migration, along with trade, cultural and political interactions during the pre-colonial era had occurred mainly within individual archipelagos. Only the introduction in the eighteenth century of European maritime engineering and technology to the region created the prerequisites for a significant surge in transborder relations.

However, the greatest development during the colonial period have received extra-regional relations of countries of the region with Britain, France and later Germany. The colonies exported raw materials (mainly agricultural products) in huge volumes to the metropolitan powers, while in the opposite direction went a flow of immigrants (mainly from England). In the second half of the nineteenth century the region also started to build migration and trade relations with the United States and East Asia. Independence for Australia and New Zealand contributed to the United States gradually becoming their main economic partner. However, from the 1970s the geographical structure of transborder relations for Australia, New Zealand and other countries in the region began to change again. The role of leading importer of raw materials from Australia and Oceania, as well as the key investors in a number of sectors of the regional economy, shifted to Asian countries, first Japan, and from the 2000s China and India. At the same time this significantly increased the influx of Asian immigrants to the region.
Decolonization, weakening the political dependence of the region on external powers, created the conditions for the strengthening of relations of the region’s countries with one another. Australia and New Zealand took advantage of this opportunity from the beginning, and already by 1944 had concluded an agreement on mutual economic cooperation. Cooperation between the two was encouraged by many factors – geographic proximity, similarity of the historical and ethno-cultural characteristics of the two societies and similar political systems imbued with the traditions of Anglo-Saxon democracy. There had been a particularly rapid growth in the volume and intensity of Australia and New Zealand’s transborder relations, after the UK, upon entering into the EEC in 1973, had restricted both countries access to its market. Currently, Australia and New Zealand are among the most important economic partners for each other.

Modern Australia-New Zealand transborder relations cover a very wide range of spheres. Between the two countries there is an active exchange of goods and services produced by all major sectors (agriculture, mining and manufacturing industries, the banking sector) of their highly diversified economies. Mutual investment relations have developed successfully. Bilateral migrations, both economic and socio-cultural, are very common. The two countries are linked by a common information space. Many Australian and New Zealand political and social organizations maintain stable contacts with each other. In terms of intensity and complexity, transborder relations of Australia and New Zealand remind one of the relations existing between countries within the EU.

The gains of other countries in the region (often called "the Pacific island countries") in the development of intra-regional transborder relations are much more modest. State weakness and the similar specialization (monoculture farming) of their economies, promotes more competition than cooperation, and along with mass unemployment, a low standard of living, the lack of adequate infrastructure and institutional conditions make them largely unattractive for reciprocal ties. In their transborder relations, Pacific island countries are usually not focused on each other, but on other, richer and more dynamic, societies. In the post-colonial period, for many of them the centers of attraction have become the regional leaders of Australia and New Zealand.

The transborder relations of the Pacific island countries with Australia and New Zealand are characterized by a distinct asymmetry. This is due to the sharp inequality of natural and social potential within the two sub-regions and the stadial gap in their historical development. The Pacific island countries supply Australia and New Zealand with some products stemming from agriculture, fishing and tradition-
al handicrafts. In the same direction heads a growing flow of migrants, who want to find in the leading countries of the region work, permanent residence and, where possible, citizenship. In turn, from Australia and New Zealand the island countries receive modern industrial, manufacturing and consumer goods, as well as most types of food. Moreover, the latter are constant recipients of various types of assistance (financial, technological, human resources, information) that runs not only through government channels, but also from private and public organizations. Have persisted for decades, this unequal and unbalanced transborder interaction of Australia and New Zealand with the Pacific island countries has reinforced their dependency and peripheral position in the region.

A similar asymmetrical character is inherent in the transborder relations of the Pacific island countries with the US and France, whose economic and migration ties to Oceania stretch far beyond their own dependent territories. The most important transborder partners for developing countries in the region also include Japan, and from the 2000s, China. Despite the disparity in their relations with large societies, the Pacific island countries are, as a rule, interested in having the number and activity of such partners in the region increase. Through multi-vector ties with mutually competing large and rich countries, the island states can to a certain extent counterbalance and mitigate its foreign dependence.

Due to the small size and low level of development of Pacific island countries, transborder relations are often more important to them than internal ties. Intense, diverse and poorly managed relationships with the outside world are transforming local communities. As noted, in particular, by Crocombe, the modern residents of the islands of Oceania are characterized by so-called multiple identities. One of the manifestations of such multiple identities is double and even triple citizenship, common, for example, among the people of Samoa, Tonga and Fiji. Another aspect of the same phenomenon is the possession of two or more languages; in addition to the local (tribal) language many islanders actively use English or French. Finally, the region has a very colorful religious and confessional structure, within which interact and mingle indigenous beliefs with various currents of Christianity, Islam and Buddhism, resulting in the emergence and development of synthetic cults. These multiple identities held

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by the populations of the Pacific island countries problematize the prospects of their consolidating as nation-states.

In the second half of the twentieth century, the development of transborder relations created the prerequisites for the formation of transborder regions in Australia and Oceania. The first such region was formed by Australia and New Zealand, already confirmed by the Free Trade Agreement of 1965, which eliminated tariffs on 80% of bilateral trade. In 1983, the two states took the next step by signing a new agreement, allowing them to create a full-fledged free trade area (ANZCERTA) by 1990.7

Formed with the active support of governments, the high level of integration and the institutionalization of the transborder region between Australia and New Zealand has served as a model for other similar formations in this part of the globe. In 1971, following an Australian initiative, the region's countries established the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).8 In 2001, during a PIF summit, the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) and the Pacific Island States Trade Agreement (PICTA) were signed. PIF and these agreements confirmed the priority of developing multilateral economic cooperation (and its integration in the form of a free trade area in the future), but the practical results stemming from such plans remains minimal. Unlike ANZCERTA, based on objective processes of regionalization, PIF, PACER, and PICTA are rather the region-building projects, attempts to establish and spatially organize transborder relations "from above". The main obstacles to the successful implementation of these projects are the low potential of mutual cooperation among the Pacific Island States and the asymmetry of their relations with the leaders of transborder integration in the region, Australia and New Zealand.

Features of border and transborder policies of countries in the region

The deep inequality between the two sub-regions of Australia and Oceania, including the degree of maturity of state institutions, fully manifests itself in the field of border and transborder policies. Australia and New Zealand possess highly specialized and extensive border systems agencies (customs, immigration, border guard and others), whose work is well coordinated. In global rankings of border man-

8 Until 2000 PIF was called the South Pacific forum. Nowadays members of this organization are 16 states.
agement efficiency, both countries regularly receive very high marks, and the level of corruption in this sphere is estimated to be insignificant.9

This situation is the result of not only the general political systems in Australia and New Zealand and the borrowing of best practices from states in Europe and North America, but also the long history of border policies in these countries. For example, Australia’s own border policy (initially a migration policy) began to develop in the mid-nineteenth century. At the initial stage this policy was characterized by a high degree of openness, with a vast, developing continent in dire need of an influx of labor. However, later, with the settlement of the country, the growth of ethnic tensions and the introduction of self-government, the entry of immigrants was gradually restricted. Shortly after the receiving a dominion status, in 1902 the Australian government adopted a policy restricting Asian migration (“white Australia”). This policy was pursued until the early 1970s, when, with decreasing flows from Europe and North America, the barriers to entry of non-European migrants have been significantly reduced. Currently, the regulation of temporary and permanent migration to Australia is highly selective, focused not on ethnicity but rather on professional and technical criteria and security requirements. The most liberal regime for crossing the border is provided by Australia for people from the Pacific island countries, for political rather than economic objectives. The migration policy in New Zealand has in many respects a similar history and has developed along similar lines.

In contrast to Australia and New Zealand, the migration and other border policies of the Pacific island countries are still in their infancy. Their management of national borders and transborder relations are usually devoid of conceptual and organizational unity, very dependent on the political situation and deeply corrupt. Although many of the small island countries in the region seem to have very open borders,10 this openness has little resemblance to the liberal border policies of developed countries. Rather, it stems more from legal disorder and administrative neglect, which creates conditions for a broad informality and the criminalization of transborder processes. Therefore, in recent decades, the Australia and Oceania region became a place in which the rapid development of international criminal networks, specializing in the production and trafficking of drugs, hu-

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10 Six of these countries (Vanuatu, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, and Tonga) have official offshore status.
man trafficking, smuggling of rare animals, financial fraud, and so forth, was occurring.

The inefficiency in, or even the failure of, the border policies of the Pacific island states have resulted in the emergence of the specific transborder policy in the region. In Australia and Oceania, attempts at the joint or inter-governmental management of transborder social and economic relations were taken in the 1960s, and had increased dramatically by the 2000s. Formally they were carried out through decisions made by multilateral consensus within the framework of regional intergovernmental institutions. However, the actual leading role in designing and implementing regional transborder policy is played by Australia and New Zealand, who largely provide the budget of PIF and are also donors to many countries in Oceania. From 2000, following a decision at a PIF summit, Australia and New Zealand were entitled to introduce their troops into the territory of other Member States in order to restore order. It is obvious that this provides Australia and New Zealand with opportunities to manage regional transborder flows in their national interests. At the same time, the active transborder policies of these two countries are closely linked to the growing migration pressures on their borders and new threats to international security that have been steadily increasing since the beginning of the twenty-first century in the Asia-Pacific as well as the rest of the world.
Recommended reading:


Internet resources:


The peculiarities of national borders in the Arctic and Antarctic

The Arctic and Antarctica are areas of the Earth located around the perimeter of its extreme points, that is, the North and South poles respectively. The Arctic is defined as an ice-covered area of the Arctic Ocean with the islands and the adjacent parts of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The Arctic region also comprises the northern part of Eurasia and North America within the Arctic Circle (66°33'N). The area of the Arctic is approximately 21 million sq. km (but taking into account the climatic features as well as outlining the southern border of the Arctic around the northern borders of tundra, its area reaches 27 million sq. km).\(^1\)

The geographical boundaries of Antarctic, at the extreme south of the earth, extend up to as far as 48°60'S (up to the line of the Antarctic Convergence), reaching an area of 52 million sq. km. The territory consists of the continent of Antarctica (with an area of more than 14 million sq. km) and the adjacent islands and parts of the Southern Ocean.

At first glance, the territory of both the Arctic and the Antarctic seems to be unsuitable for economic activities due

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to the harsh climatic conditions. However, climate change, a unique natural landscape, and the availability of natural resources will make the Polar Regions into objects of geopolitical clashes. Consequently, issues regarding their division into spheres of influence will emerge and may lead to serious confrontation in the future. The states in geographical proximity to the Polar Regions are obvious claimants of the territories in the Arctic and Antarctic zones, but non-regional actors are also demonstrating increasing interests in these regions.

Many countries consider the polar sectors of our planet as potential deposits for their future economic development, with the great powers not hiding their ambitions with regard to these regions, aiming to determine the area falling within their sphere of interest, and to embody them in particular political borders.

The problem of formation of the boundaries in the Arctic and Antarctic zones is obviously associated with the climatic features of these regions, as well as their relatively recent incorporation within international relations. For historical and political reasons, the status of the polar areas is still not absolutely defined, although the discussions about the boundaries in the Arctic are likely to be rather heated. According to experts, the Arctic is a unique area which contains enormous reserves of hydrocarbons. The data of the US Geological Survey (USGS) indicates that there are 90 billion barrels of oil, 47.3 trillion m³ of gas, and 44 billion barrels of gas condensate. Overall, the Arctic holds about 13% of global oil reserves and up to 30% of gas deposits. Arctic nations have different visions regarding their national borders and spheres of influence in the Arctic; many of these countries, oriented to protect their national interests, seek to do so by utilizing the authority of influential international organizations such as NATO or the European Union.

The Antarctic region, which has the most extreme climatic conditions on earth, is subject to the particular scrutiny of the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Chile, and Russia. Additionally, there are dozens of states that display great interest in the scientific study of Antarctica, including such economic giants as China, Japan, and India. Despite the fact that, according to the Madrid Protocol of the Antarctic Treaty, mining in Antarctica is prohibited, exploration for natural resources on the sixth continent is allowed on the grounds of scientific research. The Antarctic continental and shelf zones include deposits of iron ore, gold, copper, chromium, nickel, platinum.

Chapter 3.8 State borders in the Arctic and Antarctic

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and other minerals. Many states are hunting krill, fish and crabs in Antarctic waters. The ready availability of natural resources in the Antarctic is likely to influence both the great powers and other actors of international relations.

The process of development of these Polar Regions shows the necessity of defining the status of the Arctic region under international law. The trips of seafarers, research expeditions, exploration of the natural environment and opportunities for economic activity in the harsh conditions of the Far North have led to the development of Arctic, bringing the question of legal rights of the particular state for the developed lands. At present, most of the known areas of the Arctic are subject to the sovereignty of a state bordering the Arctic Ocean.

The territories of five states, Russia, USA, Canada, Denmark and Norway, are adjacent to the Arctic. These countries have made the greatest contribution to the research and development of the region. However, the term "Arctic states" also refers to the group of eight ‘circumpolar states’, whose territory crosses the Arctic Circle. These include Finland, Iceland and Sweden in addition to the states already mentioned. This is the format that was adopted, for example, in the text of the Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic environment (1991), which formulated a strategy for preserving the Arctic environment, as well as in the Homeland Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Region Policy (2009).

Russia is second to none in its interest in the development of Arctic resources as well as its desire for a resolution of territorial disputes, given its length of Arctic coast is more than 60% of the entire extent of Arctic coastline (22,600 km) and that the Northern Sea Route is one the most important transport communications for Russian national interests.

While national Arctic zones have been developed throughout the twentieth century, the final demarcation of these zones has not yet been completed. In addition, not all states approve the special acts promulgated regarding the status of these Arctic zones.

Captain Cook’s voyages (1773–1774), as well as the discovery of the coast of Antarctica by the expedition of Bellingshausen and Lazarev (1820), anticipated the process by which the Antarctic was divided up into spheres of influence. It was Great Britain which became the first state to make an attempt to seize territories in the South Polar Region after it expelled Argentina from the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. According to the royal decree of March 28, 1917, the Gov-

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ernor of the Falkland Islands controlled all the land to the South Pole located south of the 50th parallel between 20 and 50° west longitude and the adjacent sector, bounded by 58th parallel and by 80° west longitude on the west.4

In an effort to expand its sphere of influence in the Southern Hemisphere, the United Kingdom "shared" its Antarctic Territory with its dominions. On July 30, 1923, Great Britain announced the transfer of the rights to the Ross Dependency to New Zealand, and 10 years later was published "Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act", under which Canberra attained part of East Antarctica, that between 45° and 160° east longitude to the south of the 60th parallel, excluding Adélie Land (136–142° east longitude).

At the turn of nineteenth and twentieth centuries hundreds of hunters and whalers from many countries had rushed into Antarctic waters. The different governments continually strived to restrict the actions of its competitors (especially in the study of Antarctica and the Antarctic territories) by declaring their right to certain areas of the Antarctic. Following the British territorial claims to Antarctica France announced its positions in 1924 when it transferred the archipelago of Kerguelen, the Crozet Islands, the islands of Saint-Paul and Amsterdam and Adélie Land to the control of the governor general of Madagascar. In April 1, 1938 France established its own Antarctic sector (between 136 and 142° east longitude south of the 60th parallel). Subsequently, there followed proclamations of Antarctic sectors by Norway (1939), Chile (1940), and Argentina (1943).

Since the expedition of Nobu Shirase in 1911–1912 the Empire of Japan claimed its own Antarctic zone. In 1939 Tokyo formally declared its claim to the space between the Ross and Falkland sectors, but after defeat in World War II and the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951), Japan renounced "all claim to any right or title or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise".5

Germany also had had a strong interest in the Antarctic, although according to the Treaty of Versailles, it was deprived of any rights to the Antarctic area which had been discovered and investigated by Wilhelm Filchner’s expedition in 1911–1912. In August 12, 1939, Germany proclaimed the emergence of a "German Antarctic Sector" between 4°50’ and 16°30’ east longitude (New Swabia), near the Norwegian

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sector of Bouvet. The contemporary German government has still not formally renounced its rights to Antarctic Territory.⁶

Territorial claims in Antarctica led to serious confrontation between states because of the overlapping nature of these sectoral interests. Prior to the signing of the Antarctic Treaty (1959), diplomatic conflicts among countries applying for various Antarctic sectors occurred frequently and even brought about serious clashes. In 1948, the United States initiated informal negotiations on the question of the Antarctic, which was attended only by those countries which had put forward a claim to Antarctic territory. Negotiations impacted on the appearance of the Memorandum on the regime for Antarctica, sponsored by the Soviet Union. Moscow did not agree that the problems of a regime for the Antarctic could be solved without its involvement. It was clear that the issue of spheres of influence and the Antarctic’s borders would require legal resolution.

Territorial disputes and conflicts

The Arctic is becoming a battlefield for the different participants in the struggle (both states, organizations), who possess contradictory positions. The Arctic Powers are intensively exploring different parts of the region and have put forward their territorial claims, while other participants offer their own visions for the development of the North’s rich resources.

The interests of many states in the Arctic as well as their ideas about the boundaries of the continental shelf and maritime borders do not coincide. In addition, there has been a clear trend towards a new wave of militarization in the region because of the fight for undiscovered reserves of hydrocarbons, the use of promising shipping routes (such as the Northern Sea Route) and Trans-Arctic air transportation. The Arctic powers systematically demonstrate their presence by conducting military exercises and patrolling Arctic waters. In May 2010 Canada and Denmark concluded a memorandum on military cooperation in the Arctic.⁷

The Arctic region has a particular strategic importance for those powers possessing a nuclear submarine fleet. For instance, the deployment of ballistic missile systems in the north-east of the Barents Sea means that most of the strategic objectives in the world can be hit, because from there lies

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the shortest path for the ballistic missiles to reach any hemisphere.

In the case of an exacerbation of the struggle for Arctic resources, the eventual scenario proposed by James Holmes may occur. According to Holmes, the situation in the Arctic will come to resemble the problems in the East China Sea, in which great powers, flaunting their long-range precision-guided weapons, will come to endlessly plow through sea spaces. In September 19, 2007, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Stig Moeller, suggested that the Arctic powers should hold talks on delimiting a terra nullius in the Arctic zone as well as working out a way to settle territorial disputes.

Nowadays, the Arctic can be conventionally divided into three territories which differ in their legal status: the mainland zone of the Arctic states, and their adjacent internal marine waters, the territorial sea as well as land and islands included in the polar sector; the exclusive economic zones and continental shelf; and the open sea and seabed. The exacerbation of international competition over control of the Arctic is driven in particular by the issue of the continental shelf, with the delimitation of maritime boundaries over the shelf bringing to a head the issue of the international legal registration of territorial claims in the Arctic region.

The Arctic shelf, the borders of which extend to the North Pole, does not currently belong to any state and is controlled by the International Seabed Authority in Kingston (Jamaica). According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), coastal states have the right to control the continental shelf, comprising the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

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9 Terra nullius is a Latin term that means land belonging to no one or no man’s land. In international law, a territory which has never been subject to the sovereignty of any state. Refer. to "Terra Nullius law and legal definition," accessed May 18, 2015, http://definitions.uslegal.com/t/terra-nullius/
According to Article 76 of the Convention, no country has the right to establish control over the Arctic, but states which have access to the Arctic Ocean may declare an area extending 200 nautical miles from the coast as their exclusive economic zone, which, in turn, can be extended for another 150 miles if the country proves that the Arctic shelf is an extension of its land territory.

There are two basic principles which can be implemented by the states which seek to divide the Arctic shelf and Arctic maritime spaces: the principle of a median line and a sectoral principle. The first one assumes that the division of territories should be based on the equidistance of the boundary line from the shoreline (or base points of the coastline) of the neighboring state. This principle is more advantageous for Canada, Denmark and Norway.

According to the sectoral principle, the North Pole is considered the reference point from which straight lines are drawn down along the longitudes. This method is beneficial for Russia and the United States (in this case, their zones of influence extend to the North Pole, expanding almost three times), but is disadvantageous for Denmark and Canada. At the same time, the Convention on the Law of the Sea does not regulate this method of utilizing dividing lines between neighboring countries. It is limited to guidance on mutual consent and the principle of justice. Recently, the Arctic shelf, and in particular the resource-rich Lomonosov Ridge, has been claimed by five states - Russia, Norway, Denmark, Canada and the United States.

At the same time, the problem of maritime borders between Denmark (Greenland), Canada and Russia remains unresolved. Copenhagen claims 35% of the territory in the zone of interests of Canada. In particular, there is Denmark’s claim to the Arctic territories between Greenland and the coastal islands, which Canada considers to be part of the territory of the province of Nunavut. An acute conflict between the two parties took place because of the small (approximately the size of 1.3 sq. km) uninhabited island of Hans, located near Greenland.

It is obvious that resources are a major factor in determining controversial issues related to borders in the Arctic region. On the other hand, the problem of Arctic exploration goes far beyond territorial disputes, the division of territories and the intersection of spheres of influence, referring

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to a whole range of regional issues, including cross-border cooperation.\textsuperscript{12}

Territorial disputes in Antarctic have persisted after the Second World War. They found reflection in the different geographical names of places (e.g. the Antarctic Peninsula had different appellations on British, Argentine and Chilean maps until 1964) and territorial claims which would give rise to serious confrontation. In 1949, the United Kingdom, Argentina and Chile signed an agreement not to allow their military vessels to enter Antarctic waters south of 60° south latitude during the period of summer Antarctic season. This agreement was prolonged annually until 1957. At the same time, the issue of the status of the Antarctic territories remained unresolved until the end of the 1950’s. The first informal negotiations were held in Washington, where the parties with interests in the South Pole participated. In December 1, 1959, the Antarctic Treaty was signed, which remains the basis of efforts to resolve problems related to the status of the Antarctic territories.

The Antarctic Treaty was the first international agreement that sought to provide a regime for the South Polar region. The preamble to the Agreement stated that, in the interests of all mankind, Antarctica shall forever be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord. For these purposes, there shall be prohibited, inter alia, any military measures, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons in Antarctica (Article 1 of the Treaty).\textsuperscript{13} At present, the Antarctic Treaty has 19 signatory countries.

Territorial claims to the Antarctic, according to the Article 4, shall not be asserted while the Treaty is in force. Nevertheless, the Agreement does not eliminate the problem of the territorial ambitions of the seven states that asserted claims to a number of areas in the Antarctic, although the Treaty bans the possible extension of sovereign rights over these lands (look at the Table 1).

A regime of demilitarized and neutralized territory has been established in the Antarctic through this Treaty. Antarctica under this Agreement is the territory of this international regime (according to the principle of res communis\textsuperscript{14}),


\textsuperscript{14} Res communis – is a Latin word that means the common heritage of all humankind, not subject to the appropriation by or sovereignty Refer.
Table 1. The territorial disputes in the Antarctic (2014).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Treaty claimants</th>
<th>Reserved claimants</th>
<th>Non-claimants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia, Argentina, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Norway, France, Chile</td>
<td>Peru, Soviet Union/Russia, the United States, South Africa</td>
<td>Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Germany, India, Italy People Republic of China, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, Uruguay, Czech Republic, Sweden, Ecuador, Republic of Korea, Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


i.e., the Treaty does not recognize the sovereignty of any state on any part of the Antarctic. Areas south of 60° south latitude are included under the Antarctic Treaty. The agreement also provides the principle of freedom of scientific investigation to Antarctica, and this applies to any state, regardless of participation in the Treaty.

At the same time, those countries that retain territorial interests in the Antarctic have attempted to use different mechanisms to strengthen their position in the region. Based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea a number of the states (Argentina, Australia) have sought to gain sovereign rights over areas of the Antarctic continental shelf.

The problem of territorial claims in the Antarctic escalated in May 2012 after the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf adopted Australia’s request for the possibility of expanding its seabed (including the island of Kerguelen Plateau). The United Kingdom, in turn, began to insist on expanding its own seafloor in the South Atlantic Ocean. However, these precedents, leading to the transformation of international waters into exclusive economic zones, are contrary to the Antarctic Treaty, and are capable of creating the conditions for confrontation, particularly in ice-free areas.

The United Kingdom and two South American states, Chile and Argentina, claim their own Antarctic sectors. In addition, the United Kingdom monitors the disputed Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, which became an apple of discord and led to the war.

between Great Britain and Argentina in 1982. These three states also contest the Drake Passage, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, viewing islands to the south of the Passage as potential sites for naval bases in the event of armed clashes.

There are other ways for these states to indicate their interest. Antarctica is defined as a Special Conservation Area and a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science, according to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991). Since those states participating in the peaceful exploration of Antarctica take responsibility for the comprehensive protection of the environment, they have an opportunity to establish Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPA). Those states with territorial claims to the Antarctic have established 68% of these ASPAs. Australia has eleven ASPAs, New Zealand twelve, the United Kingdom thirteen, Chile eight, France two, Argentina three and Norway just the one. Another factor that may lead to violent conflict in the future is the establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs) in the Southern Ocean. This part of the World Ocean is under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 1980.

Arrangements over these Polar Regions have been made as disputes occur. The melting of the Arctic ice leads to the problem of demarcating spheres of influence in accordance with the Convention on the Law of the Sea (the open water of the Arctic Ocean, freed from the ice, falls under the articles of the Convention), while the urgent problem in relation to the Antarctic is the eventual division of the continent; this may involve more claimants in the future. As a matter of fact, recognition of the Arctic and Antarctic areas as terra nullius can lead to unpredictable consequences.

Transborder relations

The spaces of the Polar Regions, due to the harsh climate and difficult geography, have been on the periphery of the international processes for a long time. It was only

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in the twentieth century that the importance of the Arctic and Antarctic increased. They came to be defined as potential resources over which states would struggle, becoming potentially prominent segments of the geo-economic space, the active development of which would radically transform the future of the international transport and logistics infrastructure. It is clear that territorial disputes in the circum-polar regions of the High North and the Extreme South can also become a serious challenge to the contemporary system of international law. On the other hand, rather than acting unilaterally, those powers active in the Polar Regions have tended to develop multilateral mechanisms of international cooperation, which have affected the nature of transborder relations in the Arctic and the Antarctic.

The role of hundreds of different non-governmental organizations, particularly scientific institutions, in studying and developing transborder relations in the Arctic region, is a prominent one. They are engaged in studying features of the continental shelf in the Arctic and its maritime boundaries, environmental problems (focusing on the negative results of human activities in the Arctic and global climate change issues), issues of socio-economic development in the Arctic (including studying aspects of international cooperation in the formation of a strategy for sustainable regional development) as well as military and strategic aspects of international relations in the Arctic (including the possibilities for conflict among the states exploring its natural riches).

Among the famous academic and analytical institutions which study Arctic issues, some of the most distinguished are the International Arctic Science Committee, Research Network for the Northern region, the US National Defense University, the Canadian University of Manitoba, the Norwegian Polar Institute, the German Institute for Polar and Marine Research Alfred Wegener, University of Manchester (UK), the Japanese National Institute of Polar Research (Japan), the Institute of China Polar Research, along with many others. In addition, a number of financial institutions, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank, the Nordic Investment Bank, support programs which focus on Arctic research.

A noted non-governmental organization dealing with problems in the Arctic is the Northern Forum, founded in 1993, which unites 26 administrative bodies from 10 states. The members of the forum are the northern territories of Canada and 11 regions of Russia, the US, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Japan, Korea, China and Mongolia.18

The problems of transborder cooperation in the Arctic are dealt with by a group of intergovernmental organizations. The most prominent one is the Arctic Council (AC), founded in 1996 and including the five Arctic (Russia, Denmark, Norway, the United States and Canada) and three subarctic (Iceland, Finland, Sweden) states. The Council is one of the most authoritative international organizations, and discusses a wide range of issues related to sustainable development in the Arctic region, together with emergency situations prevention and environmental protection.

The members of the Council are represented by each nation’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, and working meetings are held twice a year involving senior officials (authorized as ambassadors). Nine intergovernmental and eleven non-governmental organizations as well as twelve non-Arctic countries: France, Germany, Great Britain, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Italy, China, Japan, Republic of Korea, India and Singapore, have the status of observers within the Council. The permanent members of the Council’s activity are the organizations of indigenous peoples of the Arctic.19

One of the most important organizations dealing with the development of Arctic regional cooperation is the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), initiated by Norway in 1993. Its permanent members are Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Russia, Finland and Sweden, as well as the Commission of the European Union. Nine states, Canada, USA, UK, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, France, and Japan, have the status of observers. Within the framework of the BEAC there are working groups and task forces which are engaged with operational issues; under the auspices of the BEAC the Barents Euro-Arctic Regional Council was established to help develop cooperation among the regions of the member states.20

In June 2013, upon completion of the Summit of the BEAC in Kirkenes (Norway), the jubilee Declaration was adopted, which emphasized the importance of programs for the development of transborder partnerships in the Barents Region and the Arctic. It highlighted the necessity of enhancing communications as well developing transport networks linking East and West, including trans-regional air services and the creation of a transport corridors through Russia, Finland, Sweden and Norway.

The document also reflects the significance of expanding cooperation for the development of ports and marine terminals, building infrastructure service systems and emergen-

cy system facilities along new sea routes (and especially the Northern Sea Route) due to the exploration and development of the continental shelf’s oil and gas deposits. The Declaration points out that economic activity should be undertaken in a way consistent with the sustainable development of the region.

Besides the key aspects of developing business and strengthening international cooperation, the Declaration also spelled out the significance of establishing a visa-free regime for short trips, launching separate financial mechanism to support projects and maximizing the investment potential of the Barents region. The importance of transborder tourism and people-to-people contacts, as well as cooperation in the prevention and elimination of consequences of emergencies, and the protection of the population and environment of the Arctic and the Barents Sea regions are also emphasized.21

Among other intergovernmental bodies involved in examining and solving Arctic problems are the Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, the Nordic Countries Ministers’ Council, and the Nordic Council. Also, the initiatives of the EU on the Arctic, and in particular the Northern Dimension of the European Union, launched since 1997 and aimed at specific projects to be co-financed by the EU and the partner country, have particular significance. At the same time, Brussels, using its economic and scientific resources, has attempted to strengthen its political presence in the Arctic. Such activities may lead to contradictions and even collisions between the EU and the Arctic states of Russia, Canada, and Norway.

Transport corridors may be another problematic aspect of transborder relations in the Arctic. Russia’s claim that the Northern Sea Route is a "national transport artery", situated within the "internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation" not only annoys the rest of the Arctic countries, Canada and the United States in particular, but also the non-Arctic countries of China, Japan, India, which are interested in the development of Northern territories and resources.

The issue of the Northern Sea Route acquires particular relevance because shipping companies have shown little interest in the other Arctic sea corridor, the Northwest Arctic Passage through Canadian and American waters, which is approximately the same length as the Northern Sea Route.

It is noteworthy that Denmark, the United States and Canada are willing to enter into a tripartite agreement aimed at establishing joint control over the Northwest Arctic Passage, including the inspection of vessels and collection of transit fees.\textsuperscript{22} Prospects for the development of the Northern Sea Route remain much more optimistic, particularly given the melting of Arctic ice, but it is likely that Russia will have a serious struggle over ownership of this crossarctic artery as well as natural resources of the Arctic.

Transborder relations in the Antarctic are defined by the articles of the Antarctic Treaty, as well as the other international agreements which together form the basis of the Antarctic Treaty System, such as the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972), the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (1980), The Protocol on Environmental Protection of the Antarctic (1991).

In accordance with Article IX (paragraph 7) of the Antarctic Treaty, the contracting parties pledge to meet regularly for the purpose of "exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty". These meetings are called the Consultative Meetings on the Antarctic Treaty (CMAT), and the first was held in Canberra in 1961. Aside from the contracting parties, the consultative meetings may also include representatives of countries which have acceded to the Treaty, provided that these countries are engaged in scientific research in the Antarctic (by having a scientific station or conducting expeditions). The recommendations adopted at the meetings are approved by the governments of the contracting states, and contribute to the development of the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty and strengthening the international regime in the region.\textsuperscript{23}

In addition to CMAT, a Special Consultative Meeting (the first was held in London in 1977) and a Meeting of Experts (the first was held in Buenos Aires in 1981) are also held within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty. At the last Meeting of Experts in 2014, it was decided to table a proposal for the establishment of marine protected areas in the


\textsuperscript{23} Vladislav Avkhadeev, "Konsul'tativnye soveshchaniya kak organ upravleniya v sisteme Dogovora ob Antarktike [Consultative meetings as a branch of coordination in the Antarctic Treaty system]," Evraziyskiy yuridicheskii zhurnal 12 (2011), 42–44.
Southern Ocean (the scope of the areas can be up to several million sq. km) before the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).

This Commission is another important international organization, established as a part of the Antarctic Treaty system on the basis of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources in 1981. At the annual meetings of the Commission, decisions are made on the use of marine living resources of the Antarctica. CCAMLR is responsible for the preservation of the unique biodiversity of the Antarctic marine ecosystem. However, this does not rule out commercial and research fishing if that fishing is carried out in a sustainable manner and takes into account the impact of fishing on other components of the ecosystem.  

Since February 1958, the International Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (ISCAR) has coordinated research in the Antarctic. It is included in the International Council of Scientific Unions, which has consultative status with UNESCO, and includes representatives of the countries actively involved in explorations of the Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, as well as representatives of several international scientific unions. ISCAR includes permanent working groups, established in accordance with the main directions of its research. In addition to the working groups, each member state has its own national committees to coordinate research on the Antarctic carried out by various departments. ISCAR involves active scientific collaboration among researchers via publications, the exchange of operational information, and holding international seminars and workshops. The Antarctic is the research focus of scientists from all over the world.

In the twentieth century the Antarctic became a key region for scientific expeditions and international cooperation, but it is in the twenty-first century when joint international programs and initiatives developed. In 2003, the international Antarctic corporate aviation program "Dronning Maud Land Air Network" (DROMLAN) was established. Additionally, the countries participating in the study of the Antarctic have signed bilateral memorandums of understanding and cooperation (e.g., Russia has signed such agreements with Germany, Chile, Peru, New Zealand, Uruguay, Australia, the USA, Ukraine, Belarus, and Turkey in the period from 1995 to 2014) and carry out joint inspections to check on activity undertaken within national Antarctic programs.

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25 Valeriy Lukin, "Antarktika i voprosy miroustoystva [The Antarctic and the issues of the world order],&quot; accessed April 29, 2015, http://globalaf-
The peculiarities of border and transborder politics of the regional states

The Arctic involves states and other international actors in discussing a wide range of issues related to Arctic exploration, environmental conservation, protection of the rights of indigenous people of the Far North, and the development of transport communications. The Arctic is also considered an area of scientific research.

Russia’s interests in the Arctic are in two spheres: socio-economic development and security. The first one envisages the establishment of the infrastructure for the development of the Arctic region and mining. Russia also faces the objectives of conservation of the industrial potential in the Arctic sector and the exploitation of the opportunities provided by the Northern Sea Route. Security issues for Russia include utilizing the strategic advantages of the Arctic sector to deploy ships of the Northern Fleet, shifting submarines, and strategic aviation. The significant NATO military capability deployed in the Arctic leads to the possibility of military confrontation in the region.

At the same time, Russia’s position in the Arctic is balanced. Moscow seeks to combine the defense of its national interests with the promotion of international cooperation on key issues of environmental, security, and economic development. The following documents relating to the mechanisms of implementation of the Russia’s national policy for the development of the Arctic have been adopted this century: the Concept of sustainable development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (2006), Principles of National Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period until 2020 and further (2008), and the Strategy of development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and provision of national security for the period until 2020 (2013). Striving to protect its national interests in the Arctic, Russia aims at the development of mutually beneficial bilateral and international cooperation with the other Arctic states on the basis of those international treaties and agreements signed by Russian Federation.

The Strategy for the Development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (2013) envisages Russia’s cooperation with other Arctic states to protect Russian national interests and implement those rights of coastal states stipulated by international law in the Arctic region. The document also includes the issues of the exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf’s resources and definition of the external borders of the Arctic shelf. It also envisages strengthen-
ing the neighborly relations of the Russian Federation with other Arctic states, both on a bilateral basis and within the framework of regional organizations, as well as the intensification of economic, scientific, technological and cultural interaction, and the reinforcement of transborder cooperation, including the efficient development of natural resources and preservation of the unique natural environment of the Arctic.27

According to the United States’ National Strategy for the Arctic region, the Arctic is a “peaceful, stable and non-conflict area”, which requires responsible management and an integrated approach to management and decision-making.28 American interests in the Arctic can be divided into the following: military and strategic (missile defense and early warning; the deployment of terrestrial and marine resources for transferring strategic forces; strategic deterrence, the presence of naval forces and maritime operations; freedom of navigation and flights), political and economic (supporting American maritime authority in the Arctic, including the sovereign rights over its exclusive economic zone; the freedom of trans-Arctic flights and freedom of navigation in relation to the entire Arctic, including the North Sea Route) and the interests of domestic security (prevention of terrorist attacks or other criminal actions, which could increase US vulnerability in the Arctic region, by increasing the number of military satellite facilities focused on the Arctic and transfer of control of Alaska to the NORAD).

One of the problematic aspects of American involvement in the development of Arctic resources, which can lead to a collision of interests between the United States and the other polar powers, is that Washington has not still signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Ratification of the Convention by the US Congress would help accelerate the implementation of America’s Arctic strategy and provide a legal framework within which to increase US coordination of policy with the other Arctic states. If the USA signed the Convention it would give them an opportunity to extract mineral resources from beyond the 200 nautical mile zone. On the other hand, American economic interests will suffer (particularly, the interests of American corpora-

tions) due to all the contentious issues concerning the borders of the continental shelf and fishing issues falling under the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The United States seeks to respond operatively to changes in the Arctic sector and interact with other states and international organizations engaged in the development of the Arctic resources. At the same time, however, Washington has yet to develop a coherent strategy for the Arctic.

Canada perceives the Arctic as an exceptionally important region, an integral part of Canadian history, culture and national identity, and which possesses enormous potential for the future of Canada. Therefore, the most important objective of Canadian foreign policy is the enforcement of sovereignty over Canada's north. The Canadian vision of the Arctic as a stable region means clean-cut boundaries, dynamic economic growth and development of the Northern Territories in conjunction with healthy and productive ecosystems. In this context, Canada is actively pursuing its sovereignty over part of the Arctic, demonstrating a presence in the region, and conducting annual military exercises. Since 2010, military exercises of the Canadian Forces in the Arctic, "Operation Nanook", have been held in cooperation with the United States and Denmark.

Canada coordinates its activities in the Arctic in three priority areas: the settlement of border issues; the gaining of full international recognition of its rights to the entire length of the continental shelf, allowing for the implementation of Canada's sovereign rights to the resources of the seabed and its subsoil; and solutions to issues related to the management of the Arctic as well as related issues, such as public safety. Canada is cooperating with other Arctic states within the Arctic Council and interacting on a bilateral basis with key Arctic partners, in particular with the United States. The Canadian government supports the principle of a sectoral division of the Arctic, the prioritizing of Arctic states in controlling the Arctic, and the demilitarization of the Arctic. Ottawa wishes to convert the Arctic Council into an influential international organization, able to enact binding laws in different spheres, including security. On the other hand, in the battle over Arctic resources, Canada is seeking to prove that the Lomonosov Ridge belongs to its Arctic shelf zone and disputing sea borders in the Beaufort Sea (anticipated to possess hydrocarbon reserves) and the status of the Northwest Passage with the United States.

The Arctic vector of Norwegian foreign policy primarily aims at protecting the sovereign rights of Norway in the region. At the same time, the Norway is interested in interna-

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29 Alan L. Kollien, Toward an Arctic Strategy (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2009), 10–11.
tional cooperation in the field of environmental protection, energy production in the Barents Sea, security of navigation and efficacy of transport and communications, and the development of transborder infrastructure. Simultaneously, to protect its strategic interests, Oslo has strengthened its military presence in the Arctic. The armed forces of Norway in the region are perceived as an essential element for the enforcing her sovereign rights in the 200-mile zone and to provide surveillance, intelligence and crisis management. Within the framework of transborder cooperation Norway interacts with Finland, Sweden and Russia, aiming at building a joint economic and cultural space. Despite the presence of political issues in relations between Norway and Russia, the two parties are interested in developing zones of transborder cooperation. In May 2012, the agreement on a visa-free regime between Russia and Norway entered into force. The area covered by the regime extends 30 km from the border and includes the settlements of Nickel, Pechenga, and Korsunovo Polar (Murmansk region, Russia), and the municipality of Sør-Varanger (Norway).

Danish interests in the Arctic touch upon the issues related to the delimitation of the Arctic territory. Copenhagen has succeeded in solving its disputes with Iceland (agreements of 11 November 1997 and 20 September 2006) and Norway (agreements of 18 December 1995, 11 November 1997 and 20 February 2006). Denmark also seeks to prove that the Lomonosov Ridge is a part of the shelf of Greenland. Copenhagen is actively pursuing scientific research aimed at collecting geological data that indicates that the Greenland Shelf extends to the North Pole.

These issues of territorial demarcation undoubtedly constitute an obstacle for the transformation of the Arctic into a region of peace, cooperation and sustainable development. However, the involvement of the non-Arctic nations (such as China, India, and Japan) in the Arctic’s development process can become a real challenge to security in the region. More than 30 countries, not including the European Union, are seriously interested in the Arctic region and its natural resources. It is obvious that the Arctic will be subject to claims from a variety of international actors. Security in the region will largely depend on the efforts of the Arctic states and the role of multilateral institutions in this issue.

Issues related to territorial delimitation are likely to be further aggravated in the Antarctic in the middle of the twenty-first century due to the depletion of natural resources, including freshwater reserves, on the planet. Antarctica was initially a disputed area, with the Antarctic Treaty halting territorial conflicts and disputes. The powers that signed the Treaty did enable the diplomacy to resolve points of controversy but, as already noted, questions of delimita-
tion and spheres of influence remain. The land area of East Antarctica is rich with mineral and energy resources, with, for instance, so-called Australian Antarctic Territory rich in deposits of manganese, iron ore, coal and hydrocarbons. Australia is concerned about the growing activity of Russia and China in this sector. New Zealand also pays attention to the region of South Pole. Wellington is interested in the Ross Dependency and anxious about the Republic of Korea’s scientific activity in this territory. In addition, New Zealand is a gateway to the US Antarctic mission stations of McMurdo and Amundsen-Scott. The USA has built an Antarctic city at the station of McMurdo, while France controls the French Southern and Antarctic Islands, Australia – the Heard and McDonald Islands, and Norway – Bouvet Island.

With the expansion of its economic influence, China has actively joined the race for the Antarctic. China’s interests include exploration of the Antarctic’s mineral resources. China’s recent construction of the Kunlun station at Dome Argus (the coldest and the highest point of Antarctica) is further proof of China’s Antarctic ambitions. There are also three research bases in Antarctica belonging to India, while Iran has expressed interest in building its own bases in the Antarctic. ³⁰

A major challenge to the Antarctic Treaty System is the lack of a unified international approach to organizing various activities in the Antarctic. According to the Article 1 of Annex 1 "Environmental impact assessment" in the Protocol on Environmental Protection, "the impact on the environment referred to in Article 8 of the Protocol of the proposed activities should be subject to review prior to the beginning of such activities in accordance with the relevant national procedures" ³¹

Some states (Australia, Germany, New Zealand, Russia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and France) have a strict licensing procedure for this issue. Another group of countries (Norway, Belgium, and USA) have a notification procedure, which accepts that the applicant is required to provide a specially designated assessment of environmental impact to an authorized state body. However, a number of the parties which have joined the Protocol on Environmental Protection (India, China, South Korea, and South Africa) lack the necessary national procedures for regulating activities in the Antarctic. As a result, there is the risk of serious environ-


mental violations in the Antarctic, including within its protected areas.

The Antarctic Treaty remains the basis of stability, cooperation and peace in the region, but the changing configuration of international relations creates the risk of tensions even in the Far South. Conflict within the Antarctic could have catastrophic consequences for all humankind.
Recommended reading:

"Natsional'naya stratégiya Soedinenyykh Statov Ameriki po Ark-
ticheskomu regionu (2013) [The National Strategy of the USA on
the Arctic region, 2013]" In Arkтикий region: problemy mezh-

Avkhadeev, Vladislav. "Konsul'tativnye soveschaniya kak organ up-
ravleniya v sisteme Dogovora ob Antarktike [Consultative meet-
ings as a branch of coordination in the Antarctic Treaty system]."


Ivanov, Igor, ed. Arkticheskiy region: problemy mezhdunarodnogo
sotrudnichestva [The Arctic region: the problems of international

Kindt, John Warren. "A Regime for Ice-Covered Areas: The Antarc-
tic and Issues Involving Resource Exploitation and the Environ-
ment." In The Antarctic Legal Regime, edited by Christopher C.
Joyner and Sudhir K. Chopra. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Pub-

Kollien, Alan L. Toward an Arctic Strategy. Carlisle Barracks: U.S.
Army War College, 2009.

Konyshev, Valery, and Alexander Sergunin. Arktika v mezhdun-
arodnoi politike: sotrudnichestvo ili sopernichestvo [The Arctic in international politics: confrontation or cooperation]. Moscow:
RISS, 2011.

Lavrov, Sergey. "Nuuskaya deklaratsiya: novy etap sotrudnichest-
va arkticheskih gosudarstv [The Declaration of Nuuk: the new
stage of cooperation among the Arctic states]," Arktika: ekologiya

Summerhayes, Colin, and Peter Beeching. "Hitler’s Antarctic base:

Yushkin, Nikolay. "Arktika v strategii realizatsii toplivno-energet-
icheskikh perspektiv [The arctic in strategy of implementation of
the fuel and energetic prospects]." In Energetika Rossii: proble-
my I perspektivy:Trudy nauchnoi sessii RAN, edited by Vladimir

Zolotukhin, Ivan. "Severnuy morskoi put’ kak transoceanicheskaya
magistral’. Problemy osvoeniya v aspekte interesov derzhav sev-
ernoi Patsifikasi: vzglyad iz Rossii [The Northern Sea Route as a
Transocean Traffic Artery. The Issues of Development in the As-
pect of the North Pacific Powers’ Interests: a View from Russia]."

Internet resources:

council.org/index.php/en/


ANNEX
Maps
Maps

Only available in the printed version
ONLY AVAILABLE IN THE PRINTED VERSION
Maps only available in the printed version.


Map Credit: Courtesy the private collection of Roy Winkelman.
http://etc.usf.edu/maps/pages/3600/3669/3669.htm.
Map 8. Tordesillas Meridian: the first modern border in South America; Brazilian Captaincies.


Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1864_Mitchell_Map_of_South_America_-_Geographicus_-_SouthAmerica-mitchell-1864.jpg.
Maps 10. Africa’s current borders.

Source: Image courtesy of the United Nations Cartographic Section.
Source: Image courtesy of Guyot’s New Intermediate Geography.
Source: Image courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

Source: Image courtesy of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Maps 13. The Pacific Ocean showing exclusive economic zones.

**Source:** Donald Denoon, ed. *The Cambridge history of the Pacific Islanders.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, end papers (a part of original map).

Source: As stated.
Maps 15. Political map of Antarctica.
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Bourdier, Frédéric, Maxime Boutry, Jacques Ivanoff, and Olivier Ferrari. *From padi states to commercial states: reflections on identity and the social construction of space in the Borderlands of Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand and Myanmar*. Amsterdam University Press, 2015.


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Association for Borderlands Studies. Available at http://absborderlands.org/


BORDERLAND: NPR. Available at http://apps.npr.org/borderland/


Borders in Globalization. Available at http://www.biglobalization.org/


Centre for International Borders Research. Available at http://www.qub.ac.uk/research-centres/CentreforInternationalBordersResearch/


El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Centro Científico de Excelencia CONACYT. Available at http://www.colef.mx/?lang=en.


Eurasia Unit for Border Research (Japan), Hokkaido University. Available at http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/ubrj/eng/

Grupo Retis. Available at http://www.retis.igeo.ufrj.br/

IBRU: Centre for Borders Research, Durham University. Available at https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/
Journal of Borderlands Studies. Available at http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjbs20#.VmgE29KLT4Z.
Laboratory of Geopolitical Studies, Institute of Geography - Russian Academy of Science. Available at http://geopolitic.igras.ru/
New Mandela, Australia National University. Available at http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/
Nijmegen Centre for Border Research. Available at http://www.ru.nl/nsm/imr/our-research/research-centres/about-ncbr/
Nodal. Available at http://www.nodal.am/
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Available at http://www.forumsec.org/
The Northern forum. Available at http://www.northernforum.org/ru/
Unbral Fronteiras. Available at http://unbral.nuvem.ufrgs.br/site/
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glossary</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anthropocentric paradigm</td>
<td>Scientific outlook and method of scientific knowledge coming from the idea that its most valuable, primary and central object is a person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthropogeography</td>
<td>Human Geography, the science that studies the problems of resettlement of races and ethnic groups, their differentiation in the process of adaptation to various physico- and socio-geographical conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assemblage</td>
<td>A way of thinking that suggests that there does not exist a fixed and stable ontology for the social world that proceeds from &quot;atoms&quot; to &quot;molecules&quot; to &quot;materials&quot;. Rather, social formations are assemblages of other complex configurations, and they in turn play roles in other, more extended configurations. (Deleuze)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier functions of border</td>
<td>Set of forms of regulatory impact of a boundary aimed at reducing the volume and intensity of interaction of a system with an environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border checkpoint</td>
<td>Point at the line of state border that open according to the law for regulated transborder movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border conflict</td>
<td>The forcible, including armed, clash of states, which subject is the contradictions over the formation or functioning of the state border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border development</td>
<td>The condition of the state border and border space that provides implementation of prospective interests of the state and society, related to improving their well-being and expanding their opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border dispute</td>
<td>The situation of a officially (diplomatically) articulated contradictions between states over the formation or functioning of the state border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border institutions</td>
<td>Stably reproducible practices of border relations, normalized and regulated by formal and informal rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border policy</td>
<td>Set of measures of state authorities aimed at regulating of transborder relations within the border space (within the territorial sovereignty of the given state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Border regime</td>
<td>Special, established by regulatory enactments, order of entry, exit, stay and movement in the cross-border areas (in the territory of the border zone and border crossing points, in the territorial sea and internal waters of the state, its own waters of border rivers, lakes and other bodies of water)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border region</td>
<td>The inner region (administrative-territorial unit of the state), directly adjacent to the state border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border security</td>
<td>The condition of the state border and border space that provides protection of vital interests of the given state and society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border space</td>
<td>Socio-geographical space within a given state, whose actors and resources are directly involved in transborder relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border studies (Borderlands studies)</td>
<td>Interdisciplinary field of research that centered around the complex of problems of formation, functioning and development of social boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border zone</td>
<td>The established by regulatory enactments strip of territory of the state along the state border, within which operates the border regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borderscape</td>
<td>A space for liberating political imagination from the burden of the territorialist imperative while opening up spaces within which the organization of new forms of the political and the social become possible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Borderwork                    | 1) The exploration of conceptual borders and borderspaces; disaggregation of the state and the border in order to conceptualize the multiple actors and sites of bottom-up bordering e.g. by ordinary citizens, entrepreneurs, and grass roots activists. 

2) Activity aimed at the construction or deconstruction of mental boundaries. |
<p>| Boundary as limit             | Spatial limit of the system, fixed by it relatively to significant for its existence, but external, not within its structure, conditions                                                                           |
| Boundary as system            | Subsystem of the system, specialized in providing its ordered relations with the environment                                                                                                                    |
| Boundary of social system (Social boundary) | Subsystem of the social system, specialized in providing of its ordered relations with the social environment                                                                                                        |
| Cohesion                      | Stability, high objective and subjective mutual significance of the relations of social systems, that are the structural basis for the formation of their common metaenvironment, including regional systems of various levels and types |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Complex object (system)</strong></th>
<th>Integrity, formed by a set of structurally related elements that perform common functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consolidating functions of border</strong></td>
<td>Set of forms of constitutive impact of a boundary aimed at providing of internal structural cohesion of a system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constitutive functions of border</strong></td>
<td>Totality of all forms of providing by means of a boundary of integrity and self-identity of a system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Construction of boundary (Bordering)** | 1) Process of reflection by the social system (by the individual) its limits (its identity) relative to significant for it conditions of physical, mental and social environment  
2) The everyday construction of borders through ideology, discourses, political institutions, attitudes, and agency. The bordering (border-making) perspective advocates that scientific knowledge ought not to be privileged over everyday geographical imaginations and popular geopolitics. |
<p>| <strong>Construction of space (environment)</strong> | Process of reflection by the social system (by the individual) its mental and social environment, organization and reorganization of its structure |
| <strong>Constructivism (Constructivist approach)</strong> | Theoretical method, which considers a boundary as a social construct (the phenomenon of collective consciousness), and, at the same time, an instrument of constructing of social community |
| <strong>Contact functions of border</strong> | Set of forms of regulatory impact of a boundary aimed at increasing the volume and intensity of interaction of a system with an environment |
| <strong>Critical approach</strong> | A school of thought that emphasizes the need for the reflective assessment and critique of society by applying knowledge from the social sciences and the humanities. |
| <strong>Cross-border cooperation</strong> | Stable and mutually beneficial form of cross-border relations |
| <strong>Cross-border relations</strong> | Transborder relations between non-state actors, being constantly in the cross-border spaces of neighboring states |
| <strong>Cross-border space</strong> | Socio-geographical space, directly adjacent to the state border |
| <strong>Delimitation</strong> | Process of conventional international legal recognition and registration of the state border |
| <strong>Demarcation</strong> | Process of exact fixation, marking and logging of location of the line of state border established by the delimitation agreements |
| <strong>Ecological approach</strong> | Theoretical method, which focuses on the study of the interaction of social boundaries and natural (ecological) systems |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Glossary</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment of system</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extraterritorial (symbolic) boundary</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extraterritorial community</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Euroregion</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Familiarity/Unfamiliarity** | 1) A concept pair that used to explain cross-border (im)mobility focusing on the complex and dynamic interplay between 'rational' and 'emotional' differences between places on both sides of the border.  
2) Inclusion /non-inclusion of an object (of an individual) in the significant environment of the social system |
<p>| <strong>Forepost border</strong> | Type of social boundaries, which is characterized by a dotted spatial form, specialized state (military-political) control and expanding dynamics |
| <strong>Formation of state border</strong> | The creation of the state border as both physical (physic-geographical) and social (international legal) object |
| <strong>Frontier boundary (Frontier)</strong> | Type of social boundaries, which is characterized by zonal spatial shape, non-specialized public control and expanding dynamics |
| <strong>Functionalist tradition</strong> | Tradition according to which the analysis of function and, more expressly, the functioning of the state, would provide a meaningful context for scientific rigour. Relevant research questions relate to the various elements that determine the integrity of the state: centrifugal and centripetal forces that have defined its physical contours, internal political organization and external connections. |
| <strong>Geographical determinism</strong> | Methodological principle according which the essence and characteristics of social phenomena and processes, social system as a whole are directly determined by the physic-geographical conditions of their existence |
| <strong>Geographical possibilism</strong> | Methodological principle according which the physic-geographical conditions determine the essence and characteristics of social phenomena and processes, social system as a whole only indirectly, by setting the objective possibilities and limits of their development |
| <strong>Geopolitical approach</strong> | Theoretical method that analyze a social (state) border as the result and the premise of the interaction of physic-geographical and military-political factors |
| <strong>Hierarchical structure of social metaenvironment (space)</strong> | Vertical and centralized order of relations which is premise to practical activity of two or more social systems (individuals) |
| <strong>Human environment</strong> | Set of external physical conditions of life (functioning) of all social systems and individuals |
| <strong>Identity</strong> | Self-determination and self-description of the social system and its representatives |
| <strong>Inner region</strong> | Large socio-geographical system, located within the borders of one state |
| <strong>Institutionalism (Institutional approach)</strong> | Theoretical method, which considers a boundary as a stable mechanism of normatively regulated social interactions, a set of formal and informal rules |
| <strong>Intermittent boundary</strong> | Type of social boundaries, which is characterized by a dotted spatial form, non-specialized public control and fluctuating dynamics |
| <strong>International region</strong> | Large socio-geographical system that extends beyond the borders of one state |
| <strong>Limes border (Limes)</strong> | Type of social boundaries, which is characterized by zonal spatial shape, specialized state (military-political) control and expanding dynamics |
| <strong>Limitrophe</strong> | Buffer, neutral or jointly controlled, territory, located in the space between the borders of two or more states |
| <strong>Limogenesis</strong> | All spontaneous and regulated processes of formation and historical development of social boundaries |
| <strong>Limology</strong> | Subdiscipline of geography that studies the boundaries of natural and social systems, the general laws of their formation, functioning and development |
| <strong>Linear border</strong> | Type of social boundaries, which is characterized by a linear spatial form, specialized state (comprehensive) control and stability |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glossary</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Localization of border</td>
<td>Defining the approximate physio- and socio-geographical location of the state border in the course of development, colonization of the territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markers of identity</td>
<td>Available for the perception, physical (natural), social (behavioral) and cultural signs that serve for the external expression of membership in a particular social system (community)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking (limiting) functions of border</td>
<td>Set of forms of constitutive impact of a boundary aimed at providing of differentiation of a system from the external environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental (cultural) environment</td>
<td>Set of subjective (mental) phenomena and relations, that constitute a significant conditions of the activity of consciousness of the social system (of the individual), of the processes of perception and construction of reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental (cultural) metaenvironment</td>
<td>Set of subjective (mental) phenomena and relations, that constitute a mutually significant conditions (mediators) of the activity of consciousness of two or more social systems (individuals), of the processes of their perception and construction of reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental (cultural) space</td>
<td>Totality of all possible mental conditions of the activity of consciousness of the social system (of the individual), regardless of their significance (of degree of awareness of them) for it, taken in aspect of extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-level governance</td>
<td>The mechanism of decentralized management of transborder integration (of transborder regions), based on the negotiation interaction of supranational, national-governmental and sub-national actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalistic paradigm</td>
<td>Scientific outlook and method of scientific knowledge coming from the idea that its most valuable, primary and central object is the nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networked structure of social metaenvironment (space)</td>
<td>Horizontal and decentralized order of relations which is premise to practical activity of two or more social systems (individuals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otherness</td>
<td>Attribution of an object (of an individual), which is part of the environment of the social system, to another social system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paradiplomacy</td>
<td>Transborder political (international political) activities of subnational actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants of transborder relations</td>
<td>Non-state collective and individual actors, consciously and purposefully involved in transborder relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perception of space (environment)</strong></td>
<td>Process of elective attaching by the social system (by the individual) subjective significance to phenomena and relations of objective (physical) space, their inclusion in its mental and social environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical environment</strong></td>
<td>Set of physical phenomena and relations, that are significant conditions of life (functioning) of the social system (of the individual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical metaenvironment</strong></td>
<td>Set of physical phenomena and relations, that are mutually significant conditions of life (functioning) of two or more social systems (individuals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical (physic-geographical) space</strong></td>
<td>Totality of physical conditions of the existence of the system, considered in the three-dimensional coordinate system (within the geographic shell)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pogranology (Border security studies)</strong></td>
<td>Applied discipline that studies the problems of border security and its providing by means of border policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political geography</strong></td>
<td>Science that studies the organization and development of political phenomena and processes in the physic-geographical space</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Postmodernism (Cultural studies)** | 1) Approach that emphasizes hybridity and suggests that traditional notion of boundaries is defunct, whereby the nation-state (along with its power relations) has become less relevant unit for critical inquiry.  
2) Theoretical method, which considers a boundary as a product of discursive practices (i.e. concrete historical system of statements and omissions). |
<p>| <strong>Pragmatic approach</strong> | Approach of research on borders that focuses on problem-oriented aspects of state borders and cross-border cooperation. |
| <strong>Regime of border functioning</strong> | Set of regulatory functions, performed by the system of state border in relation to the totality (of all types) transborder relations |
| <strong>Region</strong> | Large unit of socio-geographical space, that has some form of integrity and structural cohesion; Social metaenvironment of two or more social systems |
| <strong>Region building</strong> | Project activities of political, governmental and non-governmental, actors, aimed at creating of new socio-geographical formations |
| <strong>Regional science (Area studies)</strong> | Science that studies the forms of physic-geographical (territorial) differentiation and integration of social systems of various types |</p>
<table>
<thead>
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<th><strong>Glossary</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Regionalism</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Regionalization</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Regulatory functions of border</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Social environment</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Social geography</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social metaenvironment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social (socio-geographical) space</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Social system</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sociocentric paradigm</strong></td>
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<td><strong>State</strong></td>
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<td><strong>State border</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>State border system</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Structural and functional approach</strong></td>
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<td>Glossary</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Synergetic approach</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial (spatial) behavior</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Territorial boundary</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Territorial community</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Territory</strong></td>
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<td><strong>The functions of state border</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The object of border studies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The structure of social metaenvironment (space)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The subject of border studies</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Theoretic-system approach</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Transborder cooperation</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Transborder development</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Transborder flow</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Transborder institutions</strong></td>
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<td>Glossary Term</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transborder integration</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transborder policy (Transborder governance)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Transborder potential of society (region)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transborder region</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transborder relations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transborder security</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transborder space</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Transnational boundary</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Transnationalism (Transnational approach)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>World-system analysis (Geo-economic approach)</strong></td>
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